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ABSTRACT
Since the beginning of the 1980s, one of the most 
frequently debated issues concerning the Nationalist 
Republic of China on Taiwan (hereinafter, Taiwan) and the 
Communist People’s Republic of China on the mainland 
(hereinafter, China or the PRC) has been investment and 
trade relationships between the two. Taiwan and the PRC, 
divided since 1949 and with a background of extreme 
hostility, both continue to claim to be the sole 
legitimate government of "China”. However, they are de 
facto two exclusive entities with lawful international 
personalities which exist separately on either side of 
the Taiwan Straits.
Although the PRC has made continuous efforts to 
promote direct trade and investment with Taiwan, Taiwan 
still insists that all contacts should be indirect. 
According to the government of Taiwan's three-stage 
unification plan published in March 1991, direct business 
activities with the PRC can be conducted only if there is 
an equal, reciprocal relationship between the two 
regimes. While various scenarios are possible for future 
relationships, the most likely appears to be a 
compromise; a co-existence with economic and political 
co-operation coupled with legal modus vivendi.
The purpose of this study is first, to provide an 
academic analysis of the legal aspects of Taiwan-PRC 
trade and investment links which also promotes the cause 
of stronger Taiwan-PRC economic relations unilaterally; 
Secondly, in the broader context, to stimulate creative 
discussion of possible solutions for direct mutual 
exchange of economic activities between the two. The 
analysis of the legal aspects of Taiwanese trade and 
investment in the PRC includes an examination of the 
methods of legal settlement for handling business 
disputes.
2
This thesis employs the methodology of comparative 
analysis in approaching the topics it treats. Its 
theoretical standpoint is based on the argument that the 
model of former East-West trade and investment, arising 
from policies of mutual public non-recognition, reveals 
many close similarities to the characteristics of the 
Taiwan-PRC relationship where trade and investment are 
concerned. By undertaking a detailed examination of 
these similarities, it is hoped that this thesis provides 
not only a thorough account of the genesis and current 
state of the problem, but also that it offers realistic 
pointers to achieving an eventual satisfactory solution.
This thesis is made up of seven chapters. It begins 
with a chapter outlining comprehensively the recent 
history of China and Taiwan. This first chapter also 
outlines the goals, sources and framework of the study.
The second chapter tackles the main factors involved 
in the notion of a Greater China, embracing the present 
territories of the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 
Consideration is given to the true extent and effect of 
PRC’s economic reforms; to the political/economic 
background of the PRC-Taiwan trade and investment 
relationship; to prospects for enhancing the triangular 
economic tie which even' now links these three 
territories; to the patterns of current trade and 
investment; and not least, to the two bodies deliberately 
set up to bridge the Taiwan-PRC ideological gap by 
dealing with practical issues. A conclusion is drawn.
The third chapter opens with a brief discussion of 
the prospects for a reunited country. It then restates 
in detail the background to Taiwan-PRC economic links, 
describing the emerging legal framework governing private 
business relations between the two regimes.
3
The fourth chapter deals with the legal issues in 
private business contracts for Taiwanese trade and 
investment in the PRC. These in-depth analyses include 
several issues arising in the context, and methods 
utilised in concluding business contracts.
The fifth chapter looks at the legal protection of 
Taiwanese trade and investment in the PRC. Discussion 
includes existing PRC laws and measures, their legal 
effectiveness and significance as they affect Taiwanese 
businesses.
The sixth chapter analyses the legal solutions for 
settling business conflicts of Taiwanese trade and 
investment in the PRC. It highlights the relative roles 
of arbitration and litigation in resloving such disputes.
The final chapter presents the conclusions that can 
be drawn from this study, and considers future prospects 
for Taiwan-PRC relations.
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FOREWORD
As a Taiwanese law graduate studying abroad, I am 
glad to see that economic interaction and interdependence 
between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (China, 
or the PRC) have developed as a result of the investment 
and trading activities which began during the late 197 0s 
and have been on the increase ever since. The PRC is now
widely recognised as one of the most promising
opportunities in the coming decade for international 
business. Its phenomenal economic growth, its increased 
openness to foreign cooperation and its newly-welcoming 
legal environment have of late led to major reforms in 
the regulation of trade and investment.
Taiwan, with the common linguistic, cultural and 
ethnic background as well as geographic proximity, has 
been actively taking advantage of the PRC's modern
economic boom. In doing business with the PRC, foreign
companies should not underestimate the potential benefits 
of Taiwan-PRC economic and legal relationships. In 
undertaking research on the legal aspects of Taiwanese 
trade and investment in the PRC, I attempt to explore the
interaction of PRC law and policy which are two of the
most fascinating phenomena since 1979. This research 
also analyses the methods of legal settlement for
handling Taiwan-PRC business disputes, using the model of 
East-West trade and examines the laws and policies of 
mutual public non-recognition which were in existence.
While carrying out this research, I have received 
financial support from the Sino-British Economic and 
Cultural Association (Taiwan), the Central Research Fund 
(University of London), the Sino-British Fellowship Fund 
(Britain), and incalculable help from my.wife Yvonne Chen 
who has been working in London since 1989. Without their 
assistance it would have been impossible for me to 
complete this study.
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With the paucity of legal scholarship in Taiwan-PRC 
business links, my study is, as far as I know, the most 
comprehensive and indeed pioneering research into the 
overall legal aspects of Taiwanese business transactions 
in the PRC. While various scenarios are possible for 
future Taiwan-PRC relationships, my study may, it is 
hoped, become a legal modus vivendi in coping with 
frequently-encountered business problems in the PRC, and 
contribute to further Taiwan-PRC economic cooperation.
In 1992 and 1994, I went to both China and Taiwan to 
conduct personal fieldwork. This was in order to obtain 
first-hand information of their legal background with 
regards to their trade and investment issues. Whilst in 
China, I consulted official Chinese documents, legal 
publications, periodicals and newspapers. I also
interviewed many government officials, legal experts, 
economists, and Taiwanese businessmen based in the PRC. 
All of them have had much experience in dealing with the 
above issues. These interviews proved to be particularly 
valuable as they both confirmed and enriched the 
literatures I had obtained. Moreover, they have helped 
me gain a greater understanding of how the PRC's legal 
framework (for Taiwanese trade and investment) works in 
practice.
I owe a debt of gratitude to Michael Palmer, 
Director of East Asia Law Centre and concurrently the 
Head of the Law Department, the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS [University of London]). As my 
supervisor for this research work, his thoughtful 
instruction and great patience made this thesis become 
possible. My thanks are also due to Dr. Yuan Cheng and 
my tutor Dr. W.F. Menski who have offered very valuable 
advice and help to my research and writing.
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I dedicate this thesis to my father who sadly passed 
away soon after I was enrolled as a first year Ph.D 
student at SOAS, and to my mother who, despite her 
loneliness and hard work in Taiwan, has continuously 
given help and encouragement to my studies in London.
Since the main body of this thesis was completed in 
1994, I have been in employment with the Taiwan’ Cement 
Corporation Group. I owe many personal thanks to the 
Chairman Dr. C. F. Koo, currently Chairman of the Straits 
Exchange Foundation (the paramount semi-official channel 
of communication between Taiwan and the PRC) . With his 
encouragement and assistance, I am now able to continue 
my research work in this field.
Last but not least, I feel very much indebted to my 
wife for her understanding and support over the past few 
years in London.
Finally, the laws and regulations cited in this 
thesis are as they stood on 1 July 1995.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ARATS Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Straits
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CCPIT China Council for Promotion of International
Trade
CITIC China International Trust and Investment
Corporation
CJV Cooperative (contractual) Joint Venture
CJVL Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative
Joint Ventures 
CMAC China Maritime Arbitration Commission
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPL Civil Procedure Law of the PRC
DECL Domestic Economic Contract Law of the PRC
ECL Economic Contract Law of the PRC
EJV Equity Joint Venture
EJVL Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FECL Foreign Economic Contract Law of the PRC
FTC Foreign Trade Corporation
FETAC Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPCL General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC
KMT Kuomintang (The Nationalist Party)
MAC Mainland Affairs Commission
MFT Ministry of Foreign Trade
MOFERT Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade
PRC People's Republic of China
ROC Republic of China
SEF Straits Exchange Foundation
SEZ Special Economic Zones
TIP Taiwan Investment Provisions
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TIL Taiwan Investment Law
TMRS Taiwan1s Mainland Relations Statute
USA United States of America
WFOE Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise
WFOEL Law of the PRC on Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprises
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Survey of Recent History
China has the oldest continuous civilisation in the 
world and is also the oldest centralised state, having 
survived since 221 B.C. Taiwan, a semitropical island, 
is situated 100 miles east of China. Taiwan has been a 
major trade and shipping partner for China over many 
centuries.
After the Communist victory and the establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China (China, or the PRC) in 
1949, interaction between the Republic of China on Taiwan 
(Taiwan) and the PRC1 came to a standstill. Taiwan and 
the .PRC, with a background of extreme hostility, each 
continue to claim to be the sole legitimate government of 
"China". Driven by forces of economic expansion and 
nationalist sentiment, as well as by political and 
economic pragmatism starting in the 1980s, Taiwan and the 
PRC are now moving toward a closer informal relationship.
1.1.1 Chinese Side
China's history goes back to the earliest times, 
about 5,000 years. But it was not until the third 
century BC that China was finally unified as one country 
under its first emperor. Successive dynasties followed,
1. Throughout this thesis, I shall use the term Taiwan 
and China or the PRC as shorthand for their full names —  
the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, 
respectively, for reference only. The status between the 
two sides under international law and politics is not 
intended to be commented upon in any manner whether 
express or implied.
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the Han and the Ming are perhaps best remembered by the 
rest of world, not forgetting the Tang which is best 
remembered for its cultural strength. Imperial rule 
lasted until 1911 when the Qing2 Dynasty, which had ruled 
since 1644, was effectively overthrown by the Kuomintang 
(the Nationalist Party, or KMT) under Sun Yat-sen.
The Chinese term for China, "Zhongguo", means middle 
kingdom. The Chinese word for foreign country, "Waiguo", 
literally means outside kingdom. For centuries, the 
Chinese emperors were quite ignorant and unaware of 
developments outside the Chinese borders. China became 
very self-centred, isolated and unconscious of the growth 
and progress being made in the Western world. This 
traditional Chinese perception of the world, the so- 
called "Smo-centncism" was challenged only when 
Westerners began to penetrate into China.
During the mid-1800s, the two so-called "Opium 
Wars"4 between China and Britain erupted over a trade 
dispute. China took exception to Britain's policy of 
paying for locally-produced goods and commodities with 
opium. The "Opium Wars" resulted in the signing of the 
Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. In addition to ceding Hong 
Kong to Britain, China was forced to open five ports to 
British trade, to establish official recognition and 
extend diplomatic relations on an equal basis, and to pay 
reparation.
2. The Pinyin system of romanisation is used throughout, 
except for such widely recognised Chinese names as Sun 
Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang, Mao Tse-tung, and 
so forth.
3. For more information on the traditional Chinese view, 
see Chiao Chiao Hsieh, Strategy for Survival, London: The 
Sherwood Press, 198 5, p. 8.
4. For further studies, see Maurice Collis, Foreign Mud: 
The Opium Imbroglio at Canton in the 1830s and the Anglo- 
Chinese War, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1968.
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The Treaty of Nanjing granted the privilege of 
extraterritoriality to British nationals. This Treaty was 
the first of a whole series of "unequal treaties" by 
which Western powers extracted capitulations from China. 
Under the Treaty, the British Consul, acting as a judge, 
could extend and apply English law to British nationals 
in China. China was thus forced to open itself up to the 
outside world and make a series of political, commercial 
and territorial concessions to foreign countries. After 
the granting of privileges to Britain in China, other 
foreign countries made similar demands.
There were another seventeen powers such as France, 
Russia, Germany, Japan and so on followed the same suit 
as Britain imposed on China between this Treaty in 1842 
and the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895. The Chinese had 
looked upon such capitulations as a peculiarly odious 
stigma, of which they wanted to be rid as soon as 
possible. However, these extraterritorial rights were 
not relinquished until 1947 when China's full sovereign 
rights were recovered.
Growing Western influence in China accelerated the 
internal decay of the Qing Dynasty. The dynastic system 
of government could not withstand the pressures of
7Western intrusion and social change. After its 
overthrow in October 1911, the Republic of China (ROC)
5. The Chinese imperial government, constrained by its 
internal weakness always responded to foreign demands by 
signing treaties which provided foreign countries with 
leased territories, or extraterritoriality, or foreign 
control of custom tariffs, or the exercise of foreign 
authority over Chinese territories. For further studies 
on foreign encroachments on the 19th century China, see 
J. K. Fairbank, China: A New History, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1992.
6. See Cheng Yuan, East-West Trade, Changing Patterns in 
Chinese Foreign Trade Law and Institutions, New York: 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1991, p. 37.
7. See J. F. Fairbank, supra note 5.
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was proclaimed with the KMT as the central force in the
administration. However, the Republic existed only in
name and was unable to unify the country under a
ftcentralised political structure until 1928.
The KMT government never in reality governed the 
whole of China. Portions remained under the control of 
regional war-lords, and a newly emerging Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) movement led by Mao Zedong 
continually threatened the KMT’s rule. Both the KMT and 
the CCP collaborated and competed with each other for 
final control of China. The KMT's obsession with ridding 
China of the CCP allowed the Japanese to attack the 
country. The KMT signed a peace treaty with the Japanese 
who subsequently annexed much of northeast China.
In 1937, Japan's full-scale invasion of China forced 
the KMT government to retreat inland to Chongqing in 
southern China. Both the KMT and the CCP cooperated in 
fighting the Japanese. But on Japan's defeat in 1945, 
the two sides were once again at odds and thus finally 
waged a bloody civil war. This war brought the CCP to 
power in October 1949 when it proclaimed the PRC, and 
forced the KMT to flee to Taiwan where it continued in 
government, ruling the ROC on that island.
The CCP's unification of the PRC under Mao Zedong's 
leadership, ended more than a century of internal 
division, social upheaval, and Western influence. 
However, all foreigners were expelled and a period of 
isolation followed that was not to end until Mao Zedong's 
death in 1976. Since then, the PRC has gradually opened 
itself up to foreign visitors and overseas investors in
8. China lapsed into deeper internal turmoil as war-lords 
vied with each other for control and the Kuomintang under 
Generalissimo Chiang kai-shek was not able to unify the 
whole country. See Alvin Rabushka, The New China,
Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, USA:
Westview Press, 1987, p. 15.
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an effort to right the many economic wrongs of the 
earlier years of socialist rule. It has joined the world 
community, including the United Nations, where the ROC 
had held a seat, by maintaining its sole representation 
of China, until 1971.
1.1.2 Taiwanese Side
Q .Taiwan, or Formosa m  Portuguese , is provincial 
home to the majority Han Chinese, who were the first to 
settle this island early in the 17 00s.10 Taiwan was 
ceded to Japan by China in 1895. In 1945, following 
Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, the island was 
returned to China, then controlled by the KMT under the 
rule of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1949, the KMT forces were 
defeated by the CCP and up to one and a half million 
mainland Chinese, along with the KMT government fled to 
Taiwan for sanctuary and refuge on the island. A 
"temporary" provisional government was set up (which 
still presumes to represent all of China) dominated by 
politicians formerly in power on the mainland.11
9. Formosa is a word of Portuguese origin, meaning "the 
beautiful island". Westerners in the past often used it 
to describe the island., although Taiwan, a word of 
unclear origin, is now much more popularly used. From 
time to time, attempts are made to attach political 
significance to one word or the other. For example, 
advocates of Taiwanese independence living in America and 
Japan usually use the term of Formosa in an attempt to 
deny even a linguistic affiliation with China.
Independence advocates who live in Japan, however, are 
obliged to use the word Taiwan if they wish to be 
understood. In this study, the island will be called 
Taiwan with no intended implications.
10. A useful summary of the origin of Taiwan's population 
appears in Paul K. T. Sih, "Introduction", in Paul K. T. 
Sih, (ed.), Taiwan in Modern Times, New York: St. John's 
University Press, 1973, pp. vii-xix.
11. This section on Taiwan's political system draws from 
Richard L. Walker, "Taiwan's Movement into Political 
Modernity: 1945-1972", in ibid, pp. 359-396.
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With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950 
and the concomitant chill of a Cold War, the United 
States of America (USA) saw Taiwan as a vanguard 
essential in the defence of the Free World. In 1954, a 
security treaty was signed between Taiwan and the USA, in 
which the USA, having refused to recognised the PRC, 
pledged to protect Taiwan in the event of a communist 
attack. The USA’s support, including economic and 
military aid and advice, provided much of the initial 
investment that was to transform Taiwan's backward 
economy into one of the great economic stories of the 
post-war era. The USA then hoped for a democratic China, 
at least on Taiwan.
As relations between the USA and the PRC improved, 
however, USA non-recognition became increasingly 
untenable. In 1971, having represented China up to that 
point, Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations14and 
replaced by the PRC. The USA recognised the PRC in 1979 
and Taiwan entered a period of diplomatic isolation.
In 1973, Taiwan rejected an offer by the PRC to hold 
reunification talks and has since then consistently 
rebuffed any PRC proposal under the formula of "one 
country* two systems".15 Taiwan at that time still dealt
12. For further studies, see John F. Copper, China 
Diplomacy, The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle, USA: 
Westview View Press, 1992, pp. 1-27.
13. Ibid., p. 2.
14. In 1971, the USA decided to improve relations with 
the PRC and ended its effort to sustain Taiwan’s claim to 
be the sole legitimate government of China in the United 
Nations. See Steve Tsang, In the Shadow of China, 
Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, UK: Hurst & 
Co., 1993, pp. 1, 176-177.
15. Under PRC's "one country, two systems" formula, 
Taiwan would be recognised as a special administrative 
region with its own government, with its own domestic 
laws, with an independent judicial system, and with an 
independent armed forces. In return, Taiwan government
20
with this political dilemma with "three no's": no
contact, no negotiation and no compromise with the 
PRC.16 However, after 1987, the lifting of martial law in 
Taiwan, contacts between the people of Taiwan and those 
of the PRC have become common.17 The PRC has been one of 
Taiwan's major trading partners, albeit through third 
countries.
Nevertheless, in a White Paper published September 
1993, the PRC repeated in the strongest possible terms 
that Taiwan is part of China and must not drift into
Iff •independence. Once again, as with Hong Kong in 1982, 
the PRC was making the veiled threat of using the force 
option if it did not get its way. Taiwan, for its part, 
closely regulates private contacts with the PRC pending 
proof of its goodwill. To date, Taiwan has rejected PRC 
offers for a direct relationship in large part because of 
PRC's refusal to compromise on political issues: 
recognising Taiwan as a comparable political entity, 
lessening diplomatic isolation, and reducing the military 
threat.19
would be required to abandon its claim to authority over 
the mainland and to recognise the PRC as its sole 
international representative. For an account of such 
proposal, see Harrison, "Taiwan after Chiang Ching-Kuo", 
Foreign Affairs (1988), pp. 790, 798-99.
16. See Steve Tsang, supra note 14, p. 172.
17. Li Dahong, "Mainland-Taiwan Economic Relations on the 
Rise", Beijing Review (Beijing: 3-9 April 1989), p. 24.
18. See The Taiwan Question and Re-unification of China 
(English edition), issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office 
and Information Office, State Council, the People's 
Republic of China, August 1993.
19. See Steve Tsang, supra note 14, p. 202.
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1.2 Goals for the Study
This study attempts to present a legal modus 
operandi which is most suitable for the present Taiwan- 
PRC economic cooperation. The sheer volume of trade and 
investment activities between the two sides has in effect 
resulted in the creation of a de facto economic 
relationship of interdependency. It seems possible that 
direct Taiwan-PRC investment and trade links could help 
bring about the peaceful and eventual reunification of 
China.20 The full and complete economic integration of 
Taiwan and the PRC, if realised, could be viewed as a 
step in this direction.
The recent collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union has made the reintegration of the 
two Germanies, for example, a reality. Many Chinese 
people across the Taiwan Straits see their reunification 
as inevitable, just as those in the two Germanies looked 
forward to the day when they were able to reunite. For 
some of the leaders of Taiwan and the PRC, re-unification 
may even take on the role of a sacred mission that must 
be accomplished to make China whole again and to 
demonstrate to the world the strength of the Chinese 
people.
However, people in Taiwan who have grown up under a 
market economy and a developing democracy would prefer to 
wait until socio-economic conditions and legal reform in 
the PRC have approached a comparable and stable stage. 
How soon can we envisage the PRC finally renouncing its 
Marxist ideology of socialism and proletarian
20. The further economic integration such as direct trade 
and investment activities between Taiwan and the PRC 
could be seen as a step for eventual reunification. The 
author was informed of this in accordance with 
discussions with many Chinese and Taiwanese businessmen 
while carrying out interviews in 1992 and 1994 in the 
PRC.
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dictatorship of the so-called J,Four Cardinal 
Principles11?21 How soon can we see a final success of 
legal reforms achieved by the PRC?
While carrying out interviews in the PRC both in 
1992 and 1994, the author was informed by knowledgeable 
PRC scholars that a closer Taiwan-PRC economic 
relationship may play an important part in advancing 
democracy as well as a real market economy in the PRC. 
The present socialist market economy of the PRC is a 
market economy, but still operates within the context of 
the socialist system. The governmental functions and 
planning role of the State in the PRC have not yet been 
laid aside.22
Before the re-unification of Taiwan and the PRC, and 
before the PRC recognises Taiwan as a comparable 
political entity, can we also imagine a legal framework 
protecting Taiwanese trade and investment in the PRC? 
My purpose is first, to produce a work of high academic 
standing, while at the same time promoting the cause of 
stronger bilateral Taiwan-PRC economic and legal
relations; secondly, in the broader context to stimulate 
creative discussion and encourage formulations of 
possible solutions for a direct mutual exchange in 
economic activities across the Taiwan Straits.
As a result of the different political and economic 
systems, Taiwan-PRC legal relations also mirror East-West 
trade issues. In terms of this trade model, it came
21. These four cardinal principles are: socialist road, 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party, and the people's 
democratic dictatorship.
22. For further studies, see Tian Jun, "China's Gradual 
Reform: A Comparison With Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union", The Chinese Economic Association (UK) 
Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 11-15.
23. In the past, the term "East" was defined to cover the 
socialist countries, for the most part in Eastern Europe
23
about because of the political structure after World War 
Two, namely the East-West confrontation. In other words, 
this trade model was characterised by military 
confrontation between the "East", which refers to the 
socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well 
as the former Soviet Union (The Warsaw Pact), and the 
"West", the capitalist countries within NATO. In the 
past, it was possible to identify a common framework for 
foreign trade within the socialist countries, for 
example, the state monopoly of trade. However, with the 
collapse of the socialist regimes and the failure of 
their planned economies, these countries have embraced 
market-oriented reforms and abandoned the mandatory 
central planning system, by which they were formerly 
constrained.
In seeking routes to economic reform, the PRC, being 
included in the "East", has asserted that it is making 
substantial progress towards converting its economy to a 
socialist market-oriented economy with "Chinese
and Asia; "West" to include the industrialised
capitalist countries, largely in Western Europe and North 
America. See A Selective Bibliography of East-West 
Commercial Relations, ed. , by K. Grzybowski, New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1973, p. 293. At present, "East" is 
defined to cover all socialist countries and "West" all 
industrialised capitalist countries. The PRC should be 
categorised in the "East". See A. R. Dicks, The People's 
Republic of China in East-West Business Transactions, 
ed., by R. Starr, New York: Praeger Publications, 1974,
p. 391. For further studies on PRC's establishment of the 
so-called socialist market economy in 1992, see Prof. Gao 
Shangquan, "China's Socialist Market Economy", and Zhu 
Rongji, "The Establishment of a Socialist Market in 
China", speech report printed on The Chinese Economic 
Association (UK) Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 
1992, pp. 11-16. Taiwan should be included in the "West" 
since it has developed into a modern industrial economy 
with a structure very similar to western industrialised 
nations. See YUan-li Wu, Becoming an Industrialised 
Nation - ROC's Development on Taiwan, New York: Praeger
Special Studies, 1985; and also Taiwan Enterprises in 
Global Perspective, (ed.), N. T. Wang, New York: M. E.
Sharpe, 1992.
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characteristics."24 The extent of such development 
differs from that of European socialist countries, as it 
is dependent on factors such as political stability, 
proximity with the "West", historical and social 
background, and so on. It is now generally accepted that 
the PRC still maintains the validity of socialism 
emerging among the former socialist countries of the East 
European bloc.
To date, it seems that there is little up-to-date 
coverage of the literature with regard to this trade 
model. Unlike former Soviet and East European variants 
of market socialism, the PRC has not totally changed the 
nature of its trade (being in the "East") towards those 
of countries of the "West" including Taiwan. There 
remains a conflict between ideologies. Taiwan, to a 
considerable extent, is a capitalist system, while the 
PRC still firmly advocates socialism. The political 
confrontation between the two still exists, though they 
are more concerned with economic integration with each 
other.
Public ownership system still remains the mainstay 
of the PRC’s economy.25 And, to the extent that the PRC 
still relies on state planning, its economic activities 
are inherently discriminatory.26 Despite significant
24. For further discussion, see Cheng Yuan, East-West 
Trade - Changing Patterns In Chinese Foreign Trade Law 
And Institutions, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 
1991), pp. 321-328. Also see, Long Yonglu, "China's 
Readmission to GATT - GATT & China's Socialist Market 93- 
138", FBIS-PRC, 21 July 1993, pp. 3-7; Decision of the 
CPC Central Committee on Issues Concerning the 
Establishment of s Socialist Market Structure (14 
November 1993), China Economic News, 29 November 1993, p. 
1 .
25. See Chris Yeung, "Public Owhership Remains Mainstay", 
South China Morning Post, 2 6 November 1993, p. 1.
26. In a planned economy, the tariff and non-tariff that 
the GATT is designed to prevent are not the major 
impediments to free trade. Rather, the impediments are 
governmental control and direction over purchases and
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economic reforms, the state enterprise system still
produces ninety percent of the gross domestic product of 
the PRC.27 The PRC's foreign trade system vis-a-vis 
Taiwan still follows the " E a s t ” / " W e s t "  divide. In this 
context, the "East" as used here is defined as meaning 
the socialist countries, and the "West" as meaning the 
capitalist countries. Taiwan is considered to be a
country in the West and the PRC, of course, should be 
included in the East. Both parties, under the
circumstances of mutual non-recognition, have experienced 
many legal problems in developing their trade and 
investment ties. Therefore, above all, this thesis
analyses the legal aspects of Taiwanese trade and 
investment in the PRC and the methods of legal settlement 
for handling commercial conflicts.
Under the model of East-West trade between countries 
of mutual public non-recognition, the methodologies of 
comparative analysis and theoretical approach are the 
characteristics of this thesis. As the Taiwan-PRC 
situation is unique in looking forward to future re­
unification, the two regimes may look to foreign 
experience on both theoretical and practical levels to
help rebuild, at the very least, a prosperous economic 
relationship.
It is hoped that, by using comparative analysis and 
theoretical approach of trade and investment, this thesis 
can show a capacity for critical analysis and a good 
grasp of the legal issues involved.
prices. Thus, even the elimination of a trade barrier 
may not result in increased imports to the country, if 
the planning authorities decide against such imports or 
direct the price to below cost levels. Robert E. 
Herzstein, "China and the GATT:Legal and Policy Issues 
Raised by China's Participation in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade", 18 Law and Policy of International 
Business (1986), p. 375.
27. Chris Yeung, supra note 25.
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1.3 Sources and Structure of the Study
In common with many other foreign businesses, 
Taiwanese trade and investment in the PRC has been hard 
pressed to stay on top of PRC's fast-changing rules, 
regulations, attitudes, and practices. Indeed, doing 
business with the PRC, especially in recent years, is 
perhaps more problem-ridden than formerly. The watchword 
in the PRC is reform, which translates into changes, 
experimentation, uncertainty, and often, grave risks. 
Seeking a fruitful source of reliable data and analysis 
has therefore been essential for my research work in this 
field.
In addition to studies in London, I have carried out 
several interviews and collected much legal material 
available in both Taiwan and the PRC on these issues from 
the following four sources: historical-background
information about Taiwan-Chinese trade and investment 
activities as provided by both Taiwan and the PRC 
governments; legal problems of Taiwanese trade and 
investment in the PRC and other material published in 
official publications; literature on legal resolution 
affecting Taiwanese trade and investment in the PRC, 
published in both English and Chinese; and, finally, 
literature regarding East-West trade and foreign 
investment issues which are related to the PRC.
Since more detailed and up-to-date information in 
this field is not available in Britain, my field-work in 
Taiwan and the PRC respectively in 1992 and 1994 has 
enriched the contents of my discussions and substantially 
contributed to the quality of the whole research work.
This thesis contains seven chapters. The first 
chapter outlines evolution of the general environment 
across the Taiwan Straits. After it, this chapter goes 
on to outline the goals, sources and structure of the
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study. Appendix I of this thesis gives a full contrast 
of major events affecting Taiwan-PRC economic relations 
since 1949.
The second chapter first considers factors bearing 
upon the possible formation of a Greater China, before 
proceeding to examine the reality of PRC's economic 
reforms. After an analysis of the political-economic 
aspects of Taiwan-PRC trade and investment links, 
attention turns to Taiwan-PRC trade and investment links, 
and Hong Kong's role, seen as an economic linkage 
triangular in form. Patterns of trade and investment are 
examined in detail, illustrated with examples of some 
investments which came to fruition and some which, in the 
end, did not. Lastly, the chapter deals with the role 
and achievements of bodies serving as channels to bridge 
the still substantial idelogical gap separating Taiwan
and the PRC, from which position a conclusion is drawn.
The third chapter sets out a brief discussion of a 
re-united country, and introduces the background to 
Taiwan-Chinese trade and investment links. It continues 
by describing the legal framework for private business 
relations between the two regimes. From these
considerations, some conclusions are drawn. Appendix II 
of this thesis supplies useful referential figures of 
Taiwanese trade with and investment in the PRC since
1979.
In the fourth chapter, detailed consideration is 
given to the legal problems of Taiwan-PRC business
contracts as these concern trade and investment. This 
in-depth examination includes reference to several 
problems which commonly arise in this context, and 
analyses the methods currently utilised in the conduct of 
such business.
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In the fifth chapter, attention is turned to the 
problems of legal protection of trade and investment 
between the two regimes. Discussion includes existing 
PRC measures and laws, their legal effectiveness and 
significance as they affect Taiwanese businesses in the 
PRC. Appendix III of this thesis presents a full text of 
the new legislation of PRC's Law on Protecting Taiwanese 
Investment. Appendix IV looks at several important 
features of Taiwan's Mainland Relationship Statute 
relating to trade and investment activities.
The sixth chapter focuses on the ongoing issue of 
legal solutions presently available for settling business 
conflicts of trade and investment between Taiwan and the 
PRC. It highlights the relative roles of arbitration and 
litigation in resolving such disputes.
The final chapter begins with an examination of 
Taiwan's growing economic convergence with the PRC. It 
summarises the peculiar "shetai" (Taiwan related) 
economic relationship, and, arising from that 
relationship, the desirability of evolving a process for 
Taiwan-PRC Joint Mediation and Arbitration. It also 
looks at the feasibility of signing bilateral agreements 
covering judicial assistance in commercial matters. 
Finally, it suggests some implications for the future of 
this relationship.
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CHAPTER TWO
A "GREATER CHINA" EMBRACING THE PRC, TAIWAN, AND
HONG KONG
In the post-Colonial era, what is known to 
historians as "China proper" (the part of China that 
became the People's Republic in 1949) and the "China 
periphery" (Taiwan, the British colony of Hong Kong and 
the Portuguese colony of Macao) each survived and 
prospered, to varying degrees, as different sovereign, 
political, social and economic regimes. While different 
proposals and numerous efforts have been made to reunite 
China proper and the periphery, repeated political 
confrontations between the PRC and Taiwan have 
effectively prevented Chinese national reunification.
If one could make a general statement about the 
factors affecting Taiwan's reunification with China, or 
its separation or independence, it might be this: 
politically, Taiwan is going its own way; there is little 
or no . convergence, so to speak, with the PRC. 
Economically, it is integrating with the PRC. These are 
two contradictory trends and it is difficult to say which 
will prevail. However, it may be relevant to note the 
following: if the new world order is based on economic
power, and commercial or trade blocs come into being, the 
PRC and Taiwan are probably going to be in the same bloc 
—  either a Pacific Rim bloc led by Japan or a "Greater 
China". This is a global trend of great prominence, 
along with the demise of communism, a global economy, 
regionalism, and so on.1
1. See David Shambough, "Introduction: The emergence of 
Greater China", China Quarterly, December 1993, p. .653.
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2.1 The PRC's Economic Reform: Toward a Real Market
Economy?
The PRC's economic reforms represent a process of 
transition from a planned economy to market economy, and 
essentially involve decentralisation efforts of the 
government. There existed doubts about a centrally 
planned economy in the PRC for thirty years since 1949.2 
Indeed, it was in response to the failure of such a 
system, that the PRC launched its reform programme in 
1979. Though the PRC adopted a gradual approach and 
conducted its reforms in an experimental and fragmentary 
manner, it was a market-oriented reform from the outset. 
The slogan of "crossing the river with the guidance of 
stones" (mozhe shitou guohe) provides a vivid 
illustration of the PRC's perception of the aims of its 
reforms.
In accordance with this approach, the PRC shaped its 
regional preferential policy by setting up four Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian to 
experiment with such reform. While some reforms were 
supported by laws and regulations, many policy statements 
were directly put into practice. In 1987, the PRC's 
economic reforms were given a further boost by the call 
for the establishment and strengthening of the role of 
the market in the entire economy. The principle employed 
was "the state regulates the market, while the market
2. For further studies, generally, see Xue Muqiao, 
China's Socialist Economy, 1981; Gregory C. Chow, The 
Chinese Economy, 1985. Such an economic system sometimes 
is classified as "Non-market Economy".
3. Since 1979, the PRC has conducted agricultural and 
industrial reforms with several commercial, investment, 
and trade reforms. See Alvin Rabushka, The New China - 
Comparative Economic Development in Mainland China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong, San Francisco:Westview Press, 1987, 
p. 85.
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guides enterprises” (guojia tiaojie shichang, shichang 
yindao qiye).4
Having thus restated that the market was only an 
economic force, the adoption of a market economy as the 
PRC's ultimate goal in economic reform was viewed as the 
most appropriate way of achieving its aim of economic 
modernisation.5 In October 1992, the PRC officially 
abandoned the idea of a planned economy, as well as 
limited-market reform, and declared its total commitment 
to a market economy. However, after fourteen years of 
reform, is there any real "market" in the PRC? As 
administrative manipulations are still existing, a "free 
market" in the strict Western understanding is therefore 
not yet truly in operation in the PRC.
At present, many economic reform measures in the PRC 
may not have yet taken root or been meaningfully
implemented and accordingly have only symbolic meaning.
Furthermore, such measures are initiated and implemented 
by those government officials and insitutions which may 
still work under their old ways of "mandatory plans" and 
"guiding plans" which have been used since the 1950s.
The gradualism approach for a real market economy 
incleases the sense of uncertainty and makes 
predictability even less apparent. Such a transitional 
state of the PRC economy undoubtedly affects the making 
of laws and regulations and in particular their
implementation.
According to a speech made by the PRC Vice-Premier 
Zhu Rongji in London in 199 2, the PRC is still a
socialist country and public ownership will remain the
4. For the text, see Beijing Review, Vol.30, No. 45, 1987 
pp. 1-XXVII.
5. For example, see Fang Sheng, "Opening Up and Making 
Use of Capitalism", Beijing Review, Vol. 35, No. 12,
1992, pp. 17-19.
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• f imainstay of the PRC economy. The most recent news of 
1995 from Beijing reported that the PRC had decided to 
expand the role of old-style state planning to not just
7economic but social policy. It is beyond doubt that a 
real "market" in the strict capitalist sense (the West) 
is therefore not yet truly in operation in a typical 
socialist country such as the PRC (the East).
2.2 Political-economic Aspects of Taiwan-PRC 
Relationships
Historically, the PRC and Taiwan have continued 
their hostility since the ending of the 1949 civil war. 
This civil war resulted in a divided China with the 
Communist regime remaining in the mainland and the 
Nationalist government moving to Taiwan. The
intransigence of both states resulted in an almost 
complete breakdown of private and commercial relations 
for thirty years.
However, since the beginning of the 1980s, one of 
the most widely debated issues regarding Taiwan and the 
PRC, has been investment and trade relationships between 
the two. As both the PRC and Taiwan have existed almost 
entirely as mutually exclusive entities, they do not 
publicly recognise each other; each claims that there is 
only one China of which it is the sole legitimate 
government. There are de facto two entities with lawful 
international personalities which exist separately on 
either side of the Taiwan Straits.8
6. See the text of speech (on file with the author) made 
by Zhu Rongji at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs in London on 16 November 1992.
7. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Beijing to Increase State Planning 
Role", South China Morning Post, 14 September 1995, p. 1.
8. The Republic of China on Taiwan is a de facto entity 
with international personality: it carries out a full 
range of foreign relations, including entering into
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In the 19 50s, trade between the two sides was non­
existent and was regarded as illegal in Taiwan. Each side 
viewed the other as a mortal enemy fighting to the death. 
Since 1949, the PRC has been striving to isolate Taiwan 
diplomatically from the international community. 
Diplomacy has been waged in all or nothing terms, with 
the international community recognising one or the other 
but never both. This has given rise to the situation of 
thirty nations recognizing Taiwan and more than 150 
nations recognizing the PRC.9
After the PRC became more tolerant of foreign trade 
by adopting its "Open Policy"10 in 1979, foreign 
companies were faced with the choice of doing business 
either in the PRC or in Taiwan. By convention, they 
could not operate in both. Otherwise, they risked being 
penalised by either of the two governments for trading 
with the enemy. However, the economic reforms flowing 
from a softening of policy eased the political tension 
between the two regimes. Private and commercial
international agreements and sending and receiving 
official missions. For studies on this, see Hungdah Chiu 
and Robert Donnen (eds.), Multi-System Nations and 
International Law, Baltimore: University of Maryland,
School of Law, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in 
Contemporary Asian Studies; James Crawford, The Creation 
of States in International Law, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1979, p. 36.
9. At present (1995), Taiwan maintains diplomatic 
relations with thirty states, and has close economic and 
cultural relations with more than 12 0 countries. In 
addition, it has sixty four official or semi-official 
trade missions in forty two nations.
10. In 1978, The PRC adopted an "open-door" policy 
(duiwai kaifang zhengce), which represented a quest for 
economic development through the adaption and diffusion 
of foreign technology. Special economic zones and 
development zones were set up and coastal cities opened 
up to attract foreign investment. See Cheng Yuan, East- 
West Trade, Changing Patterns in Chinese Foreign Trade 
Law and Institutions, New York: Oceana Publications, 
Inc., 1991, p. 74.
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relationships have been permitted and even encouraged by 
the authorities of Taiwan and the PRC.
In December 1988, the PRC even allowed Taiwan to use 
a formula of "Chinese Taipei" or "Taipei China" to 
return to the Asian Development Bank.11 Co-existence with 
the PRC and allowing Taiwan room to establish its 
international presence is believed to be at the heart of 
developing links across the Taiwan Straits and laying the 
groundwork for negotiating re-unification of Taiwan and 
the PRC.12
Since the political relationship across the Taiwan 
Straits had developed from one of mutual enmity to one of 
peaceful co-existence, Taiwan further pronounced the end 
of "The Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression 
of the Communist Rebellion" on May 1991: the PRC is no
longer "the enemy" as hitherto. Hostilities between the 
two regimes have gradually become ritualised in the form 
of diplomatic games which are played out every once in a 
while.13
11. In December 1988, the PRC contended that the "Taipei 
China" formula, which was used in the Asian Development 
Bank, was a special arrangement that should not be 
universally applicable to other inter-governmental and 
international organizations. It opposed the establishment 
of official ties and contacts with Taiwan by countries 
enjoying diplomatic relations with the PRC, while 
tolerating economic, trade, and cultural exchanges of an 
entirely unofficial nature. See China Daily (Beijing), 
2 0 December 1988, p. 1.
12. Chao Man-ke, "Elastic Diplomacy: A Blessing or a
Plight to Reunification of China?" Mingbao Yuekan (Hong 
Kong: Ming-Pao Monthly), no. 3:22, 1989; Lin Cheng-i,
"Taiwan's Tactics in the Asian Development Bank", Guojia 
Zhengce (Taipei: National Policy), no. 4, 15 December
1989, p. 34; Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan Deserves to Join the 
World Community", The Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 
December 1989, p. 6.
13. One such recent event was the 1993 policy paper on 
Taiwan issued by the PRC in which it reiterated its goal 
of peacefully unifying China under the "one country two 
systems" scheme, offering Taiwan terms even more 
favourable than those devised for the PRC's takeover of
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According to Taiwan's Foreign Minister Mr. Frederick 
Chien, Taiwan must not consider the People's Republic of 
China to always be an adversary. In certain areas there 
may be compatibility.14 One such area that the two 
regimes have in common is business only, which always 
means trade and investment activities across the Taiwan 
Straits.
"Once opened, the door of exchange can never be 
closed again" —  This is the generally accepted view of 
exchanges across the Taiwan Straits. However, evolution 
of these relations was hailed by the PRC as one of its 
three primary goals for reunification.15 To be sure, both 
Taiwan and the PRC do share some common grounds: they
agree that there is only one China, that Taiwan and the 
mainland are both parts of China, and they both seek 
peaceful unification and the promotion of positive 
developments across the Taiwan Straits.
For the moment, however, there seems to be no way to 
strike a balance for the achievement of these goals. For
example, the PRC still insists on "one country, two
1 fisystems"xoas an orientation, while Taiwan advocates "one
Hong Kong in 1997. However, trade and investment 
continued as usual.
14. "Taipei's Challenge: The China Question", in The 
International Herald Tribune, 23 August 1993, p. 9.
15. Zongda Yan, "Liangan Jingmao Guanxi yu Woguo de Dalu 
Jingmao Zhengce" (Cross-Straits Commercial Relations and 
Our Mainland Commercial Policy), Zhonghua Zhanlue Xuekan 
('Taipei: China Strategic Studies Journal) , 44 (Summer
1990).
16. Under PRC's "one country, two systems" formula, 
Taiwan would be recognised as a special administrative 
region with its own government, with its own domestic 
laws, with an independent judicial system, and with an 
independent armed forces. In return, Taiwan government 
would be required to abandon its claim to authority over 
the mainland and to recognise the PRC as its sole 
international representative. For an account of such
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country, two governments"17 (or "one country, two
regions") . In the area of preset stances, the PRC
supports the "santong siliu" (three links, four
exchanges")18 and the immediate initiation of
negotiation, while Taiwan hopes for a more gradual
approach divided into near-, medium- and long-term 
1 Qstages.
Ever since 1987 when Taiwan relaxed its stance 
against the PRC by allowing its residents to visit their 
mainland Chinese relatives, the business activities of 
investing and trading with the PRC have been growing, if 
not actually bursting into bloom, at a phenomenal rate. 
Despite the government's policy of forbidding direct
proposal, see Harrison, "Taiwan after Chiang Ching-Kuo", 
Foreign Affairs (1988).
17. Since 1987, Taiwan has opted for a more flexible and 
pragmatic foreign policy and countered PRC's "one 
country, two systems" with the "one country, two
governments" concept. Under this formula, Taiwan and the 
PRC would be considered as equals, each with extensive 
authority over only their respective present areas of 
control and with joint international status. For further 
studies, see James Cotton, "Redefining Taiwan: 'one
country, two governments'", The World Today (December 
1989), pp. 213-16.
18. On 1 January 1979, the PRC called for establishing 
"three links" (mail, trade, and air and shipping
services) and "four exchanges" (relatives and tourists,
academic groups, cultural groups and sports 
representatives) with Taiwan, as a first step towards the 
ultimate goal of reunification. See "National People's 
Congress Standing Committee Messages to Compatriots in 
Taiwan", Beijing Review, vol. 22, no. 1, 5 January 1979, 
pp. 16-17.
19. In its work on advancing the reunification of China, 
Taiwan formulated the "Guidelines for National 
Reunification" on 5 March 1991. The Guidelines set the 
goal of China's reunification as a free, democratic, and 
equitably prosperous country, to be achieved through 
three phases under the principles of reason, peace, 
parity, and reciprocity. For further studies, see Ying- 
jeou Ma, "Policy Towards The Chinese Mainland: Taipei's 
View", Issues and Studies (Taipei), vol. 28, no. 6, June 
1992.
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trade and investment links, businessmen in Taiwan and the 
PRC have been conducting commerce through a third 
intermediary. The value of such indirect trading was 
US$14,39 billion in 1993 placing Taiwan as the PRC’s 
fourth largest trading partner.20 From 1987 to 1993, 
total Taiwanese investment in the PRC amounted to 
US$14.18 billion, second only to that of Hong Kong which 
was US$111.53 billion.21
Although the PRC has made continuous efforts to 
promote direct trade and investment with Taiwan, Taiwan 
is still insistent that all contacts should be
9 9indirect. Trade and investment must pass through an
intermediary which is most often Hong Kong, or Singapore. 
It is only through such methods that Taiwan businesses 
can own and control enterprises in the PRC. However, 
Taiwan's rift with the PRC shows gradual signs of 
mending.
Until its repeal in May 1991, the Statute for 
Punishing Rebellion, which had been promulgated by Taiwan 
in June 1949, prohibited all commercial contact between 
citizens within its jurisdiction and those within areas 
controlled by the PRC. In practice, businesses from 
Taiwan had begun to trade with and invest in the PRC from 
about 1983 , and since then this trend has developed into
20. Zhongguo Youbao (Taipei:China Post), 20 January 1994, 
p. 10.
21. See Zhong Qin, "Liangan Jingmao Jiaoliu" (Exchange of 
Trade and Investment Across the Taiwan Straits), Jingji 
Chienzan (Taipei: Economic Outlook), Vol. 33, p. 49, 10
January 1994. It is generally believd that a significant 
portion of the Hong Kong investment is in fact from 
Taiwan.
22. After the formal lifting of the ban on direct trade 
with North Korea and Cuba in September 1991, the PRC is 
the only country with which Taiwan bans direct trade. 
See Asian Bulletin (Taipei), vol. 16, no. 11, November 
1991, p. 26.
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a major structural shift in Taiwan's visible trade and 
investment.
Opening of direct trade and investment within the 
next few years is believed to be inevitable. It has been 
reported that the Taiwanese government will eventually be 
forced to lift the barriers on direct trade and direct 
investment with the PRC.23 According to Taiwan 
government's three-stage unification plan24 published in 
March 1991, direct business activities with the PRC can 
be conducted only if there is an equal, reciprocal 
relationship between the two governments.
The Taiwan Legislature passed a statute in July 
1992 aimed at regulating Taiwan-PRC economic and social 
relations. However, attempts to curb the tide of 
investment (i.e., by limiting commercial activities to 
indirect trade conducted via an intermediary) were 
overtaken by market forces. The two sides of both Taiwan 
and the PRC have been holding a series of semi-official
23. Jingji Ribao (Taipei: Economic Daily News), 18 March
1991, p. 1. It was reported that Taiwan government would 
allow direct trade links with the PRC in one to six 
years. Furthermore, in September 1992, Taiwan's
Legislative Yuan issued a document entitled "The Issue 
and Outlook for Direct Air and Sea Links Across the 
Straits" which set down several conditions for direct 
links with the PRC. See McKenna China Newsletter (Hong 
Kong: February 1993), no. 85, p. 23.
24. Supra note 18. See the full text of Taiwan's 
Guidelines for National Unification, reprinted in 
Zhongyang Ribao (Taipei: Central Daily News, Overseas 
Edition), 7 March 1991, p. 1.
25. Taiwan Diqu yu Dalu Diqu Renmin Guanxi Tiaoli 
(Statute Governing Relationship between People of the 
Areas of Taiwan and the Mainland) (hereinafter, Taiwan's 
Mainland Relationship Statute, or TMRS) (1992). An 
English translation text is seen Ada Koon Hang Tse, "The 
Emerging Legal Framework for Regulating Economic 
Relations Between Taiwan and Mainland China", Journal of 
Chinese Law (1992), Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 179-210.
39
meetings on handling the fast growing commercial, social,
? 6and tourism interactions.
While Taiwan and the PRC have entered a state of 
detente, neither side is willing to recognise the other 
as a legitimate government, and deep mistrust still 
exists between the two regimes. There are certain major 
political obstacles standing in the way of progress on 
other fronts. The most important of these are the issues 
of Taiwan independence, Taiwan's desired recognition as a 
comparable political entity under the "One China" 
premise, and the PRC's threat to use force for 
reunification. If these key points are not resolved, the 
growth of political ties, or the further normalisation of 
relations required for coordinated economic cooperation 
will not be possible.
These political obstacles notwithstanding, economic 
interaction and a degree of economic interdependence 
between Taiwan and the PRC have developed as a result of 
indirect investment and trading activities between the 
two which began in the late 1970s, and which have 
continued even since at an increasing rate. The PRC can 
make use of Taiwan's capital, management, marketing, and 
production techniques while Taiwan can make use of PRC's 
cheap labour, raw materials and potential market.
True, the momentum for this lively economic activity 
may well have owed its origin to self-interest, but it 
has also been fuelled by the common linguistic, cultural 
and ethnic background shared by the people on both sides 
of the Taiwan Straits, influences stronger than mere
26. Prior to 3 0 March 1994, there were four rounds of 
Taiwan-PRC talks in order to settle technical issues 
between the two regimes. The talks were organised by 
Taiwan's semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 
and its PRC counterpart Association for Relations Across 
the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). See George T. Crane, "China 
and Taiwan: Not yet 'Greater China'", International
Affairs 69, April 1993, p. 713.
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geographic proximity. While it is entirely possible to 
envisage several different scenarios for the future 
Taiwan-PRC relationship, the most likely one, at least in 
the light of the foregoing, appears to be co-existence 
based on economic cooperation, coupled with political and 
legal modus vivendi.
2.3 Intensifying a Triangular Economic Linkage
In 1979, the PRC spearheaded its "open policy" by 
creating "Special Economic Zones" (SEZs) in four coastal 
cities of Guangdong and Fujian provinces. It became 
obvious that the choice of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou (all 
in Guangdong) and Xiamen (in Fujian) as the pilot sites 
for SEZs was meant to target ethnic Chinese business 
communities in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and elsewhere in 
the world. The PRC not only encouraged traditional 
Confucian values of kinship and ancestral ties but also 
offered special tax breaks to those so-called compatriot 
(tongbao) or overseas Chinese (huaqiao) investing in the 
SEZs. As the "open policy" has achieved a high level 
of success, these investments have spurred an economic 
boom in the two provinces where various political and 
economic incentives were utilised.
27. Chinese nationals living in Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan are in Chinese law referred to as "Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan compatriots" (gang-ao-tai-tongbao), who 
are occasionally treated as "overseas Chinese" (huaqiao). 
For further studies, see Yuan Cheng, "Law and Policy of 
the People's Republic of China on Nationality", 
Immigration And Nationality Law & Practice, October 1990, 
pp. 136-144.
28. For a detailed account of the PRC's utilisation of 
huaqiao "patriotism", see Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and 
Alvin Y. So, "Ascent through National Integration: The 
Chinese Triangle of Mainland-Taiwan-Hong Kong", in Ravi 
Arvind Palat, ed., Pacific-Asia and the Future of the 
World System (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1993), pp. 133-147.
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Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, Hong Kong has 
served as the single, most crucial linkage between the 
PRC economy and the world capitalist economic system. In 
spite of the early PRC economic policy of "leaning to one 
side" (toward the Soviet Union and its communist bloc) 
and the Sino-U.S. military clash over Korea, the PRC 
imported most of its strategic supplies through Hong 
Kong. The U.S.-led United Nations embargo against the 
PRC did not prevent "significant quantities of strategic
0 Qsupplies" from being smuggled into the mainland. 
However, steady trade and investment between Hong Kong 
and the PRC was not established until the PRC's economic 
reform of implementing the SEZ policies in 1979.
As Yun-wing Sung's study illustrates, since the 
inception of Beijing's "open policy", Hong Kong has 
played a multiplicity of roles in the PRC's economy: as
financier, trading partner, middleman, facilitator, and 
so on.30 It can be said that, without Hong Kong's 
consistent participation, the success of the PRC's 
economic reform programmes would have been limited. 
Further, without Hong Kong acting as a buffer zone 
against a possible ending of the PRC's "open policy", 
foreign participation including that of Taiwan in the PRC 
economy would not have been as substained, particularly 
in the immediate aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
incident.
Officially, trade between the PRC and Taiwan did not 
exist before 1988, the year after Taiwan lifted its ban 
on private visits among Chinese families living on both 
sides of the Taiwan Straits. In reality, 1988 was merely 
the year underground trading activities between the two
29. Yun-wing Sung, The China-Hong Kong Connection: The 
Key to China's Open-Door Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. 5.
30. Sung, ibid., "The Pivotal Role of Hong Kong", pp. 15- 
43 .
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came out in the open. Since then, in spite of obvious 
political uncertainties, Taiwanese trade and investment 
in the PRC has increased steadily and has reached a very 
significant level. For example, officially approved 
Taiwanese investment in the PRC has reached eighteen
'i i
provinces, covering nineteen major industries in 1993 
and since 1994, the PRC has become Taiwan's largest 
trading partner. A decade ago, one could not have
imagined this. The growing, integrated economic ties 
across the Taiwan Straits will continue to lead, unless 
political difficulties arise, to the removal of barriers, 
and to the building of better relations between the two 
regimes.
The PRC has also played a prominent role in Kong 
Kong's economy. In monetary terms, it is Hong Kong's 
largest outside investor, followed by Japan and the 
United States. Since PRC investment is concentrated in 
Hong Kong's strategically important industries such as 
banking, real estate, air and water transportation, the 
former is poised to play a long-term role in the latter 
unless political instability within the PRC or Sino- 
British difficulties over the future of Hong Kong are so 
great, that the PRC has to withdraw from its role to a 
significant extent. Moreover, were it not for Taiwan's 
opposition to two-way trade and investment, the PRC would 
have already played a part in Taiwan's economy.
However, to suggest that economic interaction and 
mutual interdependence (which have been created by trade 
and investment) will continue to increase, one must make 
certain assumptions. Increased economic ties will
31. See the report of Taiwan's Investment Commission, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Statistics on Approved 
Indirect Mainland Investment by Area and by Industry, May 
1993, pp. 68-73.
32. See "Trade With Mainland Grows", Free China Journal 
(Taipei), 2 September 1994, p. 3.
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certainly be contingent upon the PRC continuing its drive 
toward free market capitalism. Leaving Hong Kong aside, 
could the PRC easily merge Taiwan's capitalist style 
economy with its own socialist economy? In her speech in 
Taipei in August 1992, Lady Thatcher (the former British 
Prime Minister) pointed out several conditions for 
increasing meaningful ties across the Taiwan Straits. As 
she observed:
"Still the PRC must continue privatising state-owned 
industries while making its economic links with 
Taiwan. It must resolve the contradiction of a 
capitalist economic system and a communist political 
system. It must continue to allow foreign influence 
in the PRC, including Western and Overseas Chinese 
as well as Taiwanese influence. It must develop a 
legal system that is conducive t$ the further 
development of a market economy. 33
Therefore, what political significance can be drawn 
from the situation described above? Chinese
intellectuals are among the most energetic in analysing 
the political implications that such economic linkages 
may have for the future of Chinese national reunification 
of the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. They express much 
optimism in deeper economic interaction among the three 
territories to the extent that some see as feasible the 
formation of a pan-Chinese economic bloc or an economic 
"Greater China" as the first step towards Chinese 
national reunification. Such optimism may well be ill- 
founded because the proposition that existing economic 
linkages will lead to political reconciliation between 
the PRC and Taiwan is very problematic.
2.4 Patterns of Trade and Investment
By the end of 1994, the PRC's proposals for direct 
trade and investment between itself and Taiwan had not
33. See "The Future Has No Borders", Free China Review 
(Taipei), Vol. 42, No. 9, September 1992, p. 35.
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become reality, but indirect trade and investment had 
grown explosively. The unwillingness of the Taiwan 
authorities to negotiate with PRC officials continued to 
impose limitations even on indirect intercourse, but in 
1993 two-way trade jumped to US$8.68 billion from US$77 
million in 1979 (See Appendix II). The PRC’s imports 
from Taiwan includes textile machinery,
telecommunications equipment, petrochemicals, television 
sets, motorcycles, and so on. For its part, Taiwan buys 
textile items, raw materials, Chinese herbal medicines 
and so on from the PRC.
In order to attract Taiwan's businessmen, the PRC
announced in April 1980 that Taiwan's products would be 
duty-free as "inter-provincial material exchanges"; in 
addition, Taiwan's ships which are "nationality ships" 
would not be charged tonnage-tax.34 This most-favoured- 
status policy toward Taiwan had shortcomings in that some 
other countries, through false labelling and other means, 
took unfair advantage of this tariff relaxation. As a 
result, the PRC cancelled this duty-free policy.35 
However, at the same time, the PRC announced another 
approach to woo its antagonist: "Taiwan imports, by
whatever channel, are still considered domestic products 
and thus exempt from customs tariffs. Instead, they are 
charged a lower adjustment tax which the PRC uses to 
regulate inter-provincial trade".36
It is evident that the PRC's huge potential market 
and the economic incentives offered are tempting bait, 
attractive to Taiwanese businesspeople. As a result, 
some private and indirect trade has gone on since 1979. 
The PRC's ultimate goal is direct rather than indirect
34. See Renmin Ribao, 5 April 1980, p. 1.
35. The policy was abolished in May 1981. Remin Ribao, 12
May 1981, p. 1.
36. Ibid.
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trade. The significance of the former will be greater 
than the latter both politically and economically. In 
May 1985, the PRC even announced that Taiwan’s products 
would be completely duty-free if they were genuinely 
imported from Taiwan, and if the businesspeople were 
truly Taiwanese compatriots.37
In response to such an overt political deal, Taiwan 
was placed in a dilemma about how to handle this issue. 
Then, in July 198 5, Taiwan announced three principles 
governing trade with the PRC: no direct trade would be
permitted; businesspeople were prohibited from contacting
^ O QPRC parties; and entrepot trade was allowed. Thus,
entrepot trade with the PRC has been officially
permissible since 1985. It should be noted, however, 
that Taiwan could only then export to, but not import 
from, the PRC. In July 1988, Taiwan started to allow the 
indirect import of raw materials from the PRC through a 
third country as part of its new liberal policies.39 In 
June 1989, in order to prevent the export of
sophisticated products to the PRC, Taiwan formally
relaxed its trade policy of permitting only entrepot 
trade, to allowing also indirect trade with the PRC.40
In a nutshell, Taiwan's trade policy toward the PRC 
thus far can be summarised by three points: prohibition
of direct trade; no interference with entrepSt or 
indirect trade; and gradual relaxation of the regulations 
governing imports of PRC's raw materials. These points
37. Liang Mien-kuan, "The Golden Route Between Taiwan- 
Hong Kong-China", Jiuling Niandai (Hong KOng: The 
Nineties), May 1985, p. 11.
38. See Zhungyang Ribao, (Taipei: Central Daily Nwws), 5 
July 1986, p. 1.
39. See Free China Journal (Taipei), 18 July 1988, p. 8.
40. Taiwan said that this policy would make it easier to 
control the export destination. See Zhungyang Ribao 
(Taipei), 26 June 1989, p. 2.
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do not mean that Taiwan is forever to bar direct trade 
with the PRC. Direct trade between the two is possible 
only if Taiwan can be recognised and treated as having 
equal political status.41
As for indirect investment, Taiwan began this 
process on a small scale in the mid-1980s and investment 
apace after travel to the PRC was authorised in 1987. 
Because investment is indirect, generally through 
companies in Hong Kong, accurate figures for amounts 
actually invested are not available. However, according 
to relevant sources, the PRC absorbed Taiwan investment 
totalling at least US$14 billion between 1979 and 1993
(See Appendix II). One obvious reason for this amount is
that the PRC offered special incentives to Taiwan 
investors both within its SEZs and elsewhere.
Initially, individual investments to the PRC were 
small, mostly under US$ 1 million, and frequently 
involved the shipment of used machinery from factories 
that were no longer profitable to operate in Taiwan. 
Many plants involved simple operations - processing,
finishing, or assembling materials and components shipped 
from Taiwan. Uncertainties about future economic and 
political conditions in the PRC caused investors to take 
a short-term view, investing in projects that had good
prospects for allowing recovery of their investment 
within two or three years.42
A typical example of such investment was a shoe 
factory set up in Fujian province with machinery shipped 
from Taiwan. At first, it had only a single assembly 
line with several hundred workers recruited locally,
41. See art. 3 5 of Taiwan's Mainland Relationship Statute 
(TMRS) of 1992.
42. The author was informed of this by the Taiwanese 
investors based in the PRC while carrying out interviews 
in the PRC in 1992 and 1994.
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where labour was cheap. Materials were sent from Taiwan 
to be assembled into finished shoes, which were then 
exported to the United States or other countries. This 
type of operation did not bring in high technology, but 
it was advantageous to the PRC as it absorbed surplus 
labour and earned foreign exchange. The Taiwanese owner 
supplied a small amount of capital, plus management 
skills, marketing expertise, and connections.43
Like that of other foreign investors in the PRC, 
Taiwanese investors were often beset by problems. . In 
particular, because no official relations existed between 
the two governments, these investors could not seek 
governmental assistance when trade disputes arose. 
Electric power was frequently unreliable, requiring 
investors to supply their own generators to assure 
quality and meet deadlines.44 The need to import 
materials and components from abroad led to delays caused 
by inefficiencies in the PRC customs service. The need 
to operate through a dummy paper company in a third 
country, usually located in Hong Kong, and to travel and 
ship goods through it added to costs. Moreover, it took 
between two and six weeks for a Taiwan passport holder to 
obtain a visa for Hong Kong.45
A classic example of a frustrated Taiwanese 
investment project in the PRC is the case of the Formosa 
Plastics Group. This Group, the largest private
industrial company in Taiwan, announced in 1990 the 
possibility of investing up to US$7 billion in a 
petrochemical facility in Fujian province of the PRC. 
The proposed project, which would include an oil refinery 
and two naphtha crackers capable of producing over one
43. The author interviewed a Taiwanese shoe manufacturer 
based in Fujian province in 1992.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
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billion metric tons of ethylene per year, was expected to 
lead in addition to many "downstream" petrochemical 
industries in the PRC.46
The Taiwan government feared that this investment 
project would lead others to overestimate the safety and 
potential profitability of investment in the PRC. 
Theoretically, the Taiwan government could not prevent an 
investment project by this Group, since the Group could 
invest indirectly either through its US subsidiary or via 
a "paper1 company in Hong Kong. The Taiwan government, 
however, did exert pressure on the Group by denying bank 
loans from Taiwan and preventing the transfer of capital 
abroad. This investment project highlights some of the 
complicated and challenging issues presented by the 
growing economic interaction between Taiwan and the PRC.
2.5 Bodies Bridging the Taiwan Straits
With the establishment of the Straits Exchange 
Foundation (SEF)47 in November 1990, Taiwan created an 
authoritative, "unofficial" channel for dealing with the 
PRC authorities, matched a year later by PRC establishing 
a counterpart: the Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Straits (ARATS). These two quasi-official bodies 
handle a broad range of problems arising between Taiwan 
and the PRC, including the issues of trade and 
investment.
The SEF is a nonprofit corporate entity funded 
primarily by the Taiwan government, but also with 
contributions from private sources. Dr. Koo Chen-fu, a 
prominent Taiwan businessmen, was appointed chairman. It
46. See Zhongyang Ribao (Taipei: Central Daily News), 22 
July 1990, p. 3.
47. See Free China Journal (Taipei), 25 February 1991, p. 
1.
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has a board of directors of forty-three persons, twenty 
of them from business circles, the remainder from the 
Central Standing Committee of the KMT, the National 
Assembly, academic and political circles, and the news 
media. It is an intermediary agency commissioned by the 
government to negotiate with the PRC officials on 
technical and non-official issues such as tourism, trade, 
investment, legal affairs, general affairs, and so on.
In response to SEF's request for non-official
exchanges between the two regimes, the PRC established
the ARATS in 1992 as an "unofficial" body in charge of
promoting relations with Taiwan. Nominally, the ARATS is
non-official; in fact, it is directed and administered by
the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office. Although the
announcement stressed the non-governmental nature, the
body's sixty-five-member board of directors included a
48substantial number of government officials. Wang 
Daohan, the former mayor of Shanghai, is in charge of 
this body. According to Wang, the body strives to 
promote the direct "three links" (santong) between Taiwan 
and the PRC which are: exchanges of postal services,
4 Qtransportation, and trade.
Through the SEF and the ARATS, the two regimes have 
contacted each other under the guise of non-official 
communication. The meeting known as the "Koo-Wang
CA , .Talks" u m  April 1993, held in Singapore, marked the
48. The author was informed of this while carrying out 
interviews with officials of the ARATS in the PRC in 
1992.
49. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service: China, 19 
July 1991, pp. 69-70. The mission of the ARATS is under 
the orders of the State Council and the Communist Party 
to realise the peaceful reunification task on the basis 
of "one country, two systems".
50. The term Koo-Wang refers to Dr, Koo Chen-fu and Mr. 
Wang Daohan. The former is the chairman of Taiwan's SEF 
and the latter is the: Chairman of the PRC's ARATS. Both 
of the are very important political personalities.
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highest level of such non-official contact between the 
two regimes since 1949. Although discussion of political 
issues was banned, the talks at the very least indicated 
an improvement towards an equal relationship. As a 
recent example, in early 199 5, the two bodies exchanged 
drafts of a proposed agreement on repatriation of 
hijackers. The two have also worked out the framework of 
an agreement on sending back nationals who enter each 
other's territory illegally, and an agreement on ways of 
dealing with fishing disputes.
2.6 Conclusion
While international business circles are correct to 
point out the regional or even international implications 
of what they see as Chinese economic integration, caution 
should be exercised m  using the term "Greater China". 
Officials in both the PRC and Taiwan have observed with 
some apprehension the global trend toward closer regional 
economic cooperation, as exemplified by the European 
Community and the North American Free Trade Area, fearing 
that regional organisations would become too 
protectionist. Hence, there is a strong motivation on 
the part of both governments in encouraging economic 
cooperation among the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan so as 
to create a strong regional bloc, capable of holding its 
own against challenges from other regions.
We have reason to be optimistic about future 
political-economic developments moving in the direction 
of "Greater China" economic interdependence. The PRC
51. See Asian Bulletin (Taipei), Vol. 20, No, 3, March 
1995, p. 21.
52. Stephen Whalley, "'Greater China1: What's in a 
Name?", Paper delivered to Contemporary China Seminar, 
Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Hawaii, 27 
February 1993.
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scholar, Fang Sheng, proposed the establishment of a 
"China Economic Conglomerate " to include the PRC, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan which would be at first simply a loosely 
organised, unofficial organisation, but which would 
develop step-by-step towards quasi-governmental and 
finally even full governmental cooperation. Thus, the
growing economic integration of these three economies is 
driven not only by the profit-making activities of 
individual business, but also by the vision, shared on 
both sides of the Taiwan Straits, of a future when full 
advantage could be taken of the complementary nature of 
the three economies.
53. See Beijing Review, Vol. 34, No. 48, 1991, pp. 28-30.
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CHAPTER THREE
BACKGROUND TO, AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR,
PRIVATE TAIWAN-PRC LINKS
After the Communist victory and the establishment of 
the PRC in 1949, interaction between the people of Taiwan 
and the people of the PRC came to a virtual standstill. 
The defeated KMT, while retaining control only over 
Taiwan and nearby smaller islands, continued to assert 
the existence of the ROC whose purported territories 
included all the provinces and regions of Mainland China. 
The PRC likewise claimed that its territories included 
all areas of Mainland China and Taiwan. Thus, the 
persistent position of each regime has been that there is 
only one "China" of which it is the sole legitimate 
government.
3.1 A Re-unified China: A Future or a Futility?
China became a divided country after the end of the 
civil war in 1949. Since then, the ROC on Taiwan and the 
PRC on the mainland have existed almost entirely as 
mutually exclusive entities. The main difference between 
the two in their political and economic ideology is that 
Taiwan pursues a capitalist system but the PRC is run on 
predominantly communist lines.
Since 1949, both Taiwan and the PRC each pursued 
economic policies that have ranged from attempts at 
comprehensive central planning to almost complete 
laissez-faire. In Taiwan, the KMT government initially 
undertook policies of land reform and import- 
substitution-based industrial development, which entailed 
substantial government participation in the economy. In 
the 1960s, the government switched direction to a 
private-enterprises-based, export-oriented strategy of
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industrialisation. To date, however, the government has 
continued to undertake major industrial development 
projects.
In short, Taiwan has combined some state ownership 
of heavy industry, the banking system, and provision of 
infrastructure with a largely free-enterprise, export- 
oriented economy. Taiwan has now firmly established 
itself as one of the post-war economic power houses of 
Asia. Rapid economic expansion has transformed the 
Taiwanese economy from a poor agricultural base into a 
sophisticated industrial one and most recently, to a 
service sector economy.1 In decades, Taiwan has achieved 
what has been recognized world-wide as an "economic 
miracle", and has consistently been rated one of the 
world's top economic performers in terms of both growth 
and equity.
Since 1987, the outward foreign direct investment
'i
(FDI) of Taiwan has expanded spectacularly. There are 
three main reasons for this development. First, there 
has been a rapid rise in land and labour costs in Taiwan. 
Secondly, the marked appreciation of Taiwan's currency 
(the New Taiwan Dollar) further diminishes the
1. In recent years, Taiwan's services sectors —  the 
financial sector in particular —  have gained increasing 
importance. Substantial financial liberalisation has 
been taking place in Taiwan. The objective is to promote 
Taiwan as an international financial centre that can 
compete with Hong Kong and Singapore. For further 
studies, see Prabhu Ghate et al., Informal Finance: Some 
Findings from Asia, Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank and 
Oxford University Press, 1992.
2. "The Other China is Starting to Soar", Business Week 
(6 November 1989), p. 60.
3. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an 
important role in the economic development of the Asia- 
Pacific region. For further studies, see Eric D. 
Ramstetter, (ed.), Direct Foreign Investment in Asia's 
Developing Economics and Stmictural Change in the Asia- 
Pacific Region, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.
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competitiveness of its exports. Lastly, and most 
importantly, the significant relaxation of regulations on 
outward investment (including the simplification of 
application procedure and relaxation of foreign exchange 
control) encourages investment overseas, including the 
PRC.
Many Asian countries are recipients of Taiwan's 
outward FDI. Hong Kong, with its close PRC connection 
and excellent infrastructure, acts as an important base 
for Taiwan investors to invest in the PRC. Its role as 
an intermediary has been strengthened further since 1990 
when FDI to the PRC (FDI via a third country) was 
permitted by the Taiwanese government.
In contrast to Taiwan, the PRC from the 1950s to 
197 0s, adhered more or less rigidly to a Marxist model 
of economic development in almost complete isolation, by 
a programme emphasising heavy industry coupled with its 
own radical version of rural collectivisation. 
Government planners controlled all factories, farms, and 
enterprises, set prices for all goods and services, 
assigned production inputs and specified output targets, 
allocated labour, rationed goods in short supply,
determined individual incomes, and chose the mix between
consumption and investment.
The PRC economy was in ruins at the end of the
Cultural Revolution in 1976. Since 1979, the PRC has 
reduced its emphasis on Soviet-style central planning in 
favour of greater reliance on market forces. However, 
political considerations, rather than market forces
alone, often dictate economic measures. In 1979 Deng 
Xiaoping assumed control from the Maoist leaders and 
instituted a bold new "Open Policy" designed rapidly to 
develop the PRC economy. According to this Policy, in 
the 1980s four special economic zones were established,
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followed by the opening up of fourteen coastal cities and 
the setting up of economic development zones.
Deng's plan was to introduce Western technology and 
capital, and elements of a market economy. However, ten 
years of rapid economic growth have led to the 
development of two distinct economies in the PRC, one 
inside and the other outside the state plan.4 Although 
little of the economic progress in recent years is 
attributable to the economy within the state plan, the 
PRC still relies upon its socialist system to assert firm 
authority over state enterprises.5
Although the PRC established a socialist market 
economy in 1992, however, foreign trade and investment 
are still driven by needs identified in central
f tplanning. At present, the PRC government itself still 
plays an important role in guiding the new economic 
system, with public ownership remaining the backbone of 
the economy.7 With PRC central planning offering
4. The Wall Street Journal, 3 0 August 1989, p. A-13. 
This emergence of two economies was called in the PRC the 
"Jihua nei/wai" phenomenon, i.e. economic activity which 
is within the state plan, and economic activity which is 
outside it, undertaken "privately".
5. The PRC's remarkable economy growth is driven by non­
state industries, yet state-owned enterprises still 
account for half of industrial output and seventy per 
cent of urban workforce. For further studies, see David 
Brown and Mark Easterby-Smith, Research Report on China's 
Market-Oriented Management, England: Lancaster University 
Management School, 1993.
6. In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping initiated a new era of 
economic reforms in which the market economy is described 
as compatible with either socialist or capitalist 
economies. However, Deng's emerging market economy 
policy seems to contradict the PRC Constitution which 
calls for official state economic domination of central 
planning. See Art. 15 of the 1982 PRC Constitution.
7. See Prof. Gao Shangquan, "China's Socialist Market 
Economy", The Chinese Economic Association (UK) 
Newsletter, London: The Chinese Economic Association in 
the U. K., Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 4-5.
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preferential treatment, Taiwanese trade and investment 
in the PRC has increased significantly in the late 1980s, 
particularly in Fujian and Guangdong provinces.
In recent years, the proliferation of informal 
contacts and a boom in indirect commercial relations may 
represent the beginnings of a possible future re-
Q
unification of the two. The gradually increased
reliance on Taiwanese trade and investment in the PRC 
could allow PRC to obtain control over Taiwan's economy, 
in such a way that re-unification efforts could be
accelerated.10 In fact, both Taiwan and the PRC agree 
that "there is only one China"; however, each side has 
its own version of "one China". The PRC wants Taiwan to 
be a part of "communist China" with its "Chinese-style" 
socialism, while Taiwan demands the mainland be a part of 
"free China" under conditions of democracy and a full 
capitalist market economy.
Recently, Taiwan's rapid industrialisation, as well 
as the PRC's economic reforms have significantly
complicated the "theological" debate about who are the
rightful rulers of all China. Taiwan, with its new-found 
wealth and democratic liberties is anxious to achieve 
western recognition and play a fuller role in the world 
community. Yet movement on this front is largely 
dependent upon Taiwan's status in relation to the PRC. 
The simplicity of the past has been replaced by confusion 
in Taiwan about how to deal with the "China Question".
8. Edward K. Y. Chen, "Foreign Direct Investment in East 
Asia", Asian Development Review, Manila: Asian
Development Bank Press, 1993, p. 50.
9. The PRC indicated that various investment and trade 
incentives were targeted at Taiwanese businesses to 
induce industrial and commercial circles in Taiwan to 
establish the conditions for re-unification. See Jingji 
Ribao (Beijing: Economic Daily, 9 September 1990), p. 1.
Also see note 3 9 of Chapter 1.
10. Ibid.
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Taiwan has long asked itself at what pace contacts 
with the PRC should proceed, and what will be the 
ultimate result of increasing contacts. The current KMT 
leadership says it wants a "re-united China, but not 
now".11 There are indications which suggest that Taiwan 
really seeks to return to the United Nations from which 
it was ejected in 1971 when the PRC government replaced 
it as the representative of "China". Re-entry into the 
United Nations represents Taiwan's ambition for achieving 
broad international recognition of its sovereignty.
In the event, the PRC voiced strong objections, 
saying that admitting Taiwan to the United Nations would 
set an "abominable precedent" and would interfere in PRC 
internal affairs.12 There are only thirty countries in 
the world still according Taiwan full diplomatic 
recognition. Most western countries have only de facto 
relations with Taiwan, stationing officials in Taipei at 
quasi-embassies called trade offices and limiting 
official diplomatic contacts. However, Taiwan is very 
much a reality that international society cannot afford 
to ignore.
In the context of international law, it is clear 
that Taiwan is a State. According to Article 1 of the 
19 3 3 Montevideo Convention of the Rights and Duties of 
States, "the State as a person of international law 
should possess the following qualification: (i) a
permanent population; (ii) a defined territory; (iii) a 
Government; and (iv) a capacity to enter into relations
11. Jason Hu, "President Lee's Pragmatic Diplomacy and 
China's Re-unification", The Daily Telegraph, a special 
report on the Republic of China, (London: The Daily 
Telegraph, 21 May 1990), p. 2.
12. See The Taiwan Question and Re-unification of China, 
issued by the State Council of the PRC, Beijing: Taiwan 
Affairs Office & Information Office, (English Edition), 
August 1993.
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with other states.1 According to the former President of
the United Nations Court of Administration, Madame
Bastid, the ROC on Taiwan, with its constant existence,
its territory, its people, its public service, its
national flag, and its sovereignty, is definitely a State
13m  the international community.
Is a re-unified "China" a future or a futility? No 
one knows the answer. The nature of China's division is 
unique in world affairs. Both governments of Taiwan and 
the PRC agree that "there is but one China, and Taiwan is 
a part of it". According to Taiwan's Guide-lines for 
National Unification in 1991, Taiwan's current "one 
China, not-now-but-later policy," is proof of its genuine 
desire to expand its international reach and 
responsibility, and to compete peacefully with the PRC 
for future re-unification.14
In contrast, the PRC has its own re-unification goal
15of "one country, two systems" m  respect of Taiwan. 
Under this model, the PRC would recognise Taiwan as a 
special administrative region16 with its own government, 
with its own domestic laws, with an independent judicial 
system, and with independent armed forces. In return,
13. See Kuen-chen Fu, Law and National Affairs, Taipei: 
Times Publishing Co., 1982, pp. 163-164.
14. Supra note 11.
15. This proposal was first made in 1983, offering Taiwan 
terms even more favourable than those devised for the 
PRC's takeover of Hong Kong in 1997. It became known 
through a discussion between Deng Xiaoping and Professor 
Yang Liyu of Seton Hall University of the United States. 
For an account of the discussion and for a summary of the 
proposal, see Deng Xiaoping, "An Idea for the Peaceful 
Reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan", in 
Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (1987), p. 19.
16. The PRC Constitution allows the government to 
establish special administrative regions as necessary. 
For further studies, see Hungdah Chiu, "The 1982 Chinese 
Constitution and the Rule of Law", Review of Socialist 
Law, Vol. 11 (1985).
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the government of Taiwan would be required to recognise
the PRC as its sole international representative and to
1 7 •abandon its claim to authority over the mainland. This 
proposal would result in a predominantly communist 
system, coupled with a subordinate capitalist system. 
Since the Hong Kong people have already voiced their 
doubts over this model, it would be impossible to see 
Taiwan accepting a similar scheme.
Most probably, people in Taiwan who have been
enjoying a market economy and a developing democracy
would prefer to wait until socio-economic conditions in
the PRC have become more stable and approach comparable
stage to these of Taiwan. It was Mao Zedong himself who
said that while he was sure Taiwan and the mainland would
inevitably be reunified one day, it wouldn’t necessarily
be within his lifetime; perhaps one hundred years after
his death might be needed. Now, with Maoism being phased
out, the gap between the living standards of Taiwan and
the PRC is gradually narrowing. But there still remain
fundamental differences in the social and economic
1 ftsystems of the two territories.
Nevertheless, the development of a strong economic 
relationship between Taiwan and the PRC may lead to a 
change in their relative bargaining powers in any future
17. The proposal is similar in most respects to the plan 
under which the PRC shall regain sovereignty over Hong 
Kong in 1997, see "The Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China for Solicitation of Opinions", Beijing Review, 9-15 
May 1988, p. 23.
18. The author was informed of this while carrying out 
interviews with many PRC governmental officials in 1994. 
Those governmental officials all quoted Jiang Zemin, 
Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, as 
saying "private ownership of property: not in my life 
time". It seems the PRC is still vowing to uphold its 
Socialist/Communist ideology. However, not one of these 
governmental officials commented as to how things will be 
after the Party leader and his contemporaries pass away.
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negotiations over the terms and conditions for re­
unification. 19 But with mutual non-recognition and
hostility, each side has firmly rejected the proposal of 
the other for future re-unification. Under such
circumstances, re-unification of "China" seems a long way 
off.
3.2 Background to Taiwan-Chinese Economic Links
Taiwan and China are geographically close. Taiwan 
has a long history of world trade. It was a major trade
and shipping port during the Dutch and Spanish
occupations in the seventeenth century, and again when 
China's ports were opened by the Treaty of Tientsin in 
the mid-nineteenth century.20 For centuries, economic 
relations between Taiwan and China included everything 
from piracy and smuggling to transhipping and trade.
Historians and archaeologists have yet to agree on 
exactly when economic exchanges first began between 
residents of China and residents of Taiwan, but there is 
a consensus that Taiwan-Chinese economic contacts long 
predate the first decades of the seventeenth century, 
when large numbers of Han Chinese from China first 
settled on Taiwan. Military expeditions to Taiwan in 
A . D . 230 and 610 are mentioned in early Chinese records.
It was probably over a thousand years ago that Chinese
19. See Chu-yuan Cheng, "Haixia Liangan Jingmao Guanxi 
Xianshi ji Qianjing" (The Reality and Prospects for 
Economic and Trade Relationship across the Taiwan 
Straits), Zhongyang Ribao, Taipei: Central Daily News, 22 
July 1990, p. 3.
20. For further studies on foreign encroachments on China 
in the nineteenth century, see J. F. Fairbank, China: A 
New History, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 
202.
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fishermen began coming regularly to Taiwan from the
91Chinese coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.
3.2.1 History to 1949
China has maintained contact with Taiwan since the 
earliest times. During the sixteenth century, permanent 
settlements were established by immigrants who came 
largely from southern Fujian. Subsequently, these began a 
major expansion in cross-straits commercial ties between 
China and Taiwan. For this reason, the Taiwanese dialect 
is closely related to the local dialect of Amoy (Min'an
9 9Hua) in southern Fujian.
The immigrants used Taiwan as a staging post to
Japan, a stepping stone in the then expanding trade
between Japan and South East Asia. The settlements
generated a worthwhile trade in their own right, creating
a barter business of Chinese jewellery and cloth for
9 3Taiwan's prized deer products.
As they were interested in establishing trading 
posts, the last part of the sixteenth century also 
brought Europeans to Taiwan: first the Portuguese, then
the Spanish and the Dutch. When the Portuguese sailors 
first gazed at Taiwan, they called it "Ilha Formosa" 
which means the "beautiful island."2-4 In 1624, the Dutch
21. See Lih-wu Han, Taiwan Today, Taipei: Cheng Chung 
Book Co., 1988, p. l.
22. Id.
23. During the seventeenth century, many Chinese 
fishermen visited Taiwan to purchase deer skins, which 
brought substantial profits in Japan, where they were 
used for making armour. See Simon Long, Taiwan to 1993, 
Special Report No. 1159, London: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, June 1989, p. 4.
24. "Ilha Formosa" is a word of Portuguese origin, 
meaning literally "beautiful island". It was first so 
named by the Portuguese seafarers to describe Taiwan as a
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occupied Taiwan and held it for thirty eight years until 
1661 when it was again liberated by a Ming Dynasty
loyalist named Cheng Cheng-kung. In 162 6, the Spanish 
invaded and occupied several coastal cities in northern 
Taiwan. Fifteen years later, the Spanish were driven out 
by the Dutch.
During the period of occupation, the Dutch and the 
Spanish both set up trading companies branches in Taiwan, 
giving them additional trade bases in the rest of the 
world. In 1661, Cheng Cheng-kung, the famous Ming 
loyalist known in the West as "Koxinga" fled to Taiwan 
from China, defeating the Dutch with several thousand 
Chinese, and made the island his personal kingdom. Many 
followed him to escape Manchu rule and these new 
immigrants greatly facilitated the transfer of Chinese
culture to the island.
To negate Cheng and his descendants' claims to 
sovereignty over Taiwan, the Manchu regime sought to gain 
control over the island. They eventually succeeded, 
making Taiwan a part of Fujian province in 1683. Prior 
to this, Taiwan-Chinese trade had dwindled seriously, 
leaving only piracy and smuggling activities across the 
straits. However, Taiwan kept a broad range of trade
contacts with the rest of world.
During the period 1624 to 1683, both Chinese and 
foreigners used Taiwan as a centre for transhipping 
China's commodities to the rest of the world. As a 
result, business links between Taiwan and China became 
close. For the next two centuries Taiwan remained a 
relatively obscure off-shore possession of the Chinese
Empire, until it was made a province in its own right in
beautiful island during the sixteenth century and 
remained known by this name in the Western world for four 
hundred years.
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1886. Life in Taiwan began to resemble life in China and 
conditions in the two became almost identical.
From 1683 to 1860, Taiwan's economy developed into
something more than a self-sufficient agricultural sector
- • 2 5supporting entrepot, barter and private trade. At the
same time, immigration from China was actively
encouraged. These Chinese immigrants maintained close
trade relations with their motherland. Taiwan had no
real manufacturing facilities and thus almost exclusively
imported finished goods rather than raw materials.
Chinese traders operating junks across the Taiwan Straits
supplemented the trade conducted by Western traders.
An estimated 100,000 Chinese settled in Taiwan 
between 1624 and 1661. The number doubled during the 
time when Cheng and his descendants ruled Taiwan (1661 - 
1683). By 1860, Chinese residents in Taiwan totalled two 
million. By 1905, the Chinese population on Taiwan had 
increased to nearly three million.26
According to the Treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1858 
by China with Britain, France, the United States and 
Russia, China opened a number of treaty ports to trade. 
Four ports were opened in Taiwan for the four foreign 
countries before 1862.27 Subsequently, several other 
countries also signed trade pacts with China. Between 
1860 and 1895, Taiwan established many trade links with
^  TO
the world and functioned as an entrepot.
25. Simon Long, supra note 23, p. 5.
26. See Man-houng Lin, "New Concept, Old Reality", Free 
China Review, Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Co., Vol. 44, 
No. 1, 1994, p. 43.
27. Supra note 19.
28. For example, Xiamen (Amoy) and Hong Kong became the 
transhipping ports for Taiwan's agricultural products en 
route to the West. The Western products were sold to 
Taiwan through Shanghai and Hong Kong. See Man-hong Lin, 
supra note 26, p. 44.
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In 1894, China and Japan went to war. Under the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, which followed the war, Manchuria, 
Taiwan, and the Pescadores, a group of islands lying off 
the west coast of Taiwan were 'seized1 by the Japanese in 
1895.29 Under Japanese rule, Taiwan and China initially 
maintained close trade relations. However, Japan first 
started by creating a thriving plantation economy in 
Taiwan, and then also introduced a certain measure of 
industrialisation, including the island's first railway, 
and a hydroelectric power plant. After 1902, China was 
replaced by Japan as Taiwan's chief trading partner.
By the end of the Second World War, five decades of
Japanese rule had made Taiwan the longest-established and
wealthiest Japanese colony. However, since 1895
successive Chinese governments understandably took the
view that Taiwan had been snatched from China during a
moment of weakness. Upon Japan's surrender in August
1945, Taiwan was swiftly reunited with China as a 
30province.
When the Second World War ended, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers gave the Nationalist 
Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek authority to accept
29. The term "stolen territory" was used in the Cairo 
Declaration of 26 November 1943 . It refers to the areas 
taken from the Chinese by Japan (between 1895 and 1945) , 
such as Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores.
30. The decision was made at the Cairo Conference, which 
issued the Cairo Declaration (1 December 1943) dealing 
with the post-war situation in the Far East. See 
Documents 11 and 12: "The Cairo Conference: The Chinese
record of the November 26, 194 3 Meeting" and "The Cairo
Declaration, November 26, 1943", in Hungdah Chiu (ed.),
China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis, 
New York: Praeger, 1973, pp. 205-6. The complete text of 
the Cairo Declaration can be found in Foreign Relations 
of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences 
at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 448-449.
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the Japanese surrender and administer the island. 
Although most Taiwanese undoubtedly welcomed their 
reabsorption by China, the process was not without its 
strains. Leadership positions were largely transferred 
from the former Japanese to the mainland Chinese coming 
to administer Taiwan on the central government’s behalf. 
The Taiwanese naturally resented this fact and sporadic 
protest riots spread across the island. These were 
brutally repressed at the cost of several thousand
-3 T
lives.
Although the government at that time laboured to 
repair the damage, this incident and related events laid 
a foundation for the later ill-feeling between the native 
Taiwanese (numbering about six million) and the mainland 
Chinese people (numbering about one and a half million) 
who began arriving in 1949. As a result, a Taiwan 
Independence Movement developed and this constituted a 
potential threat to Nationalist China's rule of the 
island.  ^ Trade between Taiwan and China, resumed in 
1945, was banned in 1949.
3.2.2 Military Confrontation, 1949-78
While postwar reconstruction was taking place in
Taiwan, the CCP resumed its attacks on the KMT in China. 
The KMT began to lose control of the country. In late 
1949, the KMT moved its seat of government from the 
mainland to 'the island of Taiwan, while the CCP founded
31. For further studies on this anti-Chinese riot, see 
The Truth About the February 28, 1947 Incident in Taiwan, 
Taichung: Historical Research Commission of Taiwan 
Province (comp.), 1967.
32. The Taiwan Independence Movement advocates an 
independent state of Taiwan, governed by Taiwanese only, 
and appeals to the memory of the uprising to stimulate
Taiwanese antipathy to the nationalist Chinese rule. It
is active in Japan, United States and some European 
countries. For an official Nationalist report, see id.
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the PRC on the mainland. Since 1949, Taiwan has been 
governed by the KMT directly. Despite its comprehensive 
defeat in the civil war, Taiwan regarded the 1949 retreat 
as temporary and determined to return to the mainland, to 
re-unite the country under Nationalist leadership. At 
the same time, the PRC proclaimed that Taiwan was going 
to be "liberated through military means." From 1949 to 
1978, links between the PRC and Taiwan were characterized 
by confrontation and hostility.
In the 197 0s, when the PRC was admitted to the
United Nations and established diplomatic relations with
the United States, a different strategy evolved on the
part of the mainland authorities. Instead of
"liberating" Taiwan, the PRC sought to "unify China
through peaceful means," while reserving the right to
31"solve the Taiwan problem through military means."
In the early 1980s, the PRC made an assortment of offers 
in an attempt to lure Taiwan into re-unification 
negotiations.34 Although direct contact was non­
33. On 1 October 1979, the PRC National People's Congress 
recommended the resumption of postal services between the 
two sides or opening some other channel for 
communication. At the same time, the Congress made a 
gesture of its intention to abandon the threat of 
"liberating" Taiwan by ordering a cease-fire on Quemoy 
and Matsu, Taiwan's mainland defense frontiers, while 
reserving the right to use force for solving Taiwan 
problem.. See Zili Wanbao (Taipei: Independence Evening 
Post), 29th August 1987, p. 2. Also see Yearbook of the 
Republic of China, Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 
1991, p. 197.
34. On 30 September 1981, the PRC made a "nine-point 
proposal" for the peaceful reunification of China, 
calling for direct "ruling party-to-party" negotiations 
and offering to create a "Taiwan Special Administrative 
Region" which would be able to retain its own armed 
forces and its current socio-economic system. For the 
text, see Renmin Ribao (Beijing: The People's Daily), 1 
October 1981, p. 2. Also, in 1983, the PRC proposed a 
plan for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan and 
Mainland China under the "one country, two systems" 
formula, offering Taiwan terms even more favourable than 
those devised for the PRC's takeover of Hong Kong in 
1997. See Deng Xiaoping, "An Idea for the Peaceful 
Reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan",
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existent, some economic ties of a limited indirect nature 
did exist between the two even at this stage. Some 
indirect trade, for instance, was carried out, but only 
in a clandestine manner and at a minimal volume of US$ 50 
million annually.35 Most of the indirect trade 
transactions were conducted by certain Taiwanese 
government agencies which were authorised to make 
purchases from the PRC, either via Hong Kong or on the 
international market. The PRC also imported limited 
quantities of consumer goods indirectly from Taiwan. 
Their value never exceeded US$50,000 per year. The 
balance of trade at this time was very much in the PRC's 
favour.36
3.2.3 Illegal Indirect Trade and Investment, 1978-84
In 1979, the PRC urged Taiwan to establish direct 
trade, telecommunication, and traffic connections (known 
as the "three links"), as well as academic, cultural, 
sports, and technological exchanges (known as the "four 
exchanges"). Meanwhile, it ceased its shelling of the
. 1 7 . . .Taiwan-controlled off-shore islands. The PRC initially 
made large purchases of Taiwanese consumer goods through 
intermediaries in Hong Kong. In 1980, the PRC even went
Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (1987), p. 19. 
For further relevant PRC documents, see Tongyi Zhongguo 
Renren Youze (Reunification of China is everybody's 
business), (Beijing: Beijing Publishing House, 1985).
35. For years, Taiwanese customers clandestinely 
purchased PRC medicinal herbs, tea, and other native 
products of foodstuffs, the value totalling a mere US$50 
million per year. See Li Dahong, "Mainland-Taiwan 
Economic Relations on the Rise", Beijing Review, 
(Beijing), 3-9 April 1989, p. 24.
36. See Jan S. Prybyla, "The Economic Relations Across 
the Taiwan Straits", (Paper presented in Asia & World 
Institute, Taipei, Taiwan, 1 June 1989) , Asia & World 
Institute Digest, Vol. 11, No. 1, July 1989, p. 58.
37. See Beijing Review, 5-11 January 1979, pp. 16-17.
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so far as to remove duties on Taiwanese goods, henceforth 
regarding indirect PRC-Taiwan trade, which was still 
considered illegal in Taiwan, as domestic trade. 
However, this preferential measure discriminated against 
Hong Kong-made goods and inevitably gave rise to 
speculation, and to uncertainty among Hong Kong re­
exporters. It was abolished in May 1981.38
During the period 1978 to 1984, the Taiwan 
authorities maintained that trade and investment with the 
PRC, direct and indirect, was illegal. Even though 
trading had been in fact conducted discreetly for quite 
some time, it had been on a small scale, mainly due to 
fear of penalties in the event of being discovered. 
Despite the peace rhetoric, no substantial ties, official 
or unofficial, were built up between Taiwan and the PRC 
during the period 1980-84. Yet there was a noticeable 
increase in indirect trade, which grew annually by as 
much as 157 per cent. In the post 1980 period, Taiwan 
became the leading source of Hong Kong's re-exported 
goods to the PRC. Moreover, despite official prohibition, 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs had been investing in the 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces of the PRC since 1979.39
3.2.4 Non-interference in One-way Indirect Trade and 
Investment, 1985-87
One important dimension of Taiwan-PRC economic 
relations which emerged in the mid-1980s was that more 
and more Taiwanese businessmen were encouraged by the 
market potential of the PRC's ongoing economic reforms.
38. Ricky Tung, "Mainland China in Taiwan's Economic 
Future", Issues & Studies, Vol. 11, No.l, July 1989, 
p. 58.
39. Bill Kazer, "Taiwan breaks a taboo", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 27 July 1979, pp. 44-45; Andrew Tanzer, 
"Taiwan's China links", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 
June 1981, p. 53-54.
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They set aside the political and ideological restrictions 
and went searching for commercial opportunities through 
indirect channels. They then provided technology and 
capital in their trade and investment activities on the 
PRC's southeast coast.40 Taiwan, under pressure of
public opinion, announced in July 1985 that the 
government would adhere to a principle of "non­
interference" and "non-encouragement" when dealing with 
such business activities.41
According to Taiwan law, punishment of sedition for 
financially assisting the "communist rebels" by engaging 
in direct trade and investment with the PRC could range
from ten years' imprisonment to the death penalty.42
However, the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in November 
1987 has legalised commercial activities of indirect
trade and unilateral investment from Taiwan to the PRC.
The Taiwan authorities began to assume that commercial 
activities of Taiwanese national with PRC party were not 
necessarily deemed as treason.43 Doing business with the
40. Ying-hsien Liu and Liu-chi Chiang, "Taiwan-Mainland 
Economic and Trade Relations Over the Last Decade: 
Retrospect and Prospect", Tai-Sheng (Voice of Taiwan), 
(Taipei: Tai-Sheng Press, 1989), No. 2, pp. 9-14.
41. Exports of Taiwanese goods to the PRC must be 
conducted indirectly through a third country. However, 
Taiwan maintained during 1985 to 1987 that import of PRC 
goods was illegal.
42. See Article 4(4) and 4(6) of Taiwan's Statute on 
Punishment Against Rebellion (in force 21 June 1949) 
which made any act of transporting goods for or supplying 
funds to the rebel a criminal offence punishable with no 
less than ten years in prison. The offence could even 
result in life imprisonment or death. For further 
studies, see Ming-Min Peng, "Political Offences in Taiwan 
Laws and Problems", The China Quarterly, July-September 
1971, p. 472. This Statute was abandoned in 1991 
following the announcement of the end of the "Period of 
National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist 
Rebellion" which meant the communist regime in Beijing 
was no longer considered as rebels by the Taiwan 
government.
43. Ibid. In Taiwan, many statues treated the PRC regime 
as a rebel organisation and deemed any act favourable to
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PRC in order to make a profit was not treated any more as 
assisting financially the ’’communist rebels" in the PRC. 
Taiwan's courts supported such policy by maintaining the 
same stance in similar subsequent cases.44
3.2.5 A Breakthrough in 1987
Until July 1987, Taiwan was ruled under the
provisions of an emergency decree (or "martial law"), in
force as a result of the civil war with the CCP. After
the lifting of martial law, the Taiwan authorities
enjoyed greater flexibility in adopting more liberal
4 5measures in Taiwan-PRC economic relations. At the
same time, the PRC allowed direct and extensive private 
relationships with Taiwan, and its State Council 
announced that trade activities with Taiwan would be 
jointly managed and approved by its Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT).46
Trade between Taiwan and the PRC has expanded 
quickly. As a result, by 1988, Taiwan had become the
that regime as treason. See Zhongguo Shibao (Taipei: 
China Times, 1 February 1991) , p. 11.
44. Paiff Huang, "Prospects for Economic and Trade 
Development Between Taiwan and Mainland China", (Paper 
presented at the seminar of International Business 
Fellows, Altanta, Georgia, USA, 13 April 1989) , Formosa 
Transnational Law Review, no. 46, Taipei: Formosa 
Transnational Attorney-at-Law, 1 August 1989, p. 42.
45. For Taiwan's official policy towards the PRC, see the 
text of a speech, entitled Zhonghua Minguo de Dalil 
Zhengce (The ROC's Mainland Policy), delivered by 
Taiwan's Government Spokesman Shao Yu-min, at the 
American Enterprise Institute, reprinted in Shijie Ribao, 
New York: The World Daily, 8 August 1989, p. 37.
46. See, for example, Dagong Bao (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Po, 
7 September 1989), pp. 1-2, (trans.), in "Beijing 
Authoritive Person Reiterates That Policy Toward Taiwan 
Remains Unchanged", Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
- Daily Report, China [FBIS-China], 12 September 1989,
pp. 58-59.
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sixth largest trading partner of the PRC and the PRC had
become Taiwan's number five trading partner. While
Taiwan suffered a labour shortage at this time, the PRC
had a massive labour surplus. Businesses in Taiwan,
attracted by cheap labour and other incentives offered by
the PRC,47 invested large amounts to create new
manufacturing enterprises in the PRC. By 1988, the total
investment exceeded US$600 million, more than three times
43the amount invested over the preceding decade.
In March 1989, Taiwan lifted the curb on business 
visits to the PRC, but the rules on indirect trade and 
investment have remained unchanged. Such indirect 
business activities ought, by law, to be conducted via a 
third party. But in most cases this "third party" was 
merely a shell company set up for this purpose, in Hong 
Kong or elsewhere in Asia, by a Taiwanese company. 
According to Hong Kong Customs statistics in early 1991, 
Taiwan-PRC indirect trade through Hong Kong was estimated 
to have exceeded US$4 billion in 1990. The total value 
of PRC-approved investment from Taiwan was estimated at 
US$2.2 billion, with some 2,000 Taiwanese companies
A Q
investing m  the PRC by the end of 1990.
47. See Guowuyuan Guanyu Guli Taiwan Tongbao Touzi de 
Guiding (State Council Provisions for Encouraging 
Investment by Taiwanese Compatriots, or the Taiwanese 
Investment Provisions), promulgated on 3 July 1988, text 
published in Renmin Ribao, 7 July 1988, p. 2. Unless
otherwise indicated, the Chinese English translation of 
all laws cited in this thesis can be found in the PRC's 
Foreign Economic Legislation, Beijing: Foreign Language
Press, Vol. 1, 1982; Vol. 2, 1986; Vol. 3, 1987; other
volumes forthcoming), or in the loose-leaf service 
collection of Chinese laws and regulations published by 
Commerce Clearing House (CCH), Australia, China Laws for 
Foreign Business. Here see [2 Special Zones & Cities] 
China Laws for Foreign Business (CCH-Australia) 9 6-500.
48. Li Dahong, supra note 35.
49. See Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 1, January 1991, 
p. 47.
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On 9 August 1988, the Vice-President of the PRC 
Supreme People's Court, Ma Yuan, outlined the policy of 
the Court toward a selected series of substantial issues 
concerning civil law relations between individuals from 
the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.50 This policy 
statement was safely regarded as quasi-law because of 
Ma's senior official status in her address during a press 
conference. It was the first attempt by the PRC to find 
a legal solution to private inter-regional conflicts 
between the two regimes. Moreover, the President of the 
PRC Supreme People's Court, Ren Jianxin, further 
indicated on 4 April 1991 that the PRC would recognize 
civil decisions handed down by Taiwan courts if they did 
not violate basic legal principles in the PRC. With the 
permission of the People's Supreme Court, the PRC courts 
could entrust Taiwan courts to handle legal proceedings 
and accept cases from them.51
In the area of trade and investment links between 
two regimes, business transactions and transfer of funds 
or materials in return for a direct, or indirect share of 
the earnings of the enterprises should be defined as 
"foreign" trade and investment.52 It should be noted 
that the PRC still has no special legislation regarding 
its trade with Taiwan. In contrast with many other 
countries, under current PRC law, Taiwan is accorded no 
preferential treatment in trading with the PRC. However, 
Taiwan does have some incentives for trading with the
50. Address by Ma Yuan, in her first news conference held 
by the Supreme People's Court on 9 August 1988, "Some 
Legal Issues of the People's Court Dealing With Civil 
Cases Relating to Taiwan", reprinted in Collections of 
the Laws of the PRC, Wang Huaian, Gu Min, Lin Zhun & Sun 
Wanzhong (eds.), 1989, p. 369.
51. See Zhongguo Shibao (Taipei: China Times), 4 April
1991, p. 1.
52. See Stefan Riesenfeld, "Foreign Investment", 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (ed.) Rudolf 
Bernhart, instalment 8, Amsterdam, New York, and Oxford: 
North Holland, 1985, p. 246.
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PRC. For example, Taiwanese goods are taxed at about 
one-half the normal levy for foreign goods since the PRC 
government does not recognize Taiwan as a separate 
country.
The PRC adopted special provisions on encouraging
Taiwanese investors (Taiwan Investment Provisions, or 
TIP) in 1988.54 The TIP applies to companies, 
enterprises, other economic organisations and individual 
investors in Taiwan that make investment in the PRC.
Moreover, it affirms that the general body of foreign
economic legislation of the PRC applies to the Taiwanese 
investors in their business dealings with parties in the 
PRC. Nevertheless, some local provincial authorities 
still offer special incentives for the Taiwanese 
investors for the political reason of establishing
conditions for re-umf ication.
3.2.6 Present Situation Since 1990: Pragmatism and 
Progress?
With an awareness of the need for capital and 
technology transfer from Taiwan, the PRC offered a series
53. Ming-cheung Tai, "China-Taiwan trade growth suffers a 
setback: The water margin", Far Eastern Economic Review,
(15 November 1990), p. 77.
54. Supra note 47.
55. For example, the "Provisional Regulations of Shantou 
Special Economic Zone for Encouragement of Taiwanese 
Investment" were promulgated in June 1990. The
Regulations made clear the concessions for Taiwanese 
investing in the special economic zone in terms of
registration procedures, land prices, development and tax 
rates. Also, a special zone established in Zhuhai
offered a number of incentives for Taiwanese investors 
whereby they would be exempt from land use fees for ten 
years, from local income tax for six-ten years, while the 
general foreign investors enjoyed only a six-year and a 
three-year exemption from land use fees and local income 
tax respectively.
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of incentives to attract more trade and investment, 
resulting in greater autonomy and certain economic
benefits for Taiwan. The broadening of economic ties
also had political significance, in the sense that it 
could hasten the end of the status quo between the two, 
and lessen the likelihood of the development of an 
independent Taiwan.56 However, the question of whether or 
not to legalise these indirect business transactions or 
even to lift the ban on direct trade and investment has 
sparked off heated debates in Taiwan. Taiwan's current 
trade and investment policy towards the PRC shows
significant change, but caution is still the order of the
day.57
On 6 October 1990, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic 
Affairs promulgated the "Measures Governing Control Over 
Making Indirect Investment or Undertaking Technical 
Cooperation Projects in the Mainland." There are now 
3,679 low-technology and labour-intensive items for which
CQ
indirect investment in the PRC is permitted. Since 
April 1991, Taiwanese companies can easily conduct 
indirect trade and investment by setting up shell 
companies in a semi-official Taiwan trade centre in Hong 
Kong.
56. Chia-chuan Li and Hsia-chia Kuo, "The Evolving 
Relations Between the Two Sides of Taiwan Straits: An 
Assessment And Prospect", Tai-sheng, supra note 40, p. 5.
57. For Taiwan's current official policy toward the PRC, 
see the text of a speech entitled "Zhonghua Minquo de 
Dalu Zhengcee" (The Republic of China's Mainland Policy), 
delivered by the Shao Yu-min, supra note 45. Also see 
Zhongyang Ribao (Taipei: Central Daily News), 20
September 1989, p. 4. Taiwan's Premier Lee Huan laid 
down a five-point mainland policy: reunification which
constitutes the main thrust of Taipei's mainland policy, 
is to be achieved through peaceful means, democratic 
evolution, initiative, security, concern, and gradualism.
58. Zhichun Zou, "Shishi Paoqianmian, Juece Yiluzhui, 
Falu Pinming Gan" (The Current Events Are Always in Front 
of Policy and Law), Zhongshi Wanbao (Taipei: China Times 
Evening Post, 10 September 1992), p. 3.
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On 7 March 1991, Taiwan announced a re-unification 
initiative in its relations with the PRC called "Guide­
lines for National Re-unification." These "Guide-lines" 
divided the re-unification process into three stages, 
namely: in the short-term, promoting exchanges for mutual 
benefit; in the medium-term, promoting mutual trust and 
cooperation; and in the long-term, achieving re­
unification through consultation. Although no time-frame 
for these three stages was set, a semi-official "Straits 
Exchange Foundation" (SEF) was created to deal with 
Taiwan-PRC relations in the short-term. Moreover, an 
opening up of direct trade and contacts within the next 
few years is believed to be inevitable. With regard to 
the medium-term stage, it has been expected that Taiwan 
will eventually lift the barriers on direct trade and
C Q
direct investment with the PRC.
In 1992, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council of the 
Executive Yuan lifted the ban on indirect investment to 
the PRC by certain service industries.60 Moreover, in 
July 1992, Taiwan promulgated a special law - entitled 
the "Statute Governing Relations Between People of the 
Areas of Taiwan and Mainland China" (hereinafter, 
Taiwan's Mainland Relationship Statute, or the TMRS), 
designed to serve as the primary source of legal 
authority to direct any civil exchanges across the Taiwan 
Strait and to resolve any conflicts that might result 
from such interaction.61
59. Jingji Zibao (Taipei: Economic Daily News), 18 March 
1991, p. l. It was reported that Taiwan government would 
allow direct trade links with the PRC in one to six 
years.
60. Taiwan to Let Service Industry Invest in China, 
Reuter Libr. Rep., 12 June 1992.
61. See note 3 7 of Chapter 1.
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On the other hand, in July 1991, MOFERT in the PRC 
proposed five principles for promoting bilateral economic 
and trade relations with Taiwan. The five principles are 
first, economic and trade exchanges should be direct and 
bilateral; secondly, exchanges should be in line with the 
principle of mutual benefit and equality; thirdly,
exchanges should not be confined to the fields of trade 
and investment, but be expanded to the fields of
technology, scientific research, labour cooperation, and 
so on; fourthly, bilateral exchanges should be maintained 
and promoted for a long period; finally, both sides 
should respect contracts and try to protect the
legitimate rights and interests of business people from 
the other side of the Straits.
In December 1991, the PRC established the
"Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits" 
(ARATS) which is believed to be a counterpart of Taiwan's 
SEF. In March 1994, the -PRC promulgated the Law of 
Protecting Taiwanese Investment (hereinafter, Taiwan
Investment Law, or TIL) thereby supplementing its earlier 
legislation —  TIP in this area.62 The TIL is enacted in 
response to demands by Taiwanese investors for better 
protection as they believe provisions as administrative
orders are less than a law in the PRC.
3.3 Main Features of Political Structures and
Legal Systems of the PRC and Taiwan
The efficiency of a country's economic activities is 
always conditioned mainly by the presence of its 
political and legal systems. The two systems are
typically constrained by a country's constitution, which
62. The TIL was adopted by the sixth Session of the 
Standing Committee of the eighth National People's 
Congress on 6 March 1994. See China Economic News (No. 
11), 21 March 1994, pp. 6-7.
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sets forth the political structure and basic laws against 
which all other economic activities occur.
3.3.1 The political systems of the PRC
The PRC government is organised in accordance with 
the PRC Constitution, the most recent version of which
was adopted by the NPC in 1982 and amended in 1988 and
6 3199 3. The government consists of an elected
legislature, which is the repository of authority, and 
appointed administrative bodies that implement decisions 
of the legislature, a structure which characterises the 
relationship between the NPC and the various 
administrative organs of the national government.64 This 
structure is duplicated at each of the lower levels of
fZ c ,
government. The administrative organs at each level of 
government derive their authority from the People's 
Congress at local level and are accountable thereto.
The legislative and administrative authority of PRC 
governmental bodies is coterminous with its territory. 
Thus, the NPC enacts national legislation, and central 
governmental administrative bodies adopt regulations and 
issue orders, decrees and decisions that have national
63. The most recent constitution of the People's Republic 
of China was promulgated for implementation on December 
1982 and was amended in 1988 and 1993. The PRC 
constitutions were designed to outline political goals as 
well as to establish a state structure. So, the 
constitution can be amended by a simple majority vote of 
the NPC. The preamble proclaimed the central role of the 
CCP in the political and economic life of the state. See 
Alvin Rabushka, The New China, USA: Westview Press Inc. , 
1987, p. 25.
64. The PRC administrative organs of the national 
government include the State Council, the Central 
Military Commission, and the Courts.
65. The lower levels of government in the PRC are 
provincial, county, prefectural and municipal 
governments.
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application. By contrast, legislation adopted for 
example by a regional People's Congress at the provincial 
level, is effective only within the jurisdiction of that 
Congress. The same is true for administrative decisions 
by regional governmental agencies. So, a regional 
People's Congress is accountable to any People's Congress 
which is superior to it and ultimately to the NPC. A 
regional administrative agency is accountable to any 
People's Congress on the same level and is also 
accountable to administrative agencies at higher levels.
The NPC is the highest ranking organisation in the 
state hierarchy. It consists of nearly three thousand 
representatives from all provincial-level bodies and from 
the People's Liberation Army. It is authorised to 
supervise the implementation or amendment of the nation's 
Constitution. The NPC is also charged with the adoption 
and amendment of basic laws, such as, the Criminal Code, 
the General Principles of Civil Law, and so on. The NPC 
has the authority to elect or remove the State Chairman 
and Vice Chairman, the Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission, and President of the Supreme People's Court. 
It has ultimate authority over all major matters of 
state, including the review and approval of the plan for 
national economic and social development and the state 
budget.66
The NPC appoints the Premier of the State Council on 
the recommendation of the State Chairman. The State 
Council is the highest administrative organ of the state. 
It has responsibility for the operations of all 
ministries and commissions at state level as well as for 
state administrative agencies at local levels. It also 
proposes the state plan and the state budget and sees to 
their implementation. There are currently forty one 
ministries and state commissions under the State Council.
66. The duties and powers of the NPC are specified in the 
Chapter Three of the 1982 PRC Constitution.
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Administratively, the PRC is divided into twenty- 
three provinces and, in addition, three municipalities 
directly under the Central Government which are Beijing, 
Shanghai and Tianjin. There are also five autonomous 
regions: Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Ningxia, Xinjiang and
Tibet. The provinces, municipalities and regions all 
have equal status and report directly to the State 
Council. The four principal levels of government 
administration are the central, the provincial (which 
includes provinces, autonomous regions and directly 
administered municipalities), the county and the 
township.
The PRC Constitution provides for multiple political 
parties, of which the CCP is the governing party. There 
is no formal intersection between party and government.
3.3.2 Political System of Taiwan
When the CCP took control China in 1949, the KMT 
under Chiang Kai-shek moved to Taiwan and has since then 
continued its 1947 Constitution67 in Taiwan. The 
constitution was amended in 1991, 1992, and 1994 for
three times with ten supplementary articles. The KMT, 
existing as a ruling party, has been relaxing its grip on 
political life in Taiwan. The opposition party was 
allowed to mount a serious challenge to the KMT.
Under the President and Vice-President of the state, 
the constitution in Taiwan provides for five branches of 
government which are known as five Yuans (similar to 
Chambers in the West) with five powers: Executive Yuan,
67. Taiwan’s Constitution is officially called 
Constitution of the Republic of China, promulgated on 1 
January 1947 and became effective from 25 December 1947.
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Legislative Yuan, Juridical Yuan, Control Yuan, and 
Examination Yuan.
The Executive Yuan is the state's highest
administrative organ, and in most ways resembles the 
cabinet of Western countries. The Yuan's President, the 
Premier, is nominated and appointed by the President of 
the state with the consent of the Legislative Yuan.68 It 
is responsible to the President of the state and its
members are ministers in charge of ministries and 
ministers without portfolio.
The Legislative Yuan is the highest law-making organ 
of the state. It is made up of members elected for a
fi Qterm of three years by direct popular suffrage. The
Legislative Yuan has a President and Vice-President 
elected by and from among its members.70 According to 
Article 57 of the Constitution, the Executive Yuan is
responsible to the Legislative Yuan.
The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ of 
the state. To it are entrusted the duties of
safeguarding the rights of the people, maintaining social 
order, and consolidating the security of the state. It 
consists of a Council of Grand Justices, the Supreme 
Court, the Administrative Court, and the Committee on the 
Discipline of Civil Service Personnel.71 The Judicial 
Yuan has a President and a Vice-President, who are 
nominated by the President of the state and with consent 
of the National Assembly.72
68. Ibid., art. 55.
69. Ibid., art. 62.
70. Ibid., art. 66.
71. See Law of Organisation of the Judicial Yuan, amended 
in 1992, art. 3 and 7.
72. See Supplementary Articles of the Constitution, 
amended in 1994, art. 4.
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The Examination Yuan is the state's highest
examination organ. Under it, the Ministry of Examination
and the Ministry of Personnel attend to matters
pertaining to the examination, recruitment, and placement
of civil service personnels at all levels of government.
The Examination Yuan has a President, a Vice-President,
and a certain number of members, all of whom are
nominated by the President of the state and with the
73consent of the National Assembly.
The Control Yuan, the highest supervisory organ of 
the state, is composed of members elected by provincial 
and municipal councils for a term of six years.74 It 
exercised the powers of consent, impeachment censure, and
7 S •audit. The Control Yuan has a President and a Vice-
7 6President elected by and from among its members.
Under Taiwan's present Constitution, the national 
government is empowered to delegate wide administrative 
powers to provincial and county governments. Thus, under 
the Taiwan Provincial Government are county and city 
governments; and under control of the counties, are 
district and town municipal administrations. The
Provincial Governor, members of the Provincial Assembly, 
county magistrates, mayors, city and county councillors, 
and chiefs of townships and villages are elected by 
direct suffrage.
Political parties and government structures do not 
coincide at any point as Taiwan has many political 
parties of differing lines, of which the KMT is the
73. Ibid., art. 5.
74. Supra note 67, art. 91 and 93.
75. Ibid., art. 90.
76. Ibid., art. 92.
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ruling one and the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) is the 
main opposition party.
3.3.3 Legal System of the PRC
The PRC is still in the process of developing a
comprehensive system of laws, although a significant
number of laws and regulations dealing, in particular,
with economic matters and foreign investment have been
promulgated since 1978, when the PRC first embarked on
77its policy of economic reform. In December 1982, the
PRC amended its Constitution to authorise foreign
investment and to guarantee the "lawful rights and
7ftinterests" of foreign investors m  the PRC. The
Constitution was amended again in 1988 and in 1993 to 
provide for a "socialist market economy".79
National laws of the PRC are promulgated by the
ft n • • •NPC. The State Council (and certain of the entities
affiliated with the State Council) and the People's
Congresses at the provincial and municipal levels also
have the power to promulgate administrative measures,
rules and regulations, having the force of law at
provincial and municipal levels respectively.
77. See generally, James V. Feinerman, "Economic and 
Legal Reform in China, 1978-91", Problems of Communism, 
Sept.-Oct. 1991, p. 62.
78. See art. 18 of the 1982 PRC Constitution.
79. The term "socialist market economy" (Shehui Zhiyi 
Schichang Jingji) was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1993 
as a new economic reform in which the market economy is 
described as compatible with either socialist or 
capitalist economies.
80. See art. 62 of the PRC Constitution.
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The civil legal system of the PRC is one based upon 
written statutes. Decided cases do not have binding 
force on the courts, although such cases are sometimes 
referred to for guidance. All foreign individuals, 
enterprises and other entities have the same rights and 
obligations as PRC individuals, enterprises and other 
entities instituting or defending proceedings in PRC 
courts. If, however, the rights and obligations of PRC 
individuals, enterprises or other entities to institute 
or defend legal proceedings are subject to any
restriction in a foreign jurisdiction, then reciprocal 
restrictions may be imposed by the PRC courts on the
rights and obligations of the individuals, enterprises or 
other entities of that foreign jurisdiction to institute 
or defend legal proceedings in the PRC. All foreign
individuals, enterprises and other entities who wish to
retain legal counsel in instituting or defending any 
proceedings in a PRC court may only retain lawyers
Q  -1
qualified to practice m  the PRC.
The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial 
body in the PRC.82 It is responsible for supervising all 
other courts. In case of uncertainty in relation to the 
interpretation of any law, rule or regulation, the 
Supreme People's Court may be asked to provide a binding 
opinion on the interpretation of such law, rule or 
regulation.83
If any PRC court is asked to recognise or enforce a 
judgement or award handed down by a foreign court, such 
judgement or award will be recognised and enforced in the 
PRC where there is an applicable international treaty or
81. The author was informed of this by a judge of the 
People's Court in Beijing in May 1992 while carrying out 
interviews in the PRC.
82. See art. 3 0 of the PRC's Law of the Organisation of 
the People's Court, amended in 1983.
83. Ibid., art. 3 3.
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other arrangement for reciprocal enforcement of 
judgements between the PRC and the country in which the
Q A
judgement or award is made. Enforcement of such
judgement or award must not, however, run counter to the 
basic principles of PRC law, PRC sovereignty, PRC
8 R .security or the public interest. Application for
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is dealt with in 
accordance with international treaties to which the PRC 
is a party, most importantly the Convention on the 
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards, often known as 
"The New York Convention", to which the PRC acceded in 
1987 .
3.3.4 Legal System of Taiwan
Taiwan law today towards the end of the nineteenth 
century is a codified system which was established in 
China on the model of continental countries. Between 1929 
and 193 5, the KMT finalised work on various drafts and 
provisional codes by enacting what came to be known as 
the Six Codes: the Constitution, the Civil Code, the
Criminal Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, and the Commercial Law. These Six 
Codes are still in force and having been retained by the 
KMT since 1949 when it moved from China to Taiwan.
As a general rule, there are three levels of courts, 
with appeals possible from the lower to the higher 
level.86 The lowest court is the District Court, with 
its branch courts functioning in the "hsien" (county) or
8 7 .  •municipality. Except m  those cases otherwise provided
84. See art. 267 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law, 
promulgated in 1991.
85. Ibid., art. 268.
86. See art. 1 of Taiwan's Law of the Organisation of the 
Court, amended in 1989.
87. Ibid., art. 8.
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for the law, it is a court of first instance in all civil 
and criminal cases, and it also has jurisdiction over 
non-contentious matters. Cases are tried before one
judge; only in exceptionally serious or complicated cases 
is a bench of three judges required.
Above the district Court level is the High Court 
which has jurisdiction in appeals from District Courts. 
In criminal cases involving offences against the internal 
or external security of the state, the High Court has 
jurisdiction at first instance. Cases are tried before 
three judges sitting as a bench.88
Above the High Court is the Supreme Court which sits 
in the capital of the state. It is the court of final 
resort. Except for minor civil and criminal cases, all
q q
cases can go on appeal to the Supreme Court.
As for business laws, the Taiwan Civil Code 
applicable to every contract while Company Law, the Law 
of Negotiable Instruments, Maritime Law and Insurance Law 
(known as the special laws of Civil matters) take 
precedence over the provisions of the Civil Code in 
commercial matters.
In general, a judgement or award made by a foreign 
court is not recognised or enforced in Taiwan if Taiwan's 
court judgement or awards are not recognised or 
enforceable in the jurisdiction where the judgement or 
award was given. If a foreign judgement or award is from
88. Ibid., art. 32.
89. In general, in civil cases in which the pecuniary 
value of litigation is less than NT$100,000 (about 
=i]2,500) , the parties cannot appeal to the Supreme Court. 
In criminal cases where the maximum legal penalty is less 
than three years' imprisonment, the accused is not 
allowed to appeal to the Supreme Court. See Code of 
Civil Procedure, art. 466; Criminal Code, art. 61, and 
Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 376.
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a jurisdiction without reciprocity, it may still be 
submitted for recognition and/or enforcement to a Taiwan 
court in a separate action which would admit the foreign 
decision as evidence of the legal position in the case. 
As is the case in the PRC, the enforcement of a foreign 
judgements or awards must not run counter to public order 
and good morals of Taiwan.
3.4 Legal Framework for Private Links
3.4.1 A General Theory
Private contracts create legal relationships, raise 
legal problems, and give rise to situations that may 
deteriorate into legal disputes. Basic issues such as 
the legal capacity of persons, jurisdiction, and 
recognition and enforcement of court judgements and of 
arbitration awards, all demand resolution. Specific 
disputes in areas such as trade and investment arise 
inevitably. The traditional legal order, expressed in 
domestic substantive law, in rules of conflict and, to a 
lesser extent, in principles of public international law, 
is usually sufficient to resolve such issues.
Taiwan and the PRC, however, do not recognise each 
other as separate states. The political reality is that 
the PRC views Taiwan as a local government and Taiwan
regards the PRC as a political entity with "incomplete"
a n , , .sovereignty. Accordingly, a strict application of
90. An interview with Professor Chih-wen Wang, Chairman 
of Law Research Institute, Chinese Taiwan Cultural 
University, by Taiwan's Zhongguo Shibao (Taipei: China
Times). See Free China Journal (Taipei), 28 May 1990, p.
5. As regards the official position, the Taiwan
government is very unlikely to accept the PRC's proposal
for reunification under a "one country, two systems"
formula. Taiwan still treats itself as the sole
legitimate government representing the whole China and
agrees with the PRC that there is only "one China", but
prefers to define the Taiwan-PRC relationship as "one
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notions of non-recognition as understood in orthodox 
international law would be extremely detrimental to the 
conduct of private relations between Taiwan and the PRC.
However, there is a modern alternative to the 
orthodox view. According to "newer" theory, recognition 
of foreign law in private international law is largely 
independent of recognition of foreign governments in 
public international law. Public recognition is an 
executive act, influenced by moral approval of foreign 
governments and constrained by the vagaries of 
international politics. Recognition in private
international law, whether through judicial, 
administrative, or legislative acts, is influenced by 
considerations of fairness to the parties and by a desire 
to facilitate private relations. The fundamental aim of 
private recognition is different from that of public 
recognition. Thus, the modern theory holds that the 
capacity, laws, and immunity of a firmly established but 
unrecognised foreign government can be given full legal 
effect in the domestic jurisdiction, provided that such 
recognition is not contrary to the public policy of the 
forum.91
From the point of view of state practice, a 
government may be recognised as the de facto government
Q 9of a state based on a purely political judgment. The 
de facto recognition of a state or government involves
country, two areas." See Free China Journal (Taipei), 4 
October 1990, p. 1.
91. The modern theory of conflict of laws makes 
recognition of private law relationships independent of 
political recognition of the government under which they 
were formed. See A. Anton, Private International Law 
(1967), pp. 82-85 and its second edition (1991), pp. 95-
98. This modern view has been widely held by the 
international legal scholorship for over thirty years.
92. Ian Brownie, Principle of International Law, 4th ed., 
Oxford: Claredon Press, 1990, p. 94.
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the recognition that a state is able to acknowledge the
external facts of political power, as well as protect its
interests, trade, and citizens, without committing itself
to condoning illegalities or irregularities in the
9 3emergence of the de facto state or government. The
recognition of de facto is probably a necessary legala 
expedient. The distinction between "de jure/de facto
recognition" and "recognition as the de jure/de facto
government" is insubstantial. If there is a distinction
Q Ait does not seem to matter legally , because in the
political sense recogniton of either de jure or de facto
can always be withdrawn; in the legal sense it cannot be
9 5unless a change of circumstances warrants it.
From a legal point of view, the de facto government 
can be an "independent subject" in international law. The 
overwhelming weight of legal scholarship over the last 
quarter century supports this modern theory.96 In regard 
to relations between Taiwan and the PRC, recognition of 
each other's laws does not necessarily imply recognition
93. J. G. Starke, "Recognition", Introduction to 
International Law, 10th ed., London: Butterworths, 1989, 
p. 145.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Giving full legal status to the acts of unrecognized 
regimes for private law purposes has become a trend in 
international practices. See R. D. Leslie, "Non- 
Recognition of Government and the Conflict of Law: The
Rhodesian Situation", 19 Juridical Review (1974), p. 127.
See also "The Doctrine of Recognition - A Case note on
Bilang v. Riggu, 1 Victorial University Wellington Law
Review (1915), p. 477; Casenotes, "Access to United 
States Courts by Juristic Entities Created by 
Unrecognized Governments: Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Elicofon, Motion to Intervene by Kunstsammlungen zu 
Weimar" (E.D.N.Y. 1972) , 12 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law (1973) , p. 155; V. Li, "The Law of Non- 
Recognition: The Case of Taiwan, 1 NW. J. Int'l L, & Bus. 
(1979), p. 134; Wakamizu Tsutsui, "Subjects of
International Law in the Japanese Courts", 37 Int'l & 
Comp. L. Q. (1988), p. 325.
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of each other's governments. Political recognition of a 
government is not a prerequisite to the recognition of
Q 7 *its laws. Therefore, traditional concepts of
sovereignty and national recognition should be subject to 
revision in accordance with the times and actual 
prevailing conditions. The orthodox international
practice and international law are malleable. The
problem between Taiwan and the PRC is not one of 
sovereignty, but one of law district which means
jurisdiction. Sovereignty belongs to the nation itself
and can de jure be claimed, while jurisdiction is a 
matter of political reality and can de facto be
Q Rrestricted within the law district.
3.4.2 A Particular Theory: Inter-Regional Conflicts 
of Laws
Since both Taiwan and the PRC adhere to a "one 
China" policy, an inter-regional conflict of laws 
approach is most appropriate for establishing a legal 
framework for private relations. Both Taiwan and the PRC 
recognise the authority of the other within their
respective geographic jurisdictions. Under international 
law, the concept of "territorial sovereignty" signifies 
that within within thi territorial ddomain, jurisdiction 
is exercised by the state over persons and property to 
the exclusion of other states." Using this framework, 
each side can apply its own established private
97. See Tung-Pi Chen, "Bridge Across the Formosa Strait: 
Private Relations Between Taiwan and Mainland China", 4 
Journal of Chinese Law 101 (1990), pp. 106-112.
98. See Wei Yung, "Dual Recognition Is No Obstacle To One 
China", Zhongshi Wanbao (Taipei: China Times Evening 
Post, 13 July 1991), p. 2.
99. J. G. Starke, "State Territorial Sovereignty and 
Other Lesser Territorial Rights of States", Introduction 
to International Law, 10th ed., London: Butterworths,
1989, p. 178.
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international law rules to regulate private legal aspects 
of inter-regional relations.
Both Taiwan and the PRC would be well advised to 
adopt the private inter-regional model in conducting 
their trade and investment activities. This means that 
whenever it is proper, the laws and regulations of the 
other side should be applied by the courts. It is almost 
always possible to apply established principles of 
private international law. But an jointly-agreed code of 
law or any treaty arrangement regulating private 
relations between Taiwan and the PRC is unlikely for the 
foreseeable future.
However, nothing prevents each jurisdiction from 
separately enacting laws to govern private economic 
relations between them.100 Examples are the TMRS of 
1992, the TIP of 1988, and the TIL of 1994.101 However, 
certain aspects of both Taiwan's and the PRC's existing 
private international law rules would require amendment
100. "Fa" is the usual generic term for positive or 
written law as an abstraction ("law or "the law"), but it 
may also be used to mean particular laws. The term "fa" 
is a model or standard imposed by the Chinese superior 
authority, to which the people must conform. For both 
Taiwan and the PRC, "fa" is used in two different ways in 
this thesis. The first is in a broad sense, meaning all 
types of legally binding norms. The second refers to a 
particular subset of those legal norms with the title of 
"law" as opposed to "provision", "regulation", "measure", 
and so on.
101. The TIL was promulgated on 5 March 1994. This Law 
responded to the TIP of 1988. It is noted that the State 
Council of the PRC and its subordinate organs can 
promulgate provisions that are considered narrower in 
scope and less important than the National People's 
Congress and its Standing Committee, the supreme power 
organs of the PRC with legislative authority. The 
English word "provision" is used as a translation for two 
different Chinese words. The first is "fagui", a 
category of legal enactments usually of lesser 
significance than the category "falii" (laws) . The second 
is "tiaoli", a term used in the title of certain 
individual enactments.
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or replacement when incorporated as private inter­
regional law.102 In particular, nationality is an 
important connecting factor in the international conflict 
rules of Taiwan and of the PRC,103 but is inappropriate 
for inter-regional conflict of laws. As both governments 
maintain that there is but one "China" and one 
"nationality", domicile or residence should replace 
nationality as a connecting factor for conflict rules 
governing relations between the two regimes.
In keeping with their rival positions, trade and 
investment between Taiwan and the PRC are ruled by two 
distinct systems of municipal law both of which are 
applied in the regulation of business transactions 
involving the other’s legal system. As discussed, a 
political accord between the two leading to mutual 
official recognition is difficult, if not impossible, in 
the near future. Both Taiwan and the PRC require a legal 
basis for private relations independent of official 
recognition. According to the above stated modern theory
102. For example, in the field of conflict of laws, the 
PRC could simply deem that Taiwan is a special legal 
jurisdiction for the purpose of chapter VIII of the 
General Principles of Civil Law and of other conflicts 
provisions. See T. P. Chen, "Private International Law 
of the People’s Republic of China: An Overview", 3 5 AM.
J. Comp. L.(1987), p. 445. Here the General Principles 
of Civil Law of the PRC was adopted on 12 April 1986. 
See [2 Business Regulation] China Laws for Foreign 
Business (CCH-Australian) 19-150 (1450-1452),
[hereinafter, PRC Civil Law]. Similarly, Taiwan could 
amend its Law Governing the Application of Laws to Civil 
Matters Involving Foreign Elements so that the conflicts 
rules would also apply to the PRC. See Laws of the 
Republic of China (Taipei: Law Revision Planning Group,
Executive Yuan, 1961) [hereinafter, Laws of the ROC], p. 
828. For the relevant Taiwanese laws and regulations, 
see Zhonghua Minguo Xianxing Fagui Huibian (Compilation 
of Current Laws and Regulations of the Republic of 
China), published in Taipei, 1970 cited frequently as 
CCLRRC, is updated periodically in Chinese.
103. See, for example, Laws of the ROC, id., Article 1; 
PRC Civil Law, id., Art. 143, p. 19-150 (145); also see 
T. P. Chen, id.
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of international law, the result of conflict of laws 
between the two would not be a legal vacuum: legally
sanctioned transactions would exist, companies legally 
established by the laws would be considered existent and 
could sue or be sued in their non-recognizing 
jurisdiction, and court judgements on commercial affairs 
would not be nullities.104
3.4.3 Taiwan's Mainland Relations Statute
In July 1992, the Taiwanese government promulgated a 
special law, intended to address the complexities of the 
whole private Taiwan-PRC relationships, called the 
TMRS.105 This Statute has ninety six articles covering 
civil, penal and administrative matters and applies 
conflicts of laws rules in civil matters. The structure 
of the TMRS is built around recognition of two 
fundamental distinct legal systems of the "Taiwan Region" 
and of the "Mainland Region." • Most significantly, a 
number of the provisions of the TMRS indirectly but
104. For an explanation of the theory of a legal vacuum, 
see, for instance, Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Carl- 
Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), (1966) 2 
All E. R. , p. 536, 575-92 (H.L.). The British House of 
Lords in this case allows unrecognized governments to 
bring suit if they can be viewed as a "subordinate body" 
of a recognized government. What will be decided by the 
British government is only whether it will deal with that 
foreign government or not by giving full legal status to 
the acts of unrecognised regimes for private law 
purposes. See Ian Brownlie, "Recognition in Theory and 
Practice," British Yearbook of International Law (1982), 
Vol. VIII, pp. 209-210.
105. Supra note 61. An unofficial draft law of similar 
nature was also prepared by a group of the PRC academics. 
See "Act on the Relationship Between the People of the 
Mainland Region and the People of the Taiwan Region", in 
Taiwan Falii Yanjiu (Taiwan Law Studies) , Beijing: Taiwan 
Law Research Institute, 1989, p. 10.
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effectively recognise the authority of the PRC law in the 
context of private inter-regional law.106
To some extent, the TMRS gives effect to the modern 
theory outlined above, authorising and recognising 
private law relations despite the continued absence of 
political recognition.
The PRC and Taiwan would be well advised to adopt 
the private inter-regional model. The modern approach in 
the conflict of laws makes recognition of private law 
relationships independent of political recognition of the 
government under which they were formed. In the area of 
commercial relations, the two governments should consider 
using an established intermediary to authenticate legal 
documents received from the other side.
As discussed above, some non-government 
intermediaries such as the Taiwan's SEF and the PRC's 
ARATS should not only be created in both regimes' own
jurisdiction but also be established in each other's
jurisdiction. Their presence would provide an especially 
practical solution to the need for an intermediary, as 
the services would be backed with professional 
accountability if there were any abuse of authority.
3.4.4 Issues of Substantive Law
From 1949 to 1979, contacts between separated 
spouses and family members, as well as bequests or
106. For example, Article 74 provides that civil law 
judgements and civil law arbitration decisions rendered 
in Mainland China may be given legal recognition and
enforced in Taiwan after a Taiwanese judicial ruling
accepting the judgement is obtained. This means that the 
PRC legal judgements must be first wrapped in a layer of 
Taiwan legality, so that the enforcement of such 
judgement is not recognition of the PRC law but execution 
of Taiwan law.
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successions across the Taiwan Straits were forbidden 
because of the political intransigence of both the PRC 
and Taiwan. Since 1979, private relationships have been 
permitted, and even encouraged by the authorities of the 
PRC.107 Despite the PRC’s seemingly friendly posture, 
Taiwan government has adhered strictly to its "Three 
No's" policy of "no contact, no negotiation, and no 
compromise".108 Nevertheless, the PRC has made continued 
efforts to promote direct and extensive private 
relationships with Taiwan, especially in trade and 
investment.109 By contrast, Taiwan has been more 
cautious in easing restrictions on contacts with the PRC. 
Many of these restrictions continue to be detailed in 
formal legislation.110
Under such circumstances, those articles of the TMRS 
which address issues of substantial law generally take a 
cautious and restrictive approach to the opening of 
private relations with the PRC. Almost all relationships
107. Supra note 33.
108. For Taiwan's "Three No's" policy, see Leung, "Taiwan 
Officials Urge Reunification Comprises," Hong Kong 
Standard, 12 April 1989, p. 6. Reprinted in Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report/ China, 13 
April 1989, p. 59.
109. As the modernization movement took hold around 1979, 
the PRC began to assume a more peaceful posture toward 
Taiwan, partly because a good international image was 
crucial to attracting the capital it so desperately 
needed for economic development. See, for example, Yan 
Mingfu on Trade Cooperation with Taiwan, Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report, China, 7 
April 1989, p. 79.
110. Since July 1987, lifting of martial law in Taiwan, 
the various executive and judicial measures have paved 
the way for legislative action. Prior to the 
promulgation of TMRS in 1992, the government itself had 
only a few amendments in the law for the just 
implementation of its so-called Mainland policies. With 
regard to visitations, for example, there was no Taiwan 
legislation affirming the legality of Taiwan residents 
visiting to Mainland China until the introduction of the 
TMRS in 1992.
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are subject to "approval'1 by the "authorities." Two 
sensitive areas "succession rights" and "family law" 
between Taiwan and the PRC are discussed below.
A. Succession Rights
Article 66 and 67 of the TMRS govern succession 
rights. In both underlying rationale and proposed 
effect, these articles are misconceived. They create 
unfair restrictions on the inheritance rights of people 
in the PRC and impose excessive administrative burdens. 
In addition, they are politically counterproductive in 
promoting evolution towards a peaceful relationship 
between the two regimes.
Article 66 stipulates a time limit of two years for 
a PRC heir to come to Taiwan and to claim the estate of 
the deceased. This is an unrealistic time frame in which 
to secure an exit visa from the PRC and to pass through 
Taiwan's security and various other checks for admission 
to the island country. In the absence of any logic for 
such a short limitation period, it should be extended to 
a more reasonable length.
Article 67 provides that PRC successors to an estate 
situated within the Taiwan Region are only entitled to a 
one-half share of their inheritance not exceeding NT$2 
million per successor, roughly equivalent to 
US$80,000,111 The well-publicized rationale is that the 
PRC heirs have not contributed to the accumulated wealth
111. Normally, according to Article 1141 of the Taiwanese 
Civil Code, "[w]here there are several heirs of the same 
order, they inherit in equal shares per capita..." See 
Laws of the ROC (19 61), supra note 70, p. 83. A similar 
provision is found in Article 10 and 13 of the PRC 
Succession Law. See Collections of the Laws of the PRC, 
supra note 50, p. 3 26.
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of the deceased.112 This argument is patently weak. The 
theory of succession has never been based on the 
beneficiary's contribution to the wealth of the estate of 
the deceased. The restriction and the reason behind it 
gives an impression of petty provincialism and has drawn
i n
severe criticism from the PRC.
A preferable solution would be to allow the PRC 
heirs equal shares in the estate.114 By deferring 
successors' rights to collect their shares, the interests 
of the heirs could be safeguarded, and at the same time 
Taiwan's political requirements could be satisfied. The 
estate could be held in trust by the government until 
such time as the PRC heirs could benefit substantially 
from the inheritance without possible government 
interference, and until such time as the two sides are in 
a state of peaceful relations. In the interim, a sum 
from the estate could be extracted for the necessary 
maintenance of the heirs and dependents which could be 
far below the US$80,000 maximum allowed in the TMRS.
A precedent for the suggested temporary trusteeship 
can be found by examining American alien inheritance 
statutes enacted during the immediate post-war era when 
the United States and the former Eastern bloc countries 
were locked in bitter rivalry. Money and property were 
often withheld under statutes intended to safeguard the 
beneficiary's rights until the person could show that he
112. On "Succession to the Taiwanese estate by Mainland 
Chinese Compatriots," Shijie Ribao (New York:The World 
Daily), 1 June 1989, p. 12.
113. Art. 67 of the TMRS is seen by many as purely 
discriminatory. The severe criticism was seen, for 
example, on PRC legal scholar Yu Sinzu's article "Guanyu 
Haixia Liangan Jichenfa de Bijiao Yanjiu", Faxue Yanjiu 
(Beijing: Study of Jurisprudence), No. 2, 1990, pp. 1-2.
114. For theories of wealth by inheritance, see Tai Yan- 
hui & Tai Tung-hsiung, Zhongguo Jicheng Fa (Chinese 
Succession Law), (rev. ed.), 1986, pp. 1-4.
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or she alone would receive the intended benefits, and to 
ensure that American resources would not be used by the 
former Eastern bloc countries against the United 
States.115
B. Family Law
The hundreds of thousands of "successive" marriages 
contracted by KMT followers who came to Taiwan from 
Mainland China before the Communist takeover in 1949 —  
these constitude one of the most vexed questions in 
private Taiwan-PRC inter-regional conflicts. One or both 
of the spouses who were married on the Mainland before 
1949 have new spouses in Taiwan or in Mainland China 
through subsequent marriages. The case of Deng Yuan-jeng 
is a typical illustration: for all legal purposes, the
1 1 fisecond marriages were bigamous. x
The background of this case is that Deng married his
Chinese wife Chen in Fujian in 194 0. When the PRC was
founded in 1949, Deng left for Hong Kong alone and then
resettled permanently in Taiwan. In 1960, lying about
his marital status, Deng married a Taiwanese wife Woo.
In 1986, Chen, after having left for Hong Kong herself,
through a Taiwanese lawyer, brought suit against Deng for
bigamy, seeking to annual his second marriage. Taiwan’s
district court ruled in favour of Deng’s mainland Chinese
wife and stripped the twenty eight-year relationship with
Deng's Taiwan wife of all legal effect. The High Court
1 1 7and Supreme Court upheld the same decision.
115. See Dorman, How "Cold War" Freezes Funds Due to 
"Iron Curtain" Nationals, 20 Brooklyn Barrister (1968), 
p. 54; see generally Note, Alien Inheritance Statute and 
the Foreign Relations Power, Duke Law Journal (1969), p. 
153 .
116. For further discussion of the Deng case, see Tung- 
hsiung Tai, Faxue Congkan (Taipei: China Law Journal), 
Vol. 133, January 1989, p. 25-26.
117. See Dongwei Dai, "Ershiba Nian de Laogong Zenmo 
Meile?" (Why was a Twenty-eight Years Husband Gone?),
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During this case, successive marriages between 
parties in the PRC and Taiwan, and many others, violate
the elementary principle of monogamy which forms the 
cornerstone of Taiwan's marriage system as embodied in 
its Civil Code, and of the PRC's marriage system as
1 1 R  . .provided in its Marriage Law. The action commenced m
Taiwan courts by Deng's first wife in Taiwan courts to 
render the Taiwanese marriage void was upheld by all
three levels of the judiciary.
This outcome seemed to have harsh and impractical 
consequences, and it is possibly in view of these that 
the Grand Judicial Council, Taiwan's body responsible for 
constitutional interpretation held the Supreme Court 
decision to be a violation of Article 22 of Taiwan's 
Constitution which guarantees the "freedoms and rights of 
the people". The remedial provisions in the TMRS 
(Articles 63 and 64) confirm the Grand Judicial Council's 
decision. By so doing, however, they create the 
extraordinary and unintentional situation whereby
polygamy can be tolerated in a society where Taiwan's 
Civil Code has unequivocally established the basic 
principle of monogamy. The same stance is taken in PRC
1 1 Qpolicy statements, placing Taiwan and the PRC in
identically anomalous positions.
Faxue Congkan (Taipei: China Law Journal), Vol. 133,
January 1989, pp. 27-33.
118. The elementary principle of monogamy is expressly 
stipulated in the Taiwanese Civil Code. Article 985 
declares, "A person who has a spouse may not contract 
another marriage." See Laws of the ROC, supra note 70, 
p. 3 04. Polygamy is a criminal offence punishable by 
imprisonment, Criminal Code, Article 23 7, See LAWS OF 
THE ROC, supra note 70, pp. 960-61. Similar provisions 
are in Article 312 of the PRC Marriage Act of 1980 and in 
Article 180 of the PRC Criminal Code of 1979.
119. The PRC seems to have taken a similar position. See 
an address by Ma Yuan, supra note 50, p. 1.
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If however the second marriage were to be presumed 
valid, and the first marriage void from the time of the 
second marriage, this measure would effectively serve not 
only to preserve monogamy but also to mitigate the harsh 
consequences created by rendering one of the successive 
marriages voidable. This presumption would be conclusive 
if both of the original spouses had remarried. If only 
one spouse had remarried, the validity of the first 
marriage would be contingent on the previously unmarried 
spouse of the second marriage choosing to opt out of that 
marriage; the choice would thus be given to the 
previously unmarried spouse of the second marriage as 
that individual would be the most innocent victim of the 
three parties involved. To enable the courts to deal 
most effectively with the huge number of possible 
applicants, the decision in such cases could be made 
within a prescribed time period by means of summary 
procedure. To protect the interests of spouses, whenever 
a marriage has been declared void, it would still be 
given civil effect. The spouse of the voided marriage 
would enjoy all civil rights previously enjoyed, such as 
the rights to support, inheritance, workman's 
compensation, and division of property, which are 
inherent in a marriage.
This solution would give effect to the expectations 
of all parties. It recognizes that the ongoing 
relationship is usually the stronger bond and should at 
first view be preserved over another marriage. At the 
same time, the solution compensates the party whose 
marriage has been rendered void or voidable by 
introducing legislation to maintain the civil effect of 
marriage. If this measure were to be adopted, Taiwan and 
the PRC could deal fairly with individuals caught in a 
common and disturbing situation, and at the same time 
preserve the basic principle of monogamy.
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3.5 Conclusion
Unless Taiwan and the PRC can reach a compromise for 
cooperation in the private law sphere, private relations 
between the two will continue to be impeded and political 
relations poisoned by an atmosphere of rivalry, 
suspicion, and intransigence. The potentially enormous 
benefits of a closer economic relationship will be put at 
risk. Rebuilding a suitable and workable legal framework 
in adapting to the economic development of both sides is 
essential.
As noted above, the TMRS encapsulates only the
unilateral policy decisions and implementation measures
•Taiwan has arrived at with respect to private contacts
with the PRC. Whether the PRC will move in the same
direction and adopt similar procedures is not clear. The
only official indication available is in the 1988 Supreme
People's Court news conference on how civil cases
1 o oinvolving parties from Taiwan are handled.
Taiwan's development of a careful and balanced TMRS 
is an important step toward closer relations. Its 
cautious stance may be justified, given the present
political rivalry with the PRC. The TMRS may even be 
criticised as an anachronistic legal provision, however, 
it is still a good model for the PRC to use as a 
reasonable legal framework, at least for Taiwanese trade 
and investment within its sovereignty. Although the 
Taiwan-PRC situation is unique, both governments may 
benefit from foreign experience on both theoretical and 
practical levels to move towards a prosperous economic
relationship.
120. Ibid.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PRIVATE BUSINESS CONTRACTS FOR 
TAIWANESE TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE PRC
The following description of legal problems of 
private business contracts for Taiwanese investment in 
the PRC is broadly applicable to the three forms of 
enterprises with foreign-investment that can be 
established in the PRC: equity joint ventures
(hereinafter, EJV), contractual joint ventures 
(hereinafter, CJV) and wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
(hereinafter, WFOE).
At the outset, it is worth noting that the PRC's 
foreign investment policies first received recognition 
not very long ago: in 1979 and 1982 respectively. It was 
only after the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures1 (hereinafter, EJV Law) in 1979, that 
PRC's 1982 Constitution could, for the first time, 
expressly recognise the importance of foreign investment.
In regard to foreign trade activities, business 
contracts in the PRC are basically similar to investment 
contracts, subject to their own discrete set of laws, 
regulations and guide-lines.
1. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino- 
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures was adopted by the second 
Session of the fifth National People's Congress on 1 July 
1979. An unofficial text of the law may be found in 
Beijing Review, 20 July 1979, pp. 24-26 [hereinafter 
Equity Joint Venture Law, or EJV Law]. At the outset, 
it is worth noting that the PRC's foreign investment 
policies first received recognition, after the adoption 
of this Law, by the 1982 Consitution.
102
4.1 Characteristics of Legal Problems for Private
Business Contracts
Taiwan and the PRC enjoy ties of international trade 
and investment de facto, but domestic trade and 
investment de jure. To date, most trade and investment 
activities have been conducted indirectly through an 
intermediary. Trade and investment usually co-exist
and are complementary. As in other countries, the final 
stage of trade and investment transactions between Taiwan 
and the PRC parties is ordinarily concluded by the 
creation of a valid contract. However, the contractual 
relations between the two parties involve a foreign- 
related (known as "shewai" in Chinese) element, and any 
agreement is, therefore, considered to have the general 
characteristics of an "international" business contract.
In theory, Taiwan's trade and investment with the 
PRC has not been seen as "foreign" trade and investment. 
However, in reality, Taiwanese trade and investment in 
the PRC have been regarded as having "foreign" element, 
in view of PRC's economic law and policy. This was first 
shown in October 198 6 when the PRC promulgated its 
"Provisions for Encouraging Foreign Investment." The 
Provisions are, in principle, applicable to the Taiwanese 
businesses when dealing with parties in the PRC.
2. Both Taiwan and the PRC agree that there is only one 
"China". Thus, strictly speaking the use of the terms 
"international trade" and "international investment" 
seems inapplicable.
3. See Kuei-sheng Cheng, Shewai Qiyefa Zhi Bijiao Yanjiu 
(A comparative study of contract law involving foreign 
elements. It is a revised edition of a textbook of 
international contract law, published by the author in 
Taipei, 1980.), pp. 1-7. As regards contracts, also see
D. M. Johnson & H. Chiu, Agreements of People's Republic 
of China 1949-1967, A Calendar, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1968, p. 225, Glossary.
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In the PRC, the vast majority of trade and 
investment relations with foreign countries are between 
foreign enterprises and the PRC's foreign trade 
corporations (FTCs).4 In the absence of a controlling PRC 
contract law, the FTCs have used form contracts to 
conduct their commercial activities.5 Domestic and 
foreign contract laws differ in the PRC, as evidenced by 
the introduction of the Economic Contract Law (ECL) in 
1981 and the Foreign Economic Contract Law (FECL) in 
1985. The ECL governs transactions between PRC entities 
in all areas of economic contracts, while the FECL is a 
codification of PRC's foreign economic practice. For 
historical reasons and by reason of their peculiar 
status, compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and 
overseas Chinese may at present in principle conclude 
contracts with the PRC's domestic subjects based on the 
FECL. They are thus tantamount to foreign subjects. 
Moreover, the PRC promulgated special "Taiwanese 
Investment Provisions" (TIP) in July 1988. The TIP 
further affirm that the general body of foreign economic 
legislation of the PRC should be applied to Taiwanese 
businessmen in their business dealings with parties in 
the PRC.
4. E. A. Theroux, "Technology Sales to China", 14 Journal 
Of International Law & Economics (1980), p. 185, 196; see 
generally pp. 21-24 and accompanying text for discussion 
of FTCs.
5. K. P. Herbst, "Selling into the People's Republic of 
China: The Legal Problems", International Business Lawyer 
(1987), Vol. 5, No. 7, pp. 303-306.
6. The Economic Contract Law of the PRC was adopted at 
the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's 
Congress on 13 December 1981. See H. R. Zheng, "A 
Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Economic Contract Law 
of the People's Republic of China", 3 China Law Reporter 
(1986), pp. 227, 232. The Law was amended by the 
Standing Committee of the Eighth National Congress on 2 
September 1993. For the text in Chinese, see Renmin 
Ribao (overseas ed.), 6 September 1993, p. 2.
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Nevertheless, a business' contract signed between 
parties from Taiwan and the PRC —  still politically 
separate and intent on claiming their own domestic 
legitimacy —  is rather special. Since both parties have 
radically different political ideologies and economic 
systems, the legal, contractual and related problems 
involved in the principal forms of trade and investment 
are as a result totally different from those of
countries which have formal diplomatic ties with each 
other or share the same economic system. Besides the 
problem of different economic systems existing between 
parties, mirroring East-West trade issues, there is also 
the political problem of lack of formal diplomatic ties. 
This gives rise to the complicated legal relations which
exist in a situation of non-recognition.
Generally speaking, the legal, social, and economic 
systems of the former Eastern bloc states differ very 
much from those of Western capitalist countries. In
trade, the Eastern bloc adopted the state trading system 
with their own government monopolies. Accordingly, the 
state can therefore decide what is to be bought, sold, 
bartered, or "dumped" abroad. The government's monopoly 
goes beyond the regulation, direction and control of a 
nation's foreign commerce. State trading agencies have 
authority to transact with legal effect.8 In the PRC, 
trade has remained more obviously subordinate to
political strategy than in other countries and has to 
some extent been a shuttlecock in the country's internal
7. Under a special decree promulgated by Lenin in April 
1918, foreign trade was one of the first economic 
functions nationalized by the Soviet government. With the 
advent of other communist regimes in Europe and Asia, 
the same principle of state trading was established 
throughout the affected areas. See S. Pisar, Coexistence 
and Commerce, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970,
p. 141.
8. Pisar, ibid., p. 142.
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politics.9 The extensive private elements in the PRC's 
foreign trade were virtually eliminated by 1954.10 Since 
foreign trade activities after 1949 were governed by the 
principle of state monopoly, the PRC's foreign trade 
structure and organisations were quite similar to those 
of the Soviet Union.11
The machinery of central planning and strict state 
control of the conduct of foreign trade was established 
when the Chinese communist government came to power in 
1949. This centrally controlled system of foreign trade 
remained unchanged until the reforms of the foreign trade 
system began in 1978. Before the reforms, the PRC's 
foreign trade institutions were structured as follows, 
with a Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT), and under this, 
national FTCs with their branch offices located in 
principal cities. The foreign trade bureaux in
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions were 
under the dual leadership of the MFT and the local 
government. Under this system, foreign trade was 
monopolized by the MFT, and the only institutions 
conducting import and export business on behalf of 
domestic suppliers and users were the national FTCs and 
their branch offices.
In 1978, the emergence of a new economic policy in 
the PRC, known as the "Open Policy", was accompanied by a 
rapid increase in contractual activities between the PRC
9. See R. Starr, "Developing trade with China", 13 
Virginia Journal of International Law (1973), p. 13, for 
an account of developments in this area.
10. See V. H. Li, "Legal Aspects of Trade with Communist 
China", Columbia Journal Of Transnational Law (1964), 
Vol. 3, p. 57.
11. K. D. Gott, "China's Foreign Trade Policies and 
Practices", Trade with China, (ed.), P. H. Boarman & 
Jayson Mugar, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974, p. 91,
93.
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and foreign enterprises.12 As part of the comprehensive 
reforms of the economic system, a restructuring of the 
foreign trade system took place in the same year. Since 
then, foreign trade has been decentralized to localities, 
industrial enterprises and other ministries, which are 
permitted to authorize trading corporations to carry out 
import-export business and other economic activities 
after approval by the State Council. From 1978 to 1982, 
new corporations approved by the State Council or by the 
state-appointed corporations numbered 140, of which 69 
were trading corporations, 13 contracted corporations and 
3 0 advisory and service corporations.13 Prior to March 
1982, the MFT was responsible for all matters relating to 
foreign trade. After March 1982, the planning and control 
of foreign trade and economic cooperation with foreign 
countries were enhanced when the MFT became the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT).14
At the present time, foreign trade activities are no 
longer monopolized by MOFERT alone, but MOFERT still 
retains decision-making power in administering a system 
of state monopoly.15 Many legal peculiarities stem from
12. J. P. Stevens, "The New Foreign Economic Contract Law 
in China", 18 Law & Policy of International Business 
(1986), pp. 455-457.
13. See U. N. , Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (comp., hereinafter, ESCAP), Guidebook on 
Trading with the People's' Republic of China, London: 
Graham & Trotman Limited, 1984), p. 79.
14. Ibid. In February 1982, the PRC's State 
Administrative Commission on Import and Export Affairs, 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Economic 
Relations with Foreign countries and the State Foreign 
Investment Commission were merged into a new ministry, 
the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Trade (MOFERT).
15. As regards the state monopoly, the direction and 
performance of foreign trade activities is in the hands 
of some interlocking institutions of state but not the 
particular state institution itself. See Hsin-shan Liu, 
"Dongou Guojia Duiwaimaoyi Zhidu Zhi Yanjiu" (Analysis on 
Foreign Trade System in Eastern European Countries) , The 
National Chengchi University Law Review, Taipei: Chengchi 
University Press, June 1980, No. 22, p. 41. Also see S.
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foreign trade parties contracting as a result of the
state monopoly in the PRC. It can be shown that the
investment contract/ however, is endowed with the same
characteristics as the state monopoly. An example is that
the native investment partner is in fact an agency of the
PRC government.16 The PRC, reflecting East-West trade
practices, has developed its own trade contracting norms
in many areas. Taiwan, in the non-recognition
circumstances of its current separation from the PRC,
plunged headlong into the rough and tumble of commerce
before direct trade relations were established. However,
recognition is a function of government and as a
1 7political action would have certain legal consequences.
It is also an issue of international law.
The fact of non-recognition will not necessarily
interfere directly with the private business contracting
activities between two countries. In East-West trade,
business dealings between Eastern and Western countries
have continued even in the absence of diplomatic
1 8relations, and when political tensions have been high. 
However, non-recognition may give rise to some 
limitations in business transactions. In short, there 
will be conflicts of national interest as a result. A 
state can certainly be expected to adopt a policy or law 
to limit or prohibit private business transactions with
Pissar, supra note 7, p. 142. For further studies, see 
Cheng Yuan, East-West Trade, Changing Patterns In Chinese 
Foreign Trade Law and Institutions, New York: Oceana
Pubications Inc., 1991, chapter 2 and pp. 324-328.
16. Under the socialist system in the PRC, the state owns 
all the means of production and consequently any Chinese 
participant in a joint venture is an organ of the 
government. See C. A. Jaslow, "Practical Consideration in 
Drafting a Joint Venture Agreement with China", 31 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law (1983), p. 210, note
5.
17. D. P. O ’Connell, International Law, Vol. 1, London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1970, pp. 127-128.
18. S. Pisar, supra note 7, p. 3.
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another state which it does not recognize. International 
law will of course not be able to exclude such domestic 
discriminatory policy or enactment between states which 
do not recognise each other. Although this kind of 
policy and law would not necessarily be adopted between 
those countries which do not publicly recognise each 
other, private commercial activities between them would 
be largely restricted by this policy or law. The policy 
of prohibiting commercial transactions across the Taiwan 
Straits which was followed in the past, and the banning 
of trade and investment with communist countries by the 
Republic of Korea and the Taiwan authorities are examples 
of this.19
Under these circumstances, the contracting parties 
could not sign a valid contract. Nowadays, bans imposed 
by domestic policies have, for the most part, been
lifted. Thus, an enforcement decree on guide-lines on 
exchange and cooperation with communist countries took 
effect in the Republic of Korea in February 1991. In 
addition, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs drew up 
a clear list of 3,353 items, divided into sixty-seven
types, of indirect investment or technical cooperation 
that would be allowed in the PRC after October 1990.
Taiwan established a semi-official "Straits Exchange 
Foundation" (SEF) in February 1991. This SEF works as a 
mediation group to promote trade and investment contacts 
with the PRC. In July 1992, Taiwan promulgated a special
TMRS, which is designed to serve as the primary source of
legal authority to direct any civil exchange across the 
Taiwan Straits and to resolve any conflicts that might
9 Oresult from such interaction. However, obstacles and
19. See the Trade Law of the Republic of Korea
(promulgated on 16 January 1967 in Law Series no. 1878) , 
Article 2; and Taiwan's "Regulations of Punishment for 
Treason" (enacted on 21 June 1949), Article 4, the
sedition for financially assisting the "communist
bandits."
20. TMRS, see note 3 7 of Chapter 1.
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hindrances to conducting such commercial activities 
between parties of Taiwan and the PRC still remain 
because of continued non-recognition.
4.2 Contracting Parties and Legal Methods
International trade relations are recognised as 
civil legal relations which involve a foreign element. 
The parties to international civil legal relations are 
mainly legal persons operating as private business in 
countries. However, state organs are also sometimes
9 1participants m  this kind of legal relationship.
In Taiwan, the entities that conduct trade and
investment with the PRC are either natural or legal
persons. Their legal positions are mainly dealt with in
the Civil Code or in the four "Special Laws of Civil
Matters" namely Company Law, the Law of Negotiable
9 9Instruments, Maritime Law, and Insurance Law.  ^ But 
entities which participate in trade and investment in the 
PRC differ in nature from their counterparts in Taiwan, 
this difference being mainly the result of the adoption 
by the PRC of a state monopoly in its foreign economic 
dealings.
21. Zhao Chengbi, Guoji Maoyi Falii (International Trade 
Law) , Beijing: China External Economic and Trade
Publishers, 198 6, p. 88. For a summary of the legal 
person concept in the PRC Economic law, see Wang Baoshu 
and Cui Qingzhi, Jingji Faxue Yanjiu Zongshu (Summary of 
Research on Economic Law) (1989), pp. 72-74.
22. H. P. Ma, "General Features of the Law and Legal 
System of the Republic of China", in Trade and Investment 
in Taiwan (ed.), H. P. Ma, Taipei: Institute of American 
Culture, Academia Sinica, 1985, pp. 12, 17.
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4.2.1 Authority of the PRC Party
In order to enter into legally binding business 
relations, PRC organisations must be registered as 
independent legal entities with their own organisation
and have operating funds and capacity to undertake civil 
liability. If they wish to enter into contracts for 
business cooperation, investment or trade with foreign 
companies, they must have a general authorisation to do 
so or obtain special approval.
The business licence of a PRC party will normally
testify to its legal authority and scope of business
capacity including whether it is able to enter into
contracts with foreign corporations. It will also contain 
such other information as the PRC party's registered
capital, its chairman and general manager, the period of 
validity of the licence and its registered address.
PRC government departments will not normally have
the requisite authority to sign legally binding
contracts, though they are often the initial point of 
contact for foreign businessmen. Where necessary, 
business units of government departments have been
transformed into semi-independent operating companies 
with separate funding and business registration, so that 
they satisfy the legal conditions for conducting business 
with foreign companies.
4.2.2 The PRC Contracting Parties and their Legal Status
Before 1978, the PRC's foreign trade was conducted 
exclusively through the national FTCs under the aegis of 
the MFT, trade attache-j-s or representatives of diplomatic 
missions overseas, and agencies or sub-agencies for
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9 3national FTCs in Hong Kong and Macao. However, all
foreign trade activities are now conducted on the basis 
of an overall plan by MOFERT.24
A. The PRC's "Foreign Trade Corporations"
Import-export corporations and enterprises presently 
found in the PRC include first, the national FTCs and 
their branches under MOFERT; secondly, the new FTCs 
organized mostly by industrial enterprises and some
established by ministries or commissions; and thirdly, 
local FTCs in certain municipalities and provinces. 
MOFERT handles its responsibility for coordinating and 
supervising the PRC's foreign trade activities through
9c . ,
nineteen major national FTCs. The regional authorities 
of local FTCs may, in the light of local conditions, 
examine and approve small and medium-sized compensation 
trade ventures as long as the arrangements are within the 
general guide-lines devised by MOFERT.26 FTCs are
instruments by which the PRC has controlled its
international trade. However, individual enterprises in 
the PRC are now entering the international market in 
increasing numbers despite the fact that the bulk of 
foreign trade is still handled by FTCs.27
The FTCs were established with full permission of 
the relevant authorities. They have from the outset been
23. See A. R. Dicks, "The People's Republic of China", 
East-West Business Transactions (ed.), R. Starr, New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1974, pp. 394-396.
24. China Business Guide, Hong Kong: Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 1986, p . 19.
25. Ibid., pp. 20, 160-162.
26. Ibid., p. 20.
27. S. J. Mitchell & D. D. Stein, "United States - China 
Commercial Contracts", 20 International Law (1986), p. 
897. For an in-depth discussion of the PRC's FTCs, see
E. A. Theroux, supra note 4, pp. 196-199.
112
organized as state enterprises. Like other state 
enterprises, they are endowed with legal personality, 
enabling them to finalise contracts with other legal or 
natural persons either within or outside the PRC. Their 
contractual relations with other enterprises and 
organizations are governed by the PRC's civil law and by 
the system of "economic accounting." This enables state 
enterprises to take part in economic activity as 
independent legal entities but at the same time ensures 
that such enterprises act in conformity with their 
obligations under the state plan.28
B. The PRC's Agency Companies in Hong Kong and Macao
The PRC has long established companies in Hong Kong 
and Macao which act as agencies for its national FTCs. 
Hong Kong has for much of its long history served as an 
entrep-pt for China's foreign trade dealings. Moreover, 
it has been since 1949 an enclave where foreign firms may 
contact Chinese communist officials, including bankers 
and trade officials.29 The CCP established an FTC in Hong 
Kong in 1948 called the China Resources Company, which 
was an agency of foreign trade enterprise in Hong Kong 
before the PRC itself was founded in October 1949. Other 
companies of a similar nature, but created after 1949, 
are the Chinese Arts and Crafts (H.K.) Limited, the Hua 
Yuan Company, the Ng Fung Hong, and the Tech Soon Hong 
Limited and, in Macao, the Nam Kwong Trading Company. 
These foreign trade enterprises undertook representative
28. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Jiben Wenti (Basic 
Problems of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of 
China), (hereinafter referred to as Basic Problem of the
Civil Law), Beijing: Legal Press, 1958, pp. 27-28.
29. K. D. Gott, supra note 11, p. 97.
30. Zhao, supra note 21, p. 88; see also ESCAP, supra 13, 
p . 85.
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and, to some extent, agency functions in the PRC's import
3 1and export trades.
In 1983, in order to meet the demand of developing 
business, the China Resources Company was enlarged and 
registered in Hong Kong as the China Resources 
Corporation (Group). This Group represents thirty-three 
important import-export corporations, including Tech Soon 
Hong Limited, the Hua Yuan Company, the Ng Fung Hong, and 
so on. This Group has been of major importance for 
foreign traders. These constituent corporations have 
their own individual capacities as legal persons. They 
are empowered to hold negotiations and conclude 
transactions within the scope of their business. The 
China Resources Corporation (Group) has played the role 
of general agency for the PRC's FTCs operating under 
MOFERT in Hong Kong.32
After 1978, many other trade enterprises were also 
established in Hong Kong by various PRC governmental 
bodies or local authorities. For example, the Commission 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of Guangdong 
Province established a company called Sinomart 
Development Holding Company Limited to act as a base for 
its fifty nine representative offices and trading arms in 
Hong Kong and overseas. In general, such organizations 
have been established as limited corporations. In an 
attempt to unify the conduct of foreign trade and improve 
business management, these various agency companies are 
now on the whole being re-organized.33
31. A. R. Dicks, supra note 23, p. 396; see also ESCAP, 
supra 13, p. 85.
32. Zhao, supra note 21, p. 115.
33. Ibid.
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C. The PRC's Overseas Representative Organs of FTCs
The PRC's FTCs, apart from promoting contacts with 
foreign traders and managing effectively related business 
matters, have also established many representative organs 
as single entities abroad. These representative organs 
under MOFERT are not the same as the commercial 
counsellors' offices and commercial representatives' 
offices, though all three are component parts of the PRC 
embassies.34
Their principal activities are mainly the operation 
of technical transfer businesses, investigating and 
researching current developments in foreign markets, 
providing services for local clients in the host 
country, building up relations as sales agents, assisting 
the domestic related corporations in the conclusion of 
contracts, entertaining the domestic corporations' 
temporary trade missions abroad and helping them 
accomplish their task, and other matters entrusted to 
them by the domestic corporations. In earlier years, 
before the introduction in 1979 of the "Open Policy", the 
PRC, with certain very limited exceptions, did not seek 
to extend its commercial contacts in this way.
It seems probable that one of the reasons for the 
failure to extend commercial contacts is that the PRC has 
attached great importance to avoiding, for as long as it 
has been possible, submission to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of foreign countries by any of its 
organisations. The overseas representative organs act,
34.Unlike PRC's commercial organisations stationed 
abroad, the representative organs of MOFERT are neither 
legal persons nor legal entities. Although they may not 
carry out business, they can perform legal acts related 
to their parent FTCs' business operations. For example, 
they may execute agreements, place orders, negotiate 
prices, and so on. For further studies, see ESCAP, supra 
note 13, p. 83.
35. A. R. Dicks, supra note 23, p. 395.
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in effect, as business agencies of the various FTCs in 
the PRC. They are organized by the home-based FTCs as 
are the overseas permanent representatives sent by the 
other PRC import-export enterprises. They should be 
responsible for the business operations of their parent 
corporations or enterprises. In addition, they accept 
the leadership of the commercial attaches of PRC
diplomatic missions overseas.
In general, these representative organs have the 
same legal status as the various states' commercial 
representatives permanently stationed abroad by their own 
parent enterprises. As to the issue of whether PRC's
FTCs can be established as permanently stationed 
representatives in Taiwan, there is little doubt that
this is still impossible in view of Taiwan's current 
policy and law. However, it seems possible that this
policy could be abandoned.37 If the establishment of PRC 
representative organs could be allowed under Taiwan laws, 
then the procedure for establishing a representative 
office would be to register with Taiwan's Ministry of
7 oEconomic Affairs.
D. The PRC's Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures
Under the laws and regulations formulated for equity 
joint ventures (EJVs) in the PRC, many joint ventures 
have been established in the PRC. The EJV Law
promulgated in 1979 was less than comprehensive. This
36. See Zhao, supra note 20, p. 541.
37. See TMRS, supra note 20. To approve direct cross- 
Straits commerce, Article 95 of TMRS requires the organ- 
in-charge to first obtain a resolution from the 
Legislative Yuan which is equivalent to Parliament.
38. See S. H. Wu, "A Comparison between Branch and 
Representative Office", 37 Formosa Transnational Law 
Review, Taipei, Formosa Transnational Attorney-at-Law 
Press, 1988, p. 39.
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law leaves most of the important details of the venture 
to the negotiation of the parties subject to PRC
7 Qgovernment approval.
A "joint venture" under PRC law is the contractual 
formation by a foreign investor and a domestic PRC party 
of a single economic entity where the contracting parties 
share the profits and the risks of that entity (or "joint 
venture") in proportion to their relative investment in 
the capital of the venture. All these joint ventures are 
PRC legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and 
protection of PRC law.40 This means that the single 
entity of a joint venture can be entitled to create or 
execute a contract and to bring independent litigation to 
sue, or to be sued in court.41
As regards the arrangements for foreign investment, 
PRC’s new economic legislation has allowed numerous 
different kinds of bilateral investment agreement. There 
are two main types of joint ventures in the PRC. First, 
there are EJVs which take the form of limited liability 
corporations and jointly invest in, and are managed by, 
the PRC and foreign partners. Profits and losses are 
shared according to the joint venture contract but the 
contract usually specifies that the profits should be 
proportioned according to each partner's contributing 
investment. Each partner may contribute cash or other 
assets, such as buildings, equipment or industrial
39. Supra note 1.
40. The Implementing Regulations, in addition to the EJV 
Law of 1979, were promulgated by the PRC's State Council 
on 2 0 September 1983 [hereinafter Implementing 
Regulations] which supplemented and clarified certain 
aspects of the basic EJV Law of 1979. Moreover, an 
additional "Provisions for Encouraging Foreign 
Investment" was promulgated on 11 October 1986 by the 
PRC's State Council which attempted to solve some of the 
problems which foreign investors had experienced under 
the existing framework.
41. Zhao, supra note 21, p. 114.
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property, as well as know-how or equity investment. 
Foreigners may not own less than twenty five per cent of 
the equity, but the maximum amount of foreign ownership 
is not specified. Secondly, there are cooperative joint 
ventures (CJVs) which may take any form as agreed between 
the PRC and foreign partners. The rights and obligations 
of each partner are specified in the joint venture 
contract. Under this arrangement, the PRC partners 
generally provide contributions in kind, such as land, 
natural resources, labour, equipment, and so on. The 
foreign partners provide capital, advanced technology, 
materials, and so on.
With regard to joint ventures in the Special 
Economic Zones and joint ventures involved in petroleum, 
natural gas, and resource exploitation, these two 
categories like CJVs are either partially or completely 
excluded from joint venture laws and regulations. All 
the three forms of investment are dealt with in separate 
or specialized legislation.42 A new type of contractual 
joint venture in the form of a "limited liability 
company" was introduced in late 1985.43
A joint venture has the right to conduct its 
business independently within the scope prescribed by PRC 
laws and regulations and the joint venture agreement, 
contract and articles of association. It has the 
autonomous right to perform every action related to the
42. C. G. Fenwick, "Equity Joint Ventures in the People's 
Republic of China: An Assessment of the First Five 
Years", 40 Business Law (1985), p. 840, no. 5.
43. The PRC presently has developed a uniform corporation 
law or the so-called Company Law applicable nationwide 
since 1 July 1994. Relevant law of business organizations 
is covered in the Civil Code. Article 19 of the Joint 
Venture Law simply provides that the liability of parties 
is to be "limited to the amount of capital contribution 
subscribed by each." See M. J. Moser (ed.), "Foreign 
Investment in China: The Legal Framework", Foreign Trade, 
Investment and the Law In the People's Republic of China, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 106.
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business from the beginning to the end. The PRC 
government encourages joint ventures to sell their 
products on the international market.44
The EJV Law of 1979 was amended on 4 April 1990.
Changes included the addition of a paragraph which rules
out the possibility of nationalization or requisition of
EJVs by the PRC government, the end of a thirty-year
limit on the life of certain ventures, and the lifting of
restrictions on the foreign partner acting as chairman of
the board. However, some foreign executives think that
the changes fail to address other serious problems
affecting investment decisions, such as balancing
foreign-exchange shortfalls, production limits,
45restricted distribution channels and import controls.
On 22 October 1990, the PRC through MOFERT 
promulgated the "Provisional Regulations on Sino-Foreign 
EJV Terms" which complemented the EJV Law amended on
April 1990. The new regulations state that joint
ventures eligible for unlimited terms are those
"stipulated by the state as investment projects to be 
encouraged and permitted". However, what precise kinds 
of projects will be "encouraged and permitted" remains 
uncertain.
The new regulations also identify five types of 
business in which joint ventures cannot have unlimited 
terms namely service trades, land development and real 
estate, exploration and development of resources, 
projects restricted by the state and those which any 
other state law or regulation stipulates must have a 
fixed joint venture term.46
44. See the PRC’s Implementing Regulations, supra note
40, Article 19, 7, 60.
45. See 71 PRC Law Newsletter, Hong Kong: McKenna & Co., 
May 1990, p. 10.
46. See ibid., No. 75, p. 8.
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E. Investment Partners of Taiwanese Enterprises 
in the PRC
Before 1979, the PRC considered that foreign 
investment was itself just a direct exploitation of the 
resources or labour of the Chinese people in the PRC. 
Prior to the adoption of "Open Policy" in 1979, no 
instance was recorded of PRC participation in a joint 
venture of any kind with a Western company, either inside 
or outside the PRC territory.47 After 1979, foreign 
investment was allowed in the PRC.
However, it was still not clear if the FTCs could be 
involved with such foreign investment activities. Beside 
FTCs, what were the other organs for undertaking foreign 
investment with a joint venture? Usually, each FTC under 
MOFERT has its individual monopoly to run import-export 
business for particular categories of goods. This was
A Q
designed to avoid two FTCs dealing m  the same items. 
But after 1979 the question arose of whether foreign 
enterprise investment fell within the particular monopoly 
of an FTC.
In fact, the business scope of some FTCs did
A Q
include investment. Since 1979, the FTCs established
in some municipalities and provinces have been under the 
dual leadership of the respective local authorities and 
MOFERT. These new FTCs, co-ordinated with the national 
FTCs operating directly under MOFERT, have assumed a
47. A. R. Dicks, supra note 23, pp. 398-99, 426-427. An 
apparent exception to the policy just stated might be the 
various enterprises operated in Hong Kong where 
considered by the PRC technically to be Chinese 
territory.
48. See ESCAP, supra note 13, p. 81.
49. See ibid., p. 627 et seq.
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direct supervisory role and responsibility for carrying 
out foreign trade plans and investment, joint ventures, 
compensation trade and other economic activities within 
their jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the PRC's "Implementing Regulations" of
EJV Law of 1983 stipulated that the foreign investor may
authorize the China International Trust and Investment
Corporation (CITIC), or the local trust and investment
agency under the central authority, or a relevant
government department or people-to-people organization,
to introduce it to a partner with which it may 
51cooperate.
However, the above stated regulation does not seem
to provide a clearcut explanation of what the cooperation
"partners" are. Moreover, even township enterprises in
the PRC have been allowed to develop joint ventures
with overseas Chinese or foreign enterprises in order to
acquire modern foreign equipment, technological
5 9knowledge, and managerial skill.
Therefore, it can be concluded that, not only the 
monopoly FTCs but also the general corporations, 
enterprises, or the other economic and trade 
organizations can cooperate in joint ventures with a 
foreign investor. Nevertheless, the general PRC
50. Ibid., p. 84. The terms of reference of the local 
corporations are somewhat different from those of the 
national FTCs and provincial foreign trade bureaux. One 
of their main objectives is to develop their joint 
business operations with other provinces and 
municipalities as well as economic co-operation with 
foreign or overseas entities.
51. See PRC's Implementing Regulations of Joint venture 
Law, supra note 38, Article 12.
52. Hsu Yi, "Xiangzhen Qiye Yu Duiwaimaoyi" (Township 
enterprises and foreign trade), 6 International Trade 
Issue (Beijing), (1987), p. 18.
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investment partners except FTCs still remain de facto 
organs of the central government.
4.2.3 Taiwanese Contractors and their Legal Status
As stated above, the major barrier between Taiwan 
and the PRC is political and at present third parties are 
still needed for trade and investment links. However, in 
practice, it is only since 1979 that Taiwanese 
enterprises have been allowed to carry out indirect trade 
and investment via a third party. This has been done by 
establishing a resident representative office within the 
territory of the PRC.
Even the Taiwanese government has itself legalized 
this kind of indirect business relation across the Taiwan 
Straits since August 1988.54 In Taiwan, the main bodies 
for carrying out trade and investment business with PRC 
enterprises are natural or legal persons. Their legal 
status is decided by Taiwan's civil law. In terms of the 
present policy of indirect trade with the PRC, Taiwanese 
enterprises have been allowed indirectly to send 
representatives or establish resident representative 
offices in the PRC.
On 6 October 1990, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic 
Affairs promulgated the "Measures Governing Control over 
Making Indirect Investment or Undertaking Technical 
Cooperation Projects in Mainland China." By these 
measures, individuals, legal persons, organizations or 
other institutions in Taiwan may not directly invest or
53. Jaslow, supra note 16, p. 210.
54. See The Economist, (9-15 February, 1991), p. 68. 
Taiwan's Investment Commission approved a plan by the 
Chung Shing Textile Company to invest US$900,000 in a 
joint venture in Shanghai, China. This is the first time 
Taiwan officially allowed its company to invest in the 
PRC.
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undertake technical cooperation projects in the PRC. 
Indirect investment or technical cooperation projects may 
be implemented through companies or enterprises 
incorporated in a third country but must be approved by 
the Ministry's Investment Commission.
On 3 0 October 1980, an Interim Provision on the 
control of resident representative offices of foreign 
enterprises was promulgated by the State Council of the 
PRC. With this Interim Provision, notice of the 
registration procedure for foreign enterprises and 
resident representative offices was announced by the 
General Administration for Industry and Commerce, of the 
PRC on 8 December 1980.
Any foreign enterprises desiring to establish a 
resident representative office in the PRC must present an 
application and, after receiving approval, complete 
registration procedures. Without such approval and 
registration, no foreign enterprise may commence resident
c c
business activities.
The PRC government undertakes to protect, in 
accordance with the law, the legitimate rights and 
interests of resident representative offices and their 
members and also to facilitate their normal business 
activities. The resident representative offices may not 
set up radio stations within PRC territory. They should 
apply to the local telecommunications bureaux for the 
renting of such commercial communications lines or 
communications equipment as may be necessary for their 
business operations. The personnel of resident
representative offices and their families should abide 
by PRC law, decrees and relevant regulations in all their
55. See Interim Provisions of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China for the Control of Resident 
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises, Article 2.
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activities within the PRC, and in entering and leaving 
the PRC.56
If a resident representative office and its 
personnel violate these Interim Provisions or engage in 
other unlawful activities, the competent PRC authorities 
have the right to conduct an investigation and deal with 
the matter in accordance with the law. Although
Taiwanese enterprises at present can establish a resident 
representative office via a third party in the PRC, the 
legal status of these offices is different from that of 
offices set up by other capitalist countries which have 
the same representative organs abroad. For example, 
foreign companies registered in Taiwan have capacity to 
bring a civil action. According to Article 372 of 
Taiwan's Company Law, the foreign company should appoint 
an agent to represent the company in all litigation and 
non-litigation matters. However, in the PRC's Interim 
Provisions there is no mention of the right of 
litigation.
In the PRC, the status of foreign nationals in the 
matter of litigation is decided by the 1991 Civil 
Procedure Law.58 According to Article 187 of this Civil 
Procedure Law, the PRC People's Courts shall apply the
principle of reciprocity with respect to civil rights in 
proceedings involving a foreign party. The principle of 
reciprocity, according to the PRC's official
interpretation of it, is one of equality and of mutual
benefit. It means that civil litigation rights between 
PRC and foreign nationals are treated on an equal footing 
and should be equally beneficial. Neither of the parties
56. Ibid., Article 12, 13, 14.
57. Ibid., Article 15.
58. The Law was promulgated on 9 April 1991 and
officially became effective from the same date. For the 
English text of this Law, see China Law and Practice (No. 
5, 1991), pp. 15-16.
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is entitled to special privileges. If a foreign court 
imposes restrictions on the litigation rights of PRC 
parties, the PRC court will have to do the same towards a 
foreign party. Because of this principle, those foreign 
resident representative offices without reciprocal 
relations with the PRC will not be able to enjoy the 
right of litigation.
However, these foreign resident representative
offices are nevertheless obliged to pay taxes.
According to Article 2 6 of the PRC's "Income Tax Law
Concerning Foreign Enterprises" of 1991, in disputes over
tax payment, the last legal remedy is the bringing of a
lawsuit in the local courts. Thus, there is an obvious
contradiction existing in this area of PRC's laws and
regulations. In regard to private and commercial
litigation procedures in the PRC, however, Taiwanese
enterprises have been treated as a domestic party handled
by the PRC local courts in coastal economic zones, but
60treated as "shewai" economic cases in inland areas. 
Therefore, the representative organs of Taiwanese 
enterprises in the PRC are still uncertain as to their 
precise legal status.
4.2.4 The PRC's Preliminary Project Approval
After having established the business capacity and 
legal authority of the PRC party, it is necessary for the
59. See supra note 51, Article 9; also the Individual 
Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China (Adopted 
by the Third Session of the Fifth National People's 
Congress and Promulgated on and Effective as of 10 
September 1980) , Article 1; and also the Income Tax Law 
of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign 
Enterprises (Adopted by the Fourth Session of the Fifth 
National Congress and Promulgated on 13 December 1981), 
Article 1.
60. See Jingji Ribao (Taipei: Economic Daily News), 2 
July 1990, p. 7.
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other party to establish whether or not the project to be 
negotiated has already received all necessary preliminary 
government approvals. It is normally the responsibility 
of the PRC party to apply for "preliminary project 
listing" prior to or during the early stages of 
negotiation with a foreign company. It is not unknown 
for foreign companies to have committed themselves to a 
course of negotiation in the PRC only to find out later 
that the project had never received preliminary project 
listing and was unlikely ever to be approved.
4.3 Some Problems on the Legal Status
of PRC Contractors
We have noted that, in PRC law, PRC traders or 
investors are in fact independent legal persons. These 
persons are circumscribed by strict rules of restricted 
authority, limited liability, independent accounting and 
other signs of institutional separateness. But how does 
autonomy operate in the PRC? The question is important 
on practical and theoretical levels.
If the concept of corporate personality is a legal
fiction, it is in this instance double fiction within the
6 1framework of a monolithic system. On the one hand, the 
PRC FTCs have independent properties, limited liability, 
and can even go bankrupt. On the other hand, these
61. Pisar, supra note 7, p. 262.
62. See Article 2 and 3 of the PRC's Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law (for Trial Implementation) which was 
adopted by the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Sixth National People's Congress on 2 December 1986 
and became effective three months after the coming into 
effect of a separate statute entitled "Law of Industrial 
Enterprises Under the Ownership of the Whole People". 
Concerning the legislative background and characteristic 
of this Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, see T. K. Chang, "The 
Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the 
Chinese Legislative Process", 28 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 
(1987), p. 333; see also Peng Xiaohua, "Characteristics
126
corporations, like the former Eastern bloc corporations,
are administratively and organically interwoven with the
fi ^state and with one another.
4.3.1 The Scope of Authority of the PRC FTCs
In former Eastern bloc corporations, the operating
business organizations are subject to their government- 
approved charters of incorporation, the civil codes of 
their country of origin and the regulations which are
sporadically prescribed for the state-trading apparatus 
as a whole. Transactions concluded in violation of these 
provisions are tainted with illegality and are precarious 
from the standpoint of foreign parties.64
For the PRC corporations, the General Principles of
the Civil Law (GPCL) of 1986 clearly regulate the work of
these corporations and should operate through the
approved registration and within the scope of
authority.65 Every state-owned FTC in the PRC enjoys a
monopoly in a number of import-export goods. It conducts
its import and export activities within the defined
sphere of its business. Thus, possibilities of
fi fiduplication are avoided.
of China’s First Bankruptcy Law", 28 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 
(1987), p. 373.
63. Pisar, supra note 7. p. 262.
64. See ibid., p. 263.
65. See Article 42 of the PRC's General Principles of 
Civil Law (Civil Code) which was adopted by the Fourth 
Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on 12 
April 1986, and effective as of 1 January 1987. For an 
English translation of the Law by W. Gray and H.R. Zheng, 
see 34 American Journal of Comparative Law (1986), pp. 
715-743.
66. ESCAP, supra 13, p. 81.
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Other new trading corporations, organized by 
industrial enterprises, can sell their products directly 
to foreign companies and purchase goods so long as the 
products or the goods are approved for import or export 
by the State Council of the PRC.67 This explanation can 
also apply to the new FTCs in some municipalities and 
provinces of the PRC.
In the light of experiments by the former Eastern 
bloc corporations, business transactions entered into 
without a standing or special state license, or violating 
the principle of specialization should be made void.68 
This fundamental rule can be applied to the trade 
relations between Taiwan and the PRC. Therefore,
Taiwanese enterprises should be cautious and spend time 
in seeing whether the PRC FTCs have proper authority. An 
East-West transaction concluded without proper authority 
on the state trading side is manifestly vulnerable from a
f t Qlegal point of view.
4.3.2 The PRC's FTCs and their Sovereign Immunity Status
According to the GPCL, a legal person of the PRC is
an organization which is competent to exercise civil
rights, perform civil acts, and shall independently
enjoy civil rights and assume civil duties under the 
7 0law. Furthermore, the GPCL states that the civil
liabilities of an "enterprise" legal person owned by the 
whole people shall be borne by property distributed by 
the state, and the civil liabilities of an enterprise 
legal person owned by a collective ownership shall be
67. Ibid., p. 84.
68. See Pisar, supra note 7, pp. 263-264.
69. See ibid., p. 265.
70. See the PRC's Civil Code, supra note 64, Article 36.
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7 1borne by the property of the enterprise. Like the
former Eastern bloc trade monopolies, the PRC FTCs adopt
the doctrine of an independent corporate personality
separated from the state itself. The concept of
separation here has a very different function from that
7 7which it is meant to have in "bourgeois" legal systems.'*
Internally, the notion of juridical separateness of 
corporate personality and independent accounting is 
largely a tool of management. Ultimately, the property 
belongs to the state and can at any stage be withdrawn or 
transferred to other entities. Externally, the veil 
which separates an enterprise from the state itself and 
from other state instrumentalities serves an additional 
purpose. Under a state monopoly, unincorporated foreign 
trade delegations have found it increasingly difficult to 
invoke the defence of sovereign immunity in foreign 
countries. In practice, no such immunity is claimed 
today for the corporations. A compensatory result is 
always achieved under the shield of their own laws.
The state's rights can be protected through the
concept of an independent corporate personality. Put in
other words, the state's commercial dealings in foreign
markets are carried on through interposed suable
enterprises. While its exchequer at home and property
abroad are largely kept safe from the risk of legal
claims founded on foreign laws that are diverse and which
7may occasionally be actually hostile. The commerce of
collective economies would be unmanageable if all state 
organisations and departments were jointly and severally 
liable for obligations incurred by each. By this 
reasoning, such adaptations of the legal framework made 
by the Eastern bloc states and by the PRC need not be
71. See ibid., Article 48.
72. See Pisar, supra note 7, p. 265.
73. See ibid., p. 266.
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regarded as abuses of that framework but as modifications 
which they at least regard as completely necessary.74
The legal status of national sovereignty is 
inextricably linked with the phenomenon of state trading. 
Serious difficulties arose in the past both for a 
private trader seeking a juridical remedy against a 
public instrumentality and for the forum called upon to 
decide the issue. Sovereign immunity in the sphere of 
East-West trade is a dormant, if not an altogether dead 
issue.
The legal considerations, however, continue to be
ill-defined, and clarifications are needed for the sake
7 6of certainty and predictability. Former Eastern bloc
states make a sharp distinction between sovereign 
immunity at home and abroad. Domestically, they do not, 
and logically cannot admit any such notion. Since all 
significant economic functions are exercised either by
the state itself or by its organic components, there is
7 6no need to assert sovereign privilege.
As regards sovereign immunity abroad, there are some 
differences from the way it applies at home. Initially, 
the Soviet trade monopoly sought to take full advantage 
of governmental immunities as recognised in international 
law and applied in Western courts. As regards foreign 
trade delegations, the case of Fenton Textile Association 
v. Krassin (1921) , involved a suit against the head of 
the Russian trade delegation in England to obtain the 
balance of an amount owed for certain goods sold.
The former Russian trade delegation claimed in the 
English courts that it was entitled to sovereign immunity
74. Ibid.
75. See ibid., p. 268.
76. Ibid., p. 269.
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as it was the authorized representative of a foreign
state.77 Since the trade accord had been executed prior
to de jure recognition of the Soviet government by the
U.K. , and, accordingly, by its terms did not extend
diplomatic immunity to the trade delegation, the Court of
7 8Appeal rejected the defendant’s contention. For its
decision, the court relied on two grounds: first, that
the defendant had not been recognised by the British 
government in any capacity other than that of official 
agent; second, that the rights granted to the Russian 
trade officials were defined in the agreement (trade 
accord) which did not provide for immunity from civil 
process.
With regard to state trading companies, as 
distinguished from business-oriented diplomatic personnel 
or trade delegations, the British courts' attitude 
regarding immunity is reflected clearly in the landmark 
decision of the case Krajina v. the Tass Agency in 1949. 
In this case, the Tass news agency alleged in the British 
court that it was a department of the Soviet government 
entitled to immunity from suit.
The Court of Appeal held that even if Tass was a
governmental department enjoying a separate legal status,
it did not automatically follow that it was deprived of
7 Qthe right to assert sovereign immunity. However, the
77. See K. M. Starr, "The Framework of Anglo-Soviet
Commercial Relations: The British View", East-West Trade
(ed.), K. Grzybowski, New York: Oceana Publications,
Inc., 1973, p. 64.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 66. The British plaintiff contended that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable since 
Tass has a separate legal existence from that of the 
sovereign state and that, therefore, the case was 
distinguishable from the United States Shipping Board —  
In 1924, the British Court recognised the sovereign
immunity of the "Board" in the case of Compania Mercontil
Argentina v. United States Shipping Board.—  since in
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growing government intrusion into economic life 
everywhere and the emergence of a bloc of countries 
practicing total state commerce provoked a strong 
reaction against the concept of sovereign immunity.
In fact, reaction came in various ways from business 
quarters, from courts and from administrative 
authorities. The most effective form of pressure arose 
from the natural reluctance of private firms to deal with 
the Eastern bloc at all so long as this air of 
uncertainty persisted. Certain governments, notably the 
United States, simply refused to admit foreign trade 
delegations purportedly enjoying sovereign immunity into
Q 0
their territories.
As to the English law of diplomatic immunity, 
adoption of the 19 64 Diplomatic Privileges Act operated 
to eliminate the immunity defense as to diplomatic agents 
engaging in "an action relating to any professional or 
commercial activity .... outside his official
Q I
functions." In 1952, the Tate Letter announced the
State Department's adoption of a restrictive theory of
o n
sovereign immunity.
that case the Board was clearly a governmental department 
not enjoying a separate juridical status.
80. See Pisar, supra note 7, p. 271
81. See Starr, supra note 77, p. 68.
82. Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to 
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman, 19 May 1952. 
Dept. State Bull. 26 (1952), p. 984. The Tate Letter
proclaimed the intention of the United States Government 
to abandon the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, and 
thenceforth to grant suggestions of immunity only with 
respect to a government's sovereign or public acts (jure 
imperii) . This was a definite change of position on the 
part of the United States Government. See also M. L. 
Werthan, N. L. Combs, J. L. Deitch & A. L. Fuoss, 
"Jurisdiction over Foreign Government: A Comprehensive
Review of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act", 19 
VANDERBILT J. Of TRANS'L L. (1986), P. 121-122.
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At present, many countries have undertaken to codify 
the rules of foreign sovereign immunity in their own 
domestic statutes to eliminate the private and commercial
O O
acts (acts jure gestionis). There can be no doubt that 
the restrictive approach is more just and reasonable in 
the contemporary commercial setting. Indeed, it is 
essential to eliminate the remnants of the immunity
problem in business dealings with state traders of all
. . 84origins.
At a theoretical level, former Eastern bloc jurists 
did not concede that state entities, corporate or 
otherwise, were precluded from pleading their exempt
Q C
sovereign status. However, the present doctrine of
sovereign immunity cannot be said to constitute a major
Q fl
obstacle to East-West trade.
For the PRC, it was generally recognized that the 
FTCs were entitled as legal persons to take up law suits
83. See M. B. Feldman, "The United States Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A 
Founder's View", 35 INT'L AND COM. L . Q. (1986), P. 303 . 
Regarding the basic distinction between sovereign 
functions of a state (jure imperii) and state 
instrumentalities engages in commerce (jure gestionis), 
it can be found in the Matsuda Report. See Matsuda 
Report on Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign 
States, Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law, League of Nations Doc. 
(1927), v. 9, p. 6.
84. Pisar, supra note 7, p. 272.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., pp. 271-272. As matter of usage, no immunity 
is claimed on behalf of Eastern corporate 
instrumentalities. The current pattern of submission to 
foreign process is explained on the basis of waiver, 
either made explicitly, or implied from such factors as 
the sue-and-be-sued clause which is usually included in 
their charters. In the case of trade delegation], under a 
serious of bilateral commercial treaties, the USSR was
required to waive, in respect of all economic activities,
the entitlement to immunity which was allegedly afforded 
by customary international law.
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and to answer inquiries of the court of justice and the
R7arbitration organization. As to the legal status of
the representative office of the PRC FTCs, it should be 
deemed that the representative office was just a 
representative organ of a legal person; a civil but not 
an official organ.
It is different from the commercial staff or the 
commercial organs of the PRC diplomatic missions abroad. 
The practice of not giving a state's foreign trade 
agencies —  which means the representative organs, and 
its staff—  sovereign immunity and diplomatic privilege, 
has been established as an international custom and has 
been domestically legislated by various countries.
Nevertheless, the exceptional practice of giving 
sovereign immunity and diplomatic privilege exists, 
though only if national authorities have signed a treaty 
which makes provision for it. Therefore, the enterprise's 
representative organ abroad should in general be governed
Q Q
by the law of the country of its permanent residence.
In Taiwan, all commercial activities are governed by the 
Civil Code and the Code of Civil Proceedings; while 
public functions are governed by the Administrative Code.
In Taiwan, all cases involving government 
enterprises are to be tried by civil courts; while cases 
involving public functions of government agencies are to 
be tried by the administrative court of the Judicial 
Yuan. Since Taiwan's law recognizes the doctrine of 
restrictive immunity, the litigation status of the PRC's 
FTCs in Taiwan will in theory not be influenced as they
87. Zhao, supra note 21, p. 113; see ESCAP, supra note 
13, P. 81.
88. Zhao, ibid., p. 539.
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are considered to be simply dealing with commercial
OQ
activities.
4.3.3 Responsibility of the PRC's FTCs 
for Government Action
As noted above, the concept of legal persons has a 
dual purpose under the state monopoly system. The FTC is 
closely linked with the state in terms of administration 
and organization. Therefore, the question arises whether 
the FTC can assert its responsibility to be exempted from 
an act of state. The issue most relevant to this 
question is whether a denial or cancellation of import- 
export licenses and a change of economic plan by the 
State is sufficient.
If the fact that the FTC belongs to the state in 
administration is emphasized, this- corporation then 
cannot plead a force majeure for governmental acts. In 
these circumstances, the act of one is the act of the 
other and there can be no conflict of will between the 
two such as is necessary to call into play the concept of 
insuperable force.90
On the other hand, if the FTC is an independent 
legal entity and separate and distinct from the state, 
then this corporation can plead force majeure for 
governmental acts. In this situation, a state enterprise, 
by invoking an act of its own government, may evade with 
impunity all contractual obligations toward a damaged 
party.91 Can the governmental acts for denial,
cancellation, or alteration of import-export licenses be
89. Yi-ting Chang, Collected Essays on International Law, 
Taipei: Asia & World Institute, 1986, pp. 110-111.
90. See Pisar, supra note 7, p. 276.
91. See ibid.
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asserted as a force majeure plea? The approach held for 
most countries to international practice is not suitable
Q 2
for East-West trade.
With regard to the change of economic plan, there 
was disagreement on this issue in the former Eastern bloc 
arbitration tribunals started in 1956. In the early 
stages, the view that an act of planning cannot cause a 
force majeure was not widely accepted. But, by the end
Q1
of 1964, this view did prevail in these tribunals.
Broadly speaking, former Eastern bloc parties have 
refused to assume responsibility for possible acts of 
their states. On- the contrary, they usually seek and 
obtain broad contractual force majeure definitions which
Q A
include the event of prohibitions of export or import. 
Due to the various types of sovereign &cts, the state 
must waive, in all situations, the right to act in 
contravention of a commercial contract.
No communist government can seriously be expected to
Q Rlimit its sovereign power to this extent, and there have
Q  (L
been various schemes to solve this problem. However,
92. Ibid.
93. See ibid,, pp. 277-278. The act of planning produces
effects in regard to Bulgarian enterprises, but it does
not free the Bulgarian enterprise from executing the 
contracts which it has concluded, nor from the 
consequences of its non-performance, vis-a-vis foreign 
parties [cited from p. 278].
94. See ibid., p. 281.
95. See ibid., pp. 279-280.
96. See ibid., p. 282. Evidentiary criteria to determine
state motivation, or party effort to reverse government 
interference with performance, implied contractual 
suggestions to an eventual adjudication, insurance 
coverage, sporadically available counter-guarantees or 
other improvisations by the parties do not offer 
permanent solutions to the fundamental problem of force 
majeure [cited from p. 282].
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nothing can be more satisfactory than a provision which 
deals with the question directly and in specific detail. 
Ideally, it should obtain universal application pursuant 
to treaty stipulations, legislation and adoption by the 
courts.
The FECL became effective on 1 July 1985 in the PRC. 
Although the FECL has regulations for an event of force 
majeure, it did not mention the event caused by
q 7
governmental acts. According to the FECL, the scope of 
events of force majeure may be agreed to in the
q o
contract.
In East-West trade, Western enterprises can aspire 
to a clause in all East-West agreements to which it is a 
party, to the effect that the risk of state action should 
lie on the state corporation whose government is at
QQ ,
cause. But in PRC contractual practice, it seems that 
this point has never actually been mentioned in its 
contractual clauses.
Unlike the former Eastern bloc legislation and 
practice, the PRC FTCs did not claim a force majeure 
plea concerning governmental denial of import-export 
licenses or change of economic plan.100 An example is
97. See Article 24 and 25 of the PRC’s Foreign Economic 
Contract Law which was adopted at the Tenth Session of 
the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's 
Congress on 21 March 1985.
98. See ibid., Article 24.
99. See Pisar, supra note 7, p. 282.
100. Ibid. p. 279. For example, the Czechoslovak Code on 
Foreign Trade, under which the default or an official 
authorization necessary for the accomplishment of the 
duty of the obligee is specifically excluded from the 
realm of force majeure. While the denial or cancellation 
of an export license would undoubtedly result in 
impossibility of performance for the exporting state 
enterprise and would thus terminate its obligation to 
perform, it would not release it from reparation for 
damages caused [cited from p. 279].
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provided by a large contract dispute which happened
between the PRC and Japan in 1981.101 This Baoshan
dispute was caused by a change in the PRC's economic plan
1 07and was finally settled through negotiations. Although
the contract cancellation was caused by a change of
economic plan, the China Technical Import Corporation in
this case did not plead a force majeure and paid 
1 08compensation.
4.4 Legal Methods of Taiwanese Trade
The State Council of the PRC has experimented with a 
marketing system in selected areas since September 1988. 
However, the PRC is still essentially a central planned 
economy. Most foreign trade is generally conducted
101. The total value of the cancelled contracts came to 
approximately $1.4 billion, the largest single 
cancellation in the history of Japanese trade. See D. A. 
Sneider, "The Baoshan Debacle: A Study of Sino-Japanese 
Contract Dispute Settlement", 18 NEW YORK UNIV. J. OF 
INT'L L. AND POLITICS (1986), p. 570.
102. See ibid., p. 563 et seq., 571 et seq., 588, 589.
103. See ibid., pp. 588-596. After lengthy negotiations, 
the two sides signed a "Memorandum for the Purpose of 
Contract Termination" on 21 August. The agreement awarded 
Mitsubishi ¥9.3 billion ($40 million) in compensation, 
approximately 11 percent of the contract price and one 
half the amount initially demanded by the Japanese. Since 
Mitsubishi had already received a down payment, 
Techimport was obligated to pay an additional amount of 
approximately ¥"1.3 billion ($5 million), which it agreed 
to provide within one-year [cited from p. 587]. After 
Mitsubishi's settlement, the remaining four companies, 
including NSC, reached a . similar agreement with 
Techimport in mid-September. The total value of the four 
cancelled contracts was between r14 and *15 billion ($61- 
65 million). As compensation, the companies received a 
total of ¥ 1.18 billion ($5 million), approximately eight 
and one half percent of the value of the contracts. 
Since the remaining Japanese companies had already 
received down payments of ten percent of the value of the 
contracts, they agreed to reimburse the difference to 
Techimport in the form of spare parts for other 
facilities at Baoshan [cited from p. 588].
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either pursuant to bilateral exchange with foreign 
governments and trade associations or in accordance with 
individual trade contracts, comprising what the PRC 
refers to as "payment trade". Basically, trade conducted 
by the PRC with foreign countries can be divided into two 
types: agreement trade and non-agreement trade.104
Since a political barrier has existed between Taiwan 
and the PRC since 1949, indirect trade calling for the 
medium of an entrep^-t has meant that Hong Kong or 
Singapore play an indispensable role. Indirect trade, or 
even direct trade, across the Taiwan Straits is still 
regarded as in the realm of foreign trade.
4.4.1 Agreement Trade
Trade agreements have long been a channel for the 
PRC's involvement in foreign trade. In practice, there 
are two types of PRC's trade agreements, the 
intergovernmental trade agreement and the non-
1 fie
governmental trade agreement. Up to 1986, the PRC had
signed over one hundred trade agreements or protocols 
with foreign countries.106 The majority of trade 
agreements took the form of bilateral governmental trade 
agreements, except for the agreement with the European 
Community (EC).107
However, there were differences in the nature of 
those PRC trade agreements made with the former Eastern
104. ESCAP, supra note 13, p. 91.
105. Ibid.
106. Zhao, supra note 21, p. 22.
107. Trade Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the People's Republic of China, done at 
Brussel on 3 April 1978; entered into force on 1 June 
1978. Also ESCAP, supra note 13, p. 91.
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1 08bloc and those made with the West. ° Since Taiwan and 
the PRC still do not recognize each other, Taiwanese 
enterprises are not able to trade under intergovernmental 
agreements.
In addition to intergovernmental trade agreements, 
the PRC trade organizations also conclude non­
governmental trade agreements, namely private trade 
agreements, with parties of other countries having no 
diplomatic relations with the PRC. However, private 
trade agreements may still take place after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations and even after some 
kinds of governmental trade agreements have already been
1 OQput in place.
While Taiwan and the PRC continue their non­
recognition, both contracting parties are free to adopt 
the method of private trade agreement as a means to 
conclude their present indirect and future direct 
business transactions.
4.4.2 Non-agreement Trade
This form of trade, often referred to in the PRC as 
"payment trade", accounts for the greater part of the 
PRC's trade with other countries and regions. The main 
characteristic of this trade is that business is carried 
out through negotiations on the basis of both parties' 
needs by concluding separate contracts specifying terms 
and conditions of sales or purchases.110
The PRC's import procedures are somewhat different 
from those of Western market economies. However, the PRC
108. See ibid., pp. 91-91.
109. Ibid., p. 93.
110. Ibid.
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has adopted many conventional international trading 
practices since the implementation of its "Open Policy" 
in 1979 to facilitate trade exchange with trading 
partners.111 The PRC's export procedures are generally 
similar to its import procedures.
Broadly speaking, the PRC's import and export
corporations are mostly identical, as most of her FTCs
117conduct both import and export business. Under the
circumstances of non-agreement trade between Taiwan and 
the PRC, most of the commercial transactions are usually 
initiated by the following contacts:
A. Letter, cable and telex or oral negotiation
Contact with the PRC FTCs is usually made first by 
means of letter, cable or telex. Generally,' the FTCs 
commence the transaction through a cable or telex for 
requesting information on the commodity's price, terms of 
payment, and so on. Once the transaction is agreed upon, 
the contract is normally prepared by the PRC party and 
sent to the foreign party for signature and return. If 
necessary, the foreign companies may be invited by the 
FTCS for business negotiations. The application for a 
business visa can be passed via the Commercial Section of
the PRC Embassy in the applicant's country or sent by the
11"?company directly to the relevant FTC.
B. The PRC's Export Commodities Fair
The PRC Export Commodities Fair which has been held 
twice a year in Guangzhou since 1957 is generally 
referred to as the Guangzhou Fair. This Fair is held 
primarily to promote the export of PRC products.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid., p. 106.
113. See ESCAP, supra note 13, pp. 94-95.
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However, the FTCs at the Fair also carry out import 
business.114 Moreover, the FTCs sometimes organize 
specialized mini-fairs in major cities. This kind of 
mini-fair concentrates on certain specific commodities 
and mainly conducts export business. In recent years, 
these specialised mini-fairs have been held frequently in 
the PRC.115
C. Exclusive Distributors
In promoting the sale of export goods, the FTCs may
arrange for an exclusive distributorship with reliable
foreign importers. A foreign exclusive distributor is
given the exclusive right for a certain period of time
(normally one year) to sell a product or products within
a designated district or region. This foreign exclusive
distributor is obliged to guarantee a certain quantity of
sales and to provide the PRC supplier periodically with
116market reports within his district or region.
D. Sales Agencies
In order to promote sales of new products, the FTCs 
sometimes find it necessary to conclude sales agency 
agreements with certain foreign business concerns. These 
agreements fall into two categories: sole and common
agency. Sole sales agency agreements refer to giving 
the designated agency exclusive rights for the sale of 
the PRC's products in his district. The agencies may 
either place orders on their own account or procure 
business according to the conditions and terms of sales 
set by the principal so as to pave the way for direct 
sales contracts between the principal and the ultimate 
buyers. In the former case, the agencies themselves are
114. Ibid., p. 99.
115. Ibid., p. 102, 108.
116. Ibid., p. 107.
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buyers, while in the latter they act only in the capacity 
of middlemen. However, in both cases, the designated 
agencies are entitled to agreed commissions.
According to the sole sales agency agreement, these 
agencies are bound to refrain from acting as agencies for 
anyone else in sales of similar competitive products and 
to supply the principal regularly with all necessary 
market reports. As for the common sales agency 
agreements, the designated agencies differ from those for 
sole sales agencies in that they do not enjoy a sales 
monopoly of the products. In other words, the principal 
retains the right both to sign other such agreements with 
other concerns and to make direct sales in the same 
district.117
E. Brand Names Orders
The FTCs of the PRC in general have their own trade 
marks or brand names for their export commodities. But 
requests by foreign firms or importers for a foreign 
trade mark or brand name can be accepted so long as, in 
principle, their brand names or trade marks do no harm to 
the PRC.118
4.5 Legal Methods of Taiwanese Investment
During the 1950s, the PRC was economically isolated 
from the West and in the late 1950s also broke, off 
relations with the Soviet Union. The PRC's external 
trade at this time was mainly shaped by political and 
economic considerations, and its main trading partners 
were communist countries such as North Vietnam, Albania, 
and so on. Before 1979, the PRC's external economic
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid., p. 108.
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relations with foreign countries were based only on its 
trade.
After the initiation of its "Open Policy" in 1979, 
the PRC started foreign investment by introducing Western 
capital and technology. The PRC's southeastern provinces 
of Guangdong and Fujian were therefore the first to be 
drawn into an external nexus with Taiwan. Enterprises 
from Taiwan, usually via a third country, established 
joint ventures, or ventures owned exclusively by the 
Taiwanese capital, or in other forms, invested in the 
southeastern coastal provinces of the PRC including 
Hainan province.
On 6 October 1990, Taiwan promulgated the "Measures 
Governing Control over Making Indirect Investment or 
Undertaking Technical Cooperation Projects in Mainland 
China." According to the Measures, the term "indirect 
investment" was defined and the ban on direct investment 
by Taiwanese enterprises in the PRC was reaffirmed.
The PRC authorities, for their part, have made it 
clear that the they would welcome direct investment from 
Taiwan, partly in the hope that it would reduce the 
chronic trade imbalance between the two, and partly to 
remove the inefficiencies inherent in dealing through 
intermediaries. Some PRC provinces and municipalities 
have already actively encouraged Taiwanese investment
1 1 Q
with special incentives.
119. For example, the PRC Fujian provincial government 
issued two sets of regulations designed to encourage and 
protect Taiwanese investors in July 199 0. They specify
that the Taiwanese investors can enjoy a three-year 
income holiday followed by a four-year fifty per cent 
reduction period. In addition, the Taiwanese investors 
will also enjoy a twenty per cent discount in land costs. 
See PRC Law Newsletter, London: McKENNA & Co,. September
1990, No. 73, p. 9.
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In 1985, Regulations were issued by the PRC's State
Council detailing preferential treatment for overseas
Chinese investors, including those in Hong Kong, Macao,
and Taiwan. Moreover, the State Council's TIP were
promulgated on 3 July 1988. However, these 1985 Overseas
Chinese Regulations extend beyond the scope of
concessions offered to non-Chinese investors and should
17 0be considered m  conjunction with the 1988 TIP. There
are several forms of investment allowed in the PRC. These 
are introduced below:
4.5.1 Equity Joint Ventures (EJVs)
EJVs take the form of limited liability corporations 
with the status of a legal entity. These ventures are 
still governed by the most comprehensive set of laws and 
regulations promulgated to date. According to the
amended EJV Law of 1990, the share of foreign
participants shall in general not be less than twenty 
five per cent. Both the PRC and foreign investors 
operate the ventures jointly and mutually share risks, 
profits and losses. The parties may make their
investment in cash or in the form of technology, 
equipment, land use rights or other assets.
Income tax is levied on the venture itself, rather 
than on the investors individually, and the basic 
national rate of tax is thirty per cent, with a further 
three per cent of local tax. There is no withholding tax 
on the foreign investor’s dividend remittances. Some 
preferential tax treatment (which typically takes the 
form of tax holidays during the first and second profit- 
making years may reduce income tax to ten per cent) is 
available for ventures established in several economic 
zones where foreign investment is encouraged such as
12 0. See China Law and Practice, Vol. 2, No. 7 (August
1988), p. 61.
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Special Economic Zones, various coastal cities and other 
economic open zones.
Refunds of income tax previously paid on net income
which is reinvested in the registered capital of the same
venture or to establish another venture may also be
available to foreign investors. Moreover, ventures which 
are designated as "export-orientated" or "technologically 
advanced" are eligible for preferential tax treatment.
According to PRC's "Income Tax Law for Enterprises 
with Foreign Investment" and its "Implementing 
Provisions" of 1991, all forms of foreign investment in 
the PRC are unified under one set of regulations commonly 
referred to as the "Unified Tax Law".121 However, in
addition to income tax, EJVs may also be subject to other 
taxes such as the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial 
Tax, customs duties and import taxes, the Urban Real 
Estate Tax, the Stamp Tax and the Vehicle and Vessel 
License Tax.
The board of directors is the venture's main 
decision-making body, and day-to-day management is in the 
hands of a general manager. The amended EJV Law of 1990 
allows foreign investors to hold the position of either 
chairman of the board or general manager. The PRC side 
will fill the other position. Prior to this, the 
chairmanship was required to go to the PRC party, with 
the foreign party taking the vice-chairmanship. The 
change has been interpreted by some as subtle recognition 
of the greater role foreign investors are taking in such 
venture management participation.
121. See ESCAP, supra note 13, p. 167. Also see the 
"Income Tax Law of the PRC for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment dnd Foreign Enterprises" , referred to as 
"Unified Tax Law", and its "Implementing Provisions" were 
promulgated on 1 July 1991 and 3 0 June 1991 respectively.
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Prior to revisions to the EJV Law of 1990, all 
ventures were allowed to operate with a maximum of fifty 
years. Following the 1990 changes, the amended Law 
recognises that ventures in "certain industries" may 
apply to operate without time limits. Projects which can 
introduce advanced technology to the PRC and capital 
intensive projects with a long investment return period 
are believed to be most likely to be granted operation 
terms without limits by the PRC investment approval
authorities.
4.5.2 Contractual Joint Ventures (CJVs) - also known as 
"Cooperative Joint Ventures"
This type of joint venture is based on a contractual 
method of cooperation instead of asking investors of both 
parties to make a third legal person. Their proportions 
of distribution of products, revenues and profits are 
decided by all parties according to the terms of 
cooperation. Liabilities, rights, and obligations of 
both parties are stipulated in the agreements and
contracts signed by both parties.
The CJVs are organised along slightly more flexible 
and variable lines, and for this reason have been more 
popular than EJVs among foreign investors especially for 
use in small investment projects. However, due to the
flexibility of its proportions, the CJV has resulted in a
1 TO
great variety and diversification of practices.
If an independent legal entity is created, the CJV 
will often appear the same as an EJV. If the CJV is a 
mere contractual arrangement between independent 
investors, they will not enjoy limited liability and, 
except where published laws and regulations apply, the
122. H. R. Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law, 
Singapore: Butterworth & Co Pte Ltd, 1988, p. 23 6.
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content of their rights and obligations will be basically 
as set out in their CJV contract. This provides the CJVs 
with a significant degree of flexibility, although the 
central policy is not to encourage this type of 
arrangement.
Prior to 1986, the CJVs were more popular than EJVs. 
However, due to the PRC's preference for EJVs and the 
trend towards treating CJVs in the same way as EJVs in 
law and in practice, the advantages of CJVs over EJVs 
have since 1986 diminished, and fewer CJVs than EJVS have 
been established over the past few years.
4.5.3 Joint Development
This form of business is employed mainly in joint 
exploration for off-shore petroleum. It generally has 
two stages. In the first stage, that of geographical 
exploration, all risks including financial investment, 
are carried by the foreign partners. In the second 
stage, both the PRC and foreign parties make 
contributions to the joint business. Income from
commercial production, less operating expenses, is 
distributed to the PRC party in a fixed portion. The 
other portion left is allowed to both the PRC and foreign 
parties to compensate for their invested capital together 
with accrued interest. The foreign parties are awarded a 
certain amount of the profits.
123. The PRC's Income Tax Law Concerning Foreign 
Enterprises was passed on 13 December 1981; and Detailed 
Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the above 
stated Income Tax Law was approved by the State Council 
on 17 February 1982 and promulgated by the Ministry of 
Finance on 21 February 1982. Also see ESCAP, supra note
12, p . 168.
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4.5.4 Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises (WFOE)
In order to expand foreign economic cooperation and 
technical exchange, and to further the development of the 
PRC national economy, the PRC has permitted foreign 
investors to operate WFOE within the territory of the PRC 
since 12 April 1986. The PRC protects the lawful rights 
and interests of this kind of enterprise. A WFOE is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the foreign parent established 
as a PRC legal entity under the PRC WFOE Law of 198 6 and 
its detailed Implementing Provisions of 1990.
WFOE will normally enjoy limited liability. 
However, with a few exceptions, it is not possible to 
establish a branch of a foreign company in the PRC, but a 
WFOE may function in a similar way as a locally
incorporated branch. Before 1989, WFOEs were not very 
common because of restrictions imposed by the PRC
government and an uncertain operating and regulatory 
environment. However, their numbers have increased 
considerably since 1990 following a change in the
attitude of the PRC government.
Prior to April 1986, foreign investors had been 
cautious in investing in WFOE in the PRC, and by the end 
of 198 6, there were a few WFOEs located in the PRC. On 
12 April 1986, the "Law on Wholly Foreign-owned 
Enterprises" (WFOE Law) was finally promulgated and since 
then the growth of this form of investment has developed 
rapidly in the PRC's Special Economic Zones.124 Following 
this 1986 legislation, more detailed implementing 
provisions and official explanations were announced in
124. The PRC WFOE Law was adopted at the fourth Session 
of the sixth National People's Congress on 12 April 1986. 
By the end of 1986, there were 138 WFOEs in China, most 
of which are located in the Special Economic Zones. 
Foreign investors had become increasingly confident that 
China was indeed committed to its "Open Policy". By the 
end of 1993, there were 34,000 WFOEs in the PRC.
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1990 and 1991 respectively.125 The main reason for these 
is to meet foreign investors1 demands for more control 
over their WFOE operations in the PRC, by allowing them 
to better respond to market conditions and protect trade 
secrets.
WFOE is established within the territory of the PRC 
in accordance with its relevant laws and regulations. 
In order to establish a WFOE, the project must benefit 
the development of the PRC national economy; moreover, it 
must utilize advanced technology and equipment, or export 
all or a major portion of its products. Industries in 
which the PRC prohibits or restricts the establishment 
of an enterprise of this nature shall be stipulated by 
PRC's State Council (see Article 1, 2, and 3, WFOE Law of 
1986) .
The same minimum statutory levels of registered 
capital apply to WFOEs as to EJVs and CJVs. Tax is 
levied on a WFOE in the same way as on an EJV, and it is 
generally able to enjoy the same tax holidays. However, 
because of the absence of a PRC party to a WFOE, the 
types of business in which they may engage tend to be 
narrower in scope than EJVs and CJVs.
4.5.5 Other Forms of Investment:
A. Countertrade or Compensation Trade
This is the form of medium or small scale trade 
which is most common in the PRC. It may be regarded as a 
modified form of joint venture where the foreign 
investment is paid for by the export of finished goods or
125. See detailed "Implementing Provisions on WFOE Law", 
approved 28 October 1990 by th State Council and "An 
Explanation of Several Terms Used in the Detailed 
Implementing Provisions on WFOE Law", issued on 6 
December 1991 by the MOFERT.
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another product. The practice of countertrade has been a 
significant feature of commercial relations among states 
in the Eastern Bloc. The PRC began to facilitate a 
significant volume of countertrade with the West only 
after 1979. Taiwanese enterprises have benefited in 
setting up an active partnership with PRC enterprises in 
countertrade via an intermediary.
In this type of trade, the PRC enterprise is 
normally responsible for providing factory buildings and 
labour force, while foreign investors supply production 
equipment, technology and possibly technical and
supervisory personnel. When necessary, part of the raw 
materials may also be supplied by foreign investors.
Foreign investors are paid directly by means of the goods 
produced in the project, in instalments. If repayment in 
this form is difficult, the foreign investors are paid
indirectly by means of other products or by a combination 
of other products and cash as agreed upon by both 
parties.126
Countertrade can take many forms such as
compensation trade, counterpurchase, and evidence 
account. In compensation trade, for instance, finished 
products are exported in exchange for machinery. Under a 
contractual compensation trade arrangement, a foreign 
investor will bring in advanced equipment and technology 
and manage a PRC manufacturing plant. The investor will 
take back as compensation a portion of the production of 
the plant. It is by far the most popular form of 
countertrade in the PRC.127
12 6. See ESCAP, supra note 13, pp. 169-170.
12 7. See China Business Guide, supra note 24, p. 27.
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B. Processing and Assembling
Under this type of arrangement, foreign investors 
supply raw materials, components or parts, while the PRC 
enterprises process or assemble them into finished 
products according to the foreign contractor's design and 
specifications. The PRC enterprises receive a processing 
or assembling fee and re-export the finished products to 
the foreign investors. In principle, all the machinery 
and equipment used are PRC-made unless the relevant 
machinery and equipment are not available in the PRC. 
Such machinery and equipment can be imported and are 
exempted from duties and taxes. The supply costs of such 
machinery and equipment are paid for by the PRC 
enterprise out of its processing or assembling fees.
At present, processing and assembling contracts are 
no longer concentrated mainly in the labour-intensive 
industries such as garment, textile, cloth-making 
enterprises, and so on. The PRC has also accepted orders 
for the processing or assembling of quality goods 
including electronics, digital watches, calculators, and 
the like. The PRC government offers preferential 
treatment to encourage development of processing and 
assembling business.
In addition to paying no tax on the profits, the
foreign investors are given preferential treatment within
certain limits in matters of foreign exchange control,
finance and taxation. Moreover, the foreign investors
can get support in funds, materials, power and transport,
insurance, settlement of accounts and consultant 
i 9 ftservices.
128. See ESCAP, supra note 13, p. 170.
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C. Leasing
This is a new trading practice in the PRC. It is a 
letting or grant of equipment, machinery, or other 
facilities made between the foreign investor and a PRC 
enterprise. The foreign investor is called the lessor
and the PRC enterprise is called the lessee. Usually, 
the foreign lessor provides the PRC lessee with the 
equipment, machinery, and also the technical and
managing services directly or through leasing service 
corporations or leasing agents.
The PRC lessee makes payment by instalments
according to the leasing charges agreed upon by the two 
sides. The foreign lessor (or leasing service
corporation, or leasing agent), is responsible for
customs formalities on imported equipment or machinery. 
The leasing length varies from three to five years or
i oq
even longer, depending on the customer's needs.
4.6 Methods of Concluding Business Contracts for
Taiwanese Trade and Investment in the PRC
The conclusion of business contracts for Taiwanese 
businesses in the PRC is broadly applicable to various
forms of trade and investment activities such as the 
above mentioned EJVs, CJVs, and WFOEs. Besides, there
are many other forms of business in the PRC, such as 
technology licensing contracts, compensation trade
contracts, contracts for the establishment of service
centres, construction contracts for the exploitation of 
natural resources (for example, oil).
129. See ibid.
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4.6.1 Significance and Development of PRC
Business Contracts
Since 1949, the PRC's trade representatives have
been successfully negotiating business contracts with
foreign enterprises. However, the business contract
documents signed by the parties involved have never been
unified or standardised in terms of their legal
significance. These documents, to be signed in
subsequent transactions have various titles, such as
"contract", "agreement", "letter of intent", "memorandum
of understanding", "minutes of the meeting", "protocol",
"agreed memorandum", and so on. In the view of the PRC
party, the legally enforceable commitments in these
documents are quite complicated and differ markedly from
13 0the Western understanding of them.
During the early stages of negotiation, the PRC 
party often seeks to conclude a letter of intent (which 
may also be described as a memorandum of understanding, 
minutes of the meeting, protocol, heads of agreement, or 
agreement in principle). A letter of intent is usually a 
document of two or three pages that sets out the main 
parameters of cooperation, such as the location and 
nature of the project, amount of investment, basic 
responsibilities of the parties, production capacity, 
export requirements, and term of cooperation.
Letters of intent are ordinarily non-binding 
statements of principle, and will often be modified or 
superseded during the process of negotiation and the 
formulation of the feasibility study. They can be made
13 0. Instead of a final contract or agreement, the PRC 
parties would simultaneously sign business documents such 
as memorandum of understanding, letter of intent, 
protocol, and so on on the same project with various 
foreign parties. See J. A. Cohen, "Negotiation Complex 
Contracts with China", Business Transactions with China, 
Japan, and South Korea, (eds.), P. Saney & H. Smit, New 
York: Matthew Bender, 1983, pp. 2-16,  ^ 2.04.
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binding if the parties wish to provide for the 
confidentiality of information exchanged during 
negotiations, the preclusion of other foreign companies 
from competing for the same project, or the allocation of 
feasibility study costs between the parties.
Legislation that governs both EJVs and CJVs requires 
that the PRC and foreign parties conduct a joint 
feasibility study of the project and that the resulting 
feasibility study report be submitted to the PRC approval 
authorities together with the final contract, if not 
submitted previously. In theory, a feasibility study 
should be a genuine joint effort to ensure that it 
accurately reflects domestic PRC conditions and any 
relevant international considerations, as well as the 
understanding of both parties.
In practice, however, one party often bears a 
disproportionate share of the work of preparing the 
feasibility study. Feasibility studies that are prepared 
in considerable detail are really the first stage of 
contract negotiations and can take on a qusai-contractual 
nature, as the parties rely on the contents and 
conclusions of such studies when negotiating and signing 
their contracts. Sometimes contracts contain specific 
references to feasibility studies, or such studies are 
incorporated into the contracts as appendices.
4.6.2 Significance of the PRC Business Contract
A. Definition of the PRC Business Contract
As regards PRC business practices, there is 
confusion in concept between a contract (hetong) and an 
agreement (xieyi).131 Both types of documents are
131. "Contract: An agreement between two or more persons 
which creates an obligation to do or not to do a 
particular thing. Its essentials are competent parties,
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legally binding in PRC law, but the terms are not legally 
synonymous. Although often used as synonymous with 
"contract", "agreement" is a broader term on the
principal points involved; for instance, an agreement
13 2might lack an essential element of a contract.
According to the PRC "Implementing Provisions" of 
EJV Law of 1983, an "agreement" records the parties' 
shared understanding of "certain important points and 
principles governing the establishment of the joint 
venture", but is not the final, detailed expression of 
"their mutual rights and obligations in establishing the 
joint venture." The latter is recorded in the joint 
venture "contract." The parties may or may not choose to 
resort to an "agreement" as a staging-post en route to a 
joint venture "contract", but, at least according to the 
Regulations, no joint venture can be established without 
official approval of the signed contract and articles of 
association. When negotiating an investment with PRC 
parties, as R. Randle Edwards has observed:
There is confusion between agreement and contract. 
Whereas Anglo-Americans would not ordinarily 
distinguish between an agreement and a contract, in 
some instances, as in the joint venture law itself, 
the Chinese do, maintaining that an agreement, 
although binding, only embraces the basic agreement 
on the principle points involved and leaves open 
many matters of detail that are ultimately to be 
concluded in a contract.133
subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of 
agreement, an mutuality of obligation" [H. C. Black, M.
A., Black's Law Dictionary, (15th ed.), Minnesota: West
Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 291-292]. "Agreement: In law, 
a concord of understanding and intention between two or 
more parties with respect to the effect upon their 
relatives rights and duties, of certain past or future 
fact or performance. The consent of two more persons 
concurring respecting the transmission of some property, 
right, or future fact or performance. The consent of two 
benefits, with the view of contracting on obligation, a 
mutual obligation" [Ibid., p. 62].
132. Ibid., p. 62.
133. J. A. Cohen, supra note 130, p. 2-16, -1 2.04
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According to the view stated above, it is only the 
contract that is the final and complete expression of the 
transaction parties' will. Sometimes, however, PRC 
parties treat "contract" and "agreement" synonymously.134 
In 1985, the use of the word "contract" was made uniform
1 ”3 C
in accordance with the FECL. With regards to the
other documents such as "letter of intent", "memorandum 
of understanding", "protocol", and so on, these are 
generally recognized as being only preliminary documents
IOC
without any legally binding force.
However, in certain particular circumstances or for 
special purposes, these preliminary documents are 
considered to have legal content and significance.137 
When negotiating with a PRC entity, the foreign party 
must be aware whether or not the signed "memorandum of 
understanding" allows the possibility of the PRC party 
continuing to negotiate with a third party on the same 
project. The foreign parties, therefore, have to be 
careful to have clearly defined legal expressions in the 
various documents to be signed.138
134. Ibid.
135. J. A. Cohen, "The New Foreign Contract Law", 12 The 
China Business Review, No. 4, 1985, pp. 53-54.
136. J. A. Cohen, supra note 130, p. 2-16, $ 2.04.
137. In international business transaction practices, the 
"letter of intent" is not a legal term and is generally 
of a non-binding nature. However, it is often the first 
document signed by the parties and is sometimes submitted 
by the PRC parties to the relevant authorities when 
applying for project approval. If the promises recorded 
in the document are meant to be enforceable commitments, 
the document is then thought to have a legal 
significance. See J. A. Cohen, Contract Laws of the 
People's Republic of China, Hong Kong: Longman Group 
Ltd., 1988, p. 17.
138. J. A. Cohen, supra note 130, pp. 2-17,  ^ 2.04.
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B. Characteristics of PRC Business Contracts
A business contract, signed between a party in the 
PRC and a party in Taiwan or some other Western 
countries, has always appeared to have the general 
characteristics reflecting East-West trade issues.
Although Communist enterprises employ the Western 
terminology of "contract" in domestic as well as foreign 
commerce, the conventional concepts are superimposed upon
1 IQ
fundamentally different economic structures. In the
West, an agreement is negotiated, concluded and enforced 
according to the private interests of the signatory, with 
minimal governmental interference. In contrast, however, 
the former Eastern contract is imposed upon the parties 
by the specific provisions of the national economic 
plans, and by the centrally prescribed allocation of 
materials.
The state is in effect a third party to all 
agreements, lack of privity notwithstanding. The main 
substance of every transaction and even the contractors 
themselves are predetermined by the authorities with a 
view to achieving public objectives. Indeed, the
implementation of the economic plan is the formal 
expression of both the contract and the entities which 
conclude it.140
Contractual practice in commerce among several 
Eastern bloc countries is clearly distinguished from that 
prevalent in trade with the West. Foreign enterprises
139. S. Pisar, supra note 7, pp. 287-288.
140. Ibid. The act of economic planning creates at once, 
a public law obligation on the part of two affected 
enterprises to comply with the directive of a competent 
government department and a civil-law obligation to enter 
into an appropriate contract with one another. This 
contractual phenomenon can only be found in a communist 
country.
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are required, pursuant to each nation's economic plan, to 
enter into appropriate arrangements with corresponding 
communist enterprises abroad.141 Generally speaking, the 
former Eastern bloc practice involved public, that is 
governmental, interference in private civil-law
relations when a commercial treaty instrument was 
signed.142
The contractual arrangements were in accordance with 
a network of bilateral treaties and protocols concluded 
at the level of governments. Therefore, like the ambit 
of "principle of party autonomy", the foreign trade 
enterprises' residual function of negotiating and 
defining the detailed conditions of their relationship 
was also limited.143
The characteristics of contractual practice in 
commerce among former Eastern bloc enterprises is 
entirely different from those of East-West trade. A 
Western government would not compel a private enterprise 
to assume obligations against its will, therefore, the
141. Ibid., p. 290.
142. In fact, issues arising from the interplay between a 
treaty instrument signed by two socialist governments and 
a contract entered into by two of their operating 
enterprises have caused conceptual difficulties in 
several of the Eastern foreign trade tribunals. For 
further discussion on the nature of communist contract 
and the extent of governmental interference in civil-law 
relations, see S. Pisar, supra note 7, pp. 292-293. Also 
see T. W. Hoya, "The Legal Framework of Soviet Foreign 
Trade", 56 Minnesota Law Review (1971), pp. 8-10. Here 
the "socialist countries" means Eastern bloc countries 
under 1958 "Council for Mutual Economic Aid".
14 3. The important items in commerce among the state- 
trading economies such as the types and quantities of 
goods, the delivery of schedules, the methods of payment, 
and so on were all arranged in advance in a network of 
bilateral treaties or protocols by governments. 
Therefore, the function of negotiating the detailed 
commercial conditions of a foreign trade enterprise can 
be defined as "residual." See Pisar, supra note 7, p. 
291.
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Eastern states cannot hope to establish the same rigid 
system of intergovernmental trade agreements which 
characterize relations within the socialist world.
Furthermore, of necessity, communist enterprises are 
compelled to enter the international market place to 
search for and select co-contractors and also to 
negotiate terms and conditions —  in short, to behave 
like private enterprises in the pursuit of individual 
transactions. As a result, the state-trading entities 
have more freedom to bargain over commercial arrangements 
with Western enterprises than could ever be imagined in 
their own environment.144
Under East-West trade relations, the content of
14 5bilateral trade agreements is also quite different. 
They do not attempt to establish a detailed blueprint for 
contractual relations, much less dictate the conditions 
of individual transactions.146 Bilateral commercial 
agreements between communist and non-communist countries 
are no more than loose frameworks for the achievement of 
flexibly defined goals.147
144. See ibid., pp. 293-294.
14 5. See "Text and Appendices of USA-USSR Trade 
Agreement, October 18, 1972", Business Transactions with
the USSR, (ed.), R. Starr, U.S.: ABA Press, 1975, pp.
3 49-3 65; "Text of China-United States Agreement on Trade 
Relations, July 7, 1979", 18 International Law Materials
(1979), pp. 1041-1051; "Text and Appendices of Romania- 
United States: Agreement on Trade and Relation, April 2, 
1975", 14 International Legal Materials (1975), pp. 671-
680; "Text of EEC-PRC: Trade Agreement, April, 3, 1978",
17 International Legal Materials (1978), pp. 1459-1462.
146. S. Pisar, supra note 7, p. 294.
147. The nature and style of Sino-Japanese Trade 
Agreement is quite similar to the trade agreements signed 
among communist countries. See G. T. Hsiao, "Non­
recognition and Trade: A Case Study of the Fourth Sino- 
Japanese Trade Agreement", China's Practice of 
International Law: Some Cases Studies,(ed.), J. A. Cohen, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972, pp.139-143.
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Within the structure of these agreements, business 
entities are permitted to negotiate with one another 
freely and to contract more or less as they please.148 
In East-West trade, certain contractual provisions are 
sought by the former Eastern party as a matter of need 
and habit under the influence of a planned economic
environment. However, in the framing of East-West 
contracts, the force majeure definitions, arbitration
submissions and choice-of-law elections are of special 
importance.149
As for concluding investment contracts in the PRC, 
the contractual negotiations are comparatively lengthy 
affairs and have their own special characteristics which 
are similarly of the nature of East-West trade. 
Furthermore, like the trade contracts, the contracts for 
the establishment of foreign-invested enterprises are 
normally signed in two languages: Chinese and English (or 
the language of the foreign party).
Investment contracts that must be approved by the 
PRC government authorities (including contracts for 
licensing technology and establishing foreign-invested
enterprises) do not become legally binding upon 
signature, but only upon the issue of an approval
certificate. After an approval certificate is issued, 
both parties must apply for the issue of a business 
licence, and it is only upon the issue of the latter that 
the new enterprise is legally established in the PRC.
The approval by the PRC government authorities does
not constitute approval for all matters encountered in
the course of implementing the investment contract. In
particular, separate applications must be made to the tax
148. S. Pisar, supra note 7, p. 294.
149. Ibid., pp. 296-297.
161
authorities, foreign exchange authorities and customs
administration, and the consent and active support of 
local authorities must be obtained for a host of matters 
under local jurisdiction, such as assuring the supply of 
utilities, materials and labour, the plans and costs for 
the construction of buildings, compliance with 
environmental regulations, and so on. When possible, it 
is desirable to pin these matters down prior to signing 
the contract or to try to make their satisfactory
resolution conditions precedent to contributing the 
investment called for by the contract.
In the light of contractual practices, the PRC did 
not treat inter-governmental treaty instruments such as 
trade agreements or investment protection agreements as 
an essential prerequisite to business transaction.
Without such inter-governmental agreements, the private 
enterprises of the West still engage in drawing up 
bilateral commercial contracts with the parties of the 
PRC. These contracts, of course, reflect the contractual 
characteristics of East-West trade.
C. Limits of PRC's Contractual Freedom
As stated above, the former Eastern state-trading
entities have been allowed a certain degree of freedom
to negotiate with Western enterprises. However, this
does not mean that they are absolutely exempt from local
law in opting for particular terms. Certain provisions
of domestic legislation necessarily apply to all foreign
trade dealings, whether intra-East or East-West, and
150cannot be displaced by an autonomous exercise of will.
150. C. M. Schmitthoff, "The Law of International Trade, 
Its Growth, Formulation and Operation", The Sources of 
the Law of International Trade, (ed.), C. M. Schmittholf, 
London: Stevens & Sons, 1964, p. 29.
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In the internal economic life of a socialist 
country, party autonomy is severely restricted by the 
dictates of a national plan. Although freedom of will is 
given ample play in external commerce, it is still 
circumscribed by provisions which the state monopolies 
consider essential to the regulation of their
1 Cl , . .
activities. x The contracting parties, foreign laws, 
international customs and treaty instruments are 
forbidden to encroach upon the territory of the 1 law­
making character of the export-import plan", the 
’’capacity of foreign trade operating corporations", the 
"authority of foreign trade representatives", and the 
"formalities governing the execution of contracts." 
Beyond this ambit, the parties are, at least ostensibly, 
as independent of domestic law as in the West. Both the 
state trader and the private merchant are left free to
1 R?establish in their bargain the regime they desire.
In contractual precedents, foreign negotiators will 
find that the negotiation with a PRC entity is, to a 
considerable degree, limited in freedom of choice of
151. Ibid., The concept of "freedom of will", "freedom of 
contract", and "party autonomy" should be paid more 
attention. In the law of international trade, the 
principle of party autonomy or freedom of contract is 
applied in two ways. In its classical form, the doctrine 
of party autonomy means that the parties have discretion 
to choose the proper law governing their contract. 
Whereas, in its more revolutionary form, it means that 
the parties have freedom to regulate their contractual 
relations in manner intend to be independent of any 
municipal law. In private international law, the concept 
of "freedom of contract" is different from that of civil 
law. As regards the party autonomy in communist 
countries, it seems the concept was not only defined 
within private international law but also within civil 
law. See A. R. Dicks, supra note 23, pp. 415-416; see 
also S. Pisar, supra note 7, pp. 297-300; and also A. 
Kiralfy, "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", in 
East-West Business Transactions, (ed.), R. Star, New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1974, pp. 327- 328.
152. S. Pisar, supra note 7, p. 298; cf. C. M. 
Schmitthoff, supra note 150, pp. 10-11.
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1ST • • •contract terms. In fact, if the project negotiation
involves matters of investment, it will generally need
consultation and approval from the PRC central
government. If the investment amount is less than a
certain figure, or the project itself needed no
assistance from the central government, the project would
1 S4.probably still need approval from the local authority.
Although PRC law appears to lay down no restrictions 
on the extent to which FTCs can vary the terms of their 
standard form contracts, their foreign trade officials 
are in practice by no means free to adopt any terms.
But the most serious problems for contract drafting 
arises not from the legal principles set out above but 
from the lack of close contact between the contractor and 
the end-user, the enterprise that ultimately is to use 
the goods which are to be supplied.156 This becomes one 
factor which limits the scope of party autonomy.
In trade with the Western capitalist world, the 
former Eastern parties seem to enjoy virtually unlimited 
discretion from a legal point of view. However, this 
unexpected display of sovereign liberality must not be 
taken at face value. In fact, there is little
renunciation of authority, and the appearance of laissez- 
faire procures considerable advantages for the state. 
Two examples being, first, the state monopoly gains 
strong bargaining power from contractual autonomy; 
secondly, it gains the means of influencing contractual 
relations through the various administrative channels
153. J. A. Cohen, supra note 130, pp. 2-14,  ^ 2.03.
154. Ibid. Also see art. 7 of PRC's 1985 FECL.
155. A. R. Dicks, supra note 23, pp. 415-416.
156. Ibid., p. 416.
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which are peculiarly available in a collectivist 
1 67government.
In socialist countries, the principle of party 
autonomy is still at risk of being abused. The danger 
resides in the fact that this principle may become a
vehicle for near-constraint when applied as part of an 
organized government policy.
As mentioned above, in contractual precedents, PRC 
entities seem to apply wholly the doctrine of party
autonomy as used in the East. However, limits of 
contractual freedom are still circumscribed by the PRC 
domestic law as shown in the themes of state approval,
•ic q
social and public interest, and so on.
In the PRC, the limits on contractual freedom in 
trade with the capitalist world is mainly a 
characteristic of the structure of a state planned 
economy and PRC's general observance as enshrined in law 
since 1949.160 At present, various economic laws and
regulations appear to tend realistically towards 
increasing the scope of contractual autonomy with parties 
from the West. Nevertheless, the characteristics and
157. See S. Pisar, supra note 7, pp. 298-300. Once 
properly concluded, the contract is recognized as the 
primary source of the parties' rights and duties. It is
not the sole source, however. An attempt at total self­
regulation is deemed null and void.
158. Ibid., p. 299.
159. J. P. Stevens, "The New Foreign Contract Law in 
China", 18 Law and Policy in International Business 
(1986), p. 473. Also see art. 4 and 7 of PRC's 1985 FECL.
160. All say that law is a part of the superstructure of 
society, a manifestation of the ruling class's will and a 
ruling instrument with a class nature. Socialist China 
adheres to this law. See Byron S. J. Weng and Chang Hsin
(eds.), Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong: Red River
Co. Ltd., 1991, p. 7].
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limitations of a centrally planned-economic structure 
still exist in the PRC.
4.6.3 Development of PRC Business Contracts
A: Application of the PRC Standard Form Contract
The various FTCs of the PRC prefer to use their own
161standard forms of contract for imports and exports.
The FTCs have different forms to meet the requirements of 
trade with other socialist states. Those that relate to 
trade with the West have been formulated entirely by the 
PRC side. However, Sino-Japanese trade has been an 
exception in that the contract terms were negotiated
1 6 7through commercial delegates from both sides.
As the PRC modelled its foreign trade system on 
that of the former Soviet Union, its standard form 
contract is similar to that which is used in the Soviet
1 6 'Itrade institutions. There were no multilateral
substitutes for binding norms in East-West trade 
activities until the "General Conditions for the Supply
161. S. J. Mitchel & D. D. Stein, supra note 27, p. 898; 
see also J. P. Stevens, supra note 159, p. 460; B. P. 
Fishburne III, "Trade with the People's Republic of 
China", A Lawyer's Guide to International Business 
Transactions, (eds.), W. Surrory and D. Wallace, Jr.,
Philadelphia: American Law Inst., 1977, Part I, p. 38.
162. A. R. Dicks, supra note 23, p. 413.
163. With regard to Soviet's standard form contract, see
T. W. Hoya & D. D. Stein, "Drafting Contracts in U.S. 
Soviet Trade", 7 Law and Policy in International Business 
(1975), p. 1057. See also T. W. De Pauw, Soviet-American 
Trade Negotiations, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979,
pp. 53-60. As regards Soviet's foreign trade contract, 
see A. Kiralfy, supra note 151, p. 320 et seq.
Concerning the PRC modelling its foreign trade system on 
that of Soviet Union, see S. J. Mitchell & D. D. Stein, 
supra note 161, p. 899; see also K. D. Gott, supra note 
11, p. 93.
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of Plant and Machinery for Export" was made by the 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in 1955.
An additional series of standard forms was then 
published with a view to making available to traders, on 
an optional basis, a uniform set of contract rules and 
practices. The socialist countries1 "Council for Mutual 
Economic Aid" (CMED) had also a treaty named the "General 
Conditions for the Delivery of Goods" in 1958. However, 
the ECE conditions obtained little acceptance and the 
CMED conditions are also not applicable in East-West 
trade. In the absence of effective international
regulation, each party prefers its own standard form of 
contract.
There are various types of standard form contract in 
the PRC. One contract consists of two pages only by 
which the PRC entities purchase an individual item of 
equipment or a commodity. The other is a complex 
document in which the PRC entities secure the whole
"Turn-key plant" as well as the licensing of the
technology.165 All clauses of the standard form contract 
regulate only the basic commercial terms. But sometimes 
other details such as technical specifications of the 
equipment purchased, employment training of the PRC 
personnel, and so on are regulated in its extensive
appendices.
164. See S. Pisar, supra note 7, p. 291, 295; see also C. 
M.. Schmitthoff, supra note 163, pp. 17-19.
165. Turn-key plant means the plant could be operated 
when the key was put in and turned. The so-called turn­
key contract here means the transaction was conducted 
only if a whole plant was accepted. With regard to 
complex document, see S. J. Mitchell & D. D. Stein, supra 
note 161, p. 898, cf; J. P. Stevens, supra note 159, p. 
460.
166. S. J. Mitchell & D. D. Stein, supra note 161, p. 
898.
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When commercial negotiation with the Western
enterprise is under way, FTCs in the PRC usually offer
167standard form contracts. Other than price and
quantity, the other clauses of the contract cannot 
theoretically be revised. However, as foreign trade and 
investment have been emphasized to be a key to 
modernization since 1979, the foreign parties are in fact 
entitled to revise the clauses of the PRC standard form 
contract. For example, under certain circumstances, a 
revisory contract may be influenced by the consideration 
of some factors such as the designated function of the 
FTC, the nature of the transaction itself, the status of 
the competitive contractors, and so on.168
B. Development of the PRC Complex Contracts
Before the 1980s, the majority of the PRC
international contracts were signed with regard to those
common import-export goods and commodities. For
instance, during the early 1950s, the PRC usually bought
the complete plants and the other major capital goods
from foreign countries.169 Following the increase of
economic contacts with foreign countries in the 1970s,
the PRC began to buy much more complicated goods such as
ammonia plants, earth satellite groundstations, or
aircrafts. These resulted in protracted as well as
17 0complicated contractual negotiations.
Upon entering the world business community in 1979, 
PRC entities eventually became equipped with a much more
167. Ibid.
168. See P. M. Tobert, "Contract Law in the People's 
Republic of China", Foreign Trade, Investment and the Law 
in the People's Republic of China, (ed.) M. J. Moser,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 215.
169. J. A. Cohen, supra note 130, at 2-2,  ^ 2.01.
170. Ibid.
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advanced standard intellectual apparatus, that is,
1 7 1 .complex contracts. Since 1979, most foreign capital
has been attracted through the use of complex contracts 
in the PRC.
C. Other Distinct Business Contracts
In addition to the standard form contract and the 
complex contract, several terms can be found in a PRC 
commercial contract such as a Foreign Trade Corporation 
Contract (FTC contract.) , non-FTC contract, negotiated
17?
contract, and so on. These are illustrated below.
It seems that the vast majority of foreign trade 
transactions have been conducted by FTCs under MOFERT. 
However, some of the other related ministries of the PRC 
central government, local authorities, and some special 
manufacturing-enterprises are also entitled to conclude a 
business contract. These play a vital role in developing 
the PRC's foreign trade and investment.
A contract concluded by an FTC is called a FTC
contract. It is called a non-FTC contract if concluded
by a non-FTC. While FTC contracts are always made in the
same format, by contrast the non-FTC contract, without a
standard form, has a much greater variety of styles and
content. The non-FTC contracting parties usually lack
17 7foreign trade experience.
The "negotiated" contract is a name used specifically 
to distinguish it from the standard form contract. In 
the Western view, the negotiated contract is one merely 
concluded through a negotiation. It is of no special
171. Ibid.
172. S. J. Mitchell & D. D. Stein, supra note 161, p. 
897, 900.
173. Ibid., p. 898.
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significance. But in principle, a standard form contract 
should be used in East-West trade,174 and the negotiated 
contract therefore has its own special significance in
East-West trade. Generally speaking, the non-FTC
contract and the complex contract are categorized as 
negotiated contracts.
In the PRC, a standard form contract is most often
used in trade. In contrast, a negotiated contract and a
complex contract are more often to be found in
investment. In fact, due to its own idiosyncrasy, the
standard form contract is not suitable for complicated
17 6projects. However, in practice, the complex contract
is usually found to be within the scope of a standard 
form contract. For example, the "turn-key plants
purchasing contract" is a complex contract but it is
17 6categorized as a standard form contract. Contracts
such as contract of license and technical know-how 
transfer are the same, being used as a standard form 
contract in the PRC.177
4.7 Laws Relating to PRC Business Contracts
4.7.1 Background
The FECL was adopted at the PRC's tenth Session of 
the Standing Committee of the sixth National People's
174. F. A. Orban, "The Challenge to the Enforcement of 
Socialist Arbitral Awards", 17 Virginia Journal of 
International Law (1976-1977), p. 379.
175. See P. M. Tobert, supra note 168, pp. 215-216.
17 6. See U.S. Department of Commerce (comp.), Doing 
Business with China, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1983, p. 14.
177. Concerning PRC's Sample Contract of License and 
Know-how Transfer, see L. Fung, China Trade Handbook, 
Hong Kong: Adsale People, 1984, p. 233.
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Congress on 21 March 1985. Three days later, the 
Standing Committee announced the "Regulations of the
People's Republic of China Governing Contracts for the
17 8Import of Technology". In promulgating a new law or a
new regulation, the PRC usually, in practice, passes a 
general law and then passes a more detailed and 
illustrative regulation. The "Regulations of the PRC 
Governing Contracts for the Import of Technology" were 
therefore enacted for the special legal issues involved 
in the FECL.179
Starting in 1978, the PRC initiated the 
modernization of its legal system as a part of its 
economic reform. Prior to 1979, there were no civil, 
commercial or procedural codes in the PRC. Following the 
EJV Law of 1979, a great deal of commercial legislation 
specially addressed to "shewai" matters has been 
promulgated. After the introduction of domestic Economic 
Contract Law (ECL) in 1981, the PRC finally had its first 
contract legislation. There had been no "shewai" 
contract law in the PRC until the promulgation of 1985 
FECL.180
Before 1979, the great majority of the PRC's foreign 
trade contracts were signed exclusively through its nine 
FTCs under the aegis of the MFT.181 As there was no 
contract law to be applied, the foreign entities had to 
use their own contract law as a basis on which to sign a
18 9Smo-foreign contract. A standard form contract has
178. J. L. deLisle, "Foreign Investment: Foreign Economic 
Contract Law", 27 Harvard International Law Journal 
(1986), p. 275.
179. Ibid., p. 279.
180. J. P. Stevens, supra note 159, p. 455.
181. Ibid., see also B. P. Fishburne III, supra note 161, 
p. 23 2; cf. A. R. Dicks, supra note 23, p. 3 94.
182. J. P. Stevens, supra note 176, p. 459.
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normally been used in the PRC when concluding business 
with entities from the capitalist countries.
After the PRC's decentralization of its foreign 
economic and trade system commenced in 1979, regional 
authorities and local enterprises were permitted to 
negotiate directly with foreign parties. Business
contracts could be directly signed between the foreign 
party and the FTCs from PRC ministries other than the 
MFT, or PRC state entities at lower levels.
The conduct of foreign business contracts at that 
time was no longer monopolized by the MFT. In addition 
to standard form contract, the negotiated contract is
18 4 . •also used m  the PRC. And due to an increase m
foreign trade, the complex contract is increasingly found
there.
In these circumstances, many problems in foreign 
trade contracts arose from the absence of related 
legislation. The increase of transaction costs and the 
decline of willingness to contract on the part of foreign
parties are examples of the consequences of these
18 6 . . .  problems. ° The situation is even worse in foreign
investment. In developing the PRC's economic reform,
central legislation is required to resolve the
consequential contractual problems. This is the
background which gave birth to the FECL and the related
"Regulations Governing Contract for the Import of
Technology".186
183. For a review of PRC's decentralization policy in 
this area, see Fung, "China's Decentralization of Foreign 
Trade", Asian Wall Street Journal (Weekly, 24 November 
1982) , p. 6.
184. J. P. Stevens, supra note 159, p. 460.
185. See ibid., pp. 461-462; see also J. L. deLisle, 
supra note 178, p. 281.
186. See J. P. Stevens, supra note 159, p. 459.
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4.7.2 Contents of the PRC's FECL
The FECL consists of seven chapters and forty three
articles. Chapter topics are as follows: General
Provisions; Conclusion of Contract; Performance of
Contracts and Liabilities for Breach of Contract;
Assignment of Contracts; Modification, Rescission, and
Termination of Contracts; Dispute Resolution;
18 7Supplementary Provisions.
A. General Provisions
The FECL stipulates that the parties to a contract are
the PRC enterprises and other economic organizations on
one hand and foreign enterprises, economic organizations
or individuals on the other. This law applies to all
foreign economic contracts, except those regarding
18 8international transport.
Furthermore, this law has general principles
governing contracts in its Articles 3 and 4; the delicate
issue of which country's law should govern the resolution
of disputes in its Article 5; and the issue of preemption
18 9of PRC law by international treaties m  its Article 6.
187. See the text of PRC's 1985 FECL, China Business 
Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, July-August 1985; also appears at 
24 International Legal Materials (1985), p. 799.
188. Art.2 of PRC's 1985 FECL. J. A. Cohen observed that 
purchase and sale contracts, supply of utilities, 
establishment of agency relationships and service 
centres, warehousing goods, constructing buildings, 
obtaining insurance, licensing technology and trademark, 
processing, assembly, compensation trade, joint equity 
and cooperative ventures, natural resource projects, 
financial transactions, and property and equipment leases 
are all applied to this FECL. See J. A. Cohen, supra 
note 135, p. 52.
189. Art. 3, 4, 5, and 6 of PRC's 1985 FECL.
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B. Conclusion of Contract
The FECL stipulates that a contract is formed when 
the parties have reached agreement on and signed in 
written form the provisions of the contract. An 
agreement is not void if it is reached by exchange of 
letters, telegrams or telexes. If one party requests the 
signing of a confirming document, the contract is 
considered to be formed only when the confirming document
, , 19 0is signed.
Some agreements, like the "joint venture" agreement
or the "import of technology" agreement, only become
191valid contracts after an approval is granted. All
contracts that violate the PRC's laws, and social or 
public interests are void; moreover, no contracts 
concluded by means of fraud or duress are deemed to be 
valid.192
The FECL demands that a contract should contain the
. , , 1 Q O  # , ,
main provisions^- and also specifies that the appendices
19 4 • •are an integral part of it. Also, this law details
the limits to the risks involved in undertaking the 
contract, insurance coverage, term of validity of the
19 6contract, and guarantees.
190. Ibid., art. 7. If one party asks for a letter of 
affirmation, this letter of affirmation should reach him 
before the contract is validated. See J. P. Stevens, 
supra note 159, p. 464.
191. Ibid., art. 7.
192 . Ibid., art. 9 and 10.
193 . Ibid., art. 12.
194 . Ibid., art. 8.
195. Ibid., art. 13, 14, and 15.
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C. Fulfilment of Contract and Liability for Breach 
of Contract
The parties must perform the agreed obligation of
the contract. Non-performance or failure to fulfil the
contract in accordance with stipulated terms is a breach 
1 Q fiof contract. When one party has actual evidence that
the other party cannot fulfil the contract, the
prospective injured party of a breach may temporarily
cease performance of the contract. The injured party may
ask for compensation or other remedies, or may even ask
1 97for a rescission of the contract.
If a contract contains several mutually independent
198parts, the injured party may rescind some parts of it. 
Where compensation is given, the compensation may not 
exceed the losses which the contract-breaching party
1 99should have foreseen in concluding the contract. The
injured party may not demand compensation for any 
additional losses.200
When one party cannot perform all or part of its 
contractual obligations because of an event of force 
majeure, it shall be fully or partially relieved from 
liability. In foreign economic contracts, the parties
196. Ibid., art. 16 and 18. In East-West trade, the 
principle Pacta Sunt Servanda retains both validity and 
efficacy. With regard to contractual commitment in East- 
West trade, see S. Pisar, supra note 7, pp. 283-287. In 
PRC's contractual practices, breach of contract can be 
found in a precedent of Baoshan Debacle which was 
discussed in D. A. Sneider, supra note 100, p. 541 et 
seq.
197 . Ibid., art. 17, 19, 29,
198 . Ibid., art. 30.
199. Ibid., art. 19.
200. Ibid., art. 22.
201. Ibid., art. 24 and 25.
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9 09may agree on liquidated damages and any penalty. In
addition to demanding a recovery of losses because of
breach of contract, one party may ask compensation from
the other party for losses suffered as a result of the
9 03invalidation of the contract.
D. Assignment, Modification, Rescission, and 
Termination of the Contract
The FECL allows for assignment of contractual rights 
and obligations. If a contract needs no approval from 
the state, it may be assigned to a third party after 
mutual consent is obtained between the two parties. If 
the contract needs state approval, the contractual 
parties should be given permission from the original 
approving authority.204
A party may unilaterally rescind the contract if 
there is a breach of contract, an event of force majeure, 
or other ground for rescission.205 There are three
circumstances in which a contract may be terminated. 
First, if the contract has already been fulfilled; 
secondly, if it is given a court judgement or is settled
by arbitration; and finally, if it is agreed to by both
parties.206
The contract may be modified following a written
agreement between the parties. But if state approval is 
needed, the contractual parties should gain consent from
202. Ibid., art. 20.
203. Ibid., art. 11.
204. Ibid., art. 26 and 27.
205. Ibid., art. 29. The rights to demand compensation 
for losses will not be influenced if there is a 
modification, rescission, and termination of contract. 
See also ibid., art. 34.
2 06. Ibid., art. 31.
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9 07 •the original approving authority. The provisions
regarding final accounting, liquidation, and resolution
of dispute do not lose effectiveness because of the
9 08rescission or termination of the contract.
E. Dispute Resolution
When contractual disputes arise, the parties should 
try to resolve them through private negotiation or
9 09 •relatively informal mediation. If both methods fail 
to resolve the dispute, the parties may make a written
"arbitration agreement." This agreement is not
necessarily a part of the original contract. If consent 
is given, the dispute may be submitted to a PRC
910arbitration agency or to a non-PRC arbitration body.
If the parties failed to perform any arbitration 
provision in the contract or did not agree to arbitration
911m  writing, they may bring a suit m  the PRC courts.
The parties to a contract may choose the law to be 
applied to the handling of a contractual dispute. PRC
law has to be applied in the case of an EJV contract, a
CJV contract, and contracts for cooperative exploration 
and development of natural resources to be performed 
within the PRC.212
207. Ibid., art. 28, 32, and 33.
208. Ibid., art. 35 and 36.
209. Ibid., art. 37.
210. Ibid.
211. Ibid., art. 38. See J. K. Lockett, "Dispute 
Settlement in the People's Republic of China; The 
Developing Role of Arbitration in Foreign Trade and 
Maritime Disputes", 16 The George Washington Journal of 
International Law and Economics (1982), p. 265.
212. Ibid., art. 5; cf. art. 6.
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With regard to other contractual disputes, the 
parties may choose themselves which law is to be applied. 
If there is no applicable law, the law with the closest 
relation to the contract has to be applied.
F. Supplementary Provisions
The time limit for submitting a dispute to 
litigation or arbitration in respect of a contract for 
the purchase and sale of goods is four years from the 
time that the party knew, or ought to have known, of 
the infringement of its rights. The statutes of 
limitations for other contracts are to be enacted 
separately.214
With regard to contracts for EJVs, CJVs, and 
exploration and development of natural resources, they 
are still implemented in accordance with the provisions 
of these contracts. However, the parties may consult and 
agree to the FECL being applied to contracts formed 
before the FECL itself takes effect.215
4.7.3 Contents of the PRC "Regulations Governing 
Contracts for the Import of Technology"
These Regulations consist of thirteen articles. All 
contracts referring to transfer or license, patent 
rights and other industrial property rights, technical 
know-how, and technical services between PRC individuals 
and foreigners shall be implemented in accordance with
213. Ibid., art. 39.
214. Ibid., art. 5. See H. R. Zheng, "China's New Civil 
Law", 34 The American Journal of Comparative Law (1986),
p. 200.
215. Ibid., art. 40, 41, 42, and 43.
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these Regulations.216 MOFERT of the PRC State Council 
shall itself be responsible for interpreting these 
Regulations.217
Furthermore, all technology import contracts require 
MOFERT or its authorized agencies' examination and 
approval. In Article 9 of these Regulations, there are 
nine unfair restrictive requirements which need special
9 1 8 *authorization. Since the technology import contracts
are not pure leasing agreements but contracts "to sell" 
technology to the PRC parties, there are prohibitions on 
the recipient's continued use of the imported technology 
following expiration of the contract term.
This is one of the nine "unfair restrictive
requirements" included in Article 9. In signing
technology import contract, the supplier party shall
guarantee that the technology being provided meets the
technical requirement. All the performance standards
should be stipulated in the contract.219 The recipient
shall undertake the obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of the technology being provided by the
supplier. However, this obligation is limited to the
9 9 0confidentiality portion of the contract.
216. Art. 2 of PRC's Regulations Governing Contracts for 
the Import of Technology. Officials from MOFERT said 
contracts between foreigners and Chinese individuals were 
to be applied under the scope of these Regulations. See 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 8 June 
1985, p. K 11 which was cited from J. L. deLisle, supra 
note 178, p. 279.
217. Ibid., art. 12.
218. Ibid., art. 9. An official from MOFERT admitted 
that these "restrictive requirements" can be made 
flexible under special circumstances. See FBIS, 5 June 
1985, p. K 12, cited from J. L. deLisle, supra note 178,
p. 280.
219. Ibid., art. 5 and 6.
220. Ibid., art. 7.
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4.7.4 Evaluation of the PRC's Laws Relating to
Business Contracts
In order to further encourage foreign trade and
investment, the PRC expedited the promulgation of both
the FECL and "Regulations Governing Contracts for the
Import of Technology", which became incomplete parts of
the PRC economic regulatory system. Some very important
questions therefore remain unanswered, for foreign
9 91enterprises and investors. For example, should the
FECL be applied to contracts that were concluded before 
the date the FECL itself went into effect?222 Also, 
should the PRC government's lawful actions constitute
events of force majeure when such actions induced a
T O O
failure of fulfilment m  a contract?* Under what
conditions, would the PRC authorities give approval to 
the contractual assignment and rescission? What about 
the recognition by the PRC authorities of the claim of 
"unfair restrictive requirements"?224 What contracts 
would be recognized as being against the principles of
221. J. L. deLisle, supra note 178, p. 281.
222. Art. 4 0 of PRC's Regulations Governing Contracts for 
the Import of Technology. It is not clear in legal 
significance when the word "may" is used instead of
"shall." One PRC legal scholar suggested that
reciprocity provisions should be applied to all contracts 
which had already existed before the Regulations' 
effectiveness. See J. A. Cohen, supra note 130, pp. 52-
53; see also J. P. Stevens, supra note 159, pp. 471-472.
223. There are no clauses of force majeure stipulated in 
a contract with regard to items of state approval of 
import-export, trade scheme, and economic plan. See 
Lubman & Randt, "Another Legal Milestone of China Trade", 
May 1985, p. 12. This was cited from J. L. deLisle, 
supra note 178, p. 282, note 55; cf. C. M. Schmitthoff, 
Export Trade, London: Stevens & Sons, 1981, pp. 113-114.
224. Art. 27 and 33 of PRC's 1985 FECL; Art. 9 of PRC’s 
Regulations Governing Contracts for the Import of
Technology.
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"social or public interests" and "equality and mutual 
benefit" in the PRC?225
The issue of how to address such problems has been 
the source of serious concern to foreign businessmen. 
Since 1919, the pattern of the PRC's policy and law­
making has become the main indicator as to whether or not
• • 9 9 fiforeign economic contracts should be validated.
4.7.5 Significance of the PRC's Laws Relating to 
Business Contract
Both the FECL and "Regulations Governing Contracts
for the Import of Technology" are often ambiguous and
conservative in places, but though far from perfect, they
are much more clear than the PRC's regulations of
9 9 7Special Economic Zones (SEZ). As a result, both items
of legislation were welcomed by Western businessmen and
legal experts. Their clauses and articles have become
9 9 8ground rules for Sino-foreign contract negotiations.
The FECL especially deals with certain
international business practices and American contract 
9 9 9law. The clauses and articles of both pieces of
legislation serve to reduce the high transaction costs
225. Art. 3 and 4 of PRC's 1985 FECL.
226. J. L. deLisle, supra note 178, p. 282.
227. Ibid., p. 281.
228. See J. A. Cohen, supra note 135, p. 52.
229. Ibid.; also see J. L. deLisle, supra note 178, p. 
281. The PRC's Civil Procedure Law and Criminal Law 
adopted the continental European format. However, its 
contractual concept of Economic Contract Law involved in 
a common core of continental law as well as Anglo- 
American law. See J. A. Cohen, supra note 13 0, pp. 2-18 
to 2-19, 2.05.
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which were seriously criticized by foreign parties in the 
past.230
The FECL and "Regulations Governing Contracts for 
the Import of Technology" together constituted the first 
nationwide legislation in the PRC to standardise all 
Sino-foreign business contractual patterns. -L As m  
other countries, the two PRC legislations should be 
applied to Taiwan-PRC business contracts in the area of 
private law.
In the early stages, difficulties often arose, as 
most Taiwanese enterprises had no experience of dealing 
with PRC parties in the context of business contracts. 
Under these circumstances, the ground rules to be gleaned 
from both PRC legislations are of undoubted value to both 
Taiwan and the PRC business parties in conducting trade 
and investment transactions.
4.7.6. Barriers to Taiwan-PRC Business Contracts
A. The Present Private Law Relations on 
Trade and Investment
Due to the lack of formal diplomatic relations and 
recognition, Taiwan and PRC parties face special legal 
problems in concluding trade and investment contracts. 
Trade opportunities and business activities are usually 
seriously prejudiced if there is no bilateral 
governmental relationship.232 Private business parties 
in principle have the freedom to conclude contracts in 
both domestic and international business transactions.
23 0. J. L. deLisle, supra note 178, p. 281.
231. J. A. Cohen, supra note 13 5, p. 52.
232. See C. A. Jaslow, supra note 16, p. 212.
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However, this freedom of concluding contracts is limited 
to private law in both Taiwan and the PRC.233
With increasing cooperation in the sphere of private
law, private relations between Taiwan and the PRC should
not be further impeded. Important overtures have been
made on both sides for finding legal solutions to
private inter-regional conflicts. Mutual non-recognition
should not necessarily be an inhibiting factor
influencing private business activities between parties
of two countries. For example, business activities were
conducted between Japan and the PRC although there were
2 3 4.no diplomatic relationships prior to 1972.
Generally speaking, East-West business dealings have
continued in the absence of diplomatic relations, even
7 3 6when political tensions have been high. Therefore,
the non-existence of diplomatic relations or recognition 
should not directly interfere in private business 
activities and freedom of contract conclusion.
Without formal diplomatic relations, private 
business activities are usually conducted in accordance 
with domestic legal norms. Some domestic laws can be 
applied only to friendly countries with de jure
233 . See art. 2 and 72 of Taiwan's Civil Code in 1 A 
Compilation of the Laws of the Republic of China (Taipei, 
1967). Taiwan fully recognizes the philosophy of freedom 
of contract. However, if the parties' will is directed 
to an end prohibited by law or contrary to public policy 
or good morals, then, to that extent, the court will deny 
recognition of the agreement by refusing to enforce the 
rights created by the contract. See also art. 9 of PRC's 
1985 FECL. Contracts that violate the laws of the PRC or 
contravene the social or public interest shall be void.
234. At that time, there was a Sino-Japanese non­
governmental trade agreement which had no need for 
governmental recognition. The non-governmental trade 
agreement has the nature of a private contract. See G. 
T. Hsiao, supra note 147, p. 147.
23 5. S. Pisar, supra note 7, p. 3.
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recognition. Other laws may demand the countries to have 
a certain degree of recognition before they are applied. 
Whether these laws can be applied totally depends upon 
the will of the concerned governments.
Also, there are varieties of domestic laws which may
be applied specifically between countries without de jure 
9 9 fi *recognition. Domestic laws under non-diplomatic
relations can be classified into two categories: firstly,
laws made to maintain or build up commercial relations.
The United States1s "Taiwan Relations Act" is one such 
7 3 7example. The second category involves laws made to
limit or prohibit commercial relations. In fact, the 
laws applied between countries with non-diplomatic 
relations usually belong to the second category. Private 
legal relations between such countries will be impeded if 
the second category of laws takes precedence.
B. The Present Obstacles Encountered in 
Taiwan-PRC Business Contracts
In the past, Taiwanese enterprises have usually 
encountered two main barriers when concluding business 
contracts with parties of the PRC. One is political and 
the other is legal.238
a. Political Barrier
Since the end of the Second World War, an East-West 
conflict has existed in international politics. In
23 6. See C. Y. Huang, Guoji Shangshi Fa (International 
Commercial Law), Taipei: published by the author, 1984,
pp. 483-484. With regard to the law specially applied to 
a country without formal recognition, see, for example, 
the United States' Taiwan Relations Act which can be 
found in 22 U.S.C.  ^ 3301-3316 (1988).
2 37. Ibid., Taiwan Relations Act.
238. See K. D. Gott, supra note 11, p. 92.
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East-West trade, business activities have been limited
or prohibited between hostile countries or those having
no diplomatic relations. Political factors have played a
vital role in the conduct of East-West trade. In other
words, the political situation has always been a major
7 3 9consideration in East-West trade.
Although the quest for profitable economic exchanges 
seems strong enough to transcend ideological barriers, no 
one can ignore the political and diplomatic environment 
in which antagonistic societies pursue their economic 
ends. The flow of goods is often at the mercy of state 
policies which subordinate economic needs to political 
considerations. Notable examples are the severe export 
restrictions, import discrimination and credit 
limitations which have existed in such circumstances.240
In contrast, the political barrier to Taiwan-PRC 
trade is one which cuts off trade completely by 
government decree, rather than reducing the trade flow 
either through higher prices (given the price-elasticity 
of demand for imports) as in the case of tariffs, or by 
an arbitrary upper limit, as in the case of import 
quotas.
Furthermore, the political barrier even now calls 
for the trade medium of entrepTts, and herein lies the 
indispensable role of Hong Kong in the Taiwan-PRC 
trade.241 With no direct trade and investment
relationship, a political barrier exists to prevent 
business transactions being conducted between Taiwan and 
the PRC.
239. L. Gomes, International Economic Problems, New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1979, p. 63.
240. See S. Pisar, supra note 6, p. 3.
241. See C. Y. Huang, supra note 23 6, p. 484.
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b. Legal Barrier
Given the prevailing protectionism in trade, certain 
commercial actions, which are limited or prohibited by- 
domestic law, are often adopted. This situation occurs 
even between countries with diplomatic relations. For 
instance, such can be seen in the trade actions to 
pressure other countries to take substantial measures to 
improve market access under the United States's "Special 
301 Provisions of the Trade Act." In spite of the rapid 
development of the PRC legal system in recent years, 
legal barriers in business transactions persist:
examples are statutes and regulations, often vague and 
untested. Besides, case law is not recognized as legal 
precedent in the PRC.242
In Taiwan, the TMRS will authorize and recognize 
private law relations despite the continued absence of 
political recognition of the PRC. However, this Act is 
far from comprehensive and lacks regulations concerning 
commercial relations with the PRC. In comparison, the 
PRC for its part is still in need of a sound legal 
structure refined enough to accommodate the Western 
(including Taiwan) practices of international commercial 
law. The main legal barrier arising in Taiwan-PRC 
commercial relations is the reality of non-recognition. 
The absence of a status of Most-favoured Nation (MFN) 
and other guarantee agreements on trade and investment
3 4 7are the most important features of this.
242. The PRC trade organizations usually conclude what 
may be called non-governmental trade agreements with 
business and economic groups of other countries having no 
diplomatic relations with the PRC. See ESCAP, supra note 
13, p. 92.
243. For example, Agreement on Trade Relations between 
the PRC and the USA, supra note 145.
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4.8 Conclusions - Legal Methods to Overcome Barriers
to Concluding Taiwan-PRC 
Business Contracts
Since political and legal barriers exist in East- 
West trade, various legal methods may be adopted to 
overcome these barriers. In general, there are three 
legal methods. First, to annul or amend the present 
trade law, or to promulgate a new trade law. Secondly, 
to sign a bilateral non-governmental or governmental 
trade agreement. Thirdly, to join an international 
multiple trade treaty.
Political considerations have practical implications 
for the short-term evolution of Taiwan-PRC trade. Such
political considerations have no legal effect which 
influences or even protects the commercial benefits of
private enterprises. Given the absence of formal 
recognition, the protection of private enterprises in 
law has emerged as an important issue. In commercial
practice, business contracts are not readily concluded if 
there is no guarantee of legal protection. Without 
diplomatic relations between governments, the un­
recognized party will . lack the usual channels for 
protection of national interests.244 Taiwanese 
enterprises are taking commercial risks by doing business 
within the territory of the PRC. 245 Risks of this kind
can be reduced if there is a proper application of
9 4 6domestic as well as international law.
244. D. P. O'Connell, supra note 17, pp. 124-125.
245. See G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940, Vol. I, pp. 
234, 235, 300. Although the commercial risks cited
by D. P. O'Connell were different, Taiwan-PRC business 
transactions to date incur similar risks in the eyes of 
the international law.
246. See L. A. Pinard, "United States Policy Regarding 
Nationalization Decree of 1950", 14 California Western 
International Law Journal (1984), p. 148 et seq.
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A lack of proper protective legislation has now 
become the biggest barrier to Taiwan-PRC business 
transactions. In addition to the change of domestic 
law,247 a bilateral non-governmental agreement or an 
international multiple treaty may be adopted in order to 
overcome the barriers encountered in concluding business
p A Q , ,
contracts between the two. This is why it has become 
necessary for Taiwan, when dealing with trade and 
investment in the PRC to demand, at least, such a 
bilateral non-governmental agreement with binding effect.
What Taiwan wants of the PRC is not merely a new 
proper protective statute. Admittedly, such a law would 
offer much more protection than an administrative order. 
But such legislation will be only as good as any of PRC 
laws. It cannot possibly have the binding effect provided 
by a bilaterally signed treaty or agreement. That is why 
it has become popular for countries trading with and 
investing in the PRC to demand signing a guarantee treaty
p 4, Qor, at least, a non-governmental agreement.
247. The TIL, promulgated on 3 March 1994, is intended to 
upgrade the TIP of 1988 which was issued by the State 
Council. For an English text, see Appendix III of this 
thesis.
248. To date, no non-governmental trade agreements have 
been signed between Taiwan and the PRC. However, the 
"Taiwan-Chinese Repatriation by Sea Agreement" signed by 
the Red Cross representatives on 2 0 September 1990 might 
be a model to be adopted. A mediation group such as 
Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and PRC's 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 
(ARATS) could undertake this mission. The bilateral non­
governmental agreement or treaty may be signed in order 
to avoid these barriers encountered in concluding 
business contracts between the two. It is understood 
that the possible establishment of such offices in the 
PRC for SEF and in Taiwan for ARATS will not involve the 
protocol of foreign relations since both governments 
adhere their separate own "one-China policy".
249. For example, at present (1994), the PRC has signed 
bilateral investment treaties with more than forty 
countries. See Osman Tseng, "Risky Business", Free China
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CHAPTER FIVE
LEGAL PROTECTION OF TAIWANESE TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
As noted above (see p. 39) , the Taiwanese government 
is willing to consider establishing direct trade, 
shipping and air links with the PRC only if the PRC 
renounces the use of force against Taiwan and recognises 
the island as a separate political entity. However, by 
the end of 1993, some 20,000 Taiwan-funded enterprises —  
with US$30 billion of accumulative investment had already 
been established in the PRC. Taiwan-PRC two-way trade was 
more than US$8 billion in 1994.1 At present, all such 
trade and investment is indirect, concluded mostly 
through intermediaries in Hong Kong. Taiwan seeks to 
establish a sound legal framework for the protection of 
such business transactions although the PRC claims the 
existing laws are adequate.
5.1 The Significance of Legal Protection for Taiwanese
Trade and Investment in the PRC
The various types of risks encountered in 
international trade and investment inlcude those of 
credit, politics, economics, transfer, emergency, and 
those of business risks, non-business, commercial, 
managerial, to name but some. However, these can be 
broadly grouped into credit risks, non-commercial 
(political) risks, and enterprise risks.3 Credit risks
1. Zhongyang Ribao (Taipei: Central Daily News), 2 July
1994, p. 4; and also source from Taiwan's Board of 
Foreign Trade and Hong Kong Customs of 1994. See 
Appendix II.
2. Kieran Cooke, "'Bridge built' between Taiwan and 
China", The Financial Times, 3 0 April 1993, p. 4.
3. For further studies, see J. Chang ed. , Guoji Jinrong 
Maoyi Dacidian (International Finance and Trade
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mean that when a contract is concluded, notwithstanding 
that the buyer has a problem with credit (either payment 
is not then made or delayed) , the seller therefore bears 
the risks of the commercial loss. Non-commercial risks 
are usually unpredictable under normal circumstances and 
none of the parties in the business transaction are 
liable for the loss caused, except when there is a 
concession agreement*4 As for enterprise risks, examples 
of loss liable in enterprise itself are mistakes in 
policy, business misconduct, managerial failure, and so 
on.
In international trade, the above classification of 
three risks is of practical use. The most significant 
category m  foreign investment is non-commercial risks. 
The scope of non-commercial risks in foreign investment 
is as follows: first, war; secondly, expropriation
without compensation or nationalisation; thirdly, 
discriminatory regulations; fourthly, currency
restrictions; lastly, quota limitations on foreign
Dictionary) (Taipei: China Credit Information Service
Press, 1988), pp. 156, 198, 644.
4. Non-commercial risks consist of emergency risks, non­
business risks, economic risks, and transfer risks. See 
R. Y. Dong, Protection of Foreign Investment under 
International Law, Taipei: Modern Management Foundation, 
1989, pp. 124-125. It can also refer to some other old 
articles in this field such as E. Synder, "Protection on 
the Private Foreign Investment, Examination and 
Appraisal", 10 International and Comparative Investment 
Law Quarterly (1961), p. 472; and R. C. Pugh, "Legal 
Protection of International Transaction against Non­
commercial Business Risks", A Lawyer's Guide to 
International Business Transaction, (eds.), W. S. Surrey 
and C. Shaw, Philadelphia: Joint Committee on Continuing 
Legal Education, 1963, p. 302.
5. For example, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation of the United States guaranteed only the non­
commercial risks but not the commercial risks. See W. S. 
Surrey, "Exporting to the PRC: Government Policies, 
Financing and Other Transaction Problems", Business 
Transactions with China, Japan, and South Korea, (eds.), 
P. Saney and H. Smit, New York: Matthew Bender, 1983, pp. 
3-20.
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trade. Although foreign trade and foreign investment
are different, in nature, the methods for protecting them
are not so very different. For foreign investment, either
domestic law or international law is adopted in every
country as a method for avoiding non-commercial risks.
The common situation is that countries which receive
capital investment will offer incentives, and the capital
exporting country will protect its overseas investment
through investment insurance or diplomatic protection.
Under such circumstances, the possibility of a bilateral
or multilateral investment law has always emerged as an
7issue much debated between both countries.
As for international trade, many legal methods are 
used to protect traders from non-commercial risks. 
Examples are export insurance, trade agreements, or even 
multilateral agreements* International trade is a
6. See E. Synder, supra note 4, p. 472; see also R. C. 
Pugh, supra note 4, p. 3 02.
7. For bilateral or multilateral investment law, see E. 
Synder supra note 4, p. 469 et seq. ; E. I. Nwogugu, The 
Legal Problems of Foreign Investments in Developing 
Countries, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1965, pp. 
13 5-159. These laws seem always to be suggested by 
capital exported countries and not to be accepted 
particularly by the capital imported developing 
countries. The main difficulty is that there is little 
agreement on many international law principles and 
further, each country is reluctant to limit its own 
sovereignty. See also E. I. Nwogugu, id., p. 156 et seq.
8. For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade ( GATT) under the United Nations. There are trade 
limitations. See J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law 
of GATT: A Legal Analysis of Gatt, Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merill Co. Inc., 1969, p. 193. The People's 
Republic of China applied to rejoin GATT on 10 July 1986 
although China was one of the founding members which 
itself suspended relationship on the establishment of the 
People's Republic in 1949. See R. E. Herzstein, "China 
and the GATT: Legal and Policy Issues raised by China's
Participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade", 18 Law and Policy in International Business 
(1986), p. 374. Since the PRC applied to resume its GATT 
status in 1986, there have been many recent trade and 
economic reforms but a number of issues still need to be 
resolved and their status has not yet been confirmed. A
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commercial exchange that is completed in one transaction, 
and involves much less risk than such long-term 
commercial activities such as international investment. 
Therefore, the protection of non-commercial risks in 
trade is always made in one of two ways, either through 
the administrative measures of the exporting country or 
through a bilateral or multilateral agreement.
In regard to trade and investment across the Taiwan 
Straits, the above-stated legal protection methods may be 
adopted against non-commercial risks. However, in the 
present situation in which there is a lack of any kind of 
government-imposed protection such as diplomatic
relations, the non-commercial risks still exist in trade 
and investment ties between the two. In line with both 
Taiwan and the PRC's overall policy towards each other, 
direct trade and investment links are likely to be 
implemented in the near future. However, that policy has 
no legal restrictive power which would reduce the non­
commercial risks. In the interest of enterprise itself, 
investment can always be abandoned if the non-commercial 
risks appear to outweigh its expected returns.
Because of the very special political situation 
existing between the PRC and Taiwan, non-commercial risks 
are ever-present in trade and investment activities 
between Taiwan and the PRC. Under these circumstances, 
legal protection plays a vital role in business 
transactions between the two regimes. At present, Taiwan 
is seeking a formal treaty or agreement similar to those 
which the PRC has extended to other countries. The PRC 
has claimed that safeguards in its domestic law are
8.cont'd
complication arises from the submission by Taiwan of an 
application to join GATT which was made in 1990. The PRC 
has expressed a willingness to discuss Taiwan's 
participation in GATT in accordance with its one-China 
policy but only on the basis that Taiwan would join as a 
separate customs territory of China, rather than as an 
independent member nation.
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sufficient. The PRC believes that such a treaty would 
boost Taiwan's claim to be treated as an equal political 
entity and has eschewed a bilateral or even multilateral 
agreement or treaty. The legal protection methods of 
Taiwanese investment in the PRC will be discussed by 
examining the PRC's own measures.
5.2 The PRC's Legal Protection Measures in Investment
Business and economic environments differ as between 
Taiwan and the PRC. In terms of production, Taiwan has 
management expertise, abundant capital, well developed 
market distribution channels and excellent applied 
technologies; the PRC, meanwhile, possesses plenty of 
land, labour and natural resources, and a high standard 
of basic technology. In line with the government's 
policy of industrialisation, the PRC continues to attract 
foreign capital and encourages further foreign investment
Qin its push towards economic reforms.
5.2.1 The PRC's Protection Measures and Responsibility 
for Foreign Investment
The PRC's decision to accept foreign investment was 
the result of a fundamental shift in political leadership 
and economic policy that began after the Cultural 
Revolution, and which crystallised during the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist party (the Third Plenum) in December 
1978. The new leadership declared that the primary
9. For further studies on efforts of PRC's economic 
reform since 1979, see Cheng Yuan, East-West Trade, 
Changing Patterns In Chinese Foreign Trade Law and 
Institutions, New York: Ocean Publications, Inc., 1991,
pp. 319-320. As for the importance of foreign capital for 
economic development, see A. A. Fatouros, Government 
Guarantees to Foreign Investors, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962, p. 12, note 3.
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national objective of the PRC was to raise the living 
standards of its people through economic development*10 
In order to achieve this objective, the PRC leadership 
realised that the country needed greater access to 
foreign capital, and therefore adopted many measures 
since 1979 to attract foreign capital.11
The risks associated with governmental actions are 
not infrequently a very real source of concern to foreign 
investors. Governmental action of this kind commonly 
consists of breaking concessive promises or other 
agreements, or withdrawing favourable guarantees. 
Foreign investors are greatly disquieted by non­
commercial risks such as these, and moreover by the 
unfair or inadequate remedies available in cases of 
expropriation or nationalisation. With an eye to 
allaying such fears, developing countries seeking to 
attract foreign capital always offer guarantees aimed at 
assuring potential foreign investors that commercial 
commitments will be honoured. Guarantees of this kind 
are invariably underpinned either by policy or by law. 
Different countries have differing approaches, but 
investment protection measures in general almost without 
exception are to be found enshrined in the following
three: first, Governmental Policy Statements; secondly,
Municipal Legislation; lastly, Constitutions.
Governmental Policy Statements are a form of
guarantee or warranty to attract foreign investment. For 
example, the PRC Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign
10. See, for example, Li Peng's Report on "Continue to 
Work for Stable Political, Economic and Social 
Development in China", to the 3rd Session of the 7th 
National People's Congress in March 1990.
11. For example, there were many forms of promoting
foreign direct investment in the early 1980s in the PRC. 
See Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (United Nations) [Hereinafter, ESCAP], Guidebook 
on Trading with the People's Republic of China, London: 
Graham & Trotman Ltd., 1984, pp 167 - 170.
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Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) said openly in June 
1982 during an investment promotion meeting that:
During the past 3 0 years, the Chinese government 
has always abided by its promises in its 
relationship with foreign countries. As long as 
foreign investors do not violate the laws of the 
Chinese government and the joint ventures and 
cooperative enterprises do not infringe upon the 
PRC's public interests and public order, we will not 
confiscate their investments. Even in cases 
involving factors such as large-scale war and 
disastrous natural calamities-when and if foreign 
assets have to be requisitioned-the Chinese 
government will handle affairs according to legal 
procedures and compensate in accordance with the 
principles of fairness and reasonableness*12
Such statements are purely expressions of intention
but have no legally binding force. They are therefore not
1 3reliable and may be withdrawn at any time.
Municipal Legislation is a form of legal protection 
for the guarantees or warranties of foreign investment. 
Since the 1980s, there have been many important 
investment laws promulgated in the PRC. The EJV Law of 
1979 is the most striking example.14 The Law itself is a 
kind of investment statute and is a landmark symbol of 
the PRC's commitment to attracting foreign investment. 
The types of laws used by the PRC to regulate foreign 
business activities and their sources, in general, fall 
into two different categories which are: published
12. See Beijing Review, No. 30, 26th July 1982, p. 20.
13. The statement could be more significant protection if 
it were included in investment contracts or municipal 
legislation. See E. I. Nwogugu, supra note 6, p. 54; see 
also A. A. Favours, supra note 9, p. 121.
14. The EJV Law was promulgated on and effective as of 
8th July 1979. Thes Law consists of 15 simple articles, 
and may be viewed more as a road map than as substantive 
legal authority. The PRC government has supplemented the 
Law with extensive regulations.
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1 6legislation, and internal or restricted regulations * 
Generally speaking, investment statutes are much more 
effective than the other methods of legal protection. 
With real binding force, the statutes can be amended only 
through special legal procedures and can alone enable a 
legal remedy to be obtained in that country.
As for Constitutional protection, the current PRC 
Constitution, adopted in late 1982, grants recognition 
and protection for foreign investment. Article 18 of the 
Constitution specifically authorises foreign investment 
in the PRC, provided that foreign investors abide by the 
PRC law, at the same time offering foreign investors
1 fiprotection under the PRC law.
15. The PRC's published legislation is issued in a 
variety of forms by legislative bodies and administrative 
agencies. Under PRC's Constitution, the power to enact 
and amend basic statues (falii) in the civil area is 
granted to the NPC. The NPC's Standing Committee may 
enact statutes in certain areas not specifically reserved 
to the NPC itself and may issue decrees (faling) , 
decisions (jueyi), orders (mingling), and instructions 
(zhishi) based on existing laws when the NPC is not in 
session. In addition, the PRC's State Council, 
designated by the Constitution as the highest organ of 
state administration, as well as administrative organs 
directly responsible to the State Council, are authorised 
to issue administrative regulations (guiding) and 
measures (banfa) to implement existing legislation. 
Finally, local organs of state power such as local 
people's congresses and their standing committees at the 
provincial, municipal and autonomous region levels are 
empowered to enact local laws and administrative 
regulations subject to the approval of the central 
government. For further studies, see M. J. Moser (ed.), 
Foreign Trade, Investment and the Law in the People's 
Republic of China, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
p . 2.
16. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
was amended in 1982 and its Article 18 has been 
recognised as the basic legal framework for the PRC's 
foreign investment laws and regulations adopted after 
1982 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1983).
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5.2.2 Contents of the PRC’s Protection Measures and 
Responsibility for Foreign Investment
Generally speaking, the protection measures for the 
capital-investing country need to be quite general in 
character, and include a declaration for foreign 
investors and a protection regulation providing for fair 
or non-discriminatory treatment. Some countries even ask 
for reciprocity to be a prerequisite condition of
1 7granting non-discrimination treatment.
A. General Aspects
According to Article 2 of the 1990 EJV Law, the 
PRC government protects the investment of foreign joint 
ventures, the profits due to them and their other lawful 
rights and interests in a joint venture, pursuant to the 
agreement of contract and articles of association 
approved by the Chinese government. Articles 1 and 4 of 
the 1986 WFOE Law have relevant regulations. ° As m  the 
1982 PRC Constitution, there is a general protection 
regulation in its Article 18 which is worth quoting in 
toto:
17. In order to be granted the same treatment, there must 
just have been investments made within that other 
country, which normally is a developed and capital- 
exporting country. Thus, the wisdom of inserting such a 
provision is questionable. See R. Y. Dong, supra note 4, 
pp. 125-126.
18. The WFOE Law was promulgated on and effective as of 
12th April 1986. Article 1 provides that in order to 
expand foreign economic cooperation and technical 
exchange, and further the development of the Chinese 
national economy, the People's Republic of China permits 
foreign enterprises and other economic organisations or 
individuals to operate wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
within the territory of China, and protects the lawful 
rights and interests of wholly foreign-owned enterprises. 
Article 4 provides that the investment, profits earned 
and other lawful rights and interests of foreign 
investors within the territory of China shall receive the 
protection of the laws of China.
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"The People's Republic of China permits foreign 
enterprises, other foreign economic organisations 
and individual foreigners to invest in China and to 
enter into various forms of economic cooperation 
with Chinese enterprises and other economic 
organisations in accordance with the law of the 
People's Republic of China***. Their lawful rights 
and interests are protected by the law of the 
People's Republic of China."
It appears that no provisions relating to national
treatment, non-discrimination treatment, or reciprocity
1 9treatment may be found m  the PRC's investment rules.
It is not clear if the PRC can offer fair, just and 
equitable treatment in its own law.20 Thus, the PRC 
regulations on foreign investments are thought to be a 
general assurance without any concrete content. This 
assurance is no more than an indication of the attitude 
of the PRC to its present investment climate.
B. Specific Aspects
Just like other capital-importing countries, the PRC 
has certain specific protection measures for foreign 
investments.
a. Expropriation
In attracting foreign investment, capital-importing 
countries are also concerned that expropriation of 
foreign assets will become an obstacle to investment.
19. National treatment means that all rights, immunities 
and facilities granted to domestic investors and 
companies shall be available on equal terms, to foreign 
investors and companies engaged in the same fields. See 
R. Y. Dong, supra note 4, p. 131. As for non­
discrimination, see ibid., pp. 126-129.
20. The principle of fair, just, and equitable treatment 
is always interpreted as the minimum standard of 
treatment to alien, or the international law standard of 
treatment. See E. I. Nwogugu, supra note 7, p. 135 et 
seq.; see also R. Y. Dong, supra note 4, p. 346.
21. Apart from expropriation, there are several similar 
expressions such as nationalisation, socialisation,
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In general, there are regulations in law or even in the 
Constitution for protecting people’s private assets which 
include those of foreign investors. The- investment laws 
may not refer to nationalisation or expropriation under 
the Constitution. However, some related regulations in 
the Constitution are de facto applicable. According to 
the current PRC Constitution, foreign investments will be 
protected by its "national law." The WFOE Law of 1986 
has started to consider the protection of foreign 
investment assets. In Article 5 of the Law, the PRC will 
not nationalise or carry out expropriation of WFOEs; but 
in special circumstances, the state may carry out 
expropriation. The pre-requisites are that the
expropriation must meet the needs of social and public 
interest, in accordance with legal procedures, and give 
commensurate compensation. To date, there are no other
confiscation, creeping taking, and so on. Regarding the 
concept of expropriates, the author would like to refer 
to some old books such as G. White, Nationalisation of 
Foreign Property, London: Stevens & Sons, 1961, p. 32 and
B. A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959, p. 24. As
for the concept of nationalisation, see B. A. Wortley, 
ibid., p. 36; D. P. O'Connell, International Law, New 
York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1965, Vol. 2, p. 843; and 
also M. Domke, "Foreign Nationalisation: Some Aspects of
Contemporary International Law", 55 American Journal of 
International Law (1961), pp. 587 - 588. Upon referring 
to socialisation, see S. Friedmann, Expropriation in
International Law, London: Stevens & Sons, 1953, p. 5 and 
D. P. O'Connell, ibid., p. 838. The principle of
expropriation in orthodox international law is also 
applicable for nationalisation and socialisation. See B. 
A. Wortley, ibid., p. 37; M. Domke, ibid., p. 588; L. B.
Sohn & R. R. Baxter, Responsibility of State for Injuries 
of International Law (1961), p. 554. In regard to the 
expression of confiscation, see B. A. Wortley, ibid., p. 
3 9 and J.E.S. Fawcett, "Some Foreign Effects of 
Nationalisation or Property", 27 British Year-book of 
International Law (1950), p. 3 55. The expression of
creeping taking can be referred to R. C. Pugh, supra note 
4, p. 3 02; J.E.S. Fawcett, ibid., p. 3 56; M. Domke, 
ibid., p. 359; and also H. J. Steiner & D. F. Vagts 
(eds.), Transnational Legal Problems, Materials and Text, 
New York: The Foundation Press, 1968, pp 363 - 367.
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laws regulating nationalisation of expropriation for 
foreign investment in the PRC*22
A detailed standard of remedy for nationalisation 
has been laid down in investment protection treaties 
between the PRC and foreign countries.23 In the present 
legal framework, the international treaty takes priority 
over domestic law in the PRC.24 Therefore, the investment 
protection treaty has become an important legal source
0 cregarding nationalisation m  PRC law*^
b. Taxation
In order to escape discriminatory or higher taxation 
treatment, some protection measures need to be adopted to 
avoid such kinds of non-commercial risks. If the 
taxation rate were to be based on the nationality of 
assets owners, foreign investors would never hazard their 
business activities in such a country. To assure
22. H. R. Zheng, "Foreign Investment Law in the People's
Republic of China: A 1986 Update", 19 Journal of
International Law and Politics (1987), pp. 287-288.
23. Ibid., for example, under Article 3 of the investment 
protection treaty between China and Sweden, the level of 
compensation for nationalisation is to place investors in 
the same financial position they would have been in 
without nationalisation. Article 3 further provides that 
the nationalisation may not be discriminatory and the 
compensation, which must be in convertible currency, may 
not be unjustifiably delayed. Article 3 specifies that 
compensation will include the loss of regular income from 
the investment.
24. Ibid., p. 288; see also H. R. Zheng, "China's New 
Civil Law", 34 The American Journal of Comparative Law 
(1986) , p. 700; see also General Principles of Civil Law 
(GPCL), adopted 12 April 1986 and an English translation 
in 3 4 The American Journal of Comparative Law (1986), pp. 
715-743.
25. HR. Zheng, supra note 22, p. 288.
26. The taxation right is a kind of state sovereignty.
Except for some certain immunities, the taxation right 
should be effective for aliens within the state 
territory. This is a recognised principle of
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foreign investors that no such risks exist, certain
special taxation treatments such as National Treatment,
Non-discriminatory Treatment (Most-favoured Nation
Treatment), or even Fair Treatment are offered
unilaterally by a country. There is no mention of such
taxation treatments in the PRC Constitution or its
investment laws. However, there are some relevant
7 7regulations m  the PRC investment laws*
Prior to the 1983 Joint Venture Implementing 
Regulations, an Individual Income Tax Law and a Foreign 
Enterprise Income Tax Law and associated regulations were 
also promulgated in the PRC from 1980 to 1982. All of 
these established, at least in principle, a generally 
fair and rational tax regime. Moreover, for policy 
reasons, further tax incentives have been granted to all 
foreign investing enterprises if they meet specified 
criteria, and not merely to joint ventures*
international law. See D. P. O'Connell, supra note 21, 
p. 787; see also E. I. Nwogugu, supra note 7, pp. 9-10; 
A. R. Albrecht, "The Taxation of Aliens under 
International Law", 29 British Year-book of International 
Law (1952) , p. 145; see also C. C. Hyde, International 
Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United 
States, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1947, Vol., I,
p. 655.
27. See Article 7 of the 1979 EJV Law; Article 9 and 10 
of the 1988 CJV Law; Article 17 of the 1986 WOFE Law; and 
also Article 69, 70, 71, 72 of the Regulations for the
Implementation of the EJV Law (promulgated on 20 
September 1983).
28. The Income Tax Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures was adopted on 10th September 1980 
(amended in September 1983); Detailed Rules and
Regulations for the Implementation of this Income Tax Law 
was promulgated on 14 December 1980. The Individual 
Income Tax Law of the PRC was promulgated on 10 September 
1980; Detailed Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of this Individual Income Tax Law was 
promulgated on 14 December 1980. The Foreign Enterprises 
Income Tax Law of the PRC was adopted on 13 December 
1981; Detailed Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of this Foreign Enterprises Income Tax Law 
was promulgated on 21 February 1982.
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c. Foreign Exchange
In order to balance international receipts and
expenditure, an importing country will usually establish 
a system of controlling its foreign exchange. This
method will hinder the remittance of capital and profits 
back to the capital exporting country. Therefore,
foreign exchange incentives are commonly adopted for
foreign investors by allowing remittance of their capital
and incomes. However, the capital importing country may 
abuse its monetary sovereignty or commit a tort such as 
will expose foreign investors to unexpected non-
, O Q
commercial risks.
To reduce such risks, certain protection 
legislation in the capital importing countries is adopted 
for foreign investments. For the same reason, the PRC 
investment laws have such regulations governing foreign 
exchange.30 Furthermore, the PRC's handling of the
foreign exchange issue now appears less arbitrary after a
, , . 1 1series of foreign exchange regulations were issued.
29. Every state has an exclusive monetary sovereignty. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
pointed out in the verdict of the Serbian and Brazilian 
Loan Case that it is indeed a generally accepted
principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own 
currency. See PCIJ Ser. A. No. 20 (1929), p. 44. For
further discussion on the monetary sovereignty of a 
state, see F. A. Mann, The Legal Aspects of Money, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 461 at seq. and 
also refer to J. E. S. Fawcett, "The International
Monetary Fund and International Law", 40 British Year­
book of International Law (1964), p. 49.
30. See Article 8, 10, 11 of the 1979 EJV Law; Article 8, 
11 of the 1988 CJV Law; Article 18, 19 of the 1986 WFOE
Law; and Article 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79 of the
Regulations for the Implementation of the EJV Law (1983).
31. Provisional Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control 
of the People's Republic of China were promulgated on 
18th December 1980; Rules for Implementation of Foreign 
Exchange Control Relating to Foreign Institutions in 
China and Their Personnel were promulgated on 10 August
1981; Rules Governing the Carrying of Foreign Exchange,
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5.3 Legal Effectiveness of the PRC's Protection 
Measures and Laws
In additional question is: what about legal
effectiveness should the PRC government unilaterally 
withdraw its guarantee or warranty of Constitution, 
national legislation, or policy statements by
introducing new legislation or administrative measures 
toward foreign investments? According to international 
law, under the principles of territorial jurisdiction, 
the alien's substantive and procedural rights are neither 
better nor worse than those of local nationals.
5.3.1 International Minimum Standard
It should be noted that a state is obliged to meet 
the international minimum standard of treatment in its 
legal and administrative measures for the protection of 
aliens' freedom and security. According to the
Precious Metals and Payment Instruments in Convertible 
Currency into or out of China were promulgated on 10 
August 1981; Rules for the Implementation of the Control 
of Foreign Exchange Relating to Individuals were 
promulgated on 31 December 1981; Rules for the 
Implementation of the Examination and Approval of 
Applications by Individuals for Foreign Exchange were 
promulgated on 31 December 1981.
32. L. Oppenheim - H. Lauterpacht (ed.) International 
Law, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, Vol. I, p.
641; see also S. D. Metzger, International Law, Trade and 
Finance: Realities and Prospects, New York: Oceana
Publications Inc., 1962, pp. 2-3. The reciprocity 
treatment, non-discrimination treatment, or national 
treatment are adopted in the investment laws of various 
countries. See R. Y. Dong, supra note 4, pp. 125-13 2.
33. See G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943, Vol. 5, p. 
471; see also D. P. O'Connell, supra note 21, pp. 1019- 
1023 .
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international standard of justice, a state should comply 
with the rule of non-discrimination towards aliens in 
international law. All the legal and administrative 
benefits such as substantive and procedural rights for 
aliens should meet the international standard of 
civilisation.34 A state has responsibility for any 
injuries to aliens caused by the violation of such a 
standard.JJ
However, developing countries have given a variety 
of reasons for adopting the national treatment standard, 
thus denying equality of treatment, a traditional 
principle of international law. For example, the former 
Soviet doctrine states that foreigners cannot enjoy 
greater rights than the local nationals, and may enjoy 
less.36 The PRC attitude towards aliens' treatment has 
not been clear. In the early 1960s, a jurist named Chou 
Keng-sheng mentioned the international minimum standard 
of the international law in the PRC. He believed that 
the protection of nationals abroad is the exercise of the
34. Non-discrimination treatment has become a principle 
of international law. See R. Y. Dong, supra note 4, p. 
12 6, 3 46, see also E. I. Nwogugu, supra note 7, p. 13 5 et 
esq. see also F. A. Mann, supra note 29, pp. 471-478.
35. See G. H. Hackworth, supra note 33, Vol. 5, p. 4711; 
see also G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1957, Vol. 1, pp. 200-206; see also W. W. 
Bishop, Jr., International Law, Case and Materials, 
Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1971, p. 
745; see also W. G. Friedmann, 0. J. Lissitzyn, R. C. 
Pugh, Cases and Materials on international Law, St. Paul, 
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1969, p. 748.
36. See S. N. Guba Roy, "Is the Law of Responsibility of 
States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal 
International Law?", 55 The American Journal of 
International Law (1961), pp. 881-883; see B. P. Amad, 
"Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain 
Problems of International Law", 15 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1962) , pp. 61-62; see also W.
G. Friedmann, 0. J. Lissitzyn and R. C. Pugh, supra note 
35, pp. 762-764; see A. A. Fatouros, "International law 
and the Third World", 50 Virginia Law Review (1964), p. 
8 07; see also H. S. Steiner & D. F. Vagts, supra note 21, 
p. 259.
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personal supremacy of all sovereign states. No one can 
deny this minimum standard of international law. It is a 
standard which must be observed by every state. In 
contrast, another jurist, Li Haipei mentioned in 1960 
that the best treatment foreigners may claim is merely 
equal treatment with nationals. Their treatment cannot 
surpass that of nationals.37 At present, it seems that 
the international minimum standard of treatment is denied 
by developing countries. PRC scholars strongly criticised 
the label of "international law" for the body of orthodox 
and conventional rules which are considered legally 
binding by "civilised states" in their intercourse with 
each other. The PRC denied recognition of such a 
definition, which was adopted before the 1950s by western 
scholars.38 One can therefore infer that the PRC, like 
the other developing countries, has no intention of 
adopting the international minimum standard of treatment 
in orthodox international law.
5.3.2 Some Limitations in Customary 
International Law
Under international law, only those rights which are 
recognised can become effective. A state can
unilaterally amend its laws if not in direct
contravention of international law. But any amendments 
must be limited by the principles of international law.
37. See J. A. Cohen and H. Chiu, People's China and 
International Law: A Documentary Study, Princeton, N. J. : 
Princeton University Press, 1974, Vol., 1, pp. 82, 718, 
and 72 2.
38. See L. Oppehheim - H. Lauterpacht (ed.),
International Law, Vol. I. 1948. 7th ed. , p. 4. In the
version issued in 1955, the term "civilised" was removed, 
see L. Oppenheim - H. Lautepacht, supra note 32, pp.4-5. 
As for the Chinese attitude, see H. Chiu, "Communist 
China’s Attitude Toward International Law", 60 The 
American Journal of International Law (1966), p. 250. 
Further studies, see J. A. Cohen and H. Chiu, ibid., pp. 
29-30.
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Only if such limitations were violated by state action 
would the state have international responsibility in 
accordance with international law. Once there is an 
international tort, the capital importing country assumes 
international responsibilities, such as the duty of 
making reparation to the investing state and the 
investing state being able to claim the right of
3 Qdiplomatic protection.
The PRC can unilaterally amend its own legislation 
or adopt administrative measures with the effect of 
breaking its former assurances or guarantees of the 
Constitution, or contravening its former national 
legislation, or policy statements for foreign 
investments. There will however be a violation of 
international law when such actions constitute an 
international tort.
A. Nationalisation
Nationalisation may be carried out either through 
legislation or through the administrative measures of a 
state. Expropriation can be recognised if it is not 
internationally unlawful, which means there being no 
violation of international commitments of the state and 
orthodox international obligation; and breaks no 
contractual obligations between interested parties.40 
When there are no such contractual obligations, the 
expropriation or nationalisation of foreign properties is 
recognised as a restrictive right of the state in 
international law.41 Orthodox international law
39. See B. A. Wortley, supra note 21, p. 151; see also G. 
Schwarzenberger, supra note 35, p. 563; see also L. B. 
Sohn & R. R. Baxter, supra note 21, p. 546.
40. See A. A. Fatouros, supra note 9, p. 53, 232 et seq. ; 
see also E. I. Nwogugu, supra note 7, pp. 21-24.
41. See A. Akinsanya, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources and the Future of Private Foreign Investment in 
the Third World", 18 The Indian Journal of International
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recognises the nationalisation if three conditions are 
satisfied: first, that the expropriation should meet the 
needs of public interest; secondly, that the 
expropriation should not be discriminatory to aliens; and 
thirdly, that the expropriation should offer adequate, 
prompt and effective compensation. Generally speaking, 
international law is violated if the expropriation of the 
capital importing country does not meet one or more of 
the three conditions. However, an international 
responsibility arises no matter whether the 
nationalisation is lawful or unlawful.
Any award for an unlawful nationalisation should be 
assessed punitively with the aim of keeping exact status 
quo ante.42 On the other hand, lawful nationalisation 
has as its legal basis of compensation, the principle of 
the prevention of unjust enrichment. This principle 
means that a person who has obtained a benefit from 
another, not intended as a gift and not legally 
justifiable, must repay it or make restitution to, or 
recompense the other party. There are three requirements 
relating to the compensation itself - it must be
adequate, effective, and prompt, in order to make it a 
so-called "just" compensation.43 In international 
practice, the compensation of nationalisation has tended 
to result in compromise between the two states. However, 
the three requirements of just compensation should not be 
unilaterally decided by the expropriating state. It is 
established that some developing countries set their own 
levels of compensation recoverable, without compromising
Law (1978) , pp. 176-177; see also Z. A. Kronfol,
Protection of Foreign Investment: A Study in
International Law, Leyden: Sijthoff, 1972, p. 22.
42. See A. Akinsanya, ibid., p. 181; see also Z. A. 
Kronfol, ibid., p. 99.
43. For example, B. A. Wortley, supra note 21, p. 24; 
Hyde, Fachiri, and Cheng in E. I. Nwogugu, supra note 7,
p. 22, note 2; A. A. Fatouros, supra note 9, p. 314, note
58; G. White, supra note 21, p. 32.
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with the party suffering expropriation. Such attitudes 
have caused friction between the parties and also violate 
the obligations of international law.44 Under the 
circumstances, diplomatic protection is usually sought by 
the government of the investing party. The Permanent 
Court of International Justice clearly supports the 
primacy of the obligations of international law in many
A e;
of its verdicts.
Issues of the scope of any remedy involve a 
discussion of direct and indirect damage. There has been 
much debate in international law on whether the state 
carrying out the nationalisation should be responsible 
for indirect damage caused to foreign investors. The 
direct damage, caused immediately by the conduct done in 
breach of duty, consists of all actual loss such as the 
capital and raw materials of the investors. The indirect 
damage consists of all intangible assets such as good 
will and the loss of prospective profits except for the 
interests of the investors. According to the principles 
of orthodox international law, it is generally accepted 
that where there is lawful nationalisation the government 
should be responsible for remedying its direct damage; 
and where there is unlawful nationalisation the 
government should be responsible for the loss of
A (L
prospective profits and other indirect damage.
B. Taxation
A state has its own fiscal jurisdiction over the 
subject-matter of taxation for the people, assets, and 
economic activities within its territory. However, the
44. For example, Columbia Constitution Article 30; India 
Constitution Act 1955, Article 31 (1). Also see E. I. 
Nwogugu, supra note 7, p. 23.
45. PCIJ Series A/B No. 46, p. 167, Series A. No. 7 
(1926) p. 19, Series A. No. 17, pp. 33-34.
46. See Z. A. Kronfol, supra note 41, pp. 104-107.
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taxation process for aliens should not violate any 
treaties signed between the two states; and cannot
justify confiscation of the assets of aliens by using the 
taxation right as a method. If the capital importing 
country establishes unfair taxation for aliens and their 
assets, such a discriminatory measure could be seen to be 
violating the existing treaty or the contractual
obligations. This constitutes an unlawful act in 
international law and the foreign investor has the right 
via his/her government to apply for diplomatic 
protection. Confiscatory taxation on foreign properties 
breaches orthodox international law.47
C. Foreign Exchange
A state has exclusive sovereignty to exercise 
monetary jurisdiction. However, the exercise should be 
limited by international law. There are four principles 
to limiting monetary jurisdiction under orthodox 
international law. First, legislative and administrative 
measures cannot be adopted which aim to damage aliens; 
secondly, there should be no discrimination against 
aliens; thirdly, rights cannot be abused; and lastly,
Pacta Sunt Servanda which means undertakings and
A O
contracts must be observed and implemented. If any
state acts or measures violate the principles of orthodox 
international law, the state concerned should be 
responsible for any damage incurred by foreign investors. 
To avoid such damage, the so-called "gold clause" is 
popularly to be found in bilateral or multilateral 
treaties covering currency devaluation or depreciation.
47. See C. C. Hyde, supra note 26, p. 664; see also B. A. 
Wortley, supra note 21, pp. 106-107; see also E. I. 
Nwogugu, supra note 7, p. 10; see also A. R. Albrecht, 
supra note 26, p. 171 et seq.
48. See F. A. Mann, supra note 29, pp. 471-478; see also 
F. A. Mann, "Money in Public International Law", 2 6 
British Year-book of International Law (1949), pp. 2 62- 
270.
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D. The PRC’s Attitude Towards International Law
In practice, the PRC has recognised the existence of
A Q
international law. * However, there are various
differences between the PRC and Western countries in 
their interpretations of the role, the definition, the
nature, and the sources of international law.50 There has 
been an ideological conflict between communist countries 
and capitalist countries. That is to say, the question 
of whether there should be a co-existence of socialist 
international law, general international law, and 
bourgeois international law has not been agreed upon by 
PRC legal scholars.51 Before 1979, there was a debate 
upon the issue of whether to recognise bourgeois
international law in the PRC. The PRC had its so-called 
"principles” in signing a treaty between itself and
socialist countries. "Proletarian Internationalism" was 
one of these principles and this had not been mentioned 
between the PRC and the capitalist countries.52 This 
might suggest that the PRC recognised general
international law (which is not definitely orthodox 
international law). However, no in-depth research in 
this field conducted by the outside world. In the 1960s, 
the PRC attitude towards the function of international
49. For example, by reference to the principle of 
international law in the text of a number of treaties; by 
condemning the action of another country as violations of 
international law in diplomatic statements or notes; by 
justifying its position in an international dispute in 
terms of international law. See H. Chiu, supra note 38, 
p. 246.]
50. Ibid., at relevant parts.
51. Regarding the existence of Universal (general) 
international Law between the communist countries and 
capitalist countries, see H. Chiu, supra note 38, pp. 
252, 254-256.
52. Ibid., pp. 256-257.
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law was to use it as a bargaining tool in its diplomatic
c 'i
policy.J
After 1979, following the "open policy" of economic 
reform, the PRC adopted many of the international
business practices and principles of the United States
Contract Law in its private international law.  ^ However, 
the PRC’s attitude towards public international law 
remained unchanged. Yet the PRC's position towards 
expropriation of foreign assets has not been easy to
understand. One PRC jurist Li Haopei stated that public 
international law regards nationalisation as a lawful 
exercise of state power. As to whether or not the
nationalising state must compensate original owners of 
foreign nationality, this is a question of public 
international law. In discussing various opinions with 
respect to this question, Mr Li supported the theory 
which maintains that the nationalising state has no 
obligation to compensate foreign owners of assets if the 
state does not compensate nationals who are owners.
53. One PRC scholar, however, did assert that 
international law is one of the instruments for settling 
international problems. In his view "if this instrument 
is useful to our country, to socialist enterprises, or to 
the peace enterprises of the people of the world, we will 
use it. However, if this instrument is disadvantageous 
to our country, to socialist enterprises, or to the peace 
enterprises of the people of the world, we will not use 
it and should create a new instrument to replace it. 
Today, we have a majority of the old international law 
jurists who still adhere to the purely legalistic view 
and thus they subject themselves to the disposal of 
imperialism". See Chen Ti-chiang, "Refute the Absurd 
Theory Concerning International Law", Renmin Ribao 
(People's Daily), 18 September 1957, cited from H. Chiu, 
supra note 38, pp. 248-249.
54. J. L. deLisle, "Foreign Investment Law", 21 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1986) , p. 281; see also J. A. 
Cohen, "The New Foreign Contract Law", The China Business 
Review, July-August 1985, p. 52.
55. There are three different opinions regarding whether 
the nationalising state should compensate foreign 
nationals. The first theory maintains the compensation 
must be adequate, effective, and prompt. The second 
theory requires partial compensation. The third maintains
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On 11 May 1979, the agreement between the PRC and 
the United States concerning the settlement of claims 
became the compensation precedent for PRC nationalisation 
of foreign assets. To date, the PRC has no special 
legislation regarding the nationalisation or 
expropriation of foreign assets. Nevertheless, there is
usually a detailed standard of compensation for
nationalisation in the PRC's investment protection
c  /r
treaties with foreign countries. In practice, it can be
inferred that the PRC recognises the principles of 
orthodox international law. Whilst the exact attitude of 
the PRC toward the sources of international law is not 
clear, its recognition of treaties and customs as the 
principal sources of international law seems beyond any
C  ~7
doubt. Under such circumstances, the best protection
measure for Taiwanese investment in the PRC is to adopt 
an agreement or a treaty between the two.
5.4 The PRC's Contractual Responsibility towards 
Private Taiwanese Investors
In a sovereign state, there are various ways to 
protect foreign investment. For a foreign investor, the 
standard procedure is always first to apply for an 
Instrument of Approval from the authorities of the state.
that no compensation is needed. The Chinese jurist Li 
Haopei supported the third theory. See J. A. Cohen & H. 
Chiu, supra note 37, pp. 718-720, 722.
56. See L. A. Pinard, "United States Policy Regarding 
Nationalisation of American Investment: The People's
Republic of China's Nationalisation Decree of 1950", 14
California Western International Law Journal (1984), pp. 
149, 181, 182. As for the compensation standard of
China's investment protection treaties, see H. R. Zheng, 
supra note 22, pp. 287-288.
57. See H. Chiu, supra note 38, p. 258; see also H. Chiu, 
The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 3.
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5.4.1 Responsibility of the State
The authority is usually a screening board or 
national investment board. This decides whether an 
investment project can be accepted and under what 
conditions it may be accepted. The Instrument of Approval 
varies and differs between countries. The most common 
situation is that the Instrument of Approval is delivered 
through the State’s administrative order, cabinet 
verdict, or some administrative action. Before the 
approval of such an instrument, there are always formal 
or semi-formal negotiations for an "agreement or 
contract" between the state itself and the private 
foreign investors. Such an instrument includes not only 
detailed assurances and incentives offered to investors 
but also various undertakings and representations 
required of investors. Some countries have even
recognised both instrument and act of approval as an 
"agreement or contract" in terms of their investment 
laws.58
As noted above, the "agreement or contract" is 
created by a sovereign state and a private individual. 
This cannot be described either as a private contract or 
as an international treaty. Such an "agreement or 
contract" shares special features of contract in public
CQ
law, in accordance with the practice m  many countries. * 
However, this is not a pure contract in the nature of 
public law. Since this "agreement or contract" is
58. For example, the Chilean Foreign Investment Promotion 
Law of 1960, Article 25; Panamanian Production 
Development Law of 1957, Article 8, 17, and 23.
59. For example, A. A. Fatouros, supra note 9, p. 204 et 
seq.; see also W. G. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of 
International Law, London: Stevens & Sons, 1964, p. 201 
et esq.; see also E. I. Nwogugu, supra note 7, p. 172, 
note 4.
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neither a contract of private law nor a contract of 
public law or even an international treaty, what then is 
the nature of such "agreement or contract"? As domestic 
private law and orthodox international law are applicable 
only for two parallel legal subjects, there should be a 
third law applicable in turn to the "agreement or 
contract" between a state and a foreign private investor.
In 1956, the United States jurist Philip Carlyl 
Jessup declared a so-called "Transnational Law", as a 
third law order, aside from domestic law and
international law, to be applied to business transactions
6 0between a state and a private person. The legal
sources of such transnational law comprise public 
international law, private international law, public 
domestic law, and private domestic law. According to his 
viewpoint, any domestic or international courts have the 
right to choose a fair and reasonable legal system in 
settling business disputes. The judge should reach a 
just verdict based on a consideration of international 
law, international relations, and domestic law, together 
with his own views. In some arbitration practices, this 
transnational law was found to be the general principle 
of law in settling business disputes.61
60. As for the concepts of transnational law, see Norbert 
Horn and Clive M. Schmitthoff (eds.), The Transnatiional 
Law of International Commercial Transactions, 
Deventer/The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1983, pp. 12-13.
61. See Chin-Lung Chen, Guoji Siren Touzi zhi Falii Wenti 
(Legal Problems of International Private Investment), 
Taipei: Jiaxin Cement Corporation Cultural Foundation,
1976, p. 92. For example, in the arbitration case 
between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and 
the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, the arbitrator Asqquith deemed 
the application of principles rooted in the good sense 
and common practice of civilised nations —  a sort of 
"modern law of nature"; and also in the arbitration case 
between Saudi Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company 
(Aramco), the arbitration court stated that " in so far 
as doubts may remain on the content or on the meaning of 
the agreements of the parties, it is necessary to resort 
to the general principles of law and to apply them in
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When a state breaches its agreement or contract with 
foreign investors, how can responsibility be established? 
According to general principles of law, the legal 
effectiveness of a state's breach of agreement or 
contract should be measured in terms of whether adequate 
reparation for any violations of foreign assets is given. 
An international responsibility arises if the state is in 
breach of its contractual liability. It may even cause 
"international delinquency" if the state's breaching of 
agreement or contract does violate international law. 
The methods of reparation can be either returning the 
wronged party to his previous situation, exact status quo 
ante, or through compensation with a sum of equal
monetary value. The former returns the wronged party to 
the exact status quo ante just as if the unlawful act had
never been committed; and if this is not possible, then a
fair, adequate, and effective money remedy is given in 
time. The money remedy should in principle cover the
entire loss suffered, including prospective profits.62
5.4.2 Limitation of the PRC's Application
Article 7 of the PRC 198 5 FECL stipulates that a 
contract which, pursuant to the provisions of the laws 
and administrative legislation of the State itself is to 
be approved by the State, shall be considered to be 
formed only when the approval is obtained. In the PRC, 
the MOFERT under the State Council has overall authority 
for the examination and approval of foreign investment. 
MOFERT may "entrust" this authority to provincial 
governments, municipalities, or any relevant ministries
order to interpret, and even to supplement, the 
respective rights and obligations of the parties".
62. See Ren-hung Wang, Waiguo Siren Touzi zhi Jianli yu 
Baohu (The Incentives and Protections of Foreign Private 
Investment), Taipei:Law World Monthly, 1975, pp. 195-196.
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or bureaus only if the foreign investment complies with 
two conditions: first, that the total amount of
investment must be within the limit set by the State 
Council and the PRC participants’ source of capital 
ascertained; secondly, that no additional allocations of 
raw materials by the state may be required, and the 
national balance of fuel, power, transportation, and 
foreign trade export quotas must not be affected. The 
procedures of negotiation and approval of such investment 
agreement or contract are complex. Hence, acts of 
approval are usually in the nature of an agreement or 
contract.
However, in a socialist country, the actions of PRC
state enterprises in signing such an investment agreement
or contract are not recognised as having the quality of
sovereignty as a state. The reason is that these state
enterprises are economic organs but not organisations
with state sovereignty. One PRC jurist Yao Meizhen even
maintained that the approval of foreign investment is an
exercise of economic administrative power under the state
itself. As economic organs having legal personality, the
actions of PRC state enterprises approving foreign
investment are not recognised as having any semblance of
6 4"international agreement or contract." As noted above, 
the PRC government's examination and approval of foreign 
investment agreements or contracts is a legitimate
exercise. In Article 5 of the PRC's 1985 FECL, it
stipulates that the PRC law is to be applied in the case
of Chinese-foreign equity joint venture contracts,
Chinese-foreign cooperative venture contracts and
63. For details, see China Investment Guide, Hong Kong: 
China International Economic Consultants Inc., Longman, 
1986, (3rd, ed.), Also see Article 8 of The Regulations
for the Implementation of the EJV Law, which was 
promulgated by the State Council on 20 September 1983.
64. See Yao Meizhen, Guoji Touzi Fa (International 
Investment Law), Wuhan: Wuhan Daxue Chubanshe, 1985, pp. 
344-345.
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contracts for the Chinese-foreign cooperative exploration 
and development of natural resources to be performed 
within the PRC. Therefore, all interpretations, legal 
effectiveness, and disputes arising from the agreements 
or contracts signed between the PRC and the foreign 
investors are derived from and applied by PRC law only.
Once investment has occurred in the PRC, the general 
principles of law or principles of Transnational Law can 
be applied only to matters for which PRC law has not yet
f. f. t #
made provision. Under such circumstances, foreign
investors including Taiwanese enterprises in the PRC feel 
that their agreement or contract rights can be protected 
only to a limited extent.
5.5 Significance of the PRC Protection for 
Taiwanese Investors
Since 1978, many PRC national and local laws and 
regulations have been promulgated in order to provide a 
more stable, predictable business environment for both 
domestic and foreign investors. Here the foreign 
investors include, of course, the overseas Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan enterprises.
5.5.1 The Policies and Measures
PRC government officials have spared no effort to
assure these foreign investors that no major policy
reversal lies ahead. The pattern of the PRC's politics,
policy and law-making since 1978 provides substantial
67grounds for giving credence to their assertions.
65. Ibid.
66. See Article 5, FECL.
67. See J. L. deLisle, supra note 54, p. 282.
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Following the introduction of the modernisation movement 
in 1978, the PRC began to attract Taiwanese investment by- 
indicating that all Taiwanese investment in the PRC would
fi Qreceive preferential treatment.
In addition to various economic laws and regulations 
applicable to foreign investors, the PRC particularly 
promulgated special Provisions on Encouraging Taiwanese 
Investment (Taiwan Investment Provisions, or TIP) in 1988 
and Law on the Protection of Taiwan Compatriots' 
Investment (Taiwan Investment Law, or TIL) in 1994. 
The TIP has not provided sufficient protection. A prime 
reason is that these provisions as administrative orders 
are less binding than a law, meaning Taiwanese investors 
have less assurance of enforcement. The TIL, admittedly, 
is enacted in response to demands by Taiwanese investors 
for better protection. However, such a legislation will 
only be as good as any of PRC laws. It cannot possibly 
have the binding effect provided by bilaterally signed 
investment guarantees. Besides, both TIP and TIL affirm 
that the general body of foreign economic legislation of 
the PRC applies to Taiwanese investors in their business 
dealings with parties in the PRC.
Since the above stated laws and regulations are 
couched in broad, ambiguous and sometimes conflicting 
terms, are left local or central implementing agencies 
much scope for interpretation and leads to inconsistent 
treatment. In such an environment, with new laws and 
regulations appearing one after another to govern
68. See Yan Zong-da, Liang'an Jingmao Guanxi yu Woguo de 
Dalu Jiangmao Zhengce (Cross-Strait Commercial Relations 
and Our Mainland Commercial Policy), Taipei: China 
Strategic Studies Journal, Summer 1990, P. 45.
69. See China Economic News (No. 11), 21 March 1994, pp. 
6-7. The TIL was adopted by the Sixth Sessiion of the 
Standing Committee of the eighth National People's 
Congress on 5 March 1994. There are fifteen articles of 
this new legislation. See an English translation of the 
Law on Appendix III.
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previously unregulated sets of circumstances, the fear of 
retroactive legislation effectively amending the approved 
contractual terms and adversely affecting the interests 
of the foreign party has caused concern among Taiwanese 
investors.
Two examples are given by way of illustration. The 
first one is Article 40 of the PRC's 1985 FECL, which 
provides desirable protection to certain kinds . of 
investors against adverse changes in law after their 
contract has been approved. It is vague in content and
only effective where the contract specifically addresses
7 0 •the matters in question. The second example is Article
2 0 of the TIP and Article 14 of the TIL, which the former
provides that the arbitration may only take place
pursuant to agreement either on the mainland or in Hong
Kong but not in a third venue; and the latter does not
clearly stipulate whether the arbitration can be venued
abroad (neither in Hong Kong nor in a third country) .
This discrimination seems to be unfair and unjust for
Taiwanese investors.
It is plain to see that PRC's general approach to
economic relations with Taiwan is characterised by 
greater openness, whether in visits or in exchange of 
goods and services. It has emphasised the need for
parity for the flow of goods and services as well as
personnel. As far as investment is concerned, the PRC's 
policy of encouragement is evident. The preferential
measures introduced by the central government are often 
supplemented by additional or more favourable treatment 
for Taiwanese investors. However, these preferential 
policies mask certain special difficulties encountered by 
Taiwanese businesses in the PRC.
70. See W. G. Friedmann, O. J. Lissitzyn, and R. C. Pugh, 
supra note 35, p. 745.
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First, some of the restrictions on trade, such as 
prohibition of unacceptable markings of national origin 
or flag, are irritants, although similar restrictions are 
to be found in other countries without diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. Secondly, inasmuch as the PRC
decisions to import and export are not always determined 
by market forces, there is a high degree of fluctuation 
in demand and supply. Thirdly, there has also been 
administrative wavering as to whether imports from Taiwan 
should be treated as domestic or foreign, and whether 
tariffs are applicable. Some of the special preferences, 
moreover, raise questions of compatibility with the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles 
inasmuch as both the PRC and Taiwan have applied for
7 1membership of the organisation. The preferential
treatment of Taiwanese investment in the PRC further
raises questions of deviations from the principle of 
national treatment as well as discrimination against 
domestic competitors. Admittedly, some of the measures 
are introduced m  response to investor demands. Zones 
especially reserved for Taiwan investors have, therefore, 
been set up in many localities. Some of them are
reminiscent of concessions in developing countries in 
earlier years.
In evaluating preferential arrangements, a 
distinction has to be made as to whether important 
principles are involved. For example, differential tax 
rates applied to investors of different origin constitute 
clear discrimination, but zones reserved for Taiwanese 
investors may be justified as contractual arrangements,
while the burden of proof of discrimination in
71. See Frances Williams, "China and Taiwan Membership 
Drive Tests GATT Loyalties", The Financial Times, 17 
February 1992, p. 4.
72. For example, the Formosa Plastics Group, the largest 
private industrial concern in Taiwan, announced in 1990 
interest in investing in Fujian province. See Zhongyang 
Rihao, (Taipei: Central Daily News), 22 July 1990, p. 3.
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streamlining administrative procedures probably rests 
with the accuser.
5.5.2 The Law
The TIL of 1994 is so couched as to include specific
reference to Taiwan investors only, to protect their
safety and interests, and to allow them to use investment
returns to make new investments. There are fifteen
articles of this Law which apply to Taiwanese
investments, and in circumstances where the law does not
provide a stipulation, they shall be enforced according
to other state laws and administrative rules governing
7 3Taiwanese investments.
This new legislation is intended to upgrade and 
amplify the TIP of 1988 which has been critised by 
Taiwanese investors as not having done enough to protect 
their interests in the PRC. It is true to say that the 
TIP, as administrative orders, is less binding than the 
TIL. However, it is still doubtful that the TIL could 
provide fair and adequate assurances effective enough to 
satisfy Taiwanese investors in the PRC. Below are some 
areas which are of most concern to Taiwanese investors.
A. Nationalisation and Expropriation
The Law stipulates that the State shall not 
nationalise or expropriate the investment of Taiwanese 
investors. Under special circumstances, according to the 
need of public interest, Taiwanese investment could be 
expropriated according to legal procedure with due 
remuneration.74 However, the Law makes no mention of the 
manner in which compensation will be calculated or paid.
73. Art. 2, supra note 69.
74. Art. 4, ibid.
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According to many PRC legal experts' opinions, no
existing PRC laws provide concrete rules for compensating
7 6Taiwanese investors m  such circumstances.
B. Business Dispute Resolution
Unlike the TIP, the TIL does not stipulate clearly 
an arbitration venue to be used for business disputes
7 fconcerning Taiwanese investment in the PRC. The TIP has 
been criticised by Taiwanese investors since it 
prescribes that arbitration may only take place pursuant 
to agreement either in the PRC or in Hong Kong (but not 
in a third venue) . The TIL is even worse and more 
unreasonable in prescribing no arbitration place, which 
means the arbitration can be held only in the PRC and may 
possibly exclude Hong Kong. Like foreign investors, 
Taiwanese investors always believe their interests can be 
protected only if disputes are settled by third parties, 
such as in countries of the West.
Given the absence of diplomatic protection, 
Taiwanese investors cannot claim from the PRC non- 
discriminatory treatment in order to exclude non­
commercial risks. Without any restriction of the general 
principles of international law, it seems admittedly that 
the PRC can enact discriminatory legislation for 
Taiwanese enterprises at any time. Therefore, at 
present, the PRC's unilateral policies and measures, or 
even the TIL, have little significance for Taiwanese 
enterprises. Taiwanese investors can only rely on their 
own protection measures.
75. The author was informed of this in Beijing and 
Shanghai in May 1994 while carrying out interviews in the 
PRC.
76. Art. 14, supra note 69.
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5.6 Protection Measures for Taiwanese 
Enterprises to Adopt
Because of the non-recognition relationship, 
possible non-commercial risks of trade and investment 
exist between Taiwan and the PRC. According to 
international practice, trade protection measures 
comprise trade agreements and export insurance systems 
while investment protection measures comprise investment 
agreements, diplomatic protection, and investment 
insurance systems. On the whole, diplomatic protection 
has played a large part in foreign investment but not 
foreign trade.
However, in my view, diplomatic protection can also 
be given if the non-commercial risks were unavoidable. 
This function should be taken for granted in the light of 
the nature of diplomatic protection. Since there has 
been no trade or investment protection agreement, both 
diplomatic protection and an export insurance system are 
the only options for protecting the interests of 
Taiwanese enterprises in dealing with parties of the PRC.
5.6.1 Diplomatic Protection of Taiwan Government
A. Significance of Diplomatic Protection
According to the doctrines of orthodox international
law, a delinquent state is responsible for making
reparations or giving satisfaction for the wrong-doing to
the injured state and its individual nationals or
77entities of that nationality. Either the state or the 
individual national or entity is entitled to make 
international claims for the unlawful delinquency. When 
the capital importing state violates any of the
77. Supra note 70.
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substantive principles of international law, the capital 
exporting state can claim remedies through diplomatic 
protection.
The term diplomatic protection is loose and ill- 
defined. It can denote either diplomatic assistance, 
given by a consulate or an embassy to its nationals, or 
protection through diplomatic channels. This may include 
lodging a protest or initiating a legal action before an 
international court or arbitration tribunal. In an even 
wider sense, it may include the use of economic or
7 0  , . , ,
military coercion. Strictly speaking, diplomatic
protection can be exercised only when the legal interests 
of the individual national or entity of a state are 
violated by another state. Under such circumstances, the 
injured state can then make an international claim 
against such delinquent state. Only the state itself is 
entitled to the diplomatic protection. The Permanent 
Court of International Justice maintained that the state 
itself is the sole claimant on behalf of its individual
7Qnational or entity to sue in the court. * A state cannot 
be deprived of the right to make an international claim 
even if a Calvo Clause is being used. According to
international law, a clause in a private agreement cannot 
deprive the state from giving diplomatic protection to
7 Rits individual nationals or entities.
International law imposes no duty on a state to
pursue a claim based on the injury caused by a foreign
78. See R. Y. Dong, supra note 4, p. 398.
79. PCIJ, Series A. No. 2 (1924), p. 12.
78. The Calvo Clause is a clause named after the 
Argentinian jurist who devised it. It is frequently used 
by Latin-American governments when making concession 
contracts with aliens, that the alien agrees not to seek 
the diplomatic protection of his own state and submits 
matters arising from the concession to the local 
jurisdiction. For further studies, see R. Y. Dong, supra 
note 4, pp. 192-208.
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state to one of the former's individual nationals or
entities. The injured individual national or entity has
no legally enforceable right to compel his government to
espouse his claim. Nevertheless, the state can exercise 
an unfettered discretion in determining when and how the 
claim will be presented and pressed, or withdrawn or
compromised. Even if payment is made as a remedy, the 
state has complete control over the fund paid, and which 
is held by it. Except for an executive agreement, the 
claimant government enjoys exclusive control over the 
handling and disposition of the payment of sums in
O 1
remedy.
B. Limitations on the Exercise of the Right of 
Diplomatic Protection for Taiwan
In the absence of a recognition relationship, how 
can the Taiwanese government make international claims 
against the PRC government? Would the exercise of
diplomatic protection be limited because of the non­
recognition relationship? The mutual non-recognition 
relationship between the PRC and the United States before 
1979 is a vivid illustration. Only after 1979, the
problem of PRC's nationalisation of United States 
national assets in the PRC in 1950 was finally and
Q 9
reasonably solved.
Under international law, there are two theories
regarding the legal significance of recognition. The
81. Ibid., p. 399; also see W. G. Friedmann, O. J. 
Lissitzyn, and R. C. Pugh, supra note 35, pp. 766-767; 
see also D. P. O'Connell, supra note 21, vol. 2, pp. 
1114-1115.
82. See L. A. Pinard, "United States Policy Regarding 
Nationalization of American Investment: The People's
Republic of China's Nationalization Decree of 1950", 14
California Western International Law Journal (1984), pp. 
169-170.
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first one is a declaratory theory and the other one is a 
constitutive theory. The declaratory theory holds that 
the issue of recognition can be denied while entering 
into treaty engagements with a new entity. The new 
entity is de facto a subject of international law. In 
contrast, the constitutive explanation is that the issue 
of recognition cannot be denied. Article 3 of the
Convention of Rights and Duties of States supports the
O O
declaratory theory. However, every state can have its 
own interpretation regarding the issue of recognition.
In discussing the effect of recognition on 
international liability, D. P. O'Connell said:
Recognition or non-recognition leaves untouched the 
liability as well as the rights of the state itself, 
though enforcement measures may have to await the 
appearance of a recognized government. Also as we 
have seen, a government may commit the State as a 
whole to liability towards a state withholding 
recognition of it, for non-recognition can never 
amount to carte blanche to cause injury to foreign 
nationals.84
This announcement seems to be supporting the above 
stated declaratory theory. On the contrary, L. A. Pinard 
took the view that a state is not required by 
international law to recognize an entity as a state or 
regime as the government of a state. On the basis of his 
theory, it seems that the constitutive theory gained 
support when it was maintained that the PRC had no right 
to claim its properties in the United States before 1979, 
due to a lack of de jure recognition between the two.85
83. Ibid., p. 171. See also W. G. Friedmann, 0. J.
Lisstzyh, and R. C. Pugh, supra note 35, pp. 168-169.
84. See D. P. O'Connell, supra note 21, Vol. 1, p. 179.
85. See Section 99 (1) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States; and see also 
L. A. Pinard, supra note 82, pp. 171-172.
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Under the declaratory theory, the Taiwanese 
government is entitled to have international claims 
against the PRC but these claims can only be exercised 
under the relationship of mutual recognition. On the 
other hand, in the eyes of the constitutive theory, the 
Taiwanese government is not entitled to have its 
international claims against the PRC without a 
relationship of mutual recognition. According to either 
declaratory or constitutive theory, the recognition of a 
state or government is retroactive to the commencement of 
the activities of the authority recognised. Therefore, 
the right of the Taiwanese government to international 
claims on the PRC is retroactive only after mutual 
recognition. Until then, such diplomatic protection is 
limited in its application to Taiwanese enterprises in 
the PRC.
C. Significance of the Right of Diplomatic 
Protection for Taiwanese Businesses 
in the PRC
The right of diplomatic protection has been 
developed as a principle of international law over the 
years. Due to the difficulties emerging in law or 
diplomatic politics, the protection function of this
Q £
right has not been seen to be fairly exercised. 
However, the significance of diplomatic protection is
07
still greatly valued under international law. In the
86. For opinions of various jurists, for example, see T.
H. Moran, "Transnational Strategies of Protection and 
Defence by Multinational Corporations: Spreading the Risk 
and Raising the Cost for Nationalization in Natural 
Resources", 27 International Organization (1973), p. 273; 
see also M. Bourquin, "Arbitration and Economic 
Development Agreements", Selected Readings on Protection 
by Law of Private Foreign Investments, New York: Matthew 
Bender & Co., 1973, p. 106.
87. See R. B. Lillich, "The Diplomatic Protection of 
Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of
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present situation in trading with and investing in the 
PRC, Taiwan has always claimed to be a part of divided 
China but not of the PRC. Until mutual recognition 
exists between the two, Taiwanese businesses cannot get 
prompt, adequate, and effective protection via the 
functioning of diplomatic protection.
5.6.2 Initiating Export Insurance Protection for 
Taiwanese Businesses
A. Significance and Development of Export 
Insurance Protection
Export insurance first developed as a means of 
spreading the huge credit and non-business risks on 
businesses for trade exports at the end of nineteenth 
century in the United Kingdom. In the practice of 
international trade and investment, there have been two 
insurance schemes providing for such credit or non­
business risks. The first one is marine insurance on 
trade export in delivery. The second one is export
00 .
insurance on trade export m  payment. 0 In addition to 
many various private insurance companies, the United 
Kingdom even created a government organ named "Export 
Credits Guarantee Department" which was first set up in 
1919 to provide protection for export trade. Many other 
European countries followed the United Kingdom in 
establishing export insurance of a similar protective 
nature. The United States scheme was handled by the
International Law Under Attack", 69 The American Journal 
of International Law (1975), p. 3 64.
88. See Chun-ying Huang, Shijie Zhuyao Suchu Baoxianzhidu 
zhi Bijiaoyanjiu (The Comparison and Research of Major 
Insurance Systems in the World), Taipei: Import-Export
Bank of the Republic of China, 1983, p. 2.
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Export-Import Bank of the United States and the Foreign
• • 8 9Credit Insurance Association formed m  1961.
The concept of investment insurance originated in 
the investment guaranty programme which was regulated by 
the 194 8 Economic Cooperation Act of the United States. 
The main purpose of this programme has been to guarantee 
the protection of transfer risks by encouraging United
q Q ,
States nationals to invest m  Europe. Following the 
Foreign Assistance Act in 1961, the United States 
government established the "Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation" (OPIC) by amending the Act in 1969 to 
regulate matters of investment insurance and investment
q i
guaranty program under OPIC. Up to 1971, eleven
countries had followed the United States in establishing 
a similar investment guarantee programme by offering
Q 0investment insurance. To date, many more countries have 
adopted this insurance protection scheme for their 
overseas investment activities.
Generally speaking, overseas investment insurance 
has been included in the overall functions of export 
insurance by many countries of the world, except for the
89. Ibid. 16-18; also see Foreign Credit Insurance 
Association (FCIA.), Export Credit Insurance: the
Comparative Edge, USA: FCIA Press., 1978, p. 3.
90. See Chin-lung Chen, supra note 61, p. 147.
91. For details of the development of the United States 
Investment Guaranty Program, see Marina von Newmann
Whitman, Government Risk-Sharing in Foreign Investment, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 69-
120; see also R. B. Lillich, The Protection of Foreign 
Investment: Six Procedural Studies, New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1965, pp. 148-152. As for the
introduction of the United States Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC), see OPIC, An Introduction
to OPIC, Washington, D.C.: OPIC, 1973.
92. See S. D. Metzger, "Nationality of Corporate 
Investment Under Investment Guaranty Schemes: The 
Relevance of Barcelona Traction", 65 The American Journal 
of International Law (1971), p. 535.
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Q 9United States and Germany. In trading with and 
investing in various overseas countries, Taiwan, like 
many other countries, initiated such a protection scheme 
for export insurance through its Export-Import Bank of 
the Republic of China. However, this scheme runs only 
for trade and not investment. Even though Taiwan was not 
included in the "Treaty of the Multinational Investment
Q dGuaranty Agency" of 1988, Taiwan does indeed need such 
an insurance protection measure for its overseas 
investment.
B. Problems of Initiating Export Insurance by 
Taiwanese Enterprises
In various studies concerning private investment in 
developing countries before the 1970s, the risk of 
expropriation or nationalisation consistently ranked 
highest in the category of risks which deter foreign 
investment. After the 1970s, such anxieties have rarely 
materialised in developing countries due to the threat of 
either being isolated in the international community or 
through a domestic economic recession. However, the 
stealthy taking of expropriation measures still continues
Q Rto be seen m  some developing countries. The non­
commercial risks of such stealthy expropriation have 
become the main difficulties of insurance guaranties for 
overseas investment. If Taiwan initiates such an export 
insurance scheme for its overseas investment, the
93. Examples are Article 27-33 of the Australia Export 
Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1974, Article 1 and 
14 of the Japan Export Insurance Act- 1981, the United 
Kingdom Export Guarantees and Overseas Investment Act 
1978, and so on. See Chun-yin Huang, supra note 88, pp. 
137-138.
94. See I. Shihate, Multinational Investment Guaranty 
Agency and Foreign Investment (1988), pp. 31-55.
95. See R. C. Pugh, supra note 4, p. 302; see also J. E. 
S. Fawcett, supra note 21, p. 3 56; see also E. I. 
Nwogugu, supra note 7, p. 23.
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creeping taking of expropriation will emerge as a most 
serious problem in the contents of insurance contract.
The other important issue is related to the right of 
subrogation. Under the schemes of export insurance in 
Taiwan, the insurers should be entitled to all rights and 
remedies of the assured in respect of the subject matter 
and the assured must do- nothing which might prejudice the 
right of subrogation. In other words, if an assured is 
compensated for his loss by the insurers, the latter are 
entitled to stand in the assured's place and exercise all 
rights competent to him to recover from the party who 
caused the loss. However, the right of subrogation has 
never been exercised, since Taiwan and the PRC do not 
recognise each other. Even in trade activities, the 
Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China is still not 
entitled to the right of subrogation in the PRC until 
mutual recognition exists between the two.
The right of subrogation may only be exercised in
Q filimited circumstances. How can Taiwanese enterprises, 
as creditors, protect such a right of subrogation in the 
PRC? The author believes that the method of exercising 
the right of diplomatic protection discussed earlier can 
be followed under the same circumstances. In other 
words, the Taiwanese government should espouse the 
creditors' right of subrogation and then claim the 
remedies from the PRC when mutual recognition is 
realised.
5.6.3 Legalising the Commercial Activities of 
Taiwanese Businesses in the PRC
Although the Taiwanese government has still not yet 
been recognised by the PRC, the Taiwanese government
96. See D. P. O'Connell, supra note 21, Vol. 1, p. 187.
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promulgated in July 1992 a special law, called the
"Statute Governing Relations Between People of the Areas
of Taiwan and Mainland China" (Taiwan's Mainland
Relations Statute, or TMRS). This is designed to address
97the entirety of private Taiwan-PRC relations. On the 
issues of trade and investment, TMRS is by far the most 
comprehensive primary source of legal authority to direct 
any economic contacts across the Taiwan Straits and to 
resolve any conflicts that might result from such 
interaction.
As a Taiwan interim regulation dealing with trade 
and investment in the PRC, TRMS affirms the government's 
liberalised attitude by essentially legalising economic 
activities between the two. Article 3 5 allows Taiwan 
persons and organisations to engage in investment, 
technical cooperation, trade and other commercial 
activities with PRC persons and organisations with the
98permission of the organ-in-charge. To approve direct 
cross-Straits commerce, Article 95 requires the organ-in- 
charge to first obtain a resolution from the Legislative 
Yuan which is equivalent to Parliament. However, Article 
95 provides that failure by the Legislative Yuan to come 
to a resolution within one month during the time it is in
99session shall be deemed as consent.
97. The TMRS, see note 3 7 of Chapter 1.
98. Ibid., Article 3 5 provides in part:
People, legal persons, groups or other organizations 
of the Area of Taiwan may not engage in investment or 
technical cooperation in the Area of Mainland China nor 
engage in trade or other commercial activities with any 
person, legal person, group or other organization of the 
Area of Mainland China without permission from the organ- 
in-charge.
99. Ibid., Article 95 provides:
Before the implementation of direct commerce or 
transportation between the Area of Taiwan and the Area of 
Mainland China or before permitting people from the Area 
of Mainland China to work in the Area of Taiwan, the 
organ-in-charge shall obtain a resolution within one
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Nevertheless, TMRS simply states the Taiwanese
government's new policy towards the PRC and does not
mention how governmental regulations can protect 
Taiwanese enterprises and enhance the efficiency of 
bilateral economic relations.
5.7 Difficulties of Legal Reform in the PRC
When Deng Xiaoping initiated the legal reforms in 
late 1979, he placed greater emphasis on economic
development and tried to play down the role of the 
party.100 However, since the mid-1980s, many PRC lawyers 
have called for radical legal reforms in pursuing 
economic development.101 There have been, and still are, 
considerable difficulties in carrying out meaningful
legal reforms.
Laws that govern the rights and obligations of 
parties to a contract are an important source of 
protection in economic interaction. However, numerous 
problems with the PRC legal system, ranging from the laws 
themselves to the enforcement mechanism, give rise a 
cause for concern in the conduct of commercial activities 
with PRC enterprises.
month during the time it is in session or it shall be 
deemed a consent.
100. The 1982 Constitution represented significant 
progress in the legal development of the PRC. In it,
Deng Xiaoping strengthened the role Of the NPC vis-a-vis 
the Communist Party in matters of law making. See C. A. 
Johnson, "The 1982 Constitution of the PRC: One Small 
Step for Legal Development", 2 Journal of Chinese 
Studies, No. 1 (April 1985), pp. 87-93.
101. See, for example, Wang Jiafu, Liu Hannian and Li 
Buyun, "Lun Fazhi Gaige" (On Legal Reforms), Faxue Yanjiu 
(Beijing: Study of Jurisprudence), No. 2, 1989, pp. 1-9.
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5.7.1 Lack of Legal Protection
First, it must be noted that the PRC legal system is 
still in a fairly primitive state of development. With 
respect to civil law, given the Communist rejection of 
private ownership of property, it was not until 1980 that 
the Economic Contract Law was promulgated and not until
1 0 71985 that an Inheritance Law came into existence. 
These two are examples of the mass of legislation and 
administrative regulations that emerged in the 1980s, in 
the midst of PRC's desperate attempt to bring some order 
to socialist society and great certainty to commerce and 
investment.
However, some are poorly thought-out and hence are 
of no practical value even when promulgated, while others 
have simply remained in draft form. Therefore, even if 
Taiwanese enterprises are prepared to abide by PRC laws, 
achieving a clear and fair resolution under these in the 
event of a dispute may be very difficult, if not 
impossible.
According to international practice in civil 
disputes, the normal case should be that where there is 
no law on the civil dispute, legal tradition governs, 
and, where there is no legal tradition, legal reasoning 
shall be employed. In Article 6 of the PRC 1986 GPCL103, 
it states in contrast that all civil activities must 
conform to law and where there is no law on the dispute, 
that state policy governs. Thus, judgements of the PRC 
courts are just as likely to be the creations of
102. Zhonggong Fayuan Minshi Panjue zhi Chengren yu 
Zhixing Wenti (The Problems of recognition and
enforcement of the Civil Verdicts of the PRC Courts), 134 
Faxue Congkan (China Law Journal), Taipei: Faxue Congkan
Press, April 1989, p. 150.
103. GPCL, supra note 24.
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political winds and judicial discretion as of law and 
legal reasoning.104
Furthermore, law has been used in the PRC as a
political tool for the Communist Party to implement its
policies and to promote its platforms. The Supreme
People's Court, the State Council, and even the Public
Security Bureau can issue "judicial orders" that
instantaneously have the force of law in the PRC. Given
that PRC laws are secretive, discretionary, political and
of a "class nature", they are naturally difficult to
interpret and utilise in the absence of a clear
insunderstanding of PRC politics. Indeed, separation of
powers, institutionalised law-making and an independent 
judiciary are not yet ingrained in the PRC political and 
legal systems.
5.7.2. Prospects of Legal Protection
Since there is a clear lack of fair and adequate 
legal protection, Taiwanese businesses can only seek 
their own government's protection measures while doing 
trade with or investment in the PRC. However, under the 
present circumstances of mutual non-recognition, the 
Taiwanese government cannot adopt the right of diplomatic 
protection for its businesses' trade and investment in 
the PRC. A better option is to initiate an export 
insurance scheme not only for trade but also for 
investment.
104. Ibid.
105. See "Kaifang Tanqin Yansheng de Liangan Falii Wenti 
Zuotan" (The Panel Talk on the Laws that have Emerged 
Across the Taiwan Straits after the Liberalization of 
Visitations by Taiwan Residents of Relatives in Mainland 
China), 22 Zhongguo Dalu (Mainland China), Taipei: 
National Chengchi University Press, 1989, pp. 2 3-31.
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As discussed previously, the Export-Import Bank of 
the Republic of China is still Taiwan's sole insurer
dealing with export insurance of overseas trade. To date, 
this sole insurer has not been allowed by the government
to handle export insurance business for Taiwan
businesses' trade and investment in the PRC. Even if it 
were allowed, that Bank should still consider whether it 
has the ability to indemnify for export insurance. Like 
the right of diplomatic protection, it seems that 
protection measures for export insurance can only be 
initiated when there is mutual recognition.
5.8 Conclusions
To sum up, the protection measures available for
Taiwanese businesses to adopt are all limited due to the 
present political situation of mutual non-recognition. 
Last but not least, it is anticipated that protection 
measures for Taiwanese businesses could act as a similar 
guaranty or warranty if it were workable, like a trade 
and investment agreement or treaty between Taiwan and the 
PRC. The PRC itself has extended such legal guarantees 
by providing assurances effective enough to satisfy 
foreign businesses since the early 1980s. The principal 
objective is to cover non-commercial risk, such as loss 
through foreign exchange control and confiscation, and to 
provide for reciprocal non-discriminatory treatment.
However, a trade and investment agreement or treaty 
between Taiwan and the PRC involves many and varied 
political and diplomatic factors. Chief among these 
factors is that a Taiwan-PRC trade and investment 
agreement or treaty, like any other bilateral pact, is 
something that can exist only between countries with 
equal sovereignty. The PRC has been unwilling to adopt 
such a measure towards Taiwan. Furthermore, the legal
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problems encountered within such a measure are also 
highly complex.
It seems that the process of mending relations 
between Taiwan and the PRC will be slow and painstaking. 
Nevertheless, important overtures have been made by both 
sides to find methods of legal protection for Taiwanese 
trade and investment in the PRC. Continuing these 
efforts will enhance the possibility of an emerging trade 
and investment agreement or treaty, at least on a non­
governmental basis, between the two. For the present, it 
is not clear whether either Taiwan or the PRC quite knows 
how to go about it.
238
CHAPTER SIX
LEGAL SOLUTIONS FOR SETTLING DISPUTES INVOLVING 
TAIWANESE TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE PRC
Taiwanese trade and investment with the PRC can be 
viewed as a form of East-West Trade.1 The problem of how 
to resolve disputes has been a vital issue since the 
development of East-West trade reduced much of the 
political tension during the Cold War.
In the West, arbitration has a definite competitive 
edge against its main rival of litigation in the courts. 
Because of its private and consensual character, 
arbitration is more acceptable than litigation. However, 
conciliation or mediation is held to be more effective 
than arbitration in reaching a mutually acceptable
settlement. The prevention of confrontation in the first 
place is more admired than conciliation or mediation in 
its effect on the outcome when resolving business 
disputes. In the East, however, foreign trade and 
investment activities have been recognised as acts jure 
imperii but not acts jure gestionis, and therefore these 
business disputes have always been settled in arbitration 
tribunals. National courts are not suitable for the 
settlement of East-West business disputes, because of a 
mutual suspicion of prejudice and widely divergent
concepts of business and law. In the absence of treaties 
that specifically exclude regular courts from 
adjudication in this area, the contracting parties should 
invariably seek to settle their differences by
arbitration. As regards East-West trade dispute
1. S. Pisar, Coexistence and Commerce, New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 1970, p. 381.
2. C. M. Schmitthoff, Export Trade: The Law and Practice 
of International Trade, London: Stevens & Sons, 1980, p. 
411.
3. S. Pisar, supra note 1, p. 494-495.
239
resolution, it seems that arbitration has been the rule, 
and that litigation has been the exception.
Since 1949, the PRC has not been inclined to rely on 
the formal system of People's Courts for dispute 
settlement in either internal or external trade. This 
does not mean that the PRC lacks jurisdiction in its 
first Constitution of 1954 and its organic law of the 
People's Courts (which are enacted in pursuance of the 
Constitution): both confer on the People's Courts a very 
wide jurisdiction in civil as well as criminal matters.4 
However, the PRC has commenced development of the 
economic tribunals in the People's Courts at various 
levels following the introduction of its "Open Policy" in 
1979. The mere development of such People's Courts is 
another step by the PRC towards a western-style legal 
system and a further indication that the PRC may slowly
c
be losing its collective dread of litigation.
The PRC established its arbitration institutions in 
the 1950s on the basis of the model provided by the 
former Soviet Union.6 Its foreign trade has been based 
on state monopoly, economic planning and the intervention 
of the Party. These are the characteristics of the
4. A. R. Dicks, "The People's Republic of China", East- 
West Business Transactions, in R. Starr (ed.), New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1974, pp. 428-429; S. L. Ellis & L. 
Shea, "Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement in the 
People's Republic of China", 6 The International Trade 
Law Journal (1981), p. 175; see also J. P. Stevens, "The 
New Foreign Contract Law in China", 18 Law and Policy in 
International Business (1986), p. 468.
5. J K. Lockett, "Dispute Settlement in the People's 
Republic of China: The Developing Role of Arbitration in 
Foreign Trade and Maritime Disputes", 16 The George 
Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 
(1982), pp. 265-266.
6. See A. R. Dicks, supra note 4, p. 4 29; and P. K. Chew, 
"A Procedural and Substantive Analysis of the fairness of 
Chinese and Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration", 21 Texas 
International Law Journal (1986), p. 292.
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former Soviet model for settling foreign business 
disputes. However, the PRC has also developed its own 
methods for settling foreign business disputes. These 
methods are often classfied as: first, friendly
consultation (youhao xieshang); secondly, mediation 
(tiaojie); thirdly, arbitration (zhongcai); and finally,
7 . .litigation (susong) . At present, disputes from Taiwan-
related (hereinafter, "shetai") economic cases in the PRC 
are resolved through the PRC's own internal system of 
these above four methods. For Taiwan, the PRC dispute 
resolution system, its practices and procedures for 
foreign trade and investment are too vital to be ignored.
To date, Taiwan and the PRC have not yet reached 
consensus on how to settle business disputes between 
parties from the two jurisdictions. Although friendly 
consultation and mediation are both informal, they have 
been treated as two effective methods in settling 
"shetai" business disputes in the PRC. Nevertheless,
these two methods of dispute resolution do not carry much 
legal significance and therefore this chapter will focus 
specifically on the arbitration and litigation methods.
7. According to Art. 37 and 38 of the 1985 Foreign 
Economic Contract Law of the PRC, the dispute settlement 
procedures include consultation, mediation, arbitration 
and judicial proceedings, with an emphasis on 
consultation and mediation. Regarding the friendly 
consultation or negotiation (youhao xieshang), which is 
referred as an informal method of disputes resolution in 
the PRC. As for mediation (tiaojie) , also known as 
(tiaoting) or (tiaochu), is also referred as an informal 
method of disputes resolution in the PRC. This mechanism 
for handling civil and economic disputes is officially 
designated "conciliation" or "mediation" in English. For 
further studies, see Michael Palmer, "The Revival of 
Mediation in the People's Republic of China", in W. E. 
Butler (ed.), Year-book on Socialist Legal System 1987, 
New York: Transnational Publishers, 1988, pp. 219-276,
and see also Ren Jianxin, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo de 
Tiaojie, Zhongcai, he Susong" (Mediation, Arbitration, 
and Litigation in the People's Republic of China), Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan Gongbao (Gazette of the Supreme People's 
Court), No. 2, 1987, published on 20 June 1988.
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6.1 The Role of Law in Business Disputes Settlement in 
the PRC - Legal Solutions and Limitations
During the long period of the Cold War, experience 
proved that the development of foreign trade and 
investment was a path to political reconciliation, and a 
means of reducing tensions between East and West. Legal 
method plays a major role in the operation of 
international business transactions. Obviously, business 
disputes will take different forms depending on the 
nature of the commercial interests at stake, but there 
are really four broad options for dealing with them. 
These are: conciliation, mediation, arbitration and
litigation. In the field of East-West trade,
conciliation and mediation methods were used with much
Qexperience and skill by the East, especially by the PRC. 
The PRC has had four methods of resolving disputes in 
turn and these are consultation, conciliation/mediation, 
arbitration and litigation. However, the last two
methods of dispute settlement have recently become more 
highly valued in terms of their effect on the outcome.
8. See the speech on the settlement of disputes in 
international trade by Lord Wilberforce, Chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the International Law Association, 
delivered at the Judges Training College in Taiwan on 14 
November 1984, reprinted in Ya-Ou Pinglun (Euroasia 
Review) (London: Euroasia Review Press, 1985), vol. 23, 
pp. 87-102.
9. Conciliation is a process by which the parties to a 
dispute are helped by a neutral and independent third 
party who may be either an official by the State or a 
private person, to reach a mutually acceptable 
settlement. Mediation involves a further step and the 
mediator not only conciliates but make his own 
recommendations. The author was informed that the 
function of conciliation had been included into mediation 
in the PRC during fieldwork to the PRC in May 1992. See 
also Ren Jianxin, President of the Supreme People's 
Court, "Mediation, Conciliation, Arbitration, and 
Litigation in the PRC", International Business Lawyer, 
Vol. 15, No. 9 (1987), p. 397.
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Through conciliation or mediation, the contracting 
parties negotiate amicably outside the law and reach a 
compromise. In arbitration, one or a number of
arbitrators are selected by the contracting parties to 
follow appropriate arbitral procedure and make an award 
according to law, business practice or custom. In 
litigation, the contracting parties go to the courts to 
receive a court decision. In international business 
transactions, arbitration is generally accepted by 
businesses of both East and West. Conciliation or 
mediation is an extra-judicial method of settlement, 
whereas litigation is purely by law. Arbitration is 
however an in-between method and is generally influenced 
by law.
The PRC has a distinct feature in its legal culture, 
a very strong aversion to public confrontation and 
adversarial conflicts which result in a clear winner and 
a clear loser. Hence, for PRC parties litigation is
distasteful and conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
are preferred since public procedures are not involved. 
This is not to say however that confrontation may not 
have its uses. Sometimes the threat of litigation 
proceedings (or actually starting proceedings) can be a 
powerful influence in bringing a PRC party to an 
acceptable settlement. Since 1987, a method called joint 
conciliation or joint mediation (lianhe tiaojie) has 
been developed in the PRC as an effective mechanism for 
handling foreign economic disputes.10
6.1.1 Consultation and Mediation
This is invariably the preference of all contracting 
parties for most businessmen whether in the PRC or
10. See Cheng Yuan, East-West Trade: Changing .patterns in 
Chinese Foreign Trade Law and Institutions, New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1991, p. 277.
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elsewhere: arbitration or litigation wherever it may take 
place means to most businessmen expense, dealings and 
complication. Business disputes clauses in the PRC will 
often require the parties to conduct consultation or 
"friendly negotiation" before a more formal procedure can 
be triggered. The majority of PRC standard business 
contracts invariably contain a clause making
consultation or "friendly negotiation" the first stage of 
settling disputes.
As an informal method of dispute resolution, 
consultation is conducted directly between the 
contracting parties without any third-party 
participation. Although it is optional, it aims to 
clarify existing misunderstanding and then reach a 
compromise between the contracting parties. In the PRC, 
a contract is always seen as a framework for co-operation 
rather than a statement of immutable rights set in stone, 
so pointing to the words of a contract may not be 
considered as conclusive as Western businesses might 
expect.
Provisions for the second stage of settling disputes 
are not usually included as contractual clauses. 
However, mediation, or the recently-emerging joint 
mediation, is widely adopted as the second stage of 
settling disputes in the PRC. Only when the methods fail 
at the first and second stages may the contracting
parties turn to the third stage, which is always 
arbitration.11
11. See S. L. Ellis & L. Shea, supra note 4, p. 161. 
Texts of several PRC standard trade contract appear at 
Guidebook on Trading with the People's Republic of China, 
U.N., Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (comp., hereinafter, ESCAP), London: Graham &
Trotman Ltd., 1984, p. 335 et seq. As for PRC standard 
investment contract, the term of consultation or friendly 
negotiation is also mentioned in its contractual clause. 
See Contract of An Equity Joint Venture Elevator Company 
in China, Art. 16 in China Trade Handbook, ed. , L. Fung 
(Hong Kong: The Adsale People, 1984), p. 191.
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Consultation or "friendly negotiation" is a PRC term 
used to describe conduct that Westerners simply consider 
as "discussions". Without the participation of a third 
party, consultation is used directly by both contracting 
parties to resolve their differences. It has been 
generally considered as one of the best methods of 
handling business disputes in the PRC. Should 
consultation fail, the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT) of the PRC encourages 
contracting parties to rely on mediation. The CCPIT was 
originally set up in 1952 and has been revitalised and 
expanded in the PRC since 1979.
What is mediation? It is the process by which the 
contracting parties are encouraged to reach their own 
solution to their dispute with the assistance of a 
neutral third party. For a long time, the PRC's 
mediation system has been recognised, as an alternative 
to state law, to be a good way on resolving contracting
1 O
parties' dispute. Michael Palmer points out the
rediscovery of the traditional value of "yielding " and a 
social order of "no litigation" in post-Mao China. As he 
observes:
In recent years, however, the traditonal Confucian 
emphasis on on yielding has been officially 
resurrected and, in keeping with the current concern 
to stress the value of mediation as a Chinese 
tradition, the legal press explicitly identifies 
Rang as a salient feature of mediation in pre­
socialist times that has an important role to play 
in the post-Mao era.14
12. The CCPIT, as a social organisation within the PRC 
foreign trade system, performed the functions of a 
chamber of commerce in other nations. See S. L. Ellis & 
L. Shea, ibid., p. 161.
13. See Fu Hualing, "Understanding People's Mediation in 
Post-Mao China", Journal of Chinese Law, Vol. 6, (Fall 
1992), No. 2, p. 211.
14. See Michael Palmer, supra note 7, p. 23 3.
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The 1991 Civil Procedure Law (hereinafer, CPL) of
the PRC actually provides that in conducting civil
proceedings, the trial court must always attempt to
promote a voluntary agreement between the disputants.
i sOnly if that fails should the court move to judgement.
The CCPIT has a Mediation Centre located in Beijing 
which was established in 1985. This Centre has a co­
operative arrangement with the Hamburg Mediation Centre 
in Germany; the two centres published a joint set of 
rules in 1987. It is possible to conduct a joint 
mediation involving both institutions. Since 1985, this 
Centre has acted as an intermediary in disputes between 
the PRC and foreign parties. Joined with a neutral third 
party, this method of mediation provides a better forum 
for discussion, exchange of views, and negotiation in a 
harmonious atmosphere. It not only solves civil disputes 
in a simple and practical way but also helps to brief and 
update ordinary people regarding government policies and 
decrees of the PRC.16
The procedure is fairly simple; first, the 
contracting parties must agree in writing to mediation. 
The parties may each appoint a mediator or jointly a sole 
one. The mediators will examine all the documentary 
evidence and try to promote a compromise, either by 
correspondence or if that is unsuccessful, by calling 
parties together for face-to-face meetings, with or 
without lawyers. As part of the process the mediators 
will be expected to establish the facts and form a view 
on liability. However, the mediators cannot compel a 
compromise —  they may only use persuasion. It can
15. See art. 257, CPL. The Law was promulgated by the 
Fourth Session of the Seventh National People's Congress 
on 9 April 1991. For an English text of this Law, see 
China Law and Practice (No. 5, 1991), pp. 15-16.
16. Supra note 12.
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therefore be unsuccessful. The parties can request a
mediation of their case before the arbitration tribunal 
is formed. If mediation doesn’t work, then arbitration
proceedings are commenced with a view to an award being
made soon as possible. The example below is an
illustration:
Two foreign parties made a joint application to one 
arbitration centre for mediation in Beijing. Party 
A's complaint was that its former manager had 
joined a rival company Party B, and Party B had 
thus benefited from party A ’s "know-how” and the 
close connection that the manager had been able to 
establish with a major PRC corporation.
The mediator apparently investigated the position 
and reported his findings that there was no evidence 
that Party B had benefitted from Party A ’s "know­
how" and he additionally thought that there was 
sufficient business for both parties to benefit from 
a commercial relationship with the PRC corporation. 
The parties then did reach an agreement whereby one 
party relinquished certain business opportunities to 
the other in return for a payment of money and the 
lawsuit was withdrawn.
This above account is fairly typical. Inevitably it 
is a rather over-simplified version but the features of 
mediation come through, that is to say the mediator makes 
his investigatin and tells the parties what he has 
concluded on the facts and then makes recommendations as 
to how the parties should go about resolving their 
differences.
It is so frequently used and flexible a process that 
not only can it be conducted within a mediation 
institution such as the Beijing Mediation Centre 
(according to that Centre's specific rules of mediation), 
but also concurrently during court or arbitration 
proceedings, either at the request of the contracting 
parties or purely on the judge's or arbitration 
tribunal's own initiative.17 In the latter case, the
17. For characteristics of mediation in the PRC, see 
Michael Palmer, supra note 7, pp. 222-223.
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court or arbitration proceedings will be suspended and be 
resumed only if mediation fails.
As for joint mediation, both the PRC and foreign 
contracting parties may appoint an arbitrator themselves 
from the arbitration or mediation institution of their 
own countries. If such mediation succeeds, an agreement 
will be signed by both contracting parties and a 
mediation statement will be made to that effect. This is 
not enforceable outside the PRC. Within the PRC, it can 
be enforceable in the courts as part of the normal civil 
law. If it fails, the contracting parties may go to court 
or seek arbitration according to the original arbitration
1 Ragreement.
In practice, the PRC stresses the function of 
consultation and mediation for avoiding disputes on
IQforeign trade and investment. * The 1979 Sino-American 
Agreement on Trade Relations is one of the best examples 
of this approach.20
6.1.2 Origins of the PRC Arbitration System
Socialist countries’ models of arbitration machinery 
have their origins at the beginning of the 193 0s in the 
work of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce. Attached to 
the Chamber, there were two agencies composing of the
18. James A. R. Nafziger and Ruan Jiafang, "Chinese 
Methods of Reslving International Trade, Investment and 
Maritime Disputes", Willamette Law Review, Vol. 23 
(1987), pp. 647-650.
19. Ren Jianxin, "Mediation, conciliation, Arbitration, 
and Litigation in the PRC", International Business Lawyer 
(1987), Vol. 15, No. 9, p. 397.
20. See Agreement on Trade Relations between the United 
States of America and the People's Republic of China, 7 
July 1979. Full text appears at 18 International Legal 
Materials (1979), art. VII, 1, p. 1041.
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arbitration model —  the "Maritime Arbitration
Commission", founded in 1930 and the "Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission", created in 1932. The former
purported to arbitrate all disputes arising from trade
transactions between Soviet organisations and foreign
firms. The latter was designed to handle differences in
2 1connection with maritime disputes. x
During the period 1956 to 1960, the Soviet legal 
system was treated as a model for the enactment of law in
the PRC, and during that time the above-mentioned Chamber
0 0 . arbitration model was imitated. However, unlike m  the
Soviet Union, the PRC’s two arbitration bodies —  the
"Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission" (FTAC) of 1956 and
the "Maritime Arbitration Commission" (MAC) of 1959, due
to the unusual political climate in the 1960s and 1970s,
hardly ever functioned as genuine arbitration agencies,
and only after some twenty years did their work take on
an orthodox form.23
With increased economic co-opertiion between the PRC 
and foreign countries, the FTAC expanded its business and 
became the "Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission" (FETAC) in 1980.24 Again, both FETAC and MAC 
changed their respective names as the "China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission"
21. See Cheng Yuan, supra note 10, p. 24. [cited from W.
E. Butler, Soviet Law (2nd ed.), London: Butterworths,
1988, pp. 337-340.]
22. See Tse-Tung Ko, "The Role of Law in Foreign Trade 
Dispute Settlement in Communist China", Guoji Maoyifa
Zuanlun (Special Analysis on International Trade Law) , 
Taipei: National Taiwan University Law School Press,
1981), pp. 191-192.
23. See Cheng Yuan, supra note 10, p. 55, also see Jerome 
A. Cohen, "The Legal Framework of China's Foreign Trade" 
in A. Eckstein (ed.), China Trade Prospects and U.S. 
Policy, New York: Praeger Publications, 1971, pp. 164- 
166.
24. See ESCAP, supra note 11, p. 198.
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(CIETAC) and the "China Maritime Arbitration Commission" 
(CMAC) in August 1988.25 As noted above, both
commissions were established under the aegis of the CCPIT 
in order to deal with matters relating to foreign trade 
and maritime disputes. Although the missions of these 
two commissions were identical with those of the former 
Soviet Union, it is worth noting that their function and 
practice which the PRC exerts over foreign trade and 
investment are very different from those of the former 
Soviet Union.26 At present, it is the CIETAC, under the 
CCPIT which is responsible for foreign trade and
2 7investment disputes in the PRC.
In modern foreign trade and investment practice, 
dispute settlement has depended greatly upon the 
arbitration method rather than on adjudication by courts. 
Michael Palmer has pointed out that in the PRC:
Arbitration is considered most appropriate in cases
involving important economic issues, especially
those in which the parties are governmental bodies,
2 8enterprises, or other large-scale organisations.
Reasons for choosing arbitration in preference to 
litigation include speed of resolution, reduced costs, a 
continuing commercial relationship between the parties, 
the possibility of more creative solutions, the need for 
specialised evaluation by expertly-trained arbitrators,
25. Both FETAC and MAC changed their respective names as 
the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC) and the China Maritime Arbitration 
Commission (CMAC) in August 1988. See Remin Ribao 
(domestic ed.) (Beijing: People's Daily), 12 August 1988,
p. 8.
26. Ibid.
27. See M. J. Moser, "Arbitratiion in China", China 
Business Review (Sept./Oct., 1990), p. 42.
28. See Michael Palmer, supra note 7, p. 222.
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and confidentiality. In recent years, arbitration has 
become a preferred means for resolving disputes in
9 Qinternational trade and investment.
Arbitration in the PRC has long been considered a
particularly suitable method for resolving disputes in
foreign trade and investment. In the early stages of
becoming involved in foreign trade, it appeared that the
PRC authorities showed no willingness to practise
' arbitration, to the extent that they seemed reluctant to
publicise the existence of arbitration institutions, and
9 nto disclose the functions of these institutions. But
what then is the significance of the PRC demand that an 
arbitration clause be stipulated in a private trade 
contract? The terms contained in the clause are definite 
and they manifest clearly that the disputing parties must 
submit their differences to arbitration, in the event 
that previous amicable settlement has failed.
Socialist countries, following Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine, distinguish sharply between domestic and 
international legal relations. This is indeed the case 
in the PRC. The definition of law as the explicit 
"state’s will" is merely applicable to the first category 
of relations. The law governing the relations at 
international level, either public or private, should 
have a different basis of definition, inasmuch as 
international obligations are given great emphasis in 
order to maintain harmonious relations and peaceful 
coexistence with other countries. This attitude has 
been approved by some jurists of the world in their
O 1
analysis of the nature of "International Law".
29. Peter Chen and Marcus Woo, "Enforcing Foreign 
Arbitration Awards", Asia Law, September 1993, p. 27
30. See Jerome A. Cohen, supra note 23, p. 169.
31. For example, In the PRC, law (often, party decisions) 
is frequently seen as a means to promote economic change 
or development, and not as something that develops as a 
result of changes elsewhere. See J. Feinerman, "Economic
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In matters concerning foreign trade and investment, 
the major drawback to arbitration in the PRC is that many 
PRC arbitrators have not been properly trained in law but 
are appointed after a long career as party bureaucrats in 
reward for long service. Although the number of
arbitrators with formal legal training has been 
increasing over the past few years and the arbitration 
agency is handling more and more foreign trade and 
investment cases, the lack of familiarity of the PRC 
arbitrators with international business transactions 
remains a significant disincentive to arbitration in the 
PRC. This is especially true when international
commercial customs were developed as the most important 
source of law for prevailing international business 
transactions. In the PRC, the continuing growth of 
commercial exchanges with foreign countries will generate 
an increasing need for the development of law in this 
field.33
6.1.3 Characteristics of PRC Arbitration
Ideological considerations are not the only reason 
for the PRC's reliance on arbitration as an instrument
for its foreign trade and investment operations. It 
seems that the PRC distrusted foreign national laws and
and Legal Reform in China: 1978-1991", Problems of
Communism, (Sept.-Oct. 1991), p. 66.
32. The author was informed of this by the Chinese legal
experts in May 1992 while carrying out interviews in the
PRC.
33. See Henry R. Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law 
Singapore: Butterworth & Co., 1988), p. 229. For
opinions of PRC jurists, see Li Shuangyuan (chief ed.), 
Guoji Sifa (Private International Law), Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, Sept. 1991, p. 279; Chen Zhidong & Chao 
Jianming (eds.), Guoji Jingjifa Gailun (General Analysis 
of International Economic Law), Beijing: Zhengfa Daxue
Chubanshe, 1993, p. 3; and so on.
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judgements of the courts over business disputes 
resolution; particularly between countries with different 
social, political and economic structures.34 PRC-style 
arbitration must be seen as one which reduces the scope 
of court jurisdiction and minimises the applicability of 
national law. Arbitration consists of a third party or 
an intermediary who imposes a judgement or ruling. The 
third party is either an arbitrator selected by the two 
contracting parties or an ad hoc or permanent arbitration 
body of large administrative organisation. The third 
party is also encouraged to apply customs favourably, 
instead of national laws. The philosophy has been that 
the "rule of law", having its root in individualism, is 
by its very nature not appropriate for dispute 
settlement. Arbitration remedies through the application 
of customs and other norms are more effective than 
national court jurisdiction.35 PRC law limits access to 
judicial remedies in instances where the contracting 
parties have an arbitration agreement.
The PRC stresses arbitration as a way of solving 
business disputes arising from domestic economic 
contracts. Therefore, it has also encouraged the 
employment of this model of dispute resolution as a means 
for coordination and compromise with regard to disputes 
and conflicts between contracting parties within
government bodies, state enterprises, and private 
companies in the PRC. By choosing this route, the
contracting parties can escape national court 
jurisdiction. Further, by employing such arbitration 
systems in solving business disputes arising from foreign 
trade and investment, the foreign policy of the PRC, in 
general, serves its national interests well from the 
point of view of "peaceful coexistence". The
34. Supra note 22, p. 195.
35. Ibid.
36. Henry R. Zheng, supra note 33, p. 220.
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establishment of arbitration agencies in the PRC and 
maintenance of the provisional regulations are therefore 
necessary, especially when the PRC deals in foreign trade 
and investment with partners from the West.
PRC arbitration law consists of two sets of rules 
and two sets of agencies. One set applies to domestic 
arbitration and the other applies to arbitration of
» 7 7foreign-related (hereinafter, "shewai") cases. The
1981 ECL was amended in 1993 and now the procedures and 
effects of domestic arbitration are similar to those of 
1985 FECL. However, the two systems differ in three 
major respects. First, domestic arbitration rules 
greatly resemble PRC judicial procedures, because they 
impose responsibilities on the arbitrators to verify
evidence, investigate facts and collect data for
^ fi . .determining the case. "Shewai" arbitration, on the
other hand, is similar to the common law adversarial
system and places the primary burden of proof on the
party making the allegations. Secondly, unlike "shewai”
arbitration, the domestic arbitration system does not
provide that parties to a dispute may choose their
arbitrators. Although it does allow parties to object to
the appointment of arbitrators, the arbitration authority
will ultimately determine whether to sustain such
TO
objections or not. Finally, arbitral awards issued by 
domestic arbitration authorities are subject to judicial 
review if one party commences the judicial proceeding 
within fifteen days from the date of the award.40
37. Ibid., p. 218, The Chinese term "shewai" means 
foreign-related though the Chinese law does not contain a 
clear definition of "shewai11. For further studies, see 
ibid. pp. 200-202.
38. See art. 21, Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China for Arbitration over Economic Contracts, 
promulgated by the State Council on 22 August 1983, CCH 
Austl. f 10-620.
39. Ibid., see art. 17 and 18.
40. Supra note 39, see art. 49.
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"Shewai1 arbitral awards are final, and PRC law does not 
allow the courts to intervene except to assist in 
enforcement of the arbitral award.41
Arbitration in the PRC demonstrates the importance 
of inserting an arbitration clause in the contract which 
will then satisfy both contracting parties. The 
arbitration should be conducted in accordance with the 
provisional rules of the PRC's arbitration system. For 
the foreign party, the arbitration clause means that 
dispute settlement relies on a sort of legal solution by 
an independent third party. However, in practice, it is 
found that the arbitration clause places "mediation" 
before "arbitration". A mediation agreement can be
published as an arbitration award and then can, of 
course, be enforced as such. The contracting parties, 
choosing to arbitrate, agree that an arbitrator should be 
appointed to resolve their dispute. Unless they settle 
during the course of the proceedings, the matter will be 
decided by the arbitrator whose award will be binding 
upon the parties regardless of what they think of it.42 
It is to be noted that in a mediation, no solution can be 
imposed upon the parties. Mediation means amicable 
settlement between parties in business disputes, and is a 
non-legal or "extra-judicial" settlement. Mediation of 
this type is similar to the procedure of consultation in 
dispute settlement in the PRC.43
Furthermore, the method of "mediation" or "amicable 
settlement" in practice, means the replacement of the
41. See art. 257, CPL, supra note 15.
42. The arbitration award is final and no party to the 
dispute may later bring suit in a PRC or foreign court. 
See art. 257, ibid.
43. See art. 37, FECL. This Law encourages the parties to 
settle their disputes through consultation or mediation, 
but is also permits parties to resort directly to 
arbitration.
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proper method of "arbitration". Therefore, in the PRC,
"to arbitrate" is similar in meaning "to mediate" and
"must be amicably settled". It seems that the
arbitration clause does not really mean what it says in
the PRC. Arbitration can be held either in the PRC or
abroad, depending upon the provisions of the arbitration
clause in the contract or the subsequent special
agreement, if any, between the parties.44 However, just
as the foreign party may be reluctant to accept the PRC
arbitral institutions, the PRC party often has
reservations about accepting arbitration in the country
of the foreign party. Both contracting parties will
usually agree to submit disputes to arbitration in a
neutral jurisdiction.45 The 1985 FECL of the PRC does not
favour judicial proceedings. It only permits parties to
resort to judicial settlement if the contract does not
contain an arbitration clause, and if parties are unable
to reach an agreement on arbitration after a dispute has 
46arisen.
6.1.4 Arbitration at Present in the PRC
The popularity of arbitration as a means of 
resolving international disputes stems from its dual 
advantages of neutrality and privacy. Mistrust of 
domestic laws and the impartiality of local courts make 
arbitration an attractive alternative. In the PRC, the 
trend to arbitration has been encouraged for domestic
44. Ibid.
45. The Stockholm Institute, the London Court of 
Arbitration, and the Zurich Chamber of Commerce are the 
neutral arbitration tribunals often accepted by the PRC 
party. The PRC will not resort to the International
Chamber of Commerce because of Taiwan’s representation in 
that organisation.
48. See art. 38, FECL.
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business resolution but also for sophisticated commercial 
disputes involving foreigners.
A. Arbitration Bodies
There are two main administrative bodies in the PRC 
dealing with international arbitrations. As noted, the 
first is CMAC which deals exclusively with maritime 
disputes involving foreign interest. The second is 
CIETAC which deals with the greatest number of 
international arbitrations that take place in the PRC.47
CIETAC's jurisdiction is over disputes in the area 
of commerce and trade where the parties have made 
arbitation agreements. Provided that an arbitration 
agreement is in writing, no specific form is necessary. 
CIETAC has a recommended arbitration clause which reads 
as below:
Any disputes arising from the execution of or in 
connection with this contract shall be, as far as 
possible, settled first through consultations 
between both parties. In case of settlement being 
reached through consultation the dispute shall be 
submitted to the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission, Beijing China for 
arbitration in accordance with its arbitration rules 
of procedure. The arbitral award shall be final and 
binding upon both parties."48
It is seen that this clause is frequently reproduced in 
standard form PRC contracts.
47. Cheng Yuan, supra note 10, p. 277. It was reported 
that the CIETAC handled over 500 arbitration cases in the 
single year of 1993. Fazhi Ribao (Beijing: Legal Daily), 
27 March 1994, p. 1.
48. See Arbitration Rules of the CIETAC which can be 
found in China Economic News, 31 October 1988, pp. 8-9; 
and 7 November 1988, pp. 7-9.
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B. Arbitration Procedure
An arbitration starts with a written application 
containing the claimant's details, details of the 
arbitration agreement and a statement of the case and the 
evidence to support it. The claimant must also either 
appoint his own arbitrator or authorise CIETAC to make 
the appointment. A CIETAC arbitration tribunal is
composed of one or three arbitrators. Where the tribunal 
comprises three members, the presiding arbitrator will be 
appointed by CIETAC. The tribunal must hold oral hearing 
unless the parties agree otherwise. These hearings may 
be postponed for good reason upon the request of either 
party.
The tribunal may consult experts, PRC or foreign
so . . .nationals , for clarification and the parties themselves
are entitled to question each other and any witnesses or
experts involved. Awards are decided by majority
decision and should be rendered within forty-five days of
the closing of proceedings. The award, under the PRC
law, is final and binding upon both the parties and is
6 1not subject to revision by the courts.
C. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Since the PRC's accession in 1987 to the 1958 New 
York Convention on the Recognitiion and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, it has, in theory, been 
relatively straightforward to register and enforce a
49. Art. 4, ibid.
50. The CIETAC amended its arbitration rules in 1988 to 
allow the CCPIT to appoint foreign arbitrator in dealing 
with arbitration cases in the PRC. The author was 
informed that the CCPIT has a list of 290 arbitrators, 
and among them about sixty are foreign nationas, while 
carrying out interviews with CCPIT officials in May 1994 
in Beijing.
51. See art. 257, CPL, supra note 15.
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foreign arbitral award in the PRC.52 Prior to this, 
there was a discretion for the trial courts to refuse 
enforcement where an award contradicted the "basic 
principles of the law of the PRC or violated public 
interest". After 1987, it has been the Convention's 
enforcement rules that apply. These afford far less 
discretion for PRC courts to refuse to enforce awards.
An application for enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award should be made in the appropriate Intermediate 
People's Court. It is noted that the Intermediate 
People's Courts have jurisdiction in major cases 
involving foreign parties and are therefore distinctly a 
cut above the People's Courts which deal with domestic 
disputes. The theory is that the judges of the People's 
Intermediate Court will have a working knowledge of 
international law and treaty obligations.
D. PRC Arbitral Awards
The CPL says that if a party fails to perform an 
arbitral award, the winning party must apply to execute 
the award in the local Intermediate People's Court. 
The local court has discretion to refuse to enforce on 
"public interest" grounds but basically the procedure 
gives the courts very few grounds to refuse to enforce. 
However, the enforcement is regrettably not 
straightforward. There are great difficulties and this 
is where the system at present fails. The enforcement of 
arbitral awards remains a problem in terms of giving 
credibility to the process.
52. The PRC's arbitration award can be now recognised and 
enforced in more than ninety countries in the world. The 
list of these countries can bee seen in Zhongcai yu Falii 
Tungxun (Beijing: Newsletter of Arbitration and Law),
Oct. and December 1993, No. 5 and No. 6, pp. 47-50.
53. Art. 259, CPL, supra note 15.
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Why do difficulties of enforcement occur? The main 
reason seems to be the reluctance of local courts to take 
enforcement measures against local interests. It is 
perhaps an inherent weakness of the system that it is 
necessary for a successful claimant to have to go to the 
unsuccessful respondent's place of domicile in order to 
get his award enforced. It is also generally admitted 
that the quality of judges in the courts is not
consistently high.  ^ In such an increasingly
decentralised economic and political system, local courts 
are tending to take a parochial view of their 
obligations, driven perhaps more by concern to avoid 
damaging local economic and political interests rather 
than by respect for the objective application of the law.
In addition to the revised arbitration rules of
1993, the PRC has recently promulgated the Arbitration 
Law which will become effective on 1 September 1995.55 
Both prove that the PRC has committed the development of 
a sound arbitration system.
6.1.5 Litigation at Present in the PRC
The Chinese are generally believed to be
nonlitigious people. In the absence of an agreement to 
arbitrate or mediate, litigation is likely to be the only 
remaining option for pursuing a disputed claim. In the 
PRC, the most relevant legislation in this respect is the 
CPL of 1991. The differences in litigation inside and 
outside the PRC are discussed below:
54. The author was informed of this while doing fieldwork 
in the PRC respectively in 1992 and 1994 during a 
discussion with several legal experts in Beijing.
55. The 1994 Arbitration Law of the PRC can be found in 
Renmin Ribao (Beijing: People's Daily, overseas ed.), 2
Sept. 1994, p. 2.
56. Fu Hualing, supra note 13, p. 211.
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A. Litigation Inside the PRC
In order to start litigation in the PRC, a plaintiff
must instruct a PRC lawyer and pay a security deposit to
the court. Most cases involving foreigners are handled
67at first instance by an Intermediate People's Court. A
case involving major implications for the PRC as a whole
• • • 68goes straight to the Supreme People's Court m  Beijing. 
The CPL imposes a duty on the courts to first attempt to 
mediate disputes. This can have a frustrating delaying 
effect on PRC litigation proceedings.
A special summary procedure is available for 
6Qrecovering a debt. It is also possible to freeze the
f . rj
property of a debtor. The Courts have wide powers of 
execution including the freezing and transfer of bank 
deposits, attachment of income, distraint and sale of
property. As with arbitration awards, the practice of
* 61enforcement may be rather different from the theory.
The major drawback to litigating in the PRC is that 
many PRC judges have not been properly trained in law 
but, rather, are appointed after a long career as party 
or military bureaucrats as a reward for long service. 
Although the number of judges with formal legal training
57. Art. 19, CPL, Supra note 15.
58. Art. 21, ibid.
59. Art. 189, ibid.
60. Article 92, ibid.
61. The difficulties of enforcing arbitration awards are 
seen in Zhongcai and Falii Tongxun, supra note 52, No. 4, 
Aug. 1992, pp. 44-49. For example, the local courts are 
sometimes tending to take a parochial view —  region 
protectionism to avoid damaging local economic interests.
62. The author was informed of this by the Chinese legal 
experts in 1992 and 1994 respectively while carrying out 
interviews in the PRC.
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has been increasing over the past few years and the 
courts are handling more and more cross-border commercial 
cases (particularly the maritime courts and the 
commercial courts in Guangdong and Shenzhen), the lack of 
familiarity of PRC judges with international commercial 
transactions remains a distinct element of litigation in 
the PRC.63
B. Litigation outside the PRC/Enforcement
A foreign creditor is in the strongest position if 
he or she can obtain a judgement overseas and execute it 
against assets outside the PRC. Otherwise, foreign 
judgements only have intangible benefits (such as the 
pressure of adverse publicity) since their tangible worth 
can only be measured by enforceability.
Judicial assistance treaties have only been 
concluded with a small number of countries (including 
Belgium, France, Italy and Spain). There are also 
reciprocal arrangements with Eastern European countries. 
The issue of enforcement is brick wall in the PRC. The 
enforcement of judgements obtained anywhere else such as 
London, New York, Hong Kong, and so on, for example, has
fi Ato rely on the principle of "mutual reciprocity".
The exact meaning of mutual reciprocity as a concept 
in PRC law is unclear. However, the debate is somewhat 
academic as outside observers still know of no reciprocal 
enforcement that has actually taken place.
63. Ibid.
64. Art. 266, 267, CPL, supra note 15. The guiding 
principle of "mutual reciprocity" is similar to that of 
the FECL, i.e. first, parties to a contract are equal; 
secondly, lawful rights and liabilities of the parties 
are reciprocal; lastly, no party is allowed to take undue 
advantages of another party. See art. 3, 10, FECL.
262
6.2 PRC Arbitration Involving Taiwanese Business
Disputes in Trade and Investment
Compared with litigation, arbitration for settling 
"shetai" business disputes in the PRC is a much more 
suitable method since it involves less bureaucracy. With 
a background of mutual non-recognition, the PRC 
stipulated in its TIP of 1988 that disputes arising from 
the performance of, or in connection with, a "shewai" 
investment contract in the PRC should, as far as 
possible, be settled through consultation or mediation 
between the parties. If parties do not wish to consult 
with each other or submit disputes to mediation, or where 
consultation or mediation is unsuccessful, such disputes 
may, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the contracts 
or subsequent written arbitration agreements, be 
submitted for arbitration to an arbitration agency either
6 cin the PRC or in Hong Kong. However, there are three 
problems likely to be encountered under such 
circumstances. First, there is the nature of "shetai" 
arbitration; secondly, the applicability of law; and 
lastly, recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
These will be discussed below.
6.2.1 The Nature of Arbitration
How does the PRC determine the nature of "shetai" 
arbitration for disputes resolution? The TIP stipulates 
that the arbitration may only be held in the PRC or in 
Hong Kong. However, there is no such kind of limit in 
the other "shewai" arbitrations of business dispute. For 
example, Article 37 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law 
1988 of the PRC stipulates that the parties may, in
65. See art. 20, Provisions of the State Council on 
Encouraging Investment by the Taiwanese Compatriots of 
the People's Republic of China (Taiwan Investment 
Provisions, or TIP), promulgated on 3 July 1988. See 
China Law and Practice, Vol. 2, no. 7, pp. 56-62.
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accordance with the arbitration provisions in the 
contract or a written arbitration agreement reached 
subsequent to the dispute, submit the dispute to a PRC 
arbitration agency or another arbitration agency.
Another example which needs to be noted is found in 
Article 20 of the State Council's Provisions on 
Encouraging Investment by Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and 
Macao Compatriots 1986. These permit the parties, in 
accordance with the arbitration provisions in the 
contract or a written arbitration agreement reached 
subsequent to the dispute, to submit their dispute to an 
arbitration agency within the territory of the PRC or
6 f tanother arbitration agency. Therefore, it seems that
the PRC differentiates between the treatment of "shetai11 
and "shewai" arbitration and arbitration involving Hong 
Kong and Macao compatriots (hereinafter, "Hong Kong and 
Macao related", or "Shegang'ao").67
This discriminatory treatment gives rise to the 
difficult question regarding the definition of the legal 
nature of "shetai" arbitration. Is it PRC domestic 
arbitration, PRC international arbitration or ”shewai" 
arbitration? The PRC arbitration system (regarding 
economic affairs) has been divided into domestic 
contractual arbitration and "shewai" contractual 
arbitration. The two systems differ greatly not only in
66. See art. 20, Provisions of the State Council on 
Encouraging Investment by the Overseas Chinese, Hong 
Kong, and Macao Compatriots of the People's Republic of 
China, promulgated in 198 6.
67. The PRC treats Chinese citizens living within its 
territory, excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, as 
mainland citizen (dalu gongmin) and Chinese nationals 
living in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as compatriots 
(gang-ao-tai-tongbao). All Taiwan related cases in the 
PRC are cited as "shetai" cases, and Hong Kong and Macao 
related cases are cited as ”Shegang'ao" cases. For 
further studies, see Cheng Yuan, "Law and Policy of the 
People's Republic of China", Immigration and Nationality 
Law & Practice, October 1990, pp. 136-144.
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their own procedures but also in their application of
6 8governing law (as detailed above).
Although existing PRC laws and regulations have not 
clearly defined this problem, the PRC treats a "shetai" 
business disputes resolution as a "shewai" disputes 
resolution, just as it does "shegang'ao" economic cases. 
All such economic cases are decided by "shewai" 
arbitration agencies under "shewai" proceedings of 
arbitration. This is mainly because the PRC domestic 
arbitration agencies are based on the system of socialist 
planned economy which is contrary to the nature of 
"shetai" business dispute resolution. Furthermore, PRC 
domestic arbitration proceedings are different from 
international norms of arbitration proceedings, which are
fi Qgenerally adopted in the West. This situation should
not be accepted by the Taiwanese party, should they wish 
for a sound and fair "shetai" business dispute resolution 
in the PRC. A special political goal of the PRC for 
peaceful reunification with Taiwan has been in existence 
since 1979. However, this political consideration has 
not made any difference to the PRC arbitration agency 
with regard to "shegang'ao" and "shetai" economic cases. 
Therefore, it would be reasonable and fair for the PRC 
"shewai" arbitration agencies to decide to handle
7 0"shetai" economic cases.
The second difficult problem is the applicability of 
law regarding arbitration for "shetai" business disputes
68. See Chu Chiwu, "Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai 
Zhidu (The Arbitration System of China's Foreign Economic 
and Trade), in Huang Binquen (ed.), Zhonguo Shewai zhi 
Jingji Falii Wenti (The Problems of China's Foreign- 
related and Economic Laws), (Guangxie: Guangxie People's 
Press, 1991), p. 353.
69. Supra note 40, 41, 42.
70. The author was informed of by a PRC judicial 
personnel while carrying out interviews in the PRC in May 
1992.
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in the PRC. The law of the PRC applies in the case of
Sino-foreign equity joint venture contracts, Sino-foreign
cooperative venture contracts and contracts for Sino-
foreign cooperation in the exploration and development of
natural resources. These three kinds of contracts
exclude the possibility of choosing the applicable law of
another country or law district. However, parties to
other kinds of "shewai1 business contracts may choose the
71law to be applied in the handling of contract disputes.
The PRC Supreme People's Court, through judicial
interpretation, has expanded the above stated regulation
7 7to cover "shegang'ao" trade and investment contracts. 
There is now the question of whether or not this
regulation will also apply to "shetai" arbitration. In 
other words, will the "shetai" contracting parties be 
able to choose Taiwanese law as the governing law in 
settling business disputes? Alternatively, will PRC
arbitration agencies respect the choice of the 
contracting parties?
With regard to the above, there is still no 
authoritative answer to be found in present PRC policy 
and law. However, it is assumed that PRC arbitration 
agencies are less bureaucratic and that the arbitrators 
themselves have more discretion than do the court judges. 
If the PRC acquiesces to recognition and applicability of
71. See art. 5, FECL, and art. 145, General Principles of 
Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter, 
GPCL), adopted by the Fourth Session of the Sixth 
National People's Congress on 12 April 1986, reprinted in 
Chinese in Renmin Ribao, overseas edition, 12 April 1986, 
pp. 2-3. For an English text, 34 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1986), pp. 715-743. GPCL addresses many 
basic legal issues currently facing the PRC and lays down 
a groundwork for further development of the PRC law.
72. "Minutes of the Working Panel of the Supreme People's 
Court of the People's Republic of China on the Judgement 
of Economic Cases Involving Foreigners or the Overseas 
Chinese from Hong Kong and Macao Within the Coastal Areas 
of the Country", issued on 12 June 1989, and reprinted in 
Chinese in Bulletin of the Supreme People's Court on 20 
June 1990, p. 15.
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the Taiwanese law, it will begin with arbitration. The 
reason for this is that arbitratiion is a natural area to 
start with as it is much more flexible than the courts.
The third difficult area is the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards. There are four points to 
be discussed in this respect. First, arbitral awards 
made by PRC's "shewai" arbitration agencies in "shetai" 
economic cases can be recognised and enforced in the PRC. 
Secondly, since the PRC joined the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in
New York (hereinafter, the New York Convention) in
7 8 •1987, there has been recognition and enforcement by the
PRC of most arbitral awards made in, or involving parties
from countries and areas such as Hong Kong and Macao
where they were trading with PRC parties. Thirdly, will
"shetai" arbitral awards made by the PRC be recognised
and enforced in Taiwan? This is a difficult question. In
Taiwan, the TMRS of 1992 does not stipulate clearly
enough whether the final court judgement or arbitral
awards of civil cases made by the PRC must be recognised
and enforced in Taiwan.74 There is still no legal basis
to be found for "shetai" arbitral awards made by the PRC
being recognised and enforced in Taiwan.
Nevertheless, worthy of attention in this respect, 
is the fact that the PRC Supreme People's Court has 
expressed its intention to recognise and enforce any 
court judgements or arbitral awards made by Taiwan. All
73. See Zhongguo Jiaru Waiguo Zhongcai Caijue Gongyu 
(China Acceded to Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards), Xinhua News 
Agency, news release, 2 December 198 6. The Convention on 
the recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards was created in New York on 10 June 1958 and came 
into force since 7 June 1959.
74. See Adk Koon Hang Tse, "The Emerging Legal Framework 
for Regulating Economic Relations between Taiwan and 
Mainland China", Journal of Chinese Law, vol. 6, (Fall 
1992), No. 2, p. 162.
267
such procedural problems arising from this will be solved
*7 c
in a suitable way. The TIP has explicitly excluded the
possibility of choosing Taiwanese arbitration agencies in
7 fisettling "shetai" business disputes. Therefore, at 
present, it seems unlikely that "shetai" arbitral awards 
made in Taiwan will be recognised and enforced in the 
PRC. In fact, it is not rational, in light of the nature 
of civil arbitration and the practical needs of private 
Taiwan-PRC links, for the TIP to debar "shetai1 
contracting parties from choosing the applicable law of 
Taiwan or a third country. This situation implies that 
the result of the arbitration might not be just and fair. 
It is hoped that the PRC will at least rectify this 
regulation or even remove entirely the restrictions of 
the TIP.
6.2.2 Taiwan-PRC Mediation and Arbitration Agencies
At present, the Taiwan-PRC political relationship 
has not yet been normalised. Choosing Taiwan as an 
arbitration venue seems difficult for Taiwanese 
businesses in the PRC. Taiwanese businesses feel 
insecure about arbitration in Hong Kong or by PRC
"shewai1 arbitration agencies. In addition, due to the 
absence of PRC-Taiwan direct contacts for almost forty 
years, some vestigial prejudices exist between Taiwan and 
the PRC. Considering the labour shortage arising from 
labour costs and land shortages, Taiwan now stnds high on 
the list of potential sources of help for PRC's
investment. Taiwanese businesses in the PRC hope to have
75. See "Work Report" of the Supreme People's Court by
Ren Jianxin, President of the Supreme People's Court of
the PRC, Renmin Ribao (Beijing: People's Daily), overseas 
edition, 13 April 1991, p. 3.
76. On the issue of arbitration for Taiwanese investors 
in the PRC, see Liaowang Weekly (Beijing: Xinhua News 
Press), overseas edition, no. 50, 1988, 12 December 1988,
p. 22.
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a trustworthy arbitration agency, with Taiwan's 
participation, in order to handle business disputes 
fairly. Therefore, in order to establish a just Taiwan- 
PRC arbitration agency, the two regimes should negotiate 
a suitable compromise which will satisfy and be trusted 
by both sides.
In December 1989, Taiwan and the PRC set up
separate arbitration agencies. These are, in Taiwan, the
"Coordination Council of Business Affairs across the
Taiwan Straits" and in the PRC, the "Coordination Council
77of Economy and Trade across the Taiwan Straits". Both
agencies share the same objective of promoting the
development of trade and investment between Taiwan and
the PRC. These two councils have jointly formulated
"Rules of Mediation" for governing their mutual business
disputes. Undoubtedly, this is a good start in settling
78business disputes between the two regimes. ° However, 
mediation itself is not a panacea in this respect. The 
mediation agencies can do nothing if there is no place 
for mediation. Therefore, establishment of a non­
governmental arbitration agency has become one of the 
important issues confronting those in Taiwan and the PRC. 
Of course, this arbitration agency needs to enjoy the 
common trust of the governments of Taiwan and the PRC, 
and the arbitral awards made by this agency need to be 
recognised and enforced by the courts of both sides.
It is reported that both of the above Councils, in 
formulating the "Rules of Mediation", discussed the 
possibility of establishing a common arbitration agency. 
However, the PRC still maintained that the time had not 
yet come for this. It seems the PRC believes that the
77. See Renmin Ribao (Beijing: People's Daily), overseas 
edition, 10 February 1990, p. 5.
78. See Zhongguo Falii Nianjian of 1991 (Law Year-book, 
1991), (ed.), Zhongguo Falii Nianjianshe (Beijing), 1991,
pp. 1000-1001.
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establishment of such an arbitration agency will involve
too many problems of Taiwan-PRC law and sovereignty. This
7 9proposal was therefore finally abandoned. Nevertheless, 
since the establishment of the "Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Straits" (ARATS) by the PRC in 1991, 
the PRC has expressed the intention of working actively 
to set up a committee of arbitration for maritime 
disputes across the Taiwan Straits. The proposal was also 
ratified by officials of the Mainland Affairs Council
o rj
(MAC), a powerful government committee m  Taiwan.
Given this, the establishment of a system of Taiwan- 
PRC business arbitration is the best measure for dispute 
resolution between the two. However, this kind of non­
governmental agency for business arbitration still has to 
be bilaterally recognised by the authorities of both 
Taiwan and the PRC. It is true to say that such
arbitration agencies are quasi-judicial in nature. But a 
mutual recognition of such an arbitration agency will
come to nothing if there is still no governmental
approval.
There should be no legal barrier to establishing a 
non-governmental arbitration agency between Taiwan and 
the PRC. In fact, a study of the PRC law shows that 
there is no barrier at the moment. According to the TIP, 
the contracting parties may choose a Hong Kong
arbitration agency for Taiwan-PRC business disputes 
resolution. Here a Hong Kong arbitration agency should 
be interpreted as meaning an agency located in Hong Kong, 
and thus it would cover the non-governmental arbitration
79. See Zhongcai yu Falii Tongxun (The Newsletter of 
Arbitration and Law) (Beijing), May 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 1- 
2 .
80. See Shijie Ribao (New York: The World Daily), 19 
January 1992, p. 1; see also Asian Bulletin (Taipei), 
Vol. 17, No. 2, February 1992, p. 23.
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agency (as described above) established jointly by both 
Taiwan and the PRC.
As Hong Kong and the PRC are both signatories to the 
New York Convention, they are bound by its obligations in 
recognising and enforcing foreign arbitral awards. There 
are precedents to be followed in the recognition and 
enforcement of Hong Kong-PRC arbitral awards. Therefore, 
the PRC courts should recognise and enforce the arbitral 
awards made by the Taiwan-PRC arbitration agency in Hong 
Kong.
Last but not least, it seems the PRC is ready to 
remove the restrictions stipulating a Taiwan-PRC place 
for arbitration, and directly recognise arbitral awards
ft imade by such Taiwan-PRC arbitration agencies. Judging 
from the fact that the ARATS is preparing to set up a 
Taiwan-PRC arbitrating committee for maritime dispute 
settlements, there should be no problem for the PRC 
officially to recognise and enforce the arbitral awards 
made by such Taiwan-PRC arbitration agencies. It is hoped 
that the TIP or even the TIL can relax the control of 
"shetai1 arbitration venue and treat "shetai1 arbitration 
in the same way as " shegang'ao" arbitration. If the TIP 
or the TIL can further allow "shetai" business disputes 
to undergo arbitration by other signatory countries or 
areas of the New York Convention, then this will be more 
acceptable to Taiwanese businesses operating in the PRC.
In the light of Taiwanese laws on the other hand, no 
legal barrier exists to establishing a Taiwan-PRC 
arbitration agency for dispute resolution. Taiwan's
81. See Renmin Ribao (Beijing: People's Daily), overseas
edition, 3 July 1991, p. 4. According to the spokesman 
for the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
(MOFERT) of the PRC on 3 July 1991, if a business dispute 
arises between Taiwan and the PRC, the contracting 
parties may seek relevant arbitration agencies between 
Taiwan and the PRC for business dispute settlement.
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. • » ft 9 # . * •"Commercial Arbitration Act" does not limit arbitration 
solely to an arbitration agency established in Taiwan. 
So long as the contracting parties agree, arbitration may 
proceed anywhere abroad. Arbitral awards made in Taiwan 
have the same legal force and effect as affirmed court 
judgements. The relevant party may ask for enforcement
ft o
of the arbitration award by the court. One Taiwan 
official of the ROC Ministry of Justice has unequivocally 
stated that Taiwanese courts will recognise an arbitral 
award for Taiwan-PRC business disputes made by a third
O A
party m  a foreign country.
To sum up, establishing a non-governmental 
arbitration agency is the most practical and effective 
way for business dispute resolution between Taiwan and 
the PRC. It is believed that this proposal will 
technically avoid many sensitive Taiwan-PRC political 
problems which for the time being are very difficult to 
solve.
6.3 PRC Litigation Involving Taiwanese Business Disputes 
in Trade and Investment
It has been found that many "shetai" business 
disputes are settled non-judicially through
82. Taiwan had first Commercial Arbitration Act on 2 0 
January 19 61, and then was subsequently revised and the 
Law, as amended, was promulgated on 11 June 1982, with 
the last amendments being made on 2 6 December 1986. See 
K. C. Fan, "Legal Commentary on Commercial Litigation, 
Arbitration, and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgement and 
Arbitral Awards in the Republic of China", Formosa 
Transnational Law Review (Taipei: Formosa Transnational, 
Attorney at Law, February 1990), Vol. 49, pp. 37-42.
83. Ibid. p. 39.
84. See Sing Tao Daily, (Hong Kong), 24 March 1989), p. 
8 .
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Q C
administrative mediation and arbitration. However, 
there are still quite a number of these business 
disputes which are settled by PRC courts. For example, 
in Fujian Province, in southern China, between 1987 and 
1990, the provincial courts handled more than 300
O £
"shetai" civil and economic lawsuits. It is obvious 
that litigation is one of the most important methods of 
settling "shetain business disputes in the PRC.
With reference to litigation procedures for "shetai1 
business disputes, the President of the PRC Supreme 
People's Court, Ren Jianxin, pointed out in his 1991 
"Work Report" that it was necessary to abide by PRC law, 
policy and the relevant judicial interpretations made by
Q  7
the Supreme People's Court. However, there are not many 
PRC laws or regulations which directly or individually 
define "shetai" business activities. Also, there are not 
many PRC laws or regulations which explicitly state that 
they are applicable to "shetai" business disputes. To 
date, there are no explicit or concrete legal definitions 
from the PRC National People's Congress or the Supreme 
People's Court in regard to the adjudication of "shetai" 
economic cases.
85. The author was informed of this while doing fieldwork 
in the PRC in May 1992, during a discussion with several 
Taiwanese businessmen based in the PRC.
86. Supra note 70. Unlike the West, there is a different 
system of law for "civil" and "economic" disputes in the 
PRC. For further studies, see Henry R. Zheng, supra note 
3 3, pp. 15-18.
87. See Renmin Ribao, overseas edition, 13 April 1991, p. 
3. Ren Jianxin also said that the PRC will recognise 
civil decisions handed down by Taiwan courts if they do 
not violate basic legal principles in the PRC. With the 
permission of the Supreme People's Court, the PRC courts 
can entrust Taiwan courts to handle legal proceedings and 
accept cases from them. Taiwan authorities began 
recognising documents of marriage, divorce, birth and 
transfer of property issued in the PRC on a case-by-case 
basis in 1990.
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6.3.1 The Procedure Problem - Jurisdiction
The PRC has been separately handling economic and 
civil cases involving Taiwan in its economic courts and
Q Q
civil courts. As the natures of such cases are 
basically similar, both are governed by the same
ft Q t tprocedural law. The Civil Procedure Law 1984 (for trial 
use) of the PRC has now been replaced by a new Civil 
Procedure Law of the PRC. The latter was adopted in 
1991.90
Regarding the jurisdiction over business disputes 
involving Taiwanese, the PRC generally adjudicates this 
type of dispute in accordance with relevant stipulations 
applicable to its Civil Procedure Law. However, on the 
grounds that business disputes have special features, the 
PRC courts have introduced certain special stipulations 
for economic cases involving Taiwanese. These special 
stipulations are below:
A. The Level of Jurisdiction
The PRC court system consists of local People's 
Courts, special People's Courts and the Supreme People's 
Court. Local People's Courts include Basic People's 
Courts, Intermediate People's Courts and Higher People's 
Courts. Under Article 16 of the 1982 Civil Procedure 
Law, the Basic People's Courts, except as otherwise
88. See art. 19, 24, 27, 31, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Fayuan Zuzhifa (The Law of Court Organisation of the 
People's Republic of China).
89. See "Opinions of the Supreme People's Court of the 
PRC on Some Questions Concerning the Implementation of 
the Civil Procedure Law in the Adjudication of Economic 
Cases", issued on 17 September 1984, and reprinted in 
Chinese in Bulletin of the Supreme People's Court, 20 
June 1985, p. 17.
90. Supra note 15.
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stipulated, have jurisdiction as courts of first instance
Q 1over civil cases. This Law stipulates that the
Intermediate People's Courts are the trial courts for
Q 9 ."shewai" cases. * Under a Supreme People's Court ruling, 
Intermediate People's Courts also exercise jurisdiction
Q ftover "shegang'ao" economic cases. The truth is that
"shegang'ao" economic cases are similar in nature to
"shewai" cases. The same situation applies to "shetai" 
economic cases. Since 1979, the PRC has deemed the 
Intermediate People's Courts to be the trial courts for
Q 4" shetai" business disputes.
The quality of the judgements from the Intermediate 
People's Courts is much better than it is for those from 
the Basic People's Courts. It is therefore necessary and 
significant to have another similar ruling from the 
Supreme People's Court on raising the level of 
jurisdiction for "shetai" economic cases, directly from 
the Basic to the Intermediate People's Courts. In recent 
years, the number of "shewai" cases in the PRC has been 
increasing year by year. The various Intermediate 
People's Courts of the PRC have therefore accumulated a 
body of experience in handling such "shetai" cases over 
the years. However, the 1991 Civil Procedure Law, 
replacing that of 1982, stipulates that the Intermediate
Q 6People's Courts will handle only major "shewai" cases. 
This means that the Basic People's Courts will in the 
future be the trial courts in handling ordinary "shewai" 
cases. Thus, by analogy, similar "shetai" and
"shegang'ao" cases should also be handled at the level of
91. Ibid., art. 16.
92. Ibid., art. 17.
93. Supra note 89.
94. Supra note 70.
95. Supra note 15, art. 19.
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the Basic People’s Courts. This will be a serious 
challenge for the judges at trial courts in the PRC.
B. The Scope of Exclusive Jurisdiction
According to the Civil Procedure Law 1991, the PRC 
has defined exclusive jurisdiction over a given category 
of cases. Prior to this, the PRC Supreme People's
Court, in light of the existing problems with the 
judgement of "shewai", and "shegang'ao" economic 
lawsuits, published its "Minutes of the Working Panel of 
the PRC's Coastal Areas on the Judgement of "shewai" and 
"shegang'ao" Economic Lawsuits" in June 1989. These 
Minutes specifically stipulate that foreign courts and 
courts in Hong Kong and Macao have no jurisdiction over 
those economic lawsuits which the CPL and other relevant 
laws have characterised as being under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the PRC Courts. The so-called economic 
lawsuits include cases arising from immovable property; 
cases arising from events occurring during harbour
<57operations; cases arising from registration; and cases 
arising from concluding investment contracts in the PRC 
such as equity joint venture, co-operative joint ventures
<5 3and 3)oint exploitation of natural resources.
Given the above situation, it is inferred that 
"shetai" investment disputes in the PRC are naturally 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the PRC courts. Of 
course, if the contracting parties have defined articles 
or agreements on arbitration, and agree to file this 
dispute to an arbitration agency for an award, both 
parties would not be under the control of such exclusive
96. Ibid., art. 22-39.
97. The 1991 Civil Procedure Law of the PRC has abolished 
the proceeding concerning registration to be under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the PRC courts. See ibid., 
art. 34.
98. Supra note 72.
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qq ,
jurisdiction. Besides these examples, cases involving
administrative torts of public law are also under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the PRC courts.100
Administrative torts always originate when disputes arise
between the PRC relevant trade or investment authorities
and "shewai", "shegang'ao", and "shetai" parties.101
Examples of this kind are: the approval of contracts, the
issue of business licences, and so on. Contracting
parties can only seek legal protection from the PRC
courts, instead of choosing international arbitration or
judicial remedies from the courts of foreign countries,
10 7including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. v
C. The Scope of Jurisdiction
According to the CPL, proceedings arising from 
contractual disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the 
People’s Court, and are determined by the location of the 
performance of the contract and the defendant's 
residence. Since 1989, the PRC courts, through
99. Ibid.
100. Supra note 15, art. 29; see also art. 2, 22, 70 and 
71 of the Administrative Litigation Law of the People's 
Republic of China, promulgated on 4 April 1989 and became 
effective in October 1990, which covers suspension of 
business licences, government interference with 
contracts, and so on. For an English text, see China 
Law and Practice (No. 5, 1989), p. 37.
101. Ibid., see also Zhou Haiping, Qiantan Shewai Qinquan
Xingwei De Falii Shiyong (Tentative Discussion on the
Application of Law to Torts Involving Foreign Elements), 
Zhongguo Fazhibao (Chinese Legal System Daily), 1 August
1986, p. 3.
102. Ibid. The act of the PRC authorities is an
administrative practice which is under no jurisdiction of 
the courts of foreign countries or international
arbitration.
103. Supra note 15, art. 24. The contract disputes fall 
within the jurisdiction of the court of the place where 
the contract is signed (forum contractus) or the court of 
the place of the performance (fomm solutionis) .
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judicial interpretation, have expanded the scope of their 
exclusive jurisdiction over "shewai11 and "shegang'ao1 
economic cases.104 According to this interpretation, 
they now have jurisdiction over the property of the 
defendant in the PRC, no matter whether this property is 
the subject matter of the dispute or not. This 
jurisdiction also includes the place where the contract 
was signed (forum contractus), the place where it was 
performed (forum solutionis), and cases where the 
defendant has residence, business address, or 
representative agencies in the PRC. In addition, the 
parties may file a written agreement with the PRC courts 
over which the PRC courts have no jurisdiction. Where 
there is no such agreement, the PRC courts have 
jurisdiction when a lawsuit is brought, and over the 
procedure for debating matters of substance.105 The CPL
has explicitly defined the agreed jurisdiction and the
* i n fiquasi-agreed jurisdiction. This practice of the PRC
courts in the coastal areas is also applied in "shetaiM
107economic cases.
Could "shetai1 economic cases of the PRC be handled 
by Taiwanese courts? Jurisidction has become an emerging 
issue between Taiwan and the PRC. The PRC authorities 
have so far not clarified their position on this matter. 
The reality, however, is that PRC courts treat "shetai" 
economic cases in the same way as "shewai" and 
"shegang'aon economic cases. The PRC courts even adopt 
the relevant regulations and practices of "shewai" 
litigation proceedings in the jurisdiction of "shetai" 
and "shegang'ao1 economic cases. Having been recognised 
by the PRC courts, this choice of jurisdiction is made
104. Supra note 72.
105. Ibid.
106. Supra note 15, art. 243.
107. Supra note 70.
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via an agreement or dealt with by the contracting 
parties. Therefore, such 11shewai" and "shegang'ao" 
practices in acknowledging the choice of jurisdiction of 
non-PRC courts should, by analogy, also be applied to 
Taiwanese courts.
6.3.2 The Application of Substantial Law
As mentioned above, the PRC judicial authorities 
have not specified whether or not the laws of Taiwan or 
the PRC should be used in handling 1 shetai" economic 
cases. To comply with the needs of judging "shegang'ao" 
economic cases, the PRC Supreme People's Court has 
stipulated a series of judicial interpretations which 
have had a decisive impact on the courts trying "shetai"
, i r\Q
economic cases. °
A. Applicability of Substantial Law for "Shegang'ao" 
Economic Cases
According to judicial interpretations made by the 
PRC Supreme People's Court, "Shegang'ao" economic cases 
are handled in the same basic way as "shewai" economic 
cases. The PRC Supreme People's Court has given
definitions on the applicability of substantial law on 
"shegang'ao" economic cases, in the following terms:
a. Application of PRC Laws and Regulations
The PRC has several limited "shewai" laws or
regulations which are explicitly stated to be applicable 
for "shegang'ao" cases of a similar nature. Most PRC
laws and regulations have no such stipulations and thus
cause much trouble when an application is filed. To this 
end, in 1987, the PRC Supreme People's Court clarified
108. Examples of such judicial interpretations are found 
in supra note 72 and 89.
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the position in its "Explanation on Several Issues 
Relating to the Application of the Law on Foreign 
Economic Contracts" by saying that:
The Foreign Economic Contract Law 1985 of the PRC 
is also applicable to economic contracts signed 
between Hong Kong and Macao contracting parties and 
contracting parties within the territory of the PRC. 
Moreover, this Law is also applicable to economic 
contracts signed or performed between Hong Kong and 
Macao contracting parties and foreign contracting 
parties who are themselves within the territory 
ofthe PRC.109
b. Application of Hong Kong or Macao Laws
According to the "Explanation on Several Issues
Relating to the Application of the Law on Foreign
Economic Contracts" of 1987, the PRC trial courts allow
the contracting parties, in accordance with an agreement,
to choose applicable Hong Kong or Macao law as the
governing law.110 For example, the above stated
"Explanation" explicitly state that the people's court
should apply the law chosen by the contracting parties on
entering into contract or for settling "shewai" and
"shegang'ao" business disputes. The law chosen can be
either the PRC laws or the laws of foreign countries
including Hong Kong and Macao. However, the choice made
by the contracting parties must be unanimous and
1 1 1explicitly stated m  the contract.
109. "Explanation of the Supreme People's Court of the 
PRC on Several Questions Relating to the Application of 
the Foreign Economic Contract Law", issued on 19 October 
1987, China Law and Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2 May 1988, 
pp. 52-66.
110. Ibid., also see art. 5, FECL.
111. Ibid.
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c. The Principle of Closest Connection
According to Article 145 of the PRC Civil Code and 
Article 5 of the PRC Foreign Economic Contract Law, the 
law of the country with the closest connection to the 
contract should be applied if both contracting parties 
have not made a choice. In other words, if the
contracting parties have not chosen the applicable law, 
the law of the country with the closest connection to the 
contract is deemed applicable. The PRC courts adopt the 
"Principle of Closest Connection" of private 
international law in their adjudication of "shegang'ao" 
economic cases. Moreover, The PRC Supreme People's Court 
specifies, in light of this Principle, the applicable law 
for thirteen of the most common contracts. The contract 
of international transportation is an example.114
d. Confirming Legal Personality
According to PRC judicial interpretation, the 
international rule of the lex loci contractus is used in 
determining the legal personality of foreign contracting
11c: ,
parties, that is to say whether the contracting parties
112. The Principle of Closest Connection was first 
adopted by the English scholar John Westlake as the "Most 
Real Connection" and then popularly found in many 
practices of private international law over the 
application of foreign laws. See Henri Batiffol, G. C. 
Cheshire (eds.), Private International Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 5. Also see A. E. 
Anton, Private International Law (2nd ed.), Edinburgh: W. 
Green & Son Ltd., 1990, pp. 64-65.
113. The PRC Civil Code which means the GPCL, supra note
71. For further studies on PRC law governing a contract, 
see Cheng Yuan, supra note 10, pp. 266-267.
114. Supra note 109.
115. Ibid. Lex loci contractus means the law of the place 
in which a contract was made. Lex fori means the law of 
the place in which a case is tried. For example, if an 
action were brought in England on a contract made in 
France, the law of England would, as regards such action,
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in Hong Kong and Macao have the capacity of a legal 
person and bear their own limited or unlimited
liabilities. All these fall to be determined in
116accordance with the lex loci contractus.
To sum up, PRC judicial practices have recognised
Hong Kong and Macao as independent legal areas whose laws
are applicable in the PRC. This is to say that the PRC
judiciary has in practice recognised, adopted and
practically applied the theory of inter-regional conflict
of law as noted earlier (see above pp. 71-74) . By
analogy, the applicable private international law in
resolving inter-regional conflict of laws has become a
1 1 7model for Taiwan-PRC dispute resolution.
B. Applicable Law in "Shetai" Cases
Though the PRC has made much progress in the 
applicability of law for "shegang'ao" economic cases, it 
has done little in the field of "shetai11 conflict of law. 
Except for a professed emphasis on the observance of law, 
policy and judicial interpretation in handling such 
lawsuits, the PRC has not to date proposed any 
significant measures to help resolve Taiwan-PRC legal 
problems.
However, various People's Courts in the coastal 
areas of the PRC have made their so called "local" 
definitions of the applicability of a number of general 
"shetai" laws and regulations, and have referred to the
be the lex fori, and the law of France the lex loci 
contractus.
116. Supra note 72.
117. The progress of private international law has caused 
the development of PRC private international law 
jurisprudence. For further studies, see Henry R. Zheng, 
supra note 33, pp. 229-231.
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applicability of law for "shegang'ao" economic cases. 
Under the framework set by central government, 
definitions have been made in the light of the 
characteristics of "shetaiM economic cases.
a. Lawsuits Involving Trade
The PRC courts treat Taiwanese trade lawsuits based 
on the models of Hong Kong, Macao, or foreign businesses, 
as general "shegang'ao" or "shewai" economic cases. The 
Foreign Economic Contract Law 1985 and other relevant 
laws or regulations for foreign trade are referred to and 
applied.118 It is believed that "shetai" dispute 
resolution, as a result of Taiwanese businesses trading 
directly with the PRC, should be handled in the same way 
as "shewai" and "shegang'ao" cases.
b. Lawsuits Involving Investment
Dispute resolution of economic cases amongst parties 
of Taiwan-PRC equity joint ventures and co-operative 
joint ventures is to be handled in accordance with the 
applicable laws for foreign related enterprises in the 
PRC, such as the Sino-Foreign Equity'Joint Ventures Law 
of 1990, and the Sino-Foreign Co-operative Joint 
Ventures Law of 1988.119
c. Application of International Custom
PRC courts have in the past looked to international 
custom in deciding "shewai" cases.120 If the contracting 
parties have an agreement to abide by international
118. Supra note 18. Also supra note 70.
119. See Margaret Maggio, "Important Developments in 
Mainland China's Foreign Investment Laws", International 
Business Law Jounral, No. 3, 1993, pp. 290-294.
120. Henry R. Zheng, supra note 33, p. 204.
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custom, the PRC courts will apply international custom in
respect of the choice of the contracting parties. If no
such agreement has been reached, the contracting parties
will do likewise when there are no explicit stipulations
in the PRC laws or regulations. For example, the PRC
courts have handled "shetai" economic cases of equity
joint ventures in light of general international customs
and rules concerning stock sharing limited liability of a 
121company.
d. Capacity of Legal Person and Applicability of 
Law Governing Acts of Agents
According to lex loci contractus, the PRC courts 
decide the capacity of legal persons involving Taiwanese 
businesses by the PRC law. The force of any contract of 
agency on commission, which has been created in Hong Kong 
or Taiwan, is determined in the light of the laws of Hong 
Kong or Taiwan. ^
Given this, the local People's Courts of the PRC 
have, to a certain degree, adopted the principle of 
applicability of law for handling "shegang'ao" economic 
cases in the same way as "shetai" economic cases. This 
shows the great influence exercised by judgements of 
"shegang'ao" economic cases on "shetai" economic cases in 
the PRC. However, both "shegang'ao" and "shetai" economic 
cases have fundamental differences in their applicability 
of substantial law. These are manifested mainly in the 
fact that the PRC authorities do not allow "shetai" 
contracting parties to choose Taiwan law as the 
applicable law for business dispute resolution. The PRC 
authorities even disallow the Principle of Closest 
Connection of private international law being applied in 
"shetai" economic cases. In other words, the People's
121. Supra note 18.
122. Ibid.
284
Courts of the PRC cannot directly apply Taiwan law in 
handling "shetai1 economic cases.
Viewed from the perspective of private law, 
Taiwanese laws and PRC laws are independent legal
systems. The need for an inter-regional basis for
resolving conflict of law disputes will become a 
necessity after Hong Kong returns to the PRC in 1997,
when a completely new legal system will co-exist with the
PRC legal system. Regarding business dispute resolution, 
"shetaiM economic cases do not differ much from
"shegang'ao" economic cases in terms of the relationship 
to private law. The fact is, however that the PRC 
differentiates "shetai" economic cases from "shegang'ao" 
economic cases so far as the applicability of law is 
concerned. This fact arises purely from a political 
consideration, and there is uncertainty in governmental 
recognition of public international law and foreign law 
in private international law as noted above (see pp. 52- 
54). Taiwan and the PRC should concede that recognition
of the other's laws does not necessarily imply
recognition of each other's government since the 
political recognition of a government is not a
prerequisite for recognition of its laws. This differing 
treatment for "shetai" economic cases has no legal basis 
in the PRC.124
The PRC should choose the applicable substantial law 
in handling "shetai" economic cases in the same way as it 
does in handling "shegang'ao" economic cases. On the 
basis of this, the principles of conflict of law or
private international law could be adopted in the
handling of "shetai" economic cases in the PRC. Only in
12 3. Supra note 87.
124. For further studies, see Tung-Pi Chen, "Bridge
Across the Formosa Strait: Private Law Relations Between 
Taiwan and Mainland China", 4 Journal of Chinese Law 
(Spring, 1990), pp. 106-115.
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this way may PRC courts directly use experiences acquired 
in the handling of "shewai" or "shegang'aoM economic 
cases in the judgement of "shetai" economic cases. In 
the meantime, the PRC courts could also avoid legal 
confusion on applicability of law towards "shetai" 
economic cases. This would prompt Taiwan to do likewise 
in handling business dispute resolution between itself 
and the PRC. The process of restoring relations in 
Taiwan-PRC business dispute resolution will benefit not 
only mutual economic development but also mutual 
political understanding.
6.4 Conclusions
It is evident that present PRC law and policy for 
"shetai" economic cases differ from those for its 
domestic, "shewai" and "shegang'ao" economic cases. 
Such differences in "shetai" economic cases are 
attributable to the de facto relationship of mutual non­
recognition and political standing, poisoned by the 
atmosphere of rivalry, suspicion, and intransigence 
existing between Taiwan and the PRC.
Much the same as the status quo of Hong Kong and
Macao, Taiwan has long been a political entity and a
legal region independent of PRC jurisidiction. Against
such a background, it is imperative for the PRC to 
authorise some special preferential treatment and thus to 
stipulate some relevant "shewai" economic laws or 
regulations which are to be applicable not only to 
overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Macao but also to the 
Taiwanese. In addition to attracting overseas capital, 
the PRC has had the political objective of a United Front 
policy towards Taiwan for the reunification of China. 
Therefore, in litigation procedure, the PRC basically
treats "shetai" proceedings of economic cases in the same
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way as "shegang'ao" economic cases with references from 
some "shewai" laws or regulations. As for substantial 
law, the PRC adopts some rules of conflict of laws or 
private international law. Examples are lex loci 
contractus for recognising the capacity of a legal 
person, international customs applied as the applicable 
law, and so on. Regarding arbitration, the PRC "shewai" 
arbitration agencies deal with "shetai" dispute 
resolution in accordance with "shewai" arbitration 
procedures. All these performances are attributed to 
conforming to the objective needs of equal treatment for 
"shetai" economic cases and "shewai" economic cases in 
the PRC.
The PRC tries to define the prospects of Taiwan-PRC 
relationships not only from a legal perspective but also 
with an eye to a political agenda. Due to the difference 
of political standing, Taiwan insists on the policy of 
"one China but not now" while the PRC stands by the model 
of "one country, two systems". The PRC fears that 
introducing the applicability of Taiwan law will lead to 
recognition of the Taiwanese government and thence to the 
de jure recognition of "two Chinas" or "one China, one 
Taiwan". Based on such considerations, the PRC
distinguishes between "shetai" economic cases and 
"shegang'ao" economic cases, and insists on excluding the 
applicability of Taiwan law in "shetai" economic cases.
Due to the need to improve economic relationships 
between Taiwan and the PRC, the PRC attempts to 
differentiate between arbitration of "shetai" economic 
cases and arbitration of "shewai" and "shegang'ao" 
economic cases. Taiwanese businesses afford a special 
status for disputes resolution in the PRC. As one clear- 
cut example, the TIP allows contracting parties to choose 
only the PRC or Hong Kong as their arbitration venue.
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The future development of Taiwan-PRC economic and 
political relationships depends on the fundamental 
resolution of "shetain legal problems in the PRC. It is 
imperative that both Taiwan and the PRC jointly formulate 
a concrete, progressive and rational economic policy. On 
the premise of mutual benefit, there should at least be a 
guarantee of protection for the legitimate rights of 
Taiwanese businesses in the PRC. If there is progress in 
this direction, then the economic relationship between 
Taiwan and the PRC should be supported by normalisation, 
co-operation and legalisation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
China became a divided nation in 1949; since then, 
the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland have
existed almost entirely as mutually exclusive entities. 
Relations between the two were, until recently, 
relatively straightforward: mutual non-recognition and
even hostility. This division of Taiwan and the PRC 
since 1949 has resulted in two separate independent 
political and legal systems.
Driven by forces of economic expansion and 
nationalist sentiment, as well as by political and
economic pragmatism, Taiwan and the PRC are now moving 
toward a closer informal relationship. Since 1983, the 
PRC has adopted a "one country, two systems" formula, 
offering Taiwan terms even more favourable than those 
devised for the PRC's takeover of Hong Kong in 1997.1 
Similarly, Taiwan has responded by opting for a more
flexible and pragmatic foreign policy and has countered 
Deng's proposals with the "one country, two governments"2 
concept. Under this formula, Taiwan is, in fact,
maintaining a policy of "one China but not now" or "one
1. This proposal first became known in a discussion 
between the PRC paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and 
Professor Yang Liyu of Seton Hall University. For an 
account of the discussion and for a summary of the 
proposal, see Deng Xiaoping, in Fundamental Issues in 
Present-Day China (1987), p. 19.
2. For comments from Taiwan's perspective, see T. S. 
Chao, "Lun Yige Zhongguo Liangge Dui Deng Zhengfu Wenti*r 
(Analyse the Problems of One China, Two Equal 
Governments), Wenti Yu Yanjiu (Issues and Studies) 
(Taipei: Institute of International Relations, May 1989),
p. 1.
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China, two entities". However, such political
propositions have still failed to solve a number of legal 
problems which have arisen since the time when both 
Taiwan and the PRC started making private and commercial 
contacts indirectly in the early 1980s.
There are de facto two exclusive entities with 
lawful international personalities which exist separately 
in both Taiwan and the PRC. Based on political 
considerations, both Taiwan and the PRC have increasingly 
complicated their rapidly developing economic relations 
and further confused any basis of legal principles. For 
example, the legal status of Taiwan-related (hereinafter, 
"shetai") businesses in the PRC has appeared especially 
conspicuous for the outside world. Nevertheless, as 
regards "shetai" economic cases, the PRC has in practice 
discriminated against its so-called Taiwanese 
compatriots. Therefore, the question of how to
rationalise and legalise problems of this kind in order 
to stabilise bilateral economic relations has become a 
major task for both Taiwan and the PRC.
This concluding chapter seeks first to summarise 
Taiwan's economic relations with the PRC. Secondly, it 
clarifies the complicated "shetai" economic relationship 
that has emerged in the PRC, and also attempts to analyse 
the status of the Taiwanese businesses under PRC law and 
practice. Thirdly, it illustrates the defects of the 
PRC's existing method for resolution of disputes 
concerning "shetai" economic cases, and explores the 
feasibility of establishing a joint mediation and 
arbitration system. Lastly, it looks at the possibility 
of signing agreements for judicial assistance and 
investment protection between the two territories.
3. Jason Hu, "President Lee's Pragmatic Diplomacy and 
China's Re-unification", a special report of The Daily 
Telegraph (London), 21 May 1990, p. 2.
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7.1 Taiwan's Growing Economic Convergence with the PRC
Economic relations between Taiwan and the PRC have
been intricately related to political developments from
the 1950s to the present. Nominally, trade between
Taiwan and the PRC did not break through before 1988, the
year after Taiwan lifted its ban on private visits
between people living across the Taiwan Straits. As a
matter of fact, 1988 was the year underground trading
activities between Taiwan and the PRC legally surfaced.4
Since then, the Taiwanese investment in the PRC has
increased steadily despite obvious political and legal
suncertainties.
At present, a growing number of Taiwanese business 
people have endorsed the notion of a pan-Chinese economic 
market with a high-level of optimism, as revealed in both 
their committed PRC investment decisions and public
predictions for the future of their business expansion in
£
the PRC. Despite the identical ultimate goal of
reunification cherished by both sides, exactly how this
goal to be achieved remains elusive. However, there is a
consensus that even if official negotiations for
reunification must wait until conditions are more
conducive to mutual agreement, economic relations can be
7facilitated or promoted.
4. Zha Daojiong, "A 'Greater China'? The Political 
Economy of Chinese National Reunification", The Journal 
of Contemporary China, No. 5, Spring 199 5, p. 44.
5. For example, prior to 1993, the officially approved 
Taiwanese investment in the PRC had reached eighteen 
provinces, covering nineteen major industries. See 
Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Republic of China (comp.), Statistics on Approved 
Indirect Mainland Investment by Area and by Industry, May 
1993, pp. 68-73.
6. Supra note 4.
7. Ibid., p. 47.
291
Economic integration between Taiwan and the PRC is 
not to say that political considerations can be safely 
forgotten. The foregoing chapters of this thesis have 
demonstrated that the political framework affects 
importantly the willingness, especially on the Taiwan 
side, to enjoy expanded economic relations with the PRC. 
Conversely, expanded economic relations can pave the way 
for political negotiations. A skilful management of the 
transitional stages is thus called for, and existing and 
evolving problems and anomalies in economic relations 
must be dealt with as they arise. At the present 
juncture, several major positive steps appear feasible.
First, although negotiations for reunification have 
had to be postponed, unofficial discussions of various 
modalities of coexistence should be encouraged. Such 
discussions may reduce the polarisation of those who 
insist on annexation of Taiwan by the PRC and those who 
clamour for Taiwan's independent nationhood. They should 
take place periodically in third countries as well as on
Q
both sides of the Taiwan Straits.
Secondly, although the PRC may be unwilling to 
renounce the use of force or threat of force as a 
bargaining counter, it could certainly help to reduce 
tension by narrowing the conditions under which, as a 
last resort, force is considered. The contention that 
force is needed in the event of foreign interference or 
secession implies that it will not be used purely for the
Q . . . .purpose of reunification. A more explicit definition 
and narrowing down of the conditions would be helpful.
8. For example, Taiwan's SEF and PRC's ARATS had their 
first historic talk on mutual economic exchange in 
Singapore in 1993.
9. The use of force is PRC's final option for national 
reunification. See supra note 4, pp. 58-59.
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Thirdly, although dual recognition of both political 
entities is unacceptable to the PRC and to most of the 
countries concerned,10 unofficial arrangements for 
facilitating Taiwan's commerce and business travel should 
be encouraged by the PRC. These include speedy
processing of visas as well as arrangements for avoidance 
of double taxation and treatment of investment.11
Fourthly, with Taiwan's termination of the Period of 
Mobilisation for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion 
in 1991, the political and legal rationale for 
prohibition of direct trade and investment became 
tenuous. From the point of view of economic integration, 
it seems that prohibition has become increasingly 
indefensible, especially as progressive liberalisation is 
being applied in relations with other socialist 
countries.
Lastly, economic relations between Taiwan and the 
PRC should play a positive and dynamic role in the 1990s 
and beyond for both sides. This is all the more
crucial for Taiwan since it is unthinkable that Taiwan 
can turn its back on the proven course of
10. Taiwan has made it clear to regain its lost 
membership in the United Nations and has achieved equal 
status with the PRC in eleven international organisations 
such as Asian Development Bank, Asian Pacific Economic 
Council, and so on. See ibid., pp. 49, 58.
11. The author was informed of this by several Taiwanese 
business persons based in the PRC in 1992 and 1994 
respectively while carrying out interviews there.
12. In addition to political consideration, Taiwan's 
present policy of indirect trade and investment with the 
PRC is justified to avoid having its economy too reliant 
on the PRC in the future. Interview with a Taiwanese 
government official of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
in May 1994.
13. Tzong-shian Yu, Taiwan's Economic Development and Its 
Economic Relationship with Mainland China (Occasional 
Paper Series No. 93 07), Taipei: Chung-Hua Institution For 
Economic Research, November 1993, 14-15.
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internationalisation and liberalisation. Given the
general strategy of an island economy and, in spite of 
its problems the rising position of the PRC in the world 
economy, a head-in-sand policy is both inconsistent and 
costly. Instead, a positive approach should make use of 
the comparative strengths of both sides.14
The main thrust of the government's role should 
therefore be one of facilitation. The first priority is 
the removal of artificial restraints dictated by 
yesterday's political considerations. More positively, 
the encouragement of the establishment of intermediate 
bodies that will be able to assist traders and investors 
to obtain information, locate partners, and settle 
disputes is a step that has proved its worth in numerous 
cases where normal official channels are deficient. For 
example, the useful role played by Taiwan's SEF and PRC's 
ARATS is well-known as an unofficial umbrella with some 
behind-the-scene official involvement.
For economic integration, as a large entity, the 
strategic choices for the PRC within the general 
framework of an open policy since 1979 are far greater 
than for an island economy like Taiwan. In contrast, as 
a relatively small island economy, Taiwan must compete 
globally. Taiwan's economic relations with the PRC must 
be justified on global grounds because they are 
economically superior to alternative relations. The role 
of Taiwan in the world is thus very similar to that of a 
transnational or global corporation. It engages in
14. For example, a Chinese scholar Fang Sheng from the 
People's University proposed an "economic joint 
commission", a non-political commission to work to 
coordinate a wide range of economic activities and issues 
among businesses between Taiwan and the PRC without 
demanding changes of their respective political stances. 
See Fang Sheng, "Guanyu Jianli Dalu, Taiwan he Xianggang 
Jingji Lianheti de Jidian Shexiang" (A Proposal for 
Establishing a Mainland-Taiwan-Hong Kong Joint Economic 
Commission), Jingji Ribao (Beijing: Economic Daily, 24
June 1992), p. 4.
294
activities and has facilities globally, including in the 
PRC, taking into account the special risks and problems 
in each case. The guiding spirit is multilateralism 
rather than bilateralism or regionalism.
7.2 A Complicated "Shetai" Economic Relationship
Being deeply influenced by political considerations, 
Taiwanese businesses in the PRC are operating under 
special economic laws and regulations. Because of this, 
these Taiwanese businesses have varying status in trading 
with or investing in the PRC. This varying status can be 
divided into three major types: "foreign businesses",
"quasi-foreign businesses", and "Taiwanese investors". 
These three types enjoy different legal relations with 
their contracting parties in the PRC. In consequence, 
when a dispute occurs, the resulting legal problem 
invariably becomes doubly complicated.
7.2.1 Status of Taiwan Businesses in Law
In October 1986, the State Council of the PRC
1 fi •promulgated the FIP in order to improve the investment 
environment by absorbing more foreign investment and 
introducing advanced technology. The FIP applies to 
overseas Chinese investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and
1 7 .  .Taiwan. This was the first time that investors from 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan came under jurisdiction of 
laws or regulations applicable to foreign investors.
15. Supra note 12.
16. As a national policy of encouraging more foreign 
investment, the State Council of the PRC promulgated the 
"Provisions for Encouraging Foreign Investment" (Foreign 
Investment Provisions, or FIP) on 11 October 1986. See 
CCH Austl. f 13-509.
17. Ibid., see Article 20.
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In June 1988, in order to promote economic and 
technological exchange between Taiwan and the PRC, the 
State Council promulgated the TIP.18 This TIP was
1 Qupgraded and amplified to the TIL of 1994. Besides
applying the TIP or TIL to EJVs, CJVs, and WFOEs
established in the PRC by Taiwanese investors, relevant 
state foreign economic legislation was to be implemented.
Taiwanese businesses were to enjoy treatment
corresponding to that enjoyed by businesses with foreign 
investment. In addition to applying the TIP or TIL, 
relevant state foreign economic laws and regulations
could also be implemented as appropriate in respect of 
other forms of investment conducted in the PRC by 
Taiwanese investors, as well as to PRC-derived income 
derived from individuals, interest, rentals and 
royalties, and to other PRC-derived income derived by 
Taiwanese investors who do not maintain business
establishments in the PRC.20
Given these circumstances, Taiwanese investors are 
basically regarded by the PRC economic laws as foreign 
investors and thus become entities which are subject to 
the PRC's foreign economic laws and regulations. Such 
status happens to coincide with Taiwan's official policy 
of indirect investment in the PRC. Under this policy, 
Taiwanese businesses may only invest in the PRC through a
18. The "Provisions on Encouraging Taiwanese Investment" 
(Taiwanese Investment Provisions, or TIP) was promulgated 
on 3 July 1988 by the State Council of the PRC. For an 
English text, see China Law and Practice, 22 August 1988, 
vol. 2, no. 7, pp. 56-62.
19. A special legislation with the same background as the 
TIP, the Law of the People's Republic of China on the 
Protection of Taiwan Compatriots' Investment (Taiwanese 
Investment Law, or TIL), was promulgated on 3 March 1994. 
For an English text, see China Economic News (No. 11), 21 
March 1994, pp. 6-7.
20. Ibid., art. 5.
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third country. Since they must therefore establish a 
presence in a third country, such investors thus obtain 
the status of foreign businesses before they enter the 
PRC. Therefore, they become entities subject to the
9 1PRC's foreign economic laws and regulations. 
Nevertheless, the legal status of Taiwanese businesses 
which are "legally regarded" as foreign investors, and 
those who are de facto foreign investors in law is 
substantially different.
Taiwanese businesses which have no foreign status 
from the basis of residence in a third country are 
treated as quasi-foreign investors even though they are 
"legally regarded" as foreign investors. These Taiwanese 
businesses are protected by foreign laws which are the 
laws reciprocally enforced in Taiwan. This is the direct 
result of differences of policy and ideology between 
Taiwan and the PRC. In its economic laws and
regulations, the PRC pursues discriminatory practices 
against de facto Taiwanese businesses. Though the TIP 
or TIL gives preferential treatment to Taiwanese 
investors, Taiwanese businesses are nevertheless 
discriminated against on the basis of differing political 
ideology. For example, Taiwanese investors can choose 
arbitration organs for dispute resolution only in the PRC
9 9and choose only PRC courts for litigation.
Taiwanese businesses which have foreign status on 
the basis of existence in a third country are de facto 
foreign investors in law, and are protected not only by 
foreign laws but also by the bilateral agreements on
21. For detailed PRC's foreign economic laws and 
regulations, see Dominique T. Wang, China's Foreign Trade 
Law, Taipei: National Taiwan University Law School,1992.
22. Supra note 19, art. 14; see also art. 246 of the 1991 
Civil Procedure Law (CPL) of the PRC which became 
effective on 9 April and replaced the Civil Procedure Law 
(For Trial Implementation) of 1982. For an English text, 
see China Law and Practice (No. 5, 1991), pp. 15-16.
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investment protection signed between the foreign country
and the PRC.23 In other words, like foreign businesses,
Taiwanese businesses are entitled to rely on Article 110
of the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of EJV
Law,24 Article 26 of the CJV Law,25 Articles 243 to 246
of the CPL, and the "Answers of the Supreme People's
Court on Some Questions Concerning the Applicability of
" 2 7Foreign Economic Contracts by choosing foreign laws 
and foreign courts or arbitration organs to take legal 
proceedings or arbitration procedures.
23. Are Taiwanese businesses de facto protected by these 
bilateral agreements? This depends on the individual
contents of such bilateral agreements. According to the 
law of some signatories, the foreign business is asked to 
establish a company in the country. The foreign business 
is even required to set up its main business office or
main operation office within the territory of the
signatory. To date, the PRC has signed relevant
investment protection agreements with sixty five 
countries. The Agreement on Promoting and Protecting 
Investment concluded between the People's Republic of 
China and Republic of Singapore in 1985 is an example. 
On the part of Singapore, according to this Agreement, 
the company to be protected means company, enterprise, 
social organisation, or institution which is formed, 
established or registered in the Republic of Singapore 
under its valid law and is irrespective of whether it is 
a legal person or not [Article 1, section 4 (2)]. To
avoid misunderstanding, this Agreement even states 
explicitly that all investment should be governed by the 
Agreement itself and under jurisdiction of the valid laws 
within the territory of the signatory where the 
investment is made [Article 10].
24. The Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law 
of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, 
promulgated by the State Council on 20 September 1983, 
CCH Austl. f 6-550.
25. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-
foreign Co-operative Joint Ventures, promulgated on 13 
April 1988.
26. The CPL, supra note 22.
27. "Explanation of the Supreme People's Court of the 
People's Republic of China on Several Issues Relating to 
the Application of the Law on Foreign Economic 
Contracts", No. 27, 1987. See China Law and Practice,
Vol. 2, No. 4, 2 May 1988.
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All such legal proceedings or arbitration procedures 
may be stipulated in the contracts between the parties. 
That is to say, Taiwanese businesses can use for business 
disputes resolution either the PRC law or foreign law 
which is applicable to and has been chosen by the 
contract as the governing law. During consultation, 
mediation, arbitration, and even litigation in people's 
courts, the applicable law should be used as the primary 
legal basis. Certainly, the applicable foreign law 
should not violate the basic principles of PRC law and
7 Qhamper the PRC's public interest. Furthermore, the
applicable foreign law should not be used in dealing with 
contracts performed by EJVs, CJVs, and Sino-foreign co­
operative exploitation of natural resources within the 
territory of the PRC.29
The contracting parties may have not chosen the 
applicable law in the contract in handling disputes in 
the PRC. Under these circumstances, both parties are 
still entitled to choose the applicable law even though 
the dispute has been sent to the PRC arbitration organs 
or People's Courts. If the parties fail to reach 
agreement, the applicable law should be applied in the 
light of the Principle of Closest Connection under 
private international law (see p. 281) . As for the 
choice of trial courts, the contracting parties of 
''shewai" cases may choose courts located in a place which 
has a practical connection with the dispute. This choice 
may be made through a written agreement, and should not 
contravene the regulations of both exclusive jurisdiction 
and level of trial court stipulated in the 1991 CPL of 
the PRC. In regard to choice of arbitration agency, 
besides selecting the CIETAC located in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Shenzhen, the "shewai" economic contract may equally
28. See supra note 24-27.
29. Supra note 27.
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select an arbitration agency in the country of the 
foreign party or in a third country.
To summarise, Taiwanese businesses investing in the 
PRC via a foreign third country are regarded as having a 
legal relationship between the PRC and the foreign third 
country. Here the foreign third country does not include 
the jurisdiction of Hong Kong and Macao. For example, if 
a Taiwanese business establishes a subsidiary in a third 
country such as Singapore, Japan, or Britain and then 
invests in the PRC in the name of that subsidiary, a de 
facto legal relationship arises between the PRC and the
relevant country where the subsidiary is located.
Unless Taiwanese businesses set up branch offices in a 
third country or apply for themselves to be recognised as 
"foreign" businesses, they are still de facto Taiwanese 
businesses in law when they invest in the PRC. Under 
such circumstances, the status of these Taiwanese 
businesses is regarded as one of quasi-foreign businesses 
in the PRC. They are what are so-called Taiwanese
investors in the PRC, but not de facto foreign
o rj
businesses.
We must also examine the status of those Taiwanese 
businesses which invest in the PRC via Hong Kong and 
Macao. According to the 1990 Provisions of the State 
Council on Encouraging Investment by Overseas Chinese and 
Hong Kong and Macao Compatriots of the PRC, relevant 
foreign economic laws and regulations may be applicable, 
m  addition to those provisions applicable in the PRC. 
These businesses enjoy the same treatment as foreign 
businesses. As a result, Taiwanese businesses which
30. See art. 1, supra note 18.
31. See art. 5, Provisions of the State Council on 
Encouraging Investment by Overseas Chinese and Hong Kong 
and Macao Compatriots of the People's Republic of China, 
promulgated in August 1990, see Dominique T. Wang, 
China's Foreign Trade Law, Taipei: National Taiwan 
University Law School Press, 1992, p. 44.
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I! invest in the PRC via Hong Kong and Macao are basically
similar to those which invest via a foreign third country 
as stated above. However, in the practice of handling 
economic cases, these Taiwanese businesses seem to be 
treated in the same way as Taiwanese investors rather 
than foreign investors in the PRC. They are given 
similar treatment to the de facto Taiwanese businesses 
operating in the PRC.
7.2.2 Status of Taiwanese Businesses in Practice
Though the status of the Taiwanese businesses varies 
in "shetai" economic cases in the PRC, Taiwanese 
businesses are in fact popularly known as "Taiwanese 
investors" in the PRC. As long as they can prove this 
status, they can enjoy preferential treatment, but at the 
same time they will suffer discrimination for being 
"Taiwanese". In order to encourage their so-called 
Taiwanese compatriots to invest in the PRC, the State 
Council not only gives them the same treatment as it does 
to foreign investors but also gives additional 
preferential treatment such as in forms of investment, 
extended term of investment, special approval of 
investment, tax reduction and exemptions, entry and exit 
permits, and so on.
However, both Taiwan and PRC contracting parties may 
have chosen the applicable law or jurisdiction of forum 
and the arbitration organ in settling disputes arising 
out of such economic contracts. According to the 
opinions of the PRC Supreme People's Court, the choice of 
the applicable law, jurisdiction of forum and arbitration 
organ should be based on that of the contracting parties. 
That is, both contracting parties can choose only the 
law, trial court, and arbitration agency of either the
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PRC or in the areas of Hong Kong and Macao, but not 
Taiwan.32
Though Taiwanese businesses engage in economic 
activities indirectly via Hong Kong, Macao, or other 
foreign countries, they are regarded as "shetai" economic 
activities in the PRC. The PRC People's courts treat 
such economic cases in the same way as they do "shewai" 
or "shegang'ao" (Hong Kong and Macao related) economic 
cases. These cases should be dealt with according to the 
regulation of foreign economic laws of the PRC. This 
principle should also be followed for economic cases 
concerning those de facto Taiwanese businesses engaged in 
their economic activities directly in the PRC. That is 
to say, the applicable law, trial court and arbitration 
organ of Taiwan should be chosen in handling Taiwan-PRC 
economic cases.
7.3 Establishing Taiwan-PRC Joint Mediation and
Arbitration
As noted earlier, "shetai" economic cases have been 
treated as one part of the PRC's foreign economic cases. 
According to the practice of international business 
transactions, consultation, mediation, arbitration and
litigation are all used to varying degrees in business 
disputes resolution.
7.3.1 Rules for Resolving "Shetai" Economic Cases
Under PRC law, contracting parties should
faithfully and justly perform their responsibilities in 
line with the provisions of the contract when it has been 
signed. If the provisions are ambiguous or have
32. Ibid., art. 20; supra note 18, art. 20; supra note
14, Article 246; and supra note 15.
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oversights and omissions, a dispute may occur and need to 
be settled between the contracting parties. According to 
the PRC 1985 Foreign Economic Contract Law (FECL), the 
methods of such dispute resolution for economic cases 
include consultation, mediation, arbitration, and 
litigation.33 Since the PRC favours bilateral resolution 
of such disputes, the first three of these are 
particularly important in practice for maintaining a 
friendly relationship and mutual confidence between the 
parties. The resolution of disputes arising from "shetai1 
economic cases in the PRC is no exception to this.
At present, the PRC is still a socialist country 
with a centrally planned economy. In order to attain
national economic objectives, the PRC first promulgated 
the 1982 domestic Economic Contract Law34(ECL) and then 
the 1985 FECL. There are two separate different
procedures and forums of jurisdiction for resolution of 
contractual disputes in the PRC.35 For example, Article 
48 of the ECL stipulates that:
If disputes over an economic contract arise, the 
parties shall promptly resolve them first through 
consultation. If consultation is not successful, 
any party may apply to the contract administration 
authorities specified by the State for mediation or 
arbitration, and may also directly bring suit in the 
people's courts.
33. Art. 37, FECL, adopted on 21 March 1985, CCH Austl. f 
5-550.
34. The domestic Economic Contract Law of the People's 
Republic of China was adopted at the Fourth Session of 
the Sixth National People's Congress on 13 December 1981. 
The Law has been amended by the standing committee of the 
Eighth National People's Congress on 2 September 1993. 
For an English text, see China Law and Practice, 18 
November 1993, pp. 40-48. This Law only applies to 
contractual relations between the PRC legal persons which 
mostly are the PRC domestic business entities.
35. See Dominique T. Wang, supra note 21, pp. 801-888.
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In contrast, Article 37 and 38 of the FECL stipulate
that:
When contractual disputes arise, the parties should 
do everything possible to resolve them through 
consultation or through third party mediation. If 
the parties are unwilling to consult or mediate, or 
if consultation or mediation is not successful, they 
may, in accordance with the arbitration provisions 
in the contract or a written arbitration agreement 
reached after the dispute arose, submit the dispute 
to a PRC arbitration organ or another arbitration 
agency for arbitration.
If the parties did not conclude any arbitration 
provision in the contract, and also did not reach a 
written arbitration agreement after the dispute 
arose, they may bring suit in the people's courts.
It can be seen that it is unnecessary to have 
arbitration provisions or a written arbitration agreement 
in accordance with the ECL for arbitration of economic
O  fZ
contractual disputes. There are many differences m
the approach to arbitration between ECL and FECL. As far 
as procedures are concerned, the methods of settling 
contractual disputes under the FECL are more flexible 
than those of the ECL. However, in Article 257 of the 
PRC Civil Procedure Law, it is stated even more clearly 
that disputants involved in disputes relating to foreign 
trade, foreign economic relations, international 
transportation or maritime accidents may not bring a 
lawsuit in the people's courts if arbitration provisions 
have been provided in the contract, or if a written 
arbitration agreement has been reached after the dispute 
arose and was put to a PRC arbitration agency or another 
arbitration agency for arbitration.37 On the other hand,
36. Supra note 34, art. 49. Regarding the arbitral award, 
if one party or both parties do not agree with the 
arbitration, it or they may, within fifteen days from the 
date of receipt of the arbitral award, bring suit in the 
people's courts; if suit is not filed within that period, 
the award shall become legally effective. Such 
provisions are different from arbitration of contractual 
disputes in the FECL.
37. Supra note 26, art. 257.
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the contracting parties may bring suit in the people's 
courts if there are no arbitration provisions included in 
the contract or no written arbitration agreement has been 
reached after the dispute arose.
The status of Taiwanese businesses in the PRC is 
comparable with that of foreign or Hong Kong and Macao 
businesses. All these Taiwanese businesses in the PRC 
also fall within the jurisdiction of the FECL. The 
disputes resolution for "shetai" economic cases in the 
PRC is dependant on the above-mentioned methods of 
consultation, mediation, arbitration and litigation. 
After Taiwanese businesses are set up in the PRC, they 
obtain the capacity of PRC legal persons just as do the 
foreign businesses or Hong Kong and Macao businesses. As 
a result of the change in the legal status, economic 
contracts signed between parties of these Taiwanese 
businesses or between one Taiwanese and one PRC party are 
governed by ECL and not by the FECL. All contractual 
disputes should be resolved in line with ECL, not the 
FECL. In contrast, economic contracts signed between 
these Taiwanese businesses and foreign, Hong Kong and 
Macao, and other Taiwanese businesses which have not set 
up in the PRC, are subject to the FECL and not ECL. 
These types of contractual disputes should be resolved in
T O
accordance with FECL and corresponding laws.
7.3.2 Feasibility of Establishing Taiwan-PRC Joint 
Mediation and Arbitration Systems
In resolving Sino-foreign economic disputes, the 
practices referred to as joint mediation and arbitration 
systems were created as useful methods for settling 
"shewai" economic cases. Starting between 1977 and 1979, 
these systems were created when the PRC's Foreign
38. Supra note 27.
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Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and the United 
States1 Arbitration Association jointly mediated various 
trade disputes between the two countries. As required by 
both parties, arbitration agencies from both countries 
agreed to offer joint mediation. In such a contractual 
dispute about international trade, the mediators 
appointed by arbitration agencies from both countries 
helped the parties to reach agreements to their mutual 
benefit. The PRC, in its foreign trade practice, had for 
the first time accepted the jurisdiction of a foreign
T Q
arbitral institution, in the United States.
In 1978, the PRC Maritime Arbitration Commission and 
the Japanese Maritime Arbitration Commission signed the 
Protocol of Settling Sino-Japanese Shipping Disputes by 
Arbitration. This settlement initiated a form of joint 
arbitration for economic cases in the PRC.40 Afterwards, 
several agreements on joint mediation for dispute 
resolution have been signed between the PRC and foreign
TO , , . . .
countries. Generally speaking, joint mediation is
conducted at the request of the contracting parties and 
is carried out jointly by mediators appointed by both PRC 
and foreign arbitration agencies. The mediators from 
both sides can mediate face to face or through letter or 
telex to enable them to reach unanimous agreement.
Regarding the effectiveness of joint mediation, a 
PRC jurist Yao Yi pointed out:
39. See Pitman Potter, "Resolving Contract Disputes", The 
China Business Review, Sept. - Oct. 1984, p. 21. United 
States and the People's Republic of China Agreement on 
Trade Relations, signed on 7 July 1979 and became 
effective on 1 February 1980.
40. The author was informed of this by Song Dihuang, an 
Arbitrator and Deputy Chief of Secretariat of PRC 
Maritime Arbitration Commission, in his address for the 
Chinese Legal Practitioners' Group at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (University of London) in 
early 1993.
29. See Dominique T Wang, Supra note 9, p. 805-806.
306
Since joint mediators appointed by both parties are 
from different social, economic and legal 
backgrounds, their understanding of such disputes 
may differ and thus cause the disputes to remain 
unresolved. Moreover, as joint mediation lacks 
corresponding legal effectiveness, both parties are 
in no position to enforce the mediation agreements 
through people's courts. This is based on the 
circumstances that both parties do not perform 
voluntarily their duties laid down by the mediation 
agreements.42
However, since joint mediators are appointed by 
separate Sino-foreign arbitration agencies, they should 
be readily trusted by the parties and therefore be more 
convincing in mediation work. Furthermore, the different 
legal concepts and commercial customs of the contracting 
parties have to be considered in order to reach mediation 
agreements smoothly. Given this, the PRC had several 
agreements on joint mediation with the United States, 
Japan, France, Italy, and Germany.43 A joint mediation 
system was thereby established by 1979 in the PRC and 
since then it has been widely noted in settling "shewai" 
economic disputes.
The emerging issue is whether "shetai" economic 
disputes can be settled by such joint mediation or even 
by means of a joint arbitration system. Alongside the 
development of an economic relationship between Taiwan 
and the PRC, "shetai" economic cases in the PRC will 
probably increase considerably. According to PRC's China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), 
the PRC is willing to consult and mediate all such 
"shetai" economic disputes through various means in order
42. See Yao Yi, "Shilun Shewai Jingji Maoyi Zhengyi de 
Lianhe Tiaojie Zhidu" (Talk on Joint Mediation System 
Concerning Foreign Related Economic Disputes) , Zhongguo 
Faxue (China Legal Study), vol. 1, 1990, p. 90 et seg.
43. Supra note 41.
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to promote the Taiwan-PRC relationship.44 This can be 
compared with the existing Sino-foreign models of joint 
mediation. This potential joint mediation could be 
established by an agreement between Taiwan's SEF and 
PRC's ARATS. In these circumstances, a joint Taiwan-PRC 
Arbitration system may be expected to come into being. 
As for the details arising from such joint mediation and 
arbitration system, these can be further discussed after 
the establishment of a framework for Taiwan-PRC dispute 
resolution.
Faced with such complicated "shetai" economic and 
legal relationships, a joint mediation and arbitration 
agency particularly should be established for handling of 
"shetai" economic cases while retaining existing ways of 
settling disputes between Taiwan and the PRC. These 
"shetai" economic disputes should be interpreted in a 
broad sense so as to include all Taiwanese businesses 
trading and investing in the PRC. In other words, the 
joint mediation and arbitration agency should enjoy 
jurisdiction over all "shetai" economic cases. Its 
jurisdiction over "shetai" economic cases is envisaged as 
subject to both PRC's domestic Economic Contract Law and 
Foreign Economic Contract Law.
It is necessary to avoid the tendency of failing to 
settle disputes due to defective mediation or through the 
ineffectiveness of enforcement under the systems of joint 
mediation and arbitration. The cure for such weakness is 
to give written rulings to endow joint mediation and 
arbitration with powers to settle economic disputes.45
44. The author was informed of this by a CCPIT official 
in Beijing in May 1992 while carrying out interviews in 
the PRC.
45. Art. 36, 37 and 38 of the 1988 Arbitration Rules made 
by the China Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (FETAC) under the CCPIT, see China Economic 
News, 31 Oct. 1988, pp. 8-9; and 7 Nov. 1988. Also see 
art. 49 and 52 of the ECL, supra note 34; and art. 6, 
FECL, supra note 33.
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The written rulings should have the same effectiveness as 
if given under -the framework of the New York Convention 
(the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards) . That is to say, if one 
contracting party fails to perform its duty, the other 
party can bring a lawsuit either to the PRC trial courts 
in accordance with the PRC laws or take it to a foreign 
(including Taiwan) court which has jurisdiction in 
accordance with the New York Convention or other relevant
A f i
international conventions acceded to by the PRC.
7.4 Prospects for Signing Taiwan-PRC Agreements Related
to Commercial and Judicial Assistance
Since the PRC has not formulated any legislation 
similar to Taiwan's Mainland Relationship Statute (TMRS), 
many legal problems cannot be justly and fairly solved. 
Given this, investment protection and judicial assistance 
agreements should be concluded between Taiwan and the 
PRC. In 1992, the PRC established diplomatic relations 
with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and signed four 
relevant agreements.47 Such a concept and model is worthy 
of being carefully considered and consulted by both 
Taiwan and the PRC.
Furthermore, in early 1995, both the PRC and Taiwan 
agreed with each other to let their respective agencies, 
the ARATS and SEF exchange drafts of a proposed agreement 
on repatriation of hijackers. The two bodies even had
46. See art. 2 69, CPL, supra note 22, p. 8 69.
47. See BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts (London), 1 
October 1992. The PRC and South Korea signed on 30 
September 1992 four agreements which are the Bilateral 
Investment Protection Agreement, the Bilateral Agreement 
on the establishment of Economic, Trade and technology 
Joint Commission, the Bilateral Trade Agreement, and the 
Bilateral Agreement on Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation.
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worked out the framework of an agreement on sending back
nationals who entered each other’s territory illegally,
and an agreement on ways of dealing with fishing 
A ftdisputes. Such developments cannot be, seen as
anything less than a clear step along the road which, 
barring unforeseeable disruption, seems likely to lead 
eventually to de facto accommodation acceptable to both 
sides.
7.4.1 Investment Protection Agreement between Taiwan and 
the PRC
In addition to private law for the resolution of 
business disputes, investment protection agreements are 
stipulated by public international law for settling 
investment disputes. In order to protect the interests 
of Taiwanese businesses in the PRC, any related disputes 
need to be appropriately resolved. The models of 
investment protection agreements concluded between 
international communities can be used for reference 
regarding Taiwanese investments in the PRC. This 
investment protection agreement could well be negotiated 
and reached bv the responsible agencies such as Taiwan's 
SEF and PRC's ARATS.
Both Taiwan and the PRC should reach agreement on 
the following provisions: fair and just treatment, most
favoured treatment (not lower than the treatment enjoyed 
by investors from a third country), compensation for 
damages, protection of intellectual property rights, 
transfer or remittance of investment or profits, solution 
of claims for compensation by investors' agents and 
investment disputes, agreement on settling disputes 
between the contracting parties, and so on. In so doing,
48. Se Asian Bulletin (Taipei), Vol. 20, No. 3, March 
1995, p. 24.
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the domestic protection legislation can be remedied or 
strengthened.
7.4.2 Judicial Assistance Agreement between Taiwan and 
the PRC
The models of international judicial assistance
agreements can be adapted for Taiwan-PRC economic
relationships. The separate responsible agencies like 
SEF and ARATS can negotiate to facilitate such agreements 
between the two. This aim of this would be to give 
mutual recognition and enforcement to the court
judgements or arbitral awards of economic cases made by 
the separate trial courts or arbitration agencies of 
Taiwan and the PRC.49
7.5 Conclusions
Taiwan is the fourteenth largest trading economy in 
the world. Overall trade expanded in 1994 when exports 
reached US$93 billion and imports US$85.3 billion, up by
9.4 per cent and 10.8 per cent respectively. The trade 
surplus continued to shrink (by 4 per cent compared to 
the previous year's 17 per cent) and amounted to US$7.7
49. See Article 74 of Taiwan's Mainland Relations Statute 
(TMRS) of 1992. The author interprets it as:
Civil law judgements and civil law arbitration 
decisions rendered in the Area of Mainland China 
that do not run counter to the public order and 
moral traditions of the Area of Taiwan may be given 
recognition by a judicial ruling upon application.
The judgements or decisions given recognition by 
judicial ruling referred to in the preceding 
paragraph which involve payments may be duly 
enforced.
At present, the PRC still has no clear legislation 
governing this issue.
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billion.50 At the same time the regional distribution of 
trade and the sources of the surplus continued to tilt 
towards Asia, and the PRC in particular.
Indirect trade with the PRC, mostly via Hong Kong, 
accounted for 9.3 per cent of Taiwan's total trade in 
1994 (up from 8.54 per cent in 1993).51 Hong Kong/the 
PRC is Taiwan's fastest growing market and is soon 
expected to be Taiwan's largest export market. Taiwan 
limits the range of imports from the PRC to a list of 
basic raw materials and semi-finished goods, but the list 
is growing faster and imports from the PRC increased by 
83 per cent in 1994.52
Behind the growing indirect trade with the PRC is a 
steady flow of investments there by Taiwanese companies. 
According to a recent estimates, there are now between 
15,000 and 2 0,000 Taiwanese projects worth a total of at 
least US$12 billion.53 These were initially low
technology, labour-intensive operations that moved out of 
Taiwan in order to continue exporting to the overseas 
market, especially the United States of America. More 
recently however, the Taiwanese have poured capital into 
higher technology capital-intensive goods and services 
aimed at the domestic PRC market, and in 1994 Taiwan 
officially approved projects worth US$888 million. These 
figures may understate the full picture.54
50. All these statistics are based on data replies to a 
questionnaire used by the author from officials of 
Taiwan's Board of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs in May 1995 in Taipei.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. The author was informed of this from Taiwan's Straits 
Exchange Foundation in 1995 while carrying out interviews 
with officials there.
54. Ibid.
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As a result, Taiwan's international trade is 
becoming heavily the PRC focused, so that a growing 
portion of Taiwan's GNP is derived from business with the 
PRC. There is undoubtedly potential for foreign and 
Taiwanese companies to exploit the PRC market jointly by 
combining advanced Western technology with Taiwanese 
financial strength, and Taiwanese negotiating and 
marketing knowledge.
With reference to intricate "shetai" business 
disputes in the PRC, the TMRS should advance the views 
and solutions offered by Taiwan, and which call for a 
response by the PRC.
In "shetai" business dispute resolution, the PRC's 
existing legal system basically excludes the use of
Taiwan laws, and also rules out any possibility of 
mediation, arbitration and litigation made by courts or 
arbitral agencies located in Taiwan, far less making 
mention of recognising and enforcing their judgements or 
arbitral awards. This is discrimination against
Taiwanese businesses based on the difference separating 
them from foreign or Hong Kong and Macao businesses.
The development of an economic relationship between 
Taiwan and the PRC is based on the principles of
equality, mutual trust and benefit. Except by mutual 
recognition as independent political entities, there is
no way of properly handling "shetai" business disputes in 
the PRC. As in East-West Trade, the principles of
private international law should be respected. And only 
by using more models of various investment protection and 
judicial assistance agreements signed between 
international communities, can the Taiwan-PRC economic 
relationship be soundly improved, once agreements like 
these are in place.
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The practice of discriminating against Taiwanese 
businesses in the PRC on the basis of political 
considerations is not conducive to economic cooperation 
between the two communities. Under a framework of East- 
West trade, business dispute resolution may be 
rationalised and legalised between Taiwan and the PRC, 
though neither still recognises the other. Establishing 
a joint mediation and arbitration system can certainly 
further mutual benefits, and develop a relationship of 
total economic trust between Taiwan and the PRC. Lengthy 
political enmity should not and need not continue to be a 
hindrance to the blossoming of commercial interaction and 
economic interdependence.
Although there are few indications of the emergence 
of a legal modus vivendi, those to whom such a goal is 
dear may be justified in drawing a measure of hope from 
this study.
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APPENDIX I: Major Events Affecting Taiwan-PRC Economic 
Relations since 1949.*
Year Taiwan PRC
1949 Retreat of the Nationalist 
government to Taiwan.
Establishment of the 
People's Republic of 
China.
Military attack on 
Jinmen.
1950 Announcement of decision 
for reconquest of mainland.
U.S. Seventh Fleet in 
Taiwan Straits and U.S. 
military and economic 
aid to Taiwan.
1954 Mutual defense agreement 
with the U.S.
Artillery "bombardment 
Jinmen.
1955 Announcement of 
desire for peaceful 
liberation of Taiwan.
1957 Announcement of 
conditions for 
peaceful settlement 
with Taiwan.
1958 Artillery bombardment 
of Jinmen.
1962 Emphasis on reconquest of 
the mainland by plitical 
means.
1971 Loss of United Nations 
seat.
Admission to the 
United Nations.
1972 Shanghai Communique 
with the U.S.
1978 Government regulations 
stipulate that, except for 
Chinese medicinal herbs 
and industrial materials 
imported through Hong
Liberation of Taiwan 
included in 
constitution.
Call for trade
* This is based on replies to a questionnairs used by 
the author, and on other data collected by him in the 
course of fieldwork in China and Taiwan (1992, 1994).
Interviews were conducted in Mandarin, and subsequent 
compilation, editing, and translations were also by him.
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Year Taiwan PRC
(continued)
Kong, all other goods 
from the mainland will 
be confiscated by 
customs officials.
1979 Termination of mutual 
defence agreement with 
the U.S.
Government announces 
"Three-No policy"
(No contact, no 
negotiation, and no 
compromise); direct trade 
with the mainland is 
forbidden.
with Taiwan.
Establishment of 
diplomatic relations 
with the U.S.
Artillery bombardment 
of Jinmen stopped.
Call for three links 
(mail, transport, 
trade) and four 
exchanges (economic, 
cultural, technical, 
sport) with Taiwan.
The Government 
proclaims the 
Temporary Regulations 
Governing Developing 
Trade Relations with 
Taiwan.
1980 The Government 
promulgates the 
Supplementary 
Regulations Governing 
Taiwan Products, 
ruling that no tariff 
is applicable if the 
certificate of 
origion indicates 
that goods are 
imported from Taiwan. 
In addition, the 
purchase of daily-use 
articles from Taiwan 
is encouraged; 
purchase orders of 
goods from Taiwan are 
given priority.
1981 Non-tariff rule on 
Taiwan goods is 
cancelled and 
replaced by an 
adjusted tariff.
An favourable
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Year Taiwan PRC
(continued)
1981
discount for Taiwan 
orders is also 
cancelled, but 
exports to Taiwan and 
trade with fishermen 
at sea are 
encouraged.
Announcement of the 
measures for peaceful 
reunification with 
Taiwan, also known as 
Ye Jianying's 
"Nine-point" 
Proposals, suggests 
working with Taiwan 
to reach a consensus 
on direct links; 
cross-Straits 
visits with 
relatives; and 
cross-Straits travel 
and academic, 
cultural, and 
sports exchanges.
1982 The Government 
proposes
"One country, two 
systems" for dealing 
with Taiwan.
Imports from Taiwan 
require permit issued 
by Taiwan Working 
Group, at all levels 
of Taiwan Affairs 
Office.
1983 The State Council 
procliams the Special 
Favourable
Regulations Governing 
Taiwan Investment in 
the Four Special 
Economic Zones. These 
are later extended to 
include Hainan.
1984 Restrictions are relaxed 
on mainland products 
imported through Hong Kong 
and Macao. Private sector 
trade with the mainland via 
intermediaries is allowed.
Preferential 
treatment for Taiwan 
traders.
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Year Taiwan PRC
(continued)
1985 Three principles concerning 
trade with the mainland 
through Hong Kong and Macao 
are announced: direct trade 
with the mainland is
198 5 prohibited; manufacturers 
cannot have direct contact 
with any mainland parties; 
the government will not 
intervene in trade with the 
mainland conducted via a 
third country.
Purchase of consumer 
goods from Taiwan is 
restricted. Taiwan 
products must be 
centralised in and
imported via Fujian 
or Hainan; no other 
provinces are allowed 
to import from 
Taiwan. This measure 
is later relaxed, 
mainly on electrical 
appliances and 
textile articles.
All economic and 
trade agencies on 
the provincial and 
municipal levels 
are instructed to 
obtain approval 
before importing 
Taiwanese products.
1987 Repeal of martial law.
Restrictions on visits 
to the mainland are relaxed,
Restrictions are lifted on 
the indirect important of 
twenty-nine categories of 
agricultural and industrial 
materials form the mainland,
Import/export permit 
system introduced by 
the State Council. 
Permit must be 
authorised by 
the Ministry of 
Economic Relations 
and Trade (MOFERT) 
which is responsible 
for overall trade 
development with 
Taiwan. Other state 
agencies and the 
private sector are 
restricted from 
setting up trade 
agencies handling 
business with Taiwan.
1988 The 13th National Congress 
of the KMT (Kuomintang) 
approves a mainland policy 
for the current phase of 
relations, emphasising 
people-to-people contacts, 
indirect trade, gradual 
progress in relations, and 
maintaining Taiwan’s 
security.
The State Council 
announces the 
Provisions for 
Encouraging Taiwanese 
Investment.
Xiamen, Fujian, 
issue preferential 
policies for Taiwan
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Year Taiwan PRC
(continued)
The Executive Yuan sets up 
the Mainland Afairs Task 
Force, convened by the vice 
premier.
1988 The Ministry of Economic
Affairs (MOEA) announces the 
Principles for Dealing with 
Indirect Importation of 
Mainland Products and issues 
a List of Items Allowed 
for Indirect Importation 
From the Mainland (a total 
of fifty items).
The Board of Foreign Trade, 
MOEA, promulgates the 
Important Points for 
Precautionary Measures 
Concerning Indirect 
Importation of Mainland 
Goods.
The customs office assumes 
full responsibility for 
dealing with illegal imports 
from the mainland. Minor 
violators are no longer 
punished, but the goods are 
refused entry.
investment.
MOFERT adds the 
Department of 
Economic Relations
and Trade with Taiwan 
which being in charge 
of policymaking 
concerning trade and 
economic relations 
with Taiwan. This 
tightens control on 
policies in regard to 
trade with Taiwan.
1989 Forty more items are added
to the List of Items Allowed 
for Indirect Importation 
From the mainland.
MOEA announces the 
Regulations Governing 
Mainland Goods which can 
be imported only if they 
do not endanger national 
security, have no negative 
effect on related 
industries, and help make 
export products more 
competitive.
The State Council 
announces new 
measures concerning 
Taiwanese investment 
in the mainland, 
offering favourable 
conditions to Taiwan.
The State Council 
approves the Fujian 
Province report on 
setting up Taiwan 
Investors1 Districts. 
There are four such 
districts in Fujian 
Province. Several 
others are planned in 
Guangdong and Hainan. 
MOFERT restricts the 
number of traders
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Year Taiwan PRC
(continued)
1990 Another sixty-five items 
are added to the List of 
goods that can be imported 
from the mainland.
The Regulations Governing 
Indirect Export to the 
Mainland Area are announced 
by MOEA.
The Regulations Governing 
Indirect Investment and 
Technical Cooperation in 
the mainland are announced 
by MOEA.
Manufacturers of 3,353 items 
(in sixty-seven categories) 
are allowed to invest in the 
mainland or to establish 
technical cooperation.
The National Reunification 
Council, a non-partisan 
board, is established by 
the president in drawing up 
fundamental guidelines for 
national reunification.
The Government approves the 
Statute Governing Relations 
Between People of the Areas 
of Taiwan and the Mainland 
(Taiwan's Mainland 
Relationship Statute, or the 
TMRS).
specialising in 
importing Taiwanese 
goods to sixty-eight. 
There is no 
limitation on export 
traders.
The Foreign Trade 
Administration under 
MOFERT announces a 
new measure that 
offers Taiwanese 
investors favourable 
treatment in taxation 
and investment 
categories; it also 
encourages land 
investment and 
development.
At the Working 
Conference on Taiwan 
Affairs, President 
Yang Shangkun 
suggests that 
cross-Straits 
relations should 
focus on economic 
and trade exchange 
to promote political 
development, using 
people-to-people 
contact to promote 
official contact, and 
gear the development 
of cross-Straits. 
relations toward 
reunification of the 
nation.
1991 The Mainland Affairs
Council, a formal agency 
under the Executive Yuan, is 
set up for overall planning, 
coordination, and evaluation 
of government policy toward 
the mainland.
Another nine items are added 
to the list of items allowed
MOFERT proposes five 
principles to enhance 
cross-Straits 
exchanges: exchange 
should be direct and 
two-way; be mutually 
beneficial; take 
various forms; be 
long-term and stable; 
and respect contracts
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(continued)
for indirect importation 
from the mainland. The 
number of items allowed for 
investment in the mainland 
or for technical cooperation 
is increased to 3,679.
and the spirit of 
justice.
The Association for 
Relations Across the 
Taiwan Straits is set 
up to counter
1991 A semi-official Straits Taiwan's Straits
Exchange Foundation is set Exchange Foundation.
up to handle those technical
and business relations with
the mainland that might
involve the government
authority but would be
inappropriate for the
government to handle directly
under its policy of no
official contact with the
mainland authorities.
The end of the Period of 
National Mobilisation for 
Suppression of the 
Communist Rebellion is 
announced by the president.
Foreign-based Taiwan fishing 
boats are allowed to hire 
mainland crew members, but 
non-Taiwanese crew are not 
allowed to make up more than 
one-third of the total. The 
mainland crew are not allowed 
to disembark in Taiwan.
1992 The Regulations Governing 
Mainland Goods are revised 
and promulgated. The 
Important Points for 
Precautionary Measures 
Concerning the Indirect 
Importation of Mainland 
Goods are repealed.
TMRS becomes effective.
In further relaxation 
of mainland trade and 
investment restrictions, 
the Mainland Affairs 
Council removes over 
300 restrictions on 
private contacts with
The Regulations 
Governing Chinese 
Citizens Travelling 
Between Taiwan and 
the Mainland are 
announced.
Pingtan island of 
Fujian Province is 
established as the 
mainland's first 
special district for 
trade cooperation 
with Taiwan.
The Government allows 
foreign businesses to 
invest in service
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(continued
the mainland.
The MOEA lifts the ban on 
exports to the mainland 
by state-owned firms in 
various industry sectors. 
Companies are allowed to 
apply for copyright and
1992 trademark protction in the 
mainland.
The Mainland Affairs Council 
approves the first group 
group of service industries 
(158 categories) planning 
to invest in the 
mainland.
industries and the 
domestic market, 
opening up a broader 
range of categories 
for Taiwanese 
investment.
199 3 The Regulations Governing 
the Entry of Mainland 
People Into Taiwan are 
announced.
The Regulations Governing 
Investment and Technical 
Cooperation in the 
mainland become effective. 
The former Regulations 
Governing Indirect 
Investment and Technical 
Cooperation in the Mainland 
are repealed.
The Straits Exchange 
Foundation meets with its 
mainland counterpart, the 
Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Straits 
in Singapore for the 
historic "Koo-Wang" talks 
on economic exchange.
The Government announces 
the Regulations Governing 
the Introduction of 
Technology From the 
Mainland.
The Regulations Governing 
Trade between Taiwan and 
the Mainland Area are 
promulgated, replacing the 
Regulations Governing
The Association for 
Relations Across the 
Taiwan Straits meets 
with Taiwan's Straits 
Exchange Foundation 
in Singapore for the 
historic "Koo-Wang" 
talks on mutual 
economic exchange.
The Government 
proclaims the 
Regulations Governing 
Small-scale Trade 
Between Taiwan and 
the Mainland, which 
covers trade 
conducted by fishing 
boats.
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Indirect Export to the 
Mainland Area and the 
Regulations Governing 
Mainland Goods.
The Regulations Governing 
Taiwan Residents Entering 
the Mainland Area are 
announced.
1993 The Rules Governing
Indirect Remittances to 
the Mainland are 
promulgated: business 
remittances to the mainland 
no longer have to disguised 
as personal remittances.
1994 The Mainland Affairs 
Affairs Council eases 
restrictions on the 
immigration of mainland 
people with experience in 
industry or commerce to 
stay in Taiwan for a period 
of time to work.
The Law on the 
Protection of 
Taiwan Compatriots' 
Investment is 
promulgated, 
upgrading the former 
Provisions for 
Encouraging Taiwanese 
Investment of 1988.
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APPENDIX II: A. Taiwan-PRC Indirect Trade since 1979
(Unit: U.S.$ million)
Year PRC imports PRC exports PRC trade
from Taiwan to Taiwan balance
via Hong Kong via Hong Kong with Taiwan
1979 21 56 35
1983 158 90 -68
1984 425 128 -297
1985 987 116 -871
1986 811 144 -667
1987 1,227 289 -938
1988 2, 242 479 -1,764
1989 2,896 587 -2,310
1990 3 , 278 765 -2,513
1991 4, 667 1,126 -3,541
1992 6,288 1,119 -5,169
1993 7, 585 1,103 -6,482
1994 8,517 1, 293 -7,224
Source: Statistics Office of Hong Kong (April 1995)
B. Major 
(Unit
Year
Foreign Investment in 
: U.S.$ million)
Hong Kong U.S.A.
the PRC 
Japan
: since 1979 
Taiwan
*
Total
1979-84 6, 490 1, 070 1,150 — 10,320
1985 4, 130 1, 150 470 - 6,330
1986 1, 440 530 210 - 2,830
1987 1, 950 340 300 100 3,730
1988 3,470 370 280 420 5,300
1989 3 , 160 640 440 520 5, 600
1990 3 , 680 360 460 990 6, 600
1991 6, 830 550 810 1, 400 11,980
1992 41,130 3,170 3 , 320 5, 550 57,510
1993 39,250 - - 5, 200 57,500
1979-93 111,530 8,130 7,440 14,180 167,680
Percentage
of total : 66.51 4.85 4.44 8.46 100.00
Source: Zhongguo Dui Wai Jingji Maoyi Nianjian (Almanac
of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade),
1994.
The above figures do not include several other sources, 
e.g.- Europe, South Korea, and Singapore. It is noted that 
a significant portion of Hong Kong investment to the PRC 
is generally believed to be from Taiwan. See Zhong Qin, 
"Liangan Jingmao Jiaoliu", Economic Outlook (Taipei), 
Vol. 33, 10 January 1994.
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APPENDIX III:
Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection 
of Taiwan Compatriots' Investment (Adopted by the sixth 
Session of the Standing Committee of the eighth National 
People's Congress on 5 March 1994)
Article 1
This law is enacted to protect and encourage Taiwan 
compatriots' investment and to promote economic 
development on both the mainland and Taiwan.
Article 2
This law applies to investment made by Taiwan 
compatriots. For matters involving Taiwan compatriots' 
investment that have not been stipulated in this law but 
in other related State laws or administrative 
regulations, stipulations in the latter shall apply.
Article 3
The State shall protect by law the investment of 
Taiwan investors, the return from their investment, and 
their other lawful rights and interests.
In making investment, Taiwan compatriots shall abide 
by State laws and regulations.
Article 4
The State shall not nationalise or expropriate the 
investment of Taiwan investors. Under special
circumstances, according to the need of public interest, 
the investment of Taiwan investors could be expropriated 
according to legal procedure with a due remuneration.
Article 5
According to law, the invested property, industrial 
right, returns from investment, and other lawful rights 
and interests of Taiwan investors can be transferred or 
inherited.
Article 6
Taiwan investors can make investment in convertible 
currency, machinery, equipment or other objects, or
industrial right, or non-patent technology.
They can re-invest the profits from their
investment.
*. Reprinted from China Economic News (No. 11) 21 March
1994, pp. 6-7.
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Article 7
Taiwan investors can establish equity joint
ventures, contractual joint ventures, or business solely
funded by themselves (hereinafter referred to as "Taiwan 
investment businesses"). They can also adopt other ways 
of investment provided for by laws and administrative 
regulations.
The establishment of Taiwan investment businesses 
should conform to the State’s industrial policies and be 
favourable to the development of the national economy.
Article 8
To establish a Taiwan investment business, the
investor should apply to the department or local people's 
government as designated by the State Council. The
approval office shall approve or disapprove the 
application within forty five days beginning from the day 
it receives all the application documents.
The applicant should, within thirty days, go to the 
business registration office to get registered and obtain 
a business license beginning from the day he(she) 
receives the approval certificate.
Article 9
Taiwan investment businesses should operate and 
manage according to laws and administrative regulations, 
as well as to the contracts and articles of association 
approved by the approval office. The businesses shall
have full self-decision power for operation and
management without any interference.
Article 10
In areas where Taiwan investment businesses are 
concentrated, associations of Taiwan investment 
businesses can be organised according to law, whose 
lawful rights and interests shall be protected by law.
Article 11
Profits from investment, other lawful income and 
funds gained by Taiwan investors, can be repatriated to 
Taiwan or other places beyond the mainland after
clearance.
Article 12
Taiwan investors can entrust relatives or friends as 
their agents.
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Article 13
Taiwan investment businesses shall enjoy 
preferential treatment according to related provisions of 
the State Council that encourage Taiwan compatriots to 
make investment.
Article 14
If disputes arise between Taiwan investors and 
companies, businesses, other economic organisations, or 
individuals in other provinces, autonomous regions, or 
municipalities directly under the Central Government, the 
parties concerned can resolve their disputes through 
consultation or mediation.
If the parties concerned refuse consultation or 
mediation, or if the consultation or mediation fails, 
they can submit the issue to the arbitral authority 
according to the arbitration clause in the contract or to 
written arbitral agreements if any.
If there are neither any arbitration clauses laid 
down in the contract nor a written arbitral agreement 
reached, they can bring the matter before the people's 
court.
Article 15
This law shall take effect on the day it is 
promulgated.
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APPENDIX IV:
The Statute Governing Relations Between People of the 
Areas of Taiwan and Mainland China (Passed by the 
Legislative Yuan, the Republic of China on Taiwan, in 
July 1992 and came into force with its implementing on 18 
September 1992)
Taiwan passed the above-stated landmark law which 
paves the way for Taiwan to expand economic and political 
links with the PRC. The Statute provides for Taiwan and 
the PRC to set up representative offices in each other's 
capitals for the first time since 1949. In terms of 
commercial activities that have rapidly flourished across 
the Taiwan Straits, this Statute is noteworthy for its 
potential impact on at least the following dimensions:
1. Individuals, legal persons, organisations or other 
institutions in Taiwan are required to obtain government 
permission before making investments, or entering into 
any technical cooperation projects, or conducting trade 
or other commercial activities with a counterpart in the 
PRC. The relevant regulations have been proposed by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Executive Yuan for 
enactment.
We note that the Ministry has, for expedient reasons, 
already taken up certain administrative measures even 
before promulgation of the Statute to screen 
manufacturing industries for investments in the PRC. 
For example, in August 1992, the Executive Yuan's
Mainland Affairs Commission also gave the go-ahead to ten 
categories of service industries for indirect investment 
in the PRC.
2. Those who have participated in trade with the PRC 
before the Statute came in force without obtaining proper 
approval should apply for permission within three months 
after the permission regulations are announced; 
otherwise, they face a fine ranging from NT$3,000,000 up 
to NT$10,000,000.
3. Banking and insurance institutions in Taiwan as well 
as their off-shore branches should also obtain government 
permission before they engage in direct business 
transactions with persons or entities in the PRC or their 
off-shore branches. The permission regulations will be 
drafted by the Ministry of Finance and finalized by the 
Executive Yuan.
*. The above is edited and abridged by the author. For an 
English translated text of this Statute, see Ada Koon 
Hang Tse, "The Emerging Legal Framework for Regulating 
Economic Relations Between Taiwan and the Mainland", 
Journal of Chinese Law (New York: Columbia Law School,
Fall 1992), Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 179-210.
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Any direct business relationship formed without 
prior permission will endanger the individual decision 
maker with criminal liability carrying a jail sentence up 
to three years, detention and/or fine ranging from 
NT$1,000,000 up to NT$15,000, 000, with the juridical pe 
rson whom such individual represents facing a fine of the 
same amount.
4. Individuals, legal persons, organisations and other 
institutions in Taiwan should obtain prior government 
permission to become members of or take positions in any 
legal persons, organisations or other institutions in the 
PRC, or to jointly establish or enter into 
alliance/affiliation with such entities. The permission 
regulations will be set out by the Executive Yuan.
As is widely known, quite a number of enterprises or 
firms in Taiwan have invested (including joint ventures) 
in the PRC and despatched personnel thereto before the 
promulgation of the Statute. Any individuals, legal 
persons, organisations or institutions involved in 
investment activities in such a fashion need to apply for 
permission within three months after the permission 
regulations take effect; otherwise, they will be subject 
to a fine ranging from NT$100,000 up to NT$500,000.
5. Applications for recognition of corporate status 
submitted by a foreign company in which more than 20% of 
the shares are held by individuals, legal persons, 
organisations or institutions in the PRC may be denied; 
or the granted recognition be recalled, as the case may 
be. The same rule applies where the controlling 
shareholder of a foreign company is an individual or a 
juridical person, organisation or institution in the PRC.
On the other hand, individual, legal persons, 
organisations and other institutions in the PRC need to 
obtain prior government permission to become members of 
or take positions in any legal persons, organisations or 
institutions in Taiwan. Overseas Chinese or foreign 
nationals who have either made or plan to make 
investments in Taiwan are cautioned to pay special 
attention to this provision.
6. A judgement or arbitral award made in the PRC may be 
submitted to the court in Taiwan for judicial recognition 
and enforcement if not contrary to the public order or 
good morals of Taiwan.
7. Individuals in the PRC may be hired to work in 
Taiwan, provided that prior permission obtained and their 
employment terms cannot exceed one year and they cannot 
change their job or employment. The provisions set forth 
in the Labour Standards Law relating to the fixed-term 
contracts shall apply to their employment.
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8. The term "individuals in Taiwan" refers to those who 
maintain household registration in Taiwan, whereas the 
term "individuals in Mainland China" means those who 
maintain household registration in the PRC or who come 
from Taiwan and continuously reside in the PRC for a 
period exceeding four years. By this definition, foreign 
nationals or overseas Chinese who do not maintain 
household registration in Taiwan or the PRC will not be 
subject to the jurisdiction of this Statute.
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